Bill Goodwine's Wiki - User contributions [en]

901444263: Quanta v. LGE Reply Brief of Petitioners

2011-04-29T04:14:09Z

901444263: Created page with "Reply Brief of Petitioners •Respondent (LGE) claims ability to places limits on license to make and sell is the same as the right to limit how petitioner (Quanta) uses the goo..."

Reply Brief of Petitioners

•Respondent (LGE) claims ability to places limits on license to make and sell is the same as the right to limit how petitioner (Quanta) uses the goods they have purchased, but it is not the same

•In Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., the Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. case was overturned which stated a buyer’s right to use a patented good can be limited or defeated if the patent owner specifies restrictions in the license to use or resell the goods

•Respondent says patentees can authorize licensee to make sales subject to certain restrictions and sue for infringement if the restrictions aren’t met

•License can have restrictions but a sale can’t, and a sale exhausts a patent

•Patentee can’t authorize licensee to sell product without exhausting the patent

•Licenses cannot expand patent rights

•When patentee or licensee sells a product he loses the right to restrict the use of that product

•No distinction between patentee sales and licensee sales when it comes to exhaustion. Both exhaust the patent.

•When patentee sells the patented good, the good is freed from the patent monopoly

•This case is controlled by Univis Lens case because the sales were authorized the Intel’s license

•Univis Lens case held that any noticed restrictions on the use of sold goods are unenforceable because of patent exhaustion

•Respondents and Federal Circuit court believe patentees should be able to impose restrictions on the resale of goods already sold by the patentee, subject only to antitrust laws

•Respondent believes method claims are exempt from patent exhaustion because a method cannot be sold but if this were the case then everyone would make claims method claims so their patent could never be exhausted which would defeat the purpose of the patent system

901444263:Quanta v. LGE Reply Brief of Petitioners

2011-04-29T04:12:59Z

Homeworks

2011-04-29T04:11:54Z

901444263:

== Due Jan. 24 ==

[[Selected Patent]]

== Due Jan. 28 ==

[[Description of References]]

[[Hotchkiss Analysis]]

[[A.&P. Analysis]]

[[Lyon Analysis]]

== Due Feb. 4 ==

[[Obvious Analysis]]

[[Non-Obvious Analysis]]

== Due Feb. 9==
[[Nonobviousness Outline]]

== Due March 23 ==
[[Toro Company v. Scag Power Equipment, Inc.]]

== Due April 4 ==
[[Honeywell Brief]]

== Due April 29 ==
[[901444263:Quanta v. LGE Reply Brief of Petitioners]]

Here in list of arguments in Quanta

2011-04-29T04:11:20Z

901444263:

Post a link to your summary of the brief you read here.

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901330223]]

[[901349446 Quanta Brief]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901471466]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901422128]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary Jacob Marmolejo]]

[[Homework 8 (due Friday 28)~jnosal | Quanta Brief Summary 901438174]]

[[Mitros: Quanta Brief]]

[[Zahm Homework 31: Quanta Brief]]

[[901419437 Quanta v. LGE Brief Summary]]

[[Quanta Brief 901437068]]

[[901281608: Quanta Brief]]

[[901444263: Quanta v. LGE Reply Brief of Petitioners]]

Quanta v. LGE Reply Brief of Petitioners

2011-04-29T04:10:12Z

Homeworks

2011-04-29T04:08:47Z

901444263:

Honeywell Brief

2011-04-02T17:53:59Z

901444263: Created page with "Honeywell vs. Hamilton Sundstrand, Honeywell Brief When obtaining a patent for an invention to control airflow surge in auxiliary power units (APUs), Honeywell removed some of ..."

Honeywell vs. Hamilton Sundstrand, Honeywell Brief

When obtaining a patent for an invention to control airflow surge in auxiliary power units (APUs), Honeywell removed some of their independent claims and changed the dependent claims into independent claims during patent prosecution. Honeywell concedes that any subject matter surrendered during patent prosecution cannot be used under the doctrine of equivalents to claim infringement. Rewriting the claims from dependent to independent form and deleting the independent claims creates an assumption of prosecution history estoppel. In order to remove this assumption, Honeywell must prove that the alleged equivalent was unforeseeable during patent prosecution or the reason for the changes in the claims only had a tangential relation to the equivalent.

The definition of unforeseeable should be an invention or modification that someone of ordinary skill in the subject matter could not have created at the time of the patent prosecution. Hamilton did not create their APU system with the guide vanes until the time period between 1991 and 1995. The patent prosecution occurred during 1982 and 1983. This means it took about four years for Hamilton to come up with their equivalent almost ten years after Honeywell obtained their patent. This means the equivalent was unforeseeable if it took that long to create the equivalent. The inventors at Hamilton were obviously possessed of at least ordinary skill in the subject matter, and they were unable to create the equivalent until nearly ten years after the patent prosecution occurred.

The guide vanes (IGVs) were not part of the amended claims during patent prosecution. In fact, nothing in the record shows that the IGVs were narrowed in any way. Because of this, there should be no estoppel on the IGV claims, since there was no amendment to the claims. Estoppel only applies to subject matter excluded from amended claims. As stated in the dissenting opinion from the CAFC, “Cancelling an independent claim is not an estoppel-generating act as to elements whose scope was not amended or otherwise restricted during prosecution.” Clearly estoppel has been incorrectly applied to the Honeywell claims, so the doctrine of equivalents should be applicable in this situation.

In order to state that the changes in claims had only a tangential relationship to the equivalent, the narrowing of the claims had to not have been directly related to the equivalent. In Festo IX, “whether an amendment was merely tangential to an alleged equivalent necessarily requires focus on the context in which the amendment was made…” In this case, all the record shows is that the patent examiner simply stated that the dependent claims were allowed if they were rewritten into independent form. This is not enough information about the context in which the amendment was made to properly determine the nature of the relationship of the claim changes to the equivalent. Therefore, there is still a chance that the assumption of prosecution history estoppel could be removed based on the tangential relationship between the claim changes and the equivalent.

Overall, the assumption of prosecution history estoppel should be removed. This can be done in two ways: proving the equivalent was unforeseeable during patent prosecution, and proving a tangential relationship between the claim amendments and the equivalent. The equivalent was clearly unforeseeable at the time of patent prosecution because Hamilton did not create their equivalent until nearly ten years after the Honeywell patent was prosecuted. Not enough information about the context of the claim amendments has been gathered, so there could still be a tangential relationship between the claim amendments and the equivalent. Also, the guide vanes should not be included in the estoppel because they were not part of the amended claims.

Homeworks

2011-04-02T17:53:04Z

901444263:

Doctrine of Equivalents Case List

2011-04-01T22:03:51Z

901444263:

Add your case to the list with a one-paragraph (approximately 250 words) summary of the facts at issues, i.e., "an umbrella is or is not equivalent to a parasol because..."

Please put the cases in chronological order. If two are from the same year, then put them in alphabetical order. Also put your name, your login name or NDID number with your case. Use the following for a template.

* Goodwine v. Batill, 123 US 4567 (1066)
This case concerned a patent for an iPad and the patentee sued the maker of an iPod for infringement. The important part of the claim was "a device for playing music and other media comprising a touch screen..." The court held that iPod infringed the iPad patent because the ... was equivalent to the ... because ...

Bill Goodwine

*AMEC Liquidating Trust v. IVAC Corporation, 885 F.2d 1574 (1989)

AMEC had a patent for a thermometer with a plastic cover held on by a hooking type mechanism. IVAC created a thermometer with a cover held on by a ring that created a friction lock. The CAFC held the IVAC invention was non-infringing on the AMEC patent because under the doctrine of equivalents, it did not perform the same function in the same way. The AMEC thermometer cover used an inscription fit, which created deep scratches in the cover. The IVAC thermometer used a friction fit, which only created superficial scratches in the cover. The CAFC found that the superficial scratches did not constitute an inscription fit. Also, the CAFC decided that AMEC did not present any evidence proving that the ring in the IVAC patent was equivalent to the “hook” in the AMEC patent. Because of this, the patent was non-infringing under the doctrine of equivalents.

901444263

*Hale Propeller, L.L.C. v Ryan Marine Products Pty., LTD., et al, 151 F. Supp .2d 183 (2001) Connecticut District Court
Ryan owned patent 4411073, issued on 25 October 1983, which concerned devices to measure the pitch of propeller blades. Ryan originally filed the claim on 13 July 1981 it was rejected and then ammended on 4 October 1982. Hale's device called the "Hale Propeller MRI" was developed in 1997. In question are claims 1(b),(c),(f), and 6. A third party, Michigan Wheel Corporation, a distributor of Hale's invention filed for patent invalidity. The important differences between Hale's and Ryan's device are that Hale's does not use gears or worm-drives to rotate the blade and the device does not give direct readouts of the measurements using electric circuits. The issue with claim 1(b) was if a roller was a necessary part of the structure because it prevents skipping of the probe making the measurements more accurate. The court used means-plus-function to rule that the roller was important and Hale did not infringe. The issue with claim 1(c) deals with whether a worm or gear drive is necessary to rotate the blade. Ryan's patent discloses a hand-cranked device, like Hales, but includes a worm-drive. Part of Ryan's ammendment to his claim was to include worm gear to the hand-cranking device and therefore the court used prosecution history estoppel to make their decision because Ryan forfeited that claim (hand-cranked device without worm-drive) in order to get the patent and therefore cannot use doctrine of equivalents to get the claim back. The issue of claim 1(f) was whether the computer in the claim was a special computer needed for the readouts. The court ruled that the claim was not that narrow, but then the court ruled that claim 6 dealt with a computer that receives measurement data from the optical encoder and therefore Hale did not infringe. The patent was also ruled valid using the roller and worm drive to prove that it was non-obvious §103, definitively disclosed §112, and not anticipated by prior art §102(b).

Gillian Allsup

*Next case here...
901281608

*Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc. Nos. 2010-1145, 2010-117. (2001) United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit

This case began as an infringement lawsuit by Siemens Medical Solutions USA, inc. against Saint-Gobain Ceramics and Plastics, Inc. for the alleged infringement of a patent held by Siemens for a scintillator, a part of an x-ray machine that detects radiation. Saint-Gobain owned a patent for a similar device and the circuit court found that this patent infringed on the patent held by Siemens, which was filed earlier. Though the doctrine of equivalents was used to rule infringement, Saint-Gobain was found to have accidentally, rather than willfully infringed and Siemens was awarded 52.3 million dollars.

Siemens filed for patent number 4,958,080 on August 4, 1989. This patent was for a scintillator containing cerium-doped- lutetium oxyorthosilicate. This is a component of a radiation detector that absorbs gamma-ray photons from an x-ray machine and converts them to visible light so the results can be interpreted. Saint-Gobain also produces scintillators, filing patent number 6,6424,420 in 2000 for a cerium-doped lutetium-yttrium orthosilicate. The chemical composition differs from that of the Siemens' patent as %10 of the lutetium is substituted for yttrium. These scintillators were sold by Saint-Gobain to Philips Medical Systems, a competitor of Siemens. The circuit court found that the composition of Saint-Gobain's scintillator preformed largely the same function in the same manner as Siemens' patent, and therefore was infringement under the doctrine of equivalence.

Saint-Gobain filed a motion for a new trail, on the basis that the jury was not told that infringement by the doctrine of equivalence must be proved by clear evidence and argued that damages should be remitted. The Federal Appeals Court did not grant Saint-Gobain a new trial, but did reduces the damages to 44 million.

*
*
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Toro Company v. Scag Power Equipment, Inc.

2011-03-22T20:36:08Z

901444263: Created page with "Toro Co. v. SCAG Power Equipment, Inc., No. 8:01-CV-279. This case was tried in the United States District Court in Nebraska in 2003. The defendent, Scag, filed for summary judg..."

Toro Co. v. SCAG Power Equipment, Inc., No. 8:01-CV-279.

This case was tried in the United States District Court in Nebraska in 2003. The defendent, Scag, filed for summary judgment claiming that Toro engaged in inequitable conduct by purposefully withholding prior art from the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) when applying for three of their patents ('863,'475, and '961). Both of these companies manufactured lawnmowers. For the '863 patent, Scag claimed Toro presented as prior art a brochure known as the "12/96" brochure for a Walker Manufacturing Company lawnmower, which does not count as prior art since the patent application was filed on Nov. 16, 1995. Toro claimed this brochure was only received in 12/96. The court held that the patent examiner is responsible for verifying the publication dates of prior art references, and the defendents did not sufficiently demonstrate intent by the plaintiff to deceive the patent examiner so the motion for summary judgement for the defendent was denied. For the '475 patent, Scag claims that Toro purposefully did not disclose a Scag lawnmower as prior art. Toro stated that they did present the Scag lawnmower as prior art, but it did not pertain to the '475 invention. The court held that Toro was not responsible for how much weight the patent examiner placed on the Scag lawnmower as prior art, and it held that the defendent once again failed to show intent by Toro to deceive the patent examiner, so Scag's motion for summary judgment was denied. For the '961 patent, Scag claimed Toro failed to disclose another Scag lawnmower as prior art and Toro's lawyer's refusal to submit a deposition about his disclosing of the prior art show an intent to deceive the patent examiner. Toro claimed they did disclose the Scag lawnmower in a drawing on the '961 patent. The court held that the lawyer did not have to submit a deposition because of lawyer-client confidentiality and that the drawing in the '961 patent was a sufficient disclosure of the Scag prior art. Once again, Scag's motion for summary judgement on Toro's inequitable conduct defenses was denied based on a failure to show intent by Toro to deceive the PTO.

Homeworks

2011-03-22T20:20:25Z

901444263:

Bilski brief list

2011-02-14T04:01:18Z

901444263:

Choose one of the briefs from this list. Delete it and replace it with your login name. Please be careful editing this page. If you mess up all the formatting it will create work for your colleagues.

#Reply Brief for Petitioners (Oct. 26, 2009)
#jpotter2
#Adam T. Letcher
#Craigkrzyskowski
#dcarter2
#ebingle
#Rabot
#Eric Paul
#cnorton
#Brief For Amicus Curiae Computer & Communications Industry Association in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Jnosal
#Brief of Amici Curiae Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, IP Justice, and Four Global Software Professionals and Business Leaders in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Brief for Free Software Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#eguilbea
#901444263
#Brief of Entrepreneurial and Consumer Advocates Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of the Respondent, Submitted on Behalf of Adamas Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Tethys Bioscience, Inc. (Oct. 2, 2009)
#KyleR
#Andy Stulc
#Brief for Amicus Curiae Mark Landesmann in Support of Affirmance (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Amicus Curiae Brief of Center for Advanced Study and Research in Intellectual Property (CASRIP) of the University of Washington School of Law, and of CASRIP Research Affiliate Scholars, in Support of Affirmance of the Judgment in Favor of Respondent (Oct. 1, 2009)
#Kevin Godshall
#Amici Curiae Brief of Internet Retailers in Support of Respondent (Oct. 1, 2009)
#Brief for the Respondent (Sep. 25, 2009)
#Brief of the Intellectual Property Section of the Nevada State Bar, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Sep. 25, 2009)
#Brobins
#Josh Bradley
#Brief of Amici Curiae Entrepreneurial Software Companies in Support of Petitioner (Aug. 6, 2009)
#E W Hitchler
#Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amici Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization, Advanced Medical Technology Association, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation & The Regents of the University of California in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Mzahm
#Brief of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Hamburgler
#Brief of F%21ed%21eration Internationale Des Conseils En Propri%21et%21e Industrielle as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professor Kevin Emerson Collins in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Legal OnRamp in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae John Sutton in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Novartis Corporation Supporting Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief Amicus Curiae of The Federal Circuit Bar Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Regulatory Datacorp, Inc, American Express Company, Palm Inc., Rockwell Automation, Inc., and SAP America, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Double Rock Corporation, Island Intellectual Property LLC, LIDs Capital LLC, Intrasweep LLC, Access Control Advantage, Inc., Ecomp Consultants, Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, Rearden Capital Corporation, Craig Mowry and PCT Capital LLC as Ami ci Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#901422128
#Brief of Amicus Curiae The Houston Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Franklin Pierce Law Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#LMiller
#Brief of TELES AG as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae San Diego Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party on the Merits (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Robert R. Sachs and Daniel R. Brownstone as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#CRoetzel
#Brief of Amicus Curiae AwakenIP, LLC in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Pmitros
#Brief of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#901479977
#Brief for Prometheus Laboratories Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief for the Business Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioner (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Bobby Powers
#Brief of Amici Curiae Association Internationale Pour la Protection de la Propriete Intellectuelle and International Association For The Protection Of Intellectual Property (U.S.) in Support of Reversal (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Caris Diagnostics, Inc. in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Monogram Biosciences, Inc. and Genomic Health, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Raymond C. Meiers in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Xiao Dong
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Conejo Valley Bar Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 3, 2009)
#Brief For Petitioners (Jul. 30, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Telecommunication Systems, Inc. in Support of Neither Party and for Purely Prospective Application of Any Adoption of the New Legal Test Applied Below (Jul. 24, 2009)
#Brief for the State of Oregon as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Jul. 24, 2009)
#ewolz
#kristen kemnetz
#Brief for the Respondent in Opposition (May 1, 2009)
#Brief of Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Accenture and Pitney Bowes Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief Amicus Curiae of Franklin Pierce Law Center in Support of Certiorari (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Amica Curiae Anne E. Barschall, Pro Se in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Jmarmole
#Brief of John P. Sutton Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners (Feb. 25, 2009)

Nonobviousness Outline

2011-02-06T21:55:37Z

901444263: Created page with "==Historical Development== The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard. ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (185..."

==Historical Development==
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.

===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===

Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.

:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.

:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.

:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.

:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.

:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.

:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.

===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===

While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention.
*First the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.
**In order for a combination to be patentable, its whole had to be greater than the sum of its parts. This means the combination of elements should perform some function other than those of its parts.

===35 USC 103 (1952)===
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
This was not a new set of rules to be followed. Instead it was a unification of the previous Supreme Court decisions into the law.
===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===

In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4

===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===

In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include
* scope and content of the prior art;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,
* secondary considerations, including:
** commercial success of the invention;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.

===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===

* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.
*Court said that known disadvantages that would normally discourage research in that direction may be considered when determining nonobviousness. However, ignoring disadvantages and finding new uses for old inventions does not necessarily lead to patentability.

===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.

==Suggestion to Combine==
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.

:"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."
:"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.

==Objective Tests==
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.
*This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.
The Teaching, Suggestion, Motivation (TSM) Test
*Used in KSR v. Teleflex by Court of Appeals as method for determining obviousness
*If prior art or ordinary skill teaches, suggests, or motivates a combination, then it is obvious.

*Method for creating a set of guidelines for determining obviousness

*Rejected by Supreme Court as too rigid. Court said it limited the obviousness of inquiry. For example, the problem that motivated a patent might only be one of many, so all aspects need to be investigated.

==The Inventive Step==
The meaning of the phrase, “Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made,” from Section 103 of the U.S. code means one does not need a flash of genius for something to be patentable. If the invention was discovered by accident, it is still patentable.
==Relationship with Novelty==
Novelty and nonobviousness are two separate sections of the U.S. Code, but they are both requirements of patentability. An invention cannot be novel but obvious, and it cannot be not novel but nonobvious. One requirement is not more important than the other. Novelty is more well defined than nonobviousness because nonobviousness was only added to the law in 1952 so there is more controversy around defining nonobviousness than novelty.

Novelty and nonobviousness do not necessarily follow each other. For example, an invention can be completely new, but it can also be obvious at the same time depending on the amount of skill needed to create the invention. However, it is likely that a nonobvious invention is also novel, since in order to be novel it took more than ordinary skill to create and has sufficient differences from the prior art.
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==
*Nonobviousness deals with inquiry. In order to determine nonobviousness, research must be done into the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the present claims, and if there was only a level of ordinary skill applied. If the inquiry shows that more than ordinary skill was needed for the present claim and there are sufficient differences between the present claims and the prior art, then nonobviousness can be determined. Nonobviousness is one requirement for the patentability of an invention.
*Invention deals with quality. It is most associated with novelty. An invention is something new that an inventor has created. An invention can be either nonobvious or obvious. Sections 102 and 103 of the U.S. Code refer to the patentability of inventions, which means inventions do not necessarily fulfill the requirements of patentability.

*As indicated in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the idea of nonobviousness came from the idea of inventiveness. This means nonobviousness is a form of inventiveness.
==Secondary Considerations==
Secondary considerations can be used to learn more about the circumstances surrounding the creation of the subject matter that is trying to be patented in order to determine if it is nonobvious. These secondary considerations include:
*Commercial Success
*Long felt but unsolved need
*Failure of others
It should also be noted that these considerations focus more on motivational and economic issues instead of technical issues.
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]

[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]

[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]

[[South Corp. v. US]]

Homeworks

2011-02-06T21:52:18Z

901444263:

Non-Obvious Analysis

2011-02-04T02:00:14Z

901444263: Created page with "Even though the plow in patent number 2,627,798 (‘798) is similar to the plow in patent number 2,493,811 (‘811), I would consider the ‘798 patent to be non-obvious. First o..."

Even though the plow in patent number 2,627,798 (‘798) is similar to the plow in patent number 2,493,811 (‘811), I would consider the ‘798 patent to be non-obvious. First of all, the ‘811 patent has a lever that controls the height of the ground working devices (plow teeth), and the ‘798 patent has no such device. While both patents have an I-beam that connects all the plow teeth together, the ‘798 patent secures the I-beam much better than the ‘811 patent. The ‘798 patent has a hook member on the mounting that hooks onto the upper flange of the I-beam and secures all the parts together. The ‘811 patent does not include this feature at all. By more securely attaching the I-beam to the mounting, the device was able to keep the plow teeth moving more uniformly without wobbling to the left or right as much while allowing individual teeth to overcome obstructions without breaking. The teeth overcame obstructions by pivoting upward and going over the obstruction instead of being allowed to move to the left or right of the obstruction and possibly into another obstruction that could cause a break. These differences took thought and innovation beyond ordinary skill, which makes the ‘798 patent non-obvious.

Obvious Analysis

2011-02-04T01:40:41Z

901444263:

The plow in patent number 2,627,798 (‘798) by Graham is so similar to his previous patent number 2,493,811 (‘811) that I would consider the ‘798 patent as obvious. They have such a similar set up, that it is difficult to tell them apart based on the drawings. The only main difference found in the patents is in the naming and numbering of the parts. In the ‘811 patent, the fulcrum plate lies on the bottom with the shank on top of it, which is underneath the area where the spring is mounted on the rod. In the ‘798 patent, the shank (called the boss end) is beneath the fulcrum plate (called the movable part of the mounting), which is underneath the spring seat. The spring seat is where the spring is mounted on the rod. The only difference between these two devices is the position of the shank. For both inventions, the shank and fulcrum plates are enclosed by flanges. The shank is connected to the chisel part of the plow for both inventions, so when the chisel encounters an obstruction in the dirt, the shank rotates downward and pulls down the rod, which compresses the spring. For the ‘811 patent, the shank presses on the upper half of the fulcrum plate, which pulls down the rod. For the ‘798 patent, the shank presses the lower half of the fulcrum plate while pulling down the rod. When the obstruction is removed from the chisel’s path, the compressed spring returns the plow chisels to their original position for both inventions. Since the two devices perform the same function using the same parts in only slightly different configurations, I think the ‘798 patent is obvious. It would not take much skill to switch the position of the shank and the fulcrum plate.

Obvious Analysis

2011-02-04T01:28:26Z

901444263: Created page with "The plow in patent number 2,627,798 (‘798) by Graham is so similar to his previous patent number 2,493,811 (‘811) that I would consider the ‘798 patent as not novel and obv..."

The plow in patent number 2,627,798 (‘798) by Graham is so similar to his previous patent number 2,493,811 (‘811) that I would consider the ‘798 patent as not novel and obvious. They have such a similar set up, that it is difficult to tell them apart based on the drawings. The only main difference found in the patents is in the naming and numbering of the parts. In the ‘811 patent, the fulcrum plate lies on the bottom with the shank on top of it, which is underneath the area where the spring is mounted on the rod. In the ‘798 patent, the shank (called the boss end) is beneath the fulcrum plate (called the movable part of the mounting), which is underneath the spring seat. The spring seat is where the spring is mounted on the rod. The only difference between these two devices is the position of the shank. For both inventions, the shank and fulcrum plates are enclosed by flanges. The shank is connected to the chisel part of the plow for both inventions, so when the chisel encounters an obstruction in the dirt, the shank rotates downward and pulls down the rod, which compresses the spring. For the ‘811 patent, the shank presses on the upper half of the fulcrum plate, which pulls down the rod. For the ‘798 patent, the shank presses the lower half of the fulcrum plate while pulling down the rod. When the obstruction is removed from the chisel’s path, the compressed spring returns the plow chisels to their original position for both inventions. Since the two devices perform the same function using the same parts in only slightly different configurations, I think the ‘798 patent is obvious. It would not take much skill to switch the position of the shank and the fulcrum plate.

Homeworks

2011-02-03T18:39:52Z

901444263:

Lyon Analysis

2011-01-28T02:20:11Z

901444263: Created page with "In the United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit case Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, the court decided the patent was to be upheld because it fulfilled the non-obviousness requiremen..."

In the United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit case Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, the court decided the patent was to be upheld because it fulfilled the non-obviousness requirement put into law by the Patent Act of 1952 and the novelty and utility requirements. They decided the patent was not obvious because researchers had for years been trying to accomplish what the patent accomplished, and none before had been able to successfully do it. Under the requirements of this case, my patent would still be patentable.

The first patent for a skateboard braking system was filed in 1966[http://www.google.com/patents?id=GApqAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4&source=gbs_overview_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false] and others followed it, including my patent and its references. This demonstrates that there was a need for a skateboard braking system that inventors were trying to accomplish. Even though there were patents filed for skateboard braking systems, such as the pedal braking invention and the braking/steering invention, none of them were able to become the standard the way Lyons’s method became the standard procedure when he filed his patent. This means that my patent would still be valid since it tried to fulfill the need for a skateboard braking system in a new way and thus fulfilled the novelty and utility requirements.

The pedal braking invention and the braking/steering invention were different from my patent. They accomplished the same thing, stopping the skateboard, using different mechanical setups in similar methods. The pedal braking invention used a pedal pressed by the rider to activate the friction pads on the rear wheels of the skateboard. The braking/steering invention used an arm pressed by the rider to activate the brake shoes attached to a u-bar on the rear wheels of the skateboard. My patent used a shifting of the rider’s weight to activate the frame to stop the rear wheels of the skateboard. None of the previous patents used only a shifting of weight to effect braking, which means it was not obvious, which means my patent would still be patentable.

A.&P. Analysis

2011-01-28T01:18:10Z

901444263: Created page with "In the Supreme Court case A. &P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the Supreme Court determined that the patent for a cashier’s counter was not valid because the combination of dev..."

In the Supreme Court case A. &P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the Supreme Court determined that the patent for a cashier’s counter was not valid because the combination of devices in the counter did not perform any different or additional function than the devices performed on their own. Simply put, the whole was still the same as the sum of its parts. My patent and its references would not be patentable under the requirements of the A. &P. case.

The pedal braking invention consists of a skateboard and a pedal attached to a friction device that comes into contact with the rear wheels when the pedal is pressed. The patent itself admits a regular skateboard was a commercial object prior to the pedal braking invention and braking devices for wheeled vehicles were also a prior art. The braking/steering invention also consists of a skateboard with an arm attached to a friction device (brake shoes). My patent also consisted of a braking system attached to a skateboard.

A braking device for a wheeled vehicle was intended to do exactly what it sounds like, cause a wheeled vehicle to come to a stop when the brakes are engaged. A skateboard was intended to transport a rider, much the same as a vehicle. For the pedal braking invention, the braking/steering invention, and my patent, their parts perform the same functions in their combinations as they did outside the combinations. Under the requirements of the case, these do not qualify for a patent. Even though the combinations produced better results than those seen before, their parts still performed the same functions they did before being in the combinations, so the patents would not be valid.

The reason that all three of these patents were valid when they were filed (after the A. &P. case) was because they did have inventiveness. Each was inventive in its own way to accomplish the same goal of stopping a skateboard, which had not been done before. Also their inventions took more skill than that possessed by the average person in the field of skateboard design.

Hotchkiss Analysis

2011-01-28T00:33:09Z

901444263: Created page with "In the Supreme Court case Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court decided that Hotchkiss’s method of making knobs from potter’s clay or porcelain instead of wood or metal was not i..."

In the Supreme Court case Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court decided that Hotchkiss’s method of making knobs from potter’s clay or porcelain instead of wood or metal was not inventive enough to qualify for a patent. Simply substituting materials was something a skilled mechanic could have done instead of an inventor. My patent, the skateboard with a braking system activated by shifting the rider’s weight, would qualify for a patent under the requirements of this case.

The pedal braking invention, which preceded my patent by three years, is much different from my patent in both appearance and components. Like in the Hotchkiss case where the potter’s clay knobs had a better appearance than the wood or metal knobs, my patent is more aesthetically pleasing than the pedal breaking patent. This is because it looks like a normal skateboard while the pedal braking invention has a pedal sticking out of the top of the skateboard. However, in the Hotchkiss case, the knobs had been assembled using the same method that had been used many times before for other knobs of different materials. In the case of my patent, it was assembled much differently than the pedal braking invention using different parts. My patent does not make use of a pedal component at all or the spring that is attached to the pedal. In effect, my patent accomplishes the same thing as the pedal breaking invention by a different method.

The braking/steering invention preceded my patent by two years and is also much different than my patent in appearance and components. My patent also was more aesthetically pleasing than the braking/steering invention because it did not include an arm going from the bottom of the skateboard to foot level like the braking/steering invention. My patent does not use components from the braking/steering invention like the u-bar, the leaf spring, or the arm. While my patent achieves braking in a different method than the braking/steering invention, it lacks the ability to stop only one wheel like the braking/steering invention, which provides that option to the rider.

Overall, my patent would still qualify for a patent under the requirements of the Hotchkiss v. Greenwood case. While it does contain components made of the same materials as those from the pedal braking and braking/steering inventions, such as the board, wheels, and trucks, it also uses different materials by not using the same components as the previous two inventions. In other words, this is the word of an inventor, not a skilled mechanic.

Description of References

2011-01-27T05:11:03Z

901444263:

== First Reference- Pedal Braking ==

Patent number: 4037852[http://www.google.com/patents?id=RdQ8AAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4&source=gbs_overview_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false] was filed on March 17, 1976 and issued on July 26, 1977. It is for a braking mechanism for a skateboard that consists of a pedal placed on the top of the skateboard that activates the brakes when stepped on by the user. The pedal is attached to a lever that is attached to the braking element on the underside of the skateboard. When pressed, the pedal pushes the rod, which pushes the braking element onto the rear wheels of the skateboard, causing the skateboard to stop. The more pressure the rider applies to the pedal, the more force applied to the brakes. The pedal is held in the depressed position by a spring, so after pressure is done being applied to the pedal, it returns to the depressed position.

Another configuration causes the braking to be caused by pressure on the interior vertical surfaces of the rear wheels instead of directly on top of the wheels. When the pedal is pressed, two pins come into contact with the vertical surfaces to cause braking.

According to the inventors, there were no prior inventions for braking mechanisms for skateboards at the time they filed their patent application. They also claimed that there was a need for a skateboard braking mechanism due to injuries riders received from not being able to stop their skateboards, especially on hills.

In the case analyses, this reference will be referred to as the pedal braking invention.

== Second Reference- Braking/Steering ==

Patent number: 4094524[http://www.google.com/patents?id=6vwzAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false] was filed on October 18, 1976 and issued on June 13, 1978. It is for a braking and steering system that consists of a u-shaped bar with brake shoes on the ends that are activated by pressure on an arm located above the board. The arm’s location above the board and slightly to the side allows it to be easily accessed by the rider’s foot. When pressed, the arm presses down the u-shaped bar, which presses the brake shoes onto the rear wheels of the skateboard, causing the skateboard to slow down. A leaf spring on the u-bar causes the brake shoes to move away from the wheels when pressure is not placed on the arm. The braking and steering system can be attached to the skateboard simply by placing the u-bar between the truck and the board and attaching it using the same fasteners for the truck.

The brake shoes do not necessarily have to engage both of the rear wheels. In order to steer by braking only one wheel, the rider simply needs to lean to the side of the wheel they want to stop while pressing the arm. For example, to stop only the left rear wheel, the rider needs to lean slightly to the left and press the arm more outwards than down. To stop only the right rear wheel, the rider needs to lean to the right and press on the arm. This ability to brake only one wheel allows for easier turns and steering.

The inventor expresses a need for a braking system on skateboards in order to reduce injuries and the wear and tear on shoes that is commonly found among skateboarders.

In the case analyses, this reference will be referred to as the braking/steering invention.

Description of References

2011-01-27T05:07:14Z

901444263: /* First Reference- Pedal Braking */

Description of References

2011-01-27T04:12:30Z

901444263: /* First Reference */

Description of References

2011-01-27T04:01:24Z

901444263: /* First Reference */

== First Reference ==

Patent number: 4037852[http://www.google.com/patents?id=RdQ8AAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4&source=gbs_overview_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false] was filed on March 17, 1976 and issued on July 26, 1977. It is for a braking mechanism for a skateboard that consists of a pedal placed on the top of the skateboard that activates the brakes when stepped on by the user. The pedal is attached to a lever that is attached to the braking element on the underside of the skateboard. When pressed, the pedal pushes the rod, which pushes the braking element onto the rear wheels of the skateboard, causing the skateboard to stop. The more pressure the rider applies to the pedal, the more force applied to the brakes. The pedal is held in the depressed position by a spring, so after pressure is done being applied to the pedal, it returns to the depressed position.

Another configuration causes the braking to be caused by pressure on the interior vertical surfaces of the rear wheels instead of directly on top of the wheels. When the pedal is pressed, two pins come into contact with the vertical surfaces to cause braking.

According to the inventors, there were no prior inventions for braking mechanisms for skateboards at the time they filed their patent application. They also claimed that there was a need for a skateboard braking mechanism due to injuries riders received from not being to stop their skateboards, especially on hills.

In the case analyses, this reference will be referred to as the pedal braking invention.

== Second Reference ==

Description of References

2011-01-27T03:53:11Z

901444263: Created page with "== First Reference == Patent number: 4037852 was filed on March 17, 1976 and issued on July 26, 1977. It is for a braking mechanism for a skateboard that consists of a pedal pla..."

== First Reference ==

Patent number: 4037852 was filed on March 17, 1976 and issued on July 26, 1977. It is for a braking mechanism for a skateboard that consists of a pedal placed on the top of the skateboard that activates the brakes when stepped on by the user. The pedal is attached to a lever that is attached to the braking element on the underside of the skateboard. When pressed, the pedal pushes the rod, which pushes the braking element onto the rear wheels of the skateboard, causing the skateboard to stop. The more pressure the rider applies to the pedal, the more force applied to the brakes. The pedal is held in the depressed position by a spring, so after pressure is done being applied to the pedal, it returns to the depressed position.

Another configuration causes the braking to be caused by pressure on the interior vertical surfaces of the rear wheels instead of directly on top of the wheels. When the pedal is pressed, two pins come into contact with the vertical surfaces to cause braking.

According to the inventors, there were no prior inventions for braking mechanisms for skateboards at the time they filed their patent application. They also claimed that there was a need for a skateboard braking mechanism due to injuries riders received from not being to stop their skateboards, especially on hills.

In the case analyses, this reference will be referred to as the pedal braking invention.

== Second Reference ==

Homeworks

2011-01-27T03:27:09Z

901444263: /* Due Jan. 28 */

== Due Jan. 24 ==

[[Selected Patent]]

== Due Jan. 28 ==

[[Description of References]]

[[Hotchkiss Analysis]]

[[A.&P. Analysis]]

[[Lyon Analysis]]

Homeworks

2011-01-27T03:24:28Z

901444263:

== Due Jan. 24 ==

[[Selected Patent]]

== Due Jan. 28 ==
[[Description of References]]
[[Hotchkiss Analysis]]
[[A.&P. Analysis]]
[[Lyon Analysis]]

Selected Patent

2011-01-23T23:20:04Z

901444263: /* My Selected Patent- Skateboard */

== My Selected Patent- Skateboard ==
This particular patent is for a skateboard with a built in braking mechanism. Previous skateboards either had no braking mechanisms, so a person would have to jump off a moving skateboard if they lost control, or inefficient braking mechanisms such as a block attached to the bottom end of the back or a pedal that activated wheel brakes. This patent's braking mechanism allows the user to simply shift their weight toward the back of the skateboard while riding in order to brake. When the weight is shifted, the rear wheels engage the brake shoes, which slow down the wheels. This patent was issued on Nov. 18, 1980.

A link to the patent on the US Patent Website can be found here: [http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=4234204.PN.&OS=PN/4234204&RS=PN/4234204]

Selected Patent

2011-01-22T22:57:30Z

901444263: Created page with "== My Selected Patent- Skateboard == The skateboard is a generally plastic, rectangularly shaped with rounded corners strip with wheels attached to the underside that a person s..."

== My Selected Patent- Skateboard ==
The skateboard is a generally plastic, rectangularly shaped with rounded corners strip with wheels attached to the underside that a person stands upon and can move from place to place. A person can also perform tricks while riding a skateboard such as spinning the board in the middle of riding. This particular patent is for a skateboard with a built in braking mechanism. Previous skateboards either had no braking mechanisms, so a person would have to jump off a moving skateboard if they lost control, or inefficient braking mechanisms such as a block attached to the bottom end of the back or a pedal that activated wheel brakes. This patent's braking mechanism allows the user to simply shift their weight toward the back of the skateboard while riding in order to brake. When the weight is shifted, the rear wheels engage the brake shoes, which slow down the wheels. This patent was issued on Nov. 18, 1980.

A link to the patent on the US Patent Website can be found here: [http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=4234204.PN.&OS=PN/4234204&RS=PN/4234204]

Homeworks

2011-01-22T22:55:52Z

901444263: Created page with "Selected Patent"

[[Selected Patent]]

User:901444263

2011-01-22T22:55:33Z

901444263: Replaced content with "Homeworks"

[[Homeworks]]

User:901444263

2011-01-22T22:54:48Z

901444263:

User:901444263

2011-01-20T02:17:30Z

901444263: Blanked the page

User:901444263

2011-01-20T02:17:06Z

901444263: Created page with "Bonito Boats"

[[Bonito Boats]]