Bill Goodwine's Wiki - User contributions [en]

901479977: Quanta for Petitioners

2011-04-29T07:25:57Z

901479977: Created page with "== Brief of Minebea in Support of Petitioners == 1. Based on precedents, after the first authorized sale of a patented article the patentee can no longer control the article's d..."

== Brief of Minebea in Support of Petitioners ==

1. Based on precedents, after the first authorized sale of a patented article the patentee can no longer control the article's disposition or sale.

'''Precedent'''

Adams
*"when the patentee sells an instrument whose sole value is its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use."
*Chief Justice Taney says "when the patented article passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly."
Univis
*reiterates the fact that this principle is uniform and has not changed
*This rule serves its purpose in limiting the power of a patentee to control the patented article after sale as he has already received payment.

2. The First Sale Doctrine was violated in the federal circuit's decision to allow LGE to exercise control over the use of the patented article.

*Doesn't follow concur with what was ruled in Univis, the most recent case regarding these matters, and is therefore incorrect
*"thwarts vital safeguards built into the patent law"
*if they demand additional royalties for their product being used in conjunction with others, what is to stop them from adding more royalties. Thus potentially creating infinite additional royalties for a potentially small product. It would be financially destructive and defeat the purpose of expanding the art, because there would be so many royalties involved in using the product.
*this case follows almost exactly the same as that of Univis and that previous ruling was opposite.
*in univis it was stated, "whether the licensee sells the patented article in its completed form or sells it before completion for the purpose of enabling the buyer to finish and sell it, he has equally parted with the article, and made it the vehicle for transferring to the buyer ownership of the invention with respect to that article."
*LGE was attempting to expand its monopoly
*Since 1893 it has been made painfully clear that many attempts have been made to circumvent the first sale doctrine but the court has rejected each of those attempts as evidenced by ''Keeler, Adams, and Hobble''
*This ruling blurs the law on First Sale Doctrine, and expands the rights of the patentee

Here in list of arguments in Quanta

2011-04-29T05:44:09Z

901479977:

Post a link to your summary of the brief you read here.

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901330223]]

[[901349446 Quanta Brief]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901471466]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901422128]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary Jacob Marmolejo]]

[[Homework 8 (due Friday 28)~jnosal | Quanta Brief Summary 901438174]]

[[Mitros: Quanta Brief]]

[[Zahm Homework 31: Quanta Brief]]

[[901419437 Quanta v. LGE Brief Summary]]

[[Quanta Brief 901437068]]

[[901281608: Quanta Brief]]

[[901444263: Quanta v. LGE Reply Brief of Petitioners]]

[[901479977: Quanta for Petitioners]]

Brief for Honeywell International 901479977

2011-04-08T15:37:54Z

901479977: Created page with "When examining the case of Honeywell International, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation, the court should consider what exactly should warrant estoppels to apply. Any small ..."

When examining the case of Honeywell International, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation, the court should consider what exactly should warrant estoppels to apply. Any small change in the claims resulting in the loss of the ability to use the doctrine of equivalents seems unfairly strict. Although even if the court chooses for this not to be considered, the equivalent was not foreseeable in this specific case and therefore the estoppel shouldn’t apply regardless. Going even further it can be reasoned that Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation’s patent does infringe on Honeywell International’s by the doctrine of equivalents.

To begin, estoppel principles should not be applied to all cases with claims being revised. There are a variety of reasons for the PTO to request a change in claim language according to the Warner-Jenkinson decision. It is then for the court to consider if that purpose warrants an estoppel. The purpose of an estoppel is to hold the inventor to the representations made during the application process. Therefore Honeywell should not have to surrender his ability to use the doctrine of equivalents because dependent claims were changed to independent claims including limitations that were not used before. Honeywell’s change in claims was made necessary by the cancellation of independent claims and the need to clarify the dependent claims associated with them in his improved surge control design. In no way was Honeywell trying to change the claims in his patent, it was just difficult to construct the same claims when changing them from dependent to independent.

Even if the estoppel principles are used they should not be used to form a complete bar against Honeywell. It is impossible to construct claims, with any number of attempts, in which no equivalent could be drawn without some use of the doctrine of equivalents. As Newman states, “language remains an imperfect fit for invention. The narrowing amendment may demonstrate what the claim is not; but it may still fail to capture precisely what the claim is.” Therefore I have come to the conclusion that the doctrine of equivalents should always be considered to some extent, but perhaps at a lesser level if estoppel principles are found to in affect.

Finally, Sundstrand’s product was unforeseeable thereby negating any estoppel. “Foreseeability only requires that one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably foreseen the proposed equivalent at the pertinent time.” The evidence of a L1011 system being developed for the purpose of controlling surge is generally accepted; however this only proves that Honeywell had knowledge of the surge problems. It doesn’t prove Honeywell could create a solution to the surge problem using inlet guide vanes. The L1011 system used a shock switch to control flow. From this it is not intuitive, as the district court claims, that inlet guide vane position was a foreseeable solution. It seems like a slightly exaggerated law, to both Judge Newman and myself, that a device created a decade later should be foreseeable. Where does this foreseeability end? How many years after your invention does it take for a new invention to no longer be foreseeable?

Assuming that the estoppel principles were not met and the doctrine of equivalents applies, it is quite obvious that Sundstrand’s device infringed on Honeywell’s. This is evidenced in the original court with a jury ruling willful infringement based on the doctrine of equivalents. Honeywell claimed technology to control airflow surge in auxiliary power units, using inlet guide vanes to control airflow and solve so-called “double solution” problem. Sundstrand claimed a surge control system that compares a flow-related parameter called DELPQP to a set point based on air inlet temperature and adjusts the surge bleed valve in response. This surge control device uses inlet guide vanes to determine specific actions in the system. Obviously the inlet guide vanes are used for the same means as in the Honeywell patent, even if the method to get there is slightly different. The Graver Tank ruling clearly states, based on Sanitary Refrigerator Co., that “if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result,” then the doctrine of equivalents can be invoked. Graver Tank also states later that, “consideration must be given to the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent…. and the function which it is intended to perform. An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was.” The function of the patents were essentially the same, and I am confident that anyone close to reasonably skilled in the art would know of the interchangeability of the part in question here.

In conclusion I urge the Supreme Court to consider the ways in which estoppels are applied and consider exactly how they are most affective in promoting the advancement of the art. I would also urge them to clarify what exactly is foreseeable relating to estoppels. In addition to all of this I would ask the court to see that Honeywell’s revised claims are not worth of an estoppel and a jury convicted Sundstrand of willful infringement, which is painfully obvious when considering the intended result of both patents.

User:901479977

2011-04-08T15:37:15Z

901479977:

== '''My Patent''' ==

Patent 4,519,099 : Motorcycle Helmet

Issued May 28, 1985

This invention is a motorcycle helmet. This helmet contains a vented front, and aerodynamic design. It absorbs impact through an air duct system, and contains a visor which is adjustable to weather conditions. This patent is interesting to me because my friend rides motorcycles and he has been involved in multiple collisions. The technology is interesting, as I would imagine it also applies to football and hockey helmets. Here is a link to the patent on google patent[http://www.google.com/patents?id=3ysrAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false].

[[Homework 1/28/11]]

[[Homework 2/4/11 901479977]]

[[Nonobviousness 901479977]]

[[Homework 3/22 901479977]]

[[Brief for Honeywell International 901479977]]

Brief for Honeywell International

2011-04-08T15:36:49Z

User:901479977

2011-04-08T15:36:01Z

901479977:

Doctrine of Equivalents Case List

2011-04-04T10:12:45Z

901479977:

Add your case to the list with a one-paragraph (approximately 250 words) summary of the facts at issues, i.e., "an umbrella is or is not equivalent to a parasol because..."

Please put the cases in chronological order. If two are from the same year, then put them in alphabetical order. Also put your name, your login name or NDID number with your case. Use the following for a template.

* Goodwine v. Batill, 123 US 4567 (1066)
This case concerned a patent for an iPad and the patentee sued the maker of an iPod for infringement. The important part of the claim was "a device for playing music and other media comprising a touch screen..." The court held that iPod infringed the iPad patent because the ... was equivalent to the ... because ...

Bill Goodwine

* Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968), (67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)
This case was discussed in class and presented by another student, but I read it as well. This case concerned a patent for a gyroscope owned by Adkins, the inventor of an improved gyroscope, and Lear, the company that sells gyroscopes. Lear and Adkins had a written agreement that allowed Lear to sell Adkin’s patented invention, where Adkins received a small percentage of the net sales price as royalties. In 1957, Lear refused to pay royalties to Adkins with the claim that they were selling gyroscopes that differed from Adkin’s invention. However, the “new” gyroscopes differed only in “size, form, and shape,” but “contain[ed] the same elements.” The essential elements were the same between Adkin’s patent and Lear’s other steel gyroscopes, but the scale and exact assembly was different. Since those did not constitute a substantial difference, the jury of the Supreme Court of California held Adkins in favor and required Lear to pay royalties to Adkins for the sales price of the other gyroscopes sold. This case is an example of clear infringement.

901431048

* Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968)(67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)
I am the other student^^^(see case above). Other items of note in the case, aside from the summary above, include that the court ruled that infringing the doctrine of equivalence is a matter of fact and that the jury should be the one to establish it. This brings up an interesting qualification, as it seems almost every other case considered with respect to the doctrine of equivalence was decided by judges, not juries.

Brobins

*AMEC Liquidating Trust v. IVAC Corporation, 885 F.2d 1574 (1989)

AMEC had a patent for a thermometer with a plastic cover held on by a hooking type mechanism. IVAC created a thermometer with a cover held on by a ring that created a friction lock. The CAFC held the IVAC invention was non-infringing on the AMEC patent because under the doctrine of equivalents, it did not perform the same function in the same way. The AMEC thermometer cover used an inscription fit, which created deep scratches in the cover. The IVAC thermometer used a friction fit, which only created superficial scratches in the cover. The CAFC found that the superficial scratches did not constitute an inscription fit. Also, the CAFC decided that AMEC did not present any evidence proving that the ring in the IVAC patent was equivalent to the “hook” in the AMEC patent. Because of this, the patent was non-infringing under the doctrine of equivalents.

901444263

*Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574 (1989)

The inventor, Turner, invented a thermometer probe cover that stays on (this was owned by AMEC). It kept the cover on via a sharp metal hook to tear into the cover’s plastic. IVAC developed a thermometer that served a similar purpose of keeping the probe cover on, except that it did so with a ring on the probe (to hold the cover via friction). IVAC intentionally left the probe free of any sharp edge to ease the removal of the probe cover when needed. District Court of Southern California ruled in summary judgment that IVAC’s thermometer probe covers do not infringe AMEC’s. On appeal from AMEC, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. A ring that does not tear the plastic cover is not equivalent to the hook that does. [http://campus.westlaw.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/result/default.wl?mt=CampusLaw&db=ALLCASES&rlt=CLID_QRYRLT4121840350313&origin=Search&sp=003654480-2000&method=TNC&cfid=1&rp=%2fwelcome%2fCampusLaw%2fdefault.wl&eq=welcome%2fCampusLaw&rltdb=CLID_DB1095239350313&srch=TRUE&query=TI(JOHNSTON+%26+IVAC)&vr=2.0&fmqv=s&action=Search&fn=_top&service=Search&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.01]

901471466

*Unitronics Ltd. v. Gharb, 318 Fed.Appx. 902 C.A.Fed. (Dist.Col.) (1989)

This case involved a patent for programmable logic controllers with Global System for Mobile communications. The main issue was infringement based on the capabilities of the programmable logic controllers (PLCs). The court held that alleged infringers PLCs did not contain a “digital recording device having at least one emergency message” or an equivalent. The alleged infringers PLCs also did not have the “data set for transmission to the mobile telephone including alarm information.” The court also ruled that they did not have anything equivalent to either of these claims. Based on the ruling in Warner-Jenkinson the device is not infringing unless it “contains each limitation of the claim, either literally or by an equivalent.” The alleged infringing PLCs did not have a similarity to all of the limitations to the claim and were thus allowed to continue selling their device. [[http://campus.westlaw.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/result/default.wl?mt=CampusLaw&db=ALLFEDS%2cALLSTATES%2cSCT&rlt=CLID_QRYRLT3654057332134&origin=Search&sp=003654480-2000&method=WIN&cfid=1&rp=%2fWelcome%2fCampusLaw%2fdefault.wl&eq=Welcome%2fCampusLaw&rltdb=CLID_DB3890056332134&srch=TRUE&query=unitronics+gharb&vr=2.0&fmqv=s&action=Search&fn=_top&service=Search&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.01]]

901479977

*Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates (1990)

Wilson is suing DGA/Dunlop for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents of its patented design for a golf ball. Wilson's patent is for a golf ball modeled as an icosahedron with dimples placed in such a way as to have 6 "great circles" of symmetry instead of the typical 1. The patent specifies where dimples should be placed on the ball and requires that no dimples be placed on the great circles. The accused DGA balls use the same "great circles" design, but with dimples placed on the great circles. DGA's defense is that there is "no principled difference" between its design and a design of the prior art (prior to Wilson's patent). Therefore, allowing Wilson to utilize the doctrine of equivalents would extend protection of claims already in the prior art to Wilson's patent. The CAFC decided that Wilson can only utilize the doctrine of equivalents if it can make a hypothetical claim that literally covers Dunlop's design (in this case, claim a ball with dimples placed on the great circles) and is also nonobvious considering the prior art. Wilson is unable to make such a nonobvious hypothetical claim and therefore no infringement was found.

901338276

* Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202 (1992)

Lemelson sued Mattel, alleging that Mattel's "Hot Wheels" toy car track infringed on his patented toy track. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of the plaintiff. Mattel appealed to the CAFC. The Court held that the "Hot Wheels" track did not contain all the limitations of the patent; it was equivalent to the prior art. That is, Lemelson's patent could not be both valid in light of the prior art and infringed upon by Mattel. Furthermore, upon his first application, claim 3 of Lemelson's patent had five clauses. The PTO examiner found the patent to be indistinguishable from the prior art. Lemelson added clauses [f] and [g] and received a patent. The important parts of the claim were, "[f] said guide means include a pair of spaced apart runner portions for defining the pathway of a vehicle moving over said track, [g] said spaced apart runner portions include upwardly extending rails for guiding the wheels of a vehicle." The Court held that "Hot wheels" did not contain any elements equivalent to the clauses [f] and [g]. The Court also noted that the public is entitled to the PTO record to determine the scope and meaning of claims.

901330223

*Valmont Industries Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing Company Inc., 983 F.2d 1039 (1993)

901316153

This case concerns an adaption for center-pivot (i.e. rotating) irrigation systems. The adaption (an apparatus that attaches to the main frame of the sprinkler) allows the corners of a field, normally missed by the standard rotating irrigation system, to be watered. The infringement issue relates to the means by which the position of the sprinkler is detected, relative to the field. The patent uses a method of pivot angle encoders, while the "infringing" patent uses buried electromagnetic cables to guide the sprinkler around the field.

The CAFC ruled that the second device was not infringing, reversing the decision of the district court. The district court argued that the means of controlling the system were equivalent. The CAFC's argument was that while the two irrigation systems performed substantially the same overall function to obtain substantially the same overall result as the claimed invention, the way those results were achieved was substantially different. "Comparison of these two control means compels the conclusion that the claimed control means and Reinke's control means are not structurally equivalent.[...][E]ven though both the control means in the specification and the control means on Reinke's device use electric signals, the structures generating those signals are strikingly different."

Because the doctrine of equivalence requires that the two devices perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same results, the two control systems were not equivalent under the doctrine of equivalence because they did not meet the "way" requirement of the doctrine of equivalence.

*William Bradshaw and Robert Shepherd v. Igloo Products Corp. 1997 WL 543109 (US District Court, N.D.Ill.)

William Bradshaw sued Igloo Products for infringement of a wheeled cooler. Bradshaw’s patent was for a cooler with a pulling handle and two lifting handles, one of which was connected on the same axle as the pulling handle. The Igloo products in question were the Rolling Kool Locker which had a rotatable lifting hand that can also be used to pull the cooler and the Cool Roller which had separate lifting and pulling handles coupled to separate axles. The court decided that the prior art for the Cool Roller was a different patent, the Mason patent. This patent was for a wheeled cooler with separate lifting and pulling handles. The Mason patent was granted before Bradshaw’s patent. The court ruled that the Cool Roller fell under the Mason patent. Therefore, if Bradshaw’s patent were to be expanded to include the Cool Roller’s handles, it would be an invalid patent as a result of the prior art, the Mason patent. This leads to a method of deciding infringement. If the product in question mimics prior art, then it cannot infringe the patent otherwise that patent would be invalid. In deciding infringement for the Rolling Kool Locker, the court decided that it was up to a jury to decide whether the Kool Lockers handles were equivalent to Bradshaw’s patent, since there was no other glaring evidence.

Eric Paul

* Dr. Raymond G. Tronzo v. Biomet Inc. 1998 156 F.3d 1154 (United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit)
In this case Biomet was accused of infringement of an artificial hip prosthesis patented by Dr. Tronzo (patent 4,743,262). The alleged infringement revolved around the shape of the artificial hip socket and the hinge that was inserted into the socket. Patent ‘262 claimed a “generally conical” shape of the hip socket. Biomet’s design contained a strictly hemispherical shape. The court heard evidence in which it was claimed that even though the shapes would have at first glance performed in the same manner, the forces generated on the surface of each implant would be different depending on the shape. Additionally, after hearing expert testimony that suggested any shape would have been equivalent to the conical limitations of the patent claims, the court said that such a ruling would have been impermissible under the all-elements rule of Warner Jenkinson because it would write the “generally conical” shape limitation out of the claims. Therefore, the court held that the accused design did not infringe upon the patent claims under the doctrine of equivalence.

Peter Mitros (901461727)

*Hale Propeller, L.L.C. v Ryan Marine Products Pty., LTD., et al, 151 F. Supp .2d 183 (2001) Connecticut District Court
Ryan owned patent 4411073, issued on 25 October 1983, which concerned devices to measure the pitch of propeller blades. Ryan originally filed the claim on 13 July 1981 it was rejected and then ammended on 4 October 1982. Hale's device called the "Hale Propeller MRI" was developed in 1997. In question are claims 1(b),(c),(f), and 6. A third party, Michigan Wheel Corporation, a distributor of Hale's invention filed for patent invalidity. The important differences between Hale's and Ryan's device are that Hale's does not use gears or worm-drives to rotate the blade and the device does not give direct readouts of the measurements using electric circuits. The issue with claim 1(b) was if a roller was a necessary part of the structure because it prevents skipping of the probe making the measurements more accurate. The court used means-plus-function to rule that the roller was important and Hale did not infringe. The issue with claim 1(c) deals with whether a worm or gear drive is necessary to rotate the blade. Ryan's patent discloses a hand-cranked device, like Hales, but includes a worm-drive. Part of Ryan's ammendment to his claim was to include worm gear to the hand-cranking device and therefore the court used prosecution history estoppel to make their decision because Ryan forfeited that claim (hand-cranked device without worm-drive) in order to get the patent and therefore cannot use doctrine of equivalents to get the claim back. The issue of claim 1(f) was whether the computer in the claim was a special computer needed for the readouts. The court ruled that the claim was not that narrow, but then the court ruled that claim 6 dealt with a computer that receives measurement data from the optical encoder and therefore Hale did not infringe. The patent was also ruled valid using the roller and worm drive to prove that it was non-obvious §103, definitively disclosed §112, and not anticipated by prior art §102(b).

Gillian Allsup

901281608

*Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc. Nos. 2010-1145, 2010-117. (2001) United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit

This case began as an infringement lawsuit by Siemens Medical Solutions USA, inc. against Saint-Gobain Ceramics and Plastics, Inc. for the alleged infringement of a patent held by Siemens for a scintillator, a part of an x-ray machine that detects radiation. Saint-Gobain owned a patent for a similar device and the circuit court found that this patent infringed on the patent held by Siemens, which was filed earlier. Though the doctrine of equivalents was used to rule infringement, Saint-Gobain was found to have accidentally, rather than willfully infringed and Siemens was awarded 52.3 million dollars.

Siemens filed for patent number 4,958,080 on August 4, 1989. This patent was for a scintillator containing cerium-doped- lutetium oxyorthosilicate. This is a component of a radiation detector that absorbs gamma-ray photons from an x-ray machine and converts them to visible light so the results can be interpreted. Saint-Gobain also produces scintillators, filing patent number 6,6424,420 in 2000 for a cerium-doped lutetium-yttrium orthosilicate. The chemical composition differs from that of the Siemens' patent as %10 of the lutetium is substituted for yttrium. These scintillators were sold by Saint-Gobain to Philips Medical Systems, a competitor of Siemens. The circuit court found that the composition of Saint-Gobain's scintillator preformed largely the same function in the same manner as Siemens' patent, and therefore was infringement under the doctrine of equivalence.

Saint-Gobain filed a motion for a new trail, on the basis that the jury was not told that infringement by the doctrine of equivalence must be proved by clear evidence and argued that damages should be remitted. The Federal Appeals Court did not grant Saint-Gobain a new trial, but did reduces the damages to 44 million.

*Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Homedics, Inc., Slip Copy, 2010 WL 5230892 (2010)

This case involved a patent for a force-transmitting bearing used with a platform scale. Sunbeam held a patent which specified bearings which were attached to the platform via loose tabs which allowed the bearings to move horizontally. The patent claims required the base of the bearing to be oriented parallel to the platform and remain parallel to the platform at all times. The structure of the accused device was such that the bearings were connection to the platforms using dimples on the lower surface of the platform which the bearings fit into. Sunbeam had criticized prior art which used a similar dimple connection during prosecution beacuse of the potential for unwanted force moments applied by the bearing. The CAFC upheld the District Court's finding of no infringement based on the doctrine of equivalents because bearings which rocked and pivoted, as the accused device did, did not fall within the reach of the patent claims because they did not remain parallel to the platform at all times.

901422128

*Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326 (2001)
Kustom Signals held a patent for a multimode traffic radar system which will show either the fastest speed or the strongest signal. Three of the claims used the word "or" in their wording. Kustom claimed that the "or" was a logical operator meaning one, the other, or both. Applied Concepts had designed a radar system which returned both the fastest speed and the strongest signal. The Court held that the word "or" was to hold its traditional, customary meaning as being exclusive, not inclusive, of the two statements.

901 41 7852

*Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc., 126 F. 3d 1420 (1997)

Sage Products sued Devon Industries for infringement of several patents relating to containers for disposing of hazardous medical waste (needles etc.). Devon counter-sued for infringement of one of its similar patents. The district court held (on summary judgment) that there was no infringement by either party literally or equivalently. The appellate court affirmed.

Devon’s first alleged infringement was of Sage’s container claiming an elongated slot "at the top" of the apparatus for which to deposit waste, and a "barrier over the slot" to prevent contamination. Devon's patent involved a type of elongated slot that was embedded within the container and a hinged element at the opening. The court ruled no literal infringement because the Devon patent did not include the "at the top" and "over" features of the Sage claim. Even though the devices perform the same function the court ruled no equivalent infringement because the hinged element did not "substantially constrict access" to the container, and the slot was not "substantially at the top" of the container. The court was adamant that equivalent function could not negate the “at the top” and “over” limitations of the patent, stating that such power would reduce patent claims to "functional abstracts" devoid of meaningful structure limitations for the public to reference. A second infringement involved in this case resulted in the court ruling that if patent claims specify a function and recite its importance the patentee cannot later accuse an invention devoid of the specified function of infringement.

901419437

*Siemens Medical Solutions USA, INC. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics., F.3d, 2011 WL 651790 (2011)

Siemens developed, manufactured, and sold PET scanners which made use of scintillator crystals consisting of cerium-doped lutetium oxyorthosilicate (LSO). Saint-Gobain manufactures and sells scintillator crystals for use in PET scanners which consisted of cerium-doped lutetium-yttrium orthosilicate (LYSO). This is chemically different from LSO in that some of the lutetium is substituted for by yttrium. In Saint-Gobain's crystals, 10% of the lutetium atoms are substituted for by yttrium atoms (crystals are 10% Y LYSO). In April of 2007, Siemens sued Saint-Gobain for infringement of claims 1 and 2 of Siemens '080 patent for LSO scintillator crystals and photodetectors. Saint-Gobain aregued that its LYSO crystals are not equivalent to those claimed in the '080 patent because their crystals are separately claimed by their '420 patent. A jury trial found Saint-Gobain infringing upon the claims held by Siemens. Saint-Gobains appeals, and claims that the district court erred in jury instructions, claiming that in cases where an alleged equivalent is separately patented, a higher burden of evidence is required. Their reasoning was that the jury's finding of infringement effectively invalidated their '420 patent for LYSO crystals as the ruling of equivalence implied a conclusion of obviousness. The Court of Appeals disagrees, stating that it is well established that separate patentability does not avoid equivalency as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals also disagrees that the jury's finding of infringement invalidates the '420 patent; it only finds the level of LYSO used in practice (10%) is equivalent to Siemen's LSO crystals. Other compositions of LYSO could well be non-equivalent. Using the function-way-result test which asks whether an element of the an accused product performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way, the Court of Appeals affirms the juries finding of infringement.

Erich Wolz

*Sunbeam Products Inc. v. Homedics Products Inc. , US Court of Appeals, District Court of Wisconsin (2010)
This case involved a clear example of non-equivalence relating to the doctrine of equivalence. The patent holder Sunbeam Products brought action against competitor Homedics, alleging infringement of its patent for force-transmitting bearings for a platform scale. This case was decided under the district court of Wisconsin. Sunbeam Products had created platform bearings which translated purely horizontally along a platform which transferred all platform loads into purely vertical loads supported by the bearings. A previous patent, ‘326 patent, encompassed bearings which rocked and pivoted. HoMedics's accused scales all include bearings similar to the bearing disclosed in the ′326 patent. Each of the HoMedics bearings is machined with a nose-like protrusion that fits into a corresponding dimple on the underside of the platform. The trial court noted that the accused bearings all rock and pivot within their corresponding dimples in the underside of the platform. Sunbeam did not dispute that the HoMedics bearings rock and pivot in that manner. Sunbeam's argument was that in addition to rocking and pivoting, the HoMedics bearings were capable of some horizontal movement and therefore infringe the ′420 patent.
In light of its claim construction and the undisputed evidence regarding the operation of the bearings in the accused HoMedics products, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. The court determined that no reasonable juror could find that bearings that rock and pivot remain parallel to the underside of the platform; accordingly, it held that the pivoting bearings in all of the accused products do not literally infringe the ′420 patent.

The most important distinction that was made in this case was the following statement. “The doctrine of equivalents is not a license to rewrite the claims to encompass what a patentee believes to be an equivalent structure. That is especially true in a case such as this one, where the accused product is not later-developed technology that is insubstantially different from the claimed invention, but instead embodies disavowed prior art. Thus, the district court correctly held that the accused bearings do not infringe the ′420 patent under the doctrine of equivalents.”

Christine Roetzel - 901425022

*Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. 717 F.2d 1351

NASA and Department of Defense, were trying to build a satellite that would orbit the earth. However, they were unable to do so they had problems with the attitude control. Williams, a man who was working for Hughes Co. was able to figure out the problem. He was able to have lab model on 4/2/60 and it was called "dynamic wheel." Williams presented it to NASA and then Hughes Co and NASA entered an agreement to build the satellite. Williams filed for a patent on 4/18/60 and that became known as "Williams patent."
However, the govt started to build these spacecrafts that used the same systems from the satellite and did not give compensation to Williams. It went to court and the govt said that Williams patent was invalid because it infringed McLean's telescope. Williams rewrote his claims and stated “McLean's infrared telescope does not indicate the instantaneous spin angle position of his body with reference to a fixed external coordinate system, and it does not indicate the orientation of the axis with reference to a fixed external coordinate system." The court found Williams patent valid.
Then, the court looked at the spacecraft and compared it to Williams satellite. They found the following similarites: "(1) each is spin-stabilized; (2) each contains a jet on the periphery, connected by a valve to a tank containing fluid for expulsion substantially parallel to the spin axis; (3) each employs sun sensors to sense ISA position; (4) each requires knowledge of orientation relative to a fixed external coordinate system; (5) each contains radio equipment for communicating with the ground; (6) each transmits spin rate and sun angle information to a ground crew; and (7) in each, jet firing is synchronized with ISA position to effect controlled precession and thus to achieve a desired orientation."
Needless to say the court ruled that govt infringed Williams patent.

901439143

* Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc. 126 F.3d. 1420 (1997)

In this case, Sage Products sued Devon Industries for infringement of two of its patents and Devon countersued Sage for infringement of one of its own patents, all of which relate to the disposal of medical waste products such as needles. In trial and on appeal, the courts held that there was no literal infringement nor infringement by the doctrine of equivalents by any party. Sage claimed that Devon's '251 for a "tortuous path" disposal container infringed on both its '728 patent for a sharps disposal container and its '849 patent for the removal and storage of syringe needles. Devon claimed that Sage's '728 patent infringed on its '592 patent for a disposal container.
** The '728 patent consists of an opening with a curved arc extending above it and another below it (inside the container) with a rotatable L-shaped flap such that waste can be deposited without exposing it again.
** The '849 patent covers a container with notches for removing needles and a "moveable closure" that allows the container to be closed and reopened as needed.
** The '251 patent covers a disposal container with a slotted opening at the top and 2 overlapping but displaced obstructions within the container to prevent accessing material that has been disposed of. It also has a closure that permanently locks once closed.
** The 592 patent covers a container that has a slotted opening and another "baffle" within the container that has another slotted opening horizontally displaced from the first
The courts held that the '251 patent did not infringe on the '728 patent because the patent explicitly described a precise configuration of an opening at the "top of the container" with one obstruction "over said slot" and another below, and that '251 configuration was different. They also held that the '251 patent did not infringe on the '849 patent because there was an important difference between permanent closure and closure that can be reopened. Finally, the '728 patent did not infringe on the '592 patents for similar reasons as the first: the configurations were very different. The '592 patent emphasized a horizontal displacement, which was not part of the '728 patent. The courts held that the use of precise language in patents limited the claims and because disposal containers were reasonably simple and straightforward, different configurations could not be equated.

Julia Potter (jpotter2)

* Kudlacek v. DBC, Inc. 115 F. Supp. 2d 996 (2000)

Owner of Patent No. 5,611,325 for an archery bow stabilizer, Donald Kudlacek, brought an infringement suit against competitor DBC, Inc. DBC counterclaimed, stating that its patent for a peep sight targeting system was being infringed. The claim in question was a "threading" limitation on the stabilizer describing how it is adjusted and secured. The District Court decided that neither Kudlacek's stabilizer nor DBC's peep sight target system were infringed. This was because the accused device, the "Super Stix," was found to not be equivalent to the patented device because it did not infringe all the elements of claim 1. Though the accused device performs, basically, the same function, it does so in a substantially different way; therefore the Doctrine of Equivalents does not apply. Note that the invalidity issue was not settled by finding that the patent was not infringed.

901437068

* Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968), (67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)

Adkins v. Lear discussed the assembly and sale of a certain type of gyroscope. The gyroscope design had originally been borrowed by Lear, from Adkins under the terms that Lear would pay a small percentage of their profits to Adkins since Lear was not the original inventor of the gyroscope mechanical design. Conflicts arose when Lear refused to pay Adkins under the claim that their new gyroscope was a unique design that differed from the original design contracted from Adkins. The judges determined that since the new design was similar to the original in all the necessary inner working components and only differed in the external aesthetic features, the new design infringed on the old since it did not provide any new or useful feature. Based on this judgment Lear was required to pay Adkins for any sales of the new gyroscope.

901438174

* Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968), (67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)

I hate to be repetitive, but I read the same case. I will reiterate, it is a case about a dispute over profit sharing. Adkins invented the gyroscope and required Lear to share profits if he used the design. The dispute arose when Lear made an improvement upon the designed and refused to pay profits on this "new and improved" design. This design was really just the innards reworked into a new shape without altering the size or scale. This was ruled to be equivalent to the original design, reinforcing the underlying ideas of the doctrine of equivalents.

cmadiga1

Lemelson v. Mattel (1992), (968 F.2d 1202)

Lemelson sued Mattel, saying that their hotwheels toys infringed on his patent for a flexible track for toy cars. In the original case, Hotwheels was ruled to have infringed on Lemelson's patent. The history of the patents in the toy race car tracks was important in this case. Before Lemelson received his patent, Giardiol had a patent for a flexible car track with an internal support. Mattel's track was very similar in all aspects of the Giardiol patent, but did not have an internal frame. Lemelson's patent was originally denied as being completely anticipated by Giardiol. However by adding claims to the vertical supports which define the track and keep the car on the track Lemelson was able to distinguish his product and obtain a patent. Therefore, these were ruled as the defining characteristics of Lemelson's patent. In the original case, the jury found that Hotwheels product did not contain these characteristics. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the previous ruling saying that the jury had made a logical error.

Andy Stulc

Homework 3/22 901479977

2011-03-23T09:18:33Z

901479977: Created page with "'''Hazani v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n (1997)''' '''Summary''' Hazani contended that it's patent No. 5166904 of semiconductors had claims infringed upon by various other compani..."

'''Hazani v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n (1997)'''

'''Summary'''

Hazani contended that it's patent No. 5166904 of semiconductors had claims infringed upon by various other companies. Hazani's complaint was filed with the US International Trade Commission (ITC). The administrative law judge ruled against them stating that all but one claim was anticipated under 35 USC 102(e) by a different Kuo patent. The one remaining claim was ruled to not be infringed so Hazani appealed contending the Kuo structure does not store charge in all modes of operation as theirs does, and it's structure does not satisfy the limitations of claim 1. Because these claims were raised late, at reconsideration, they were ignored by the ITC. Even if this is considered, it is not sufficient reason to have Hazani's patent held valid. The claims stated in the patent are not the same as those suggested in court and therefore are not considered. Also implied parts of claims are to be allowed, everything does not need to be stated in black and white terms. Experts contended that Kuo's patent achieved things Hazani's unrightfully claimed in their patent. Hazani continues to state that someone skilled in the art would not be able to assume the implied terms in the Kuo patent and therefore have reduced capabilities with it, while if they used Hazani's there would be enhanced capabilities. Therefore the US Court of Appeals upheld the administrative law judge's ruling of an invalid patent on the part of Hazani. Overall Hazini lost their patent rights because they tried to clarify on old claims of Kuo, and their responses were untimely.

User:901479977

2011-03-23T08:54:02Z

901479977: /* My Patent */

ESB Briefs

2011-03-04T05:08:53Z

901479977:

Here is a list of briefs for the Electric Storage Battery Co v. Shimadzu case. Add your name next to the list for the one with the fewest names and read that one.
* Reply Brief for Respondents. (Feb. 27, 1939)
#Michael Madden
#Hwong1
#croetzel
#kroshak
#Adam Mahood
#Michael Ackroyd
#Sam Karch
#Kyle Tennant
#Steve Bonomo
#
* Reply Brief for Petitioner. (Feb. 7, 1939)
#Cmadiga1
#90144463
#901422128
#jpotter2
#ewolz
#E W Hitchler
#Davin Sakamoto
#Kevin Godshall
#901479977
#
* Brief for Respondents (Jan. 28, 1939)
#LMiller
#Josh Bradley
#Brobins
#Ebingle
#kyergler
#BCastel1
#Eric Leis
#Eddie Guilbeau
#
#
* Brief for Petitioner. (Jan. 1939)
#Kschlax
#Andy Stulc
#Mzahm
#Rabot
#Peter Mitros
#Jacob Marmolejo
#Greg Torrisi
#Kevin Dacey
#
#

ESB Briefs

2011-03-04T05:08:39Z

901479977:

Here is a list of briefs for the Electric Storage Battery Co v. Shimadzu case. Add your name next to the list for the one with the fewest names and read that one.
* Reply Brief for Respondents. (Feb. 27, 1939)
#Michael Madden
#Hwong1
#croetzel
#kroshak
#Adam Mahood
#Michael Ackroyd
#Sam Karch
#Kyle Tennant
#Steve Bonomo
#
* Reply Brief for Petitioner. (Feb. 7, 1939)
#Cmadiga1
#90144463
#901422128
#jpotter2
#ewolz
#E W Hitchler
#Davin Sakamoto
#Kevin Godshall
#mcirillo
#
* Brief for Respondents (Jan. 28, 1939)
#LMiller
#Josh Bradley
#Brobins
#Ebingle
#kyergler
#BCastel1
#Eric Leis
#Eddie Guilbeau
#
#
* Brief for Petitioner. (Jan. 1939)
#Kschlax
#Andy Stulc
#Mzahm
#Rabot
#Peter Mitros
#Jacob Marmolejo
#Greg Torrisi
#Kevin Dacey
#
#

Bilski brief list

2011-02-13T21:46:55Z

901479977:

Choose one of the briefs from this list. Delete it and replace it with your login name. Please be careful editing this page. If you mess up all the formatting it will create work for your colleagues.

#Reply Brief for Petitioners (Oct. 26, 2009)
#jpotter2
#Adam T. Letcher
#Craigkrzyskowski
#dcarter2
#ebingle
#Rabot
#Eric Paul
#Brief of Amici Curiae American Insurance Association, the Hartford Financial Services, Jackson National Life Insurance Company, Pacific Life Insurance Company, Sun Life Assurance Company Of Canada (U.S.), and Transamerica Life Insurance Company in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Brief For Amicus Curiae Computer & Communications Industry Association in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Software & Information Industry Association (SIIA) as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Amici Curiae Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, IP Justice, and Four Global Software Professionals and Business Leaders in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Brief for Free Software Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Brief for Bank of America Corporation, Barclays Capital Inc., The Clearing House Association L.L.C., The Financial Services Roundtable, Google Inc., MetLife, Inc., and Morgan Stanley as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Peter S. Menell and Michael J. Meurer In Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Entrepreneurial and Consumer Advocates Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of the Respondent, Submitted on Behalf of Adamas Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Tethys Bioscience, Inc. (Oct. 2, 2009)
#KyleR
#Andy Stulc
#Brief for Amicus Curiae Mark Landesmann in Support of Affirmance (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Amicus Curiae Brief of Center for Advanced Study and Research in Intellectual Property (CASRIP) of the University of Washington School of Law, and of CASRIP Research Affiliate Scholars, in Support of Affirmance of the Judgment in Favor of Respondent (Oct. 1, 2009)
#Kevin Godshall
#Amici Curiae Brief of Internet Retailers in Support of Respondent (Oct. 1, 2009)
#Brief for the Respondent (Sep. 25, 2009)
#Brief of the Intellectual Property Section of the Nevada State Bar, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Sep. 25, 2009)
#Brief of Professor Lee A. Hollaar and IEEE-USA as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance (Sep. 1, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Austin Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amici Curiae Entrepreneurial Software Companies in Support of Petitioner (Aug. 6, 2009)
#E W Hitchler
#Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amici Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization, Advanced Medical Technology Association, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation & The Regents of the University of California in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Mzahm
#Brief of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Hamburgler
#Brief of F%21ed%21eration Internationale Des Conseils En Propri%21et%21e Industrielle as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professor Kevin Emerson Collins in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Legal OnRamp in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae John Sutton in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Novartis Corporation Supporting Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief Amicus Curiae of The Federal Circuit Bar Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Regulatory Datacorp, Inc, American Express Company, Palm Inc., Rockwell Automation, Inc., and SAP America, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Double Rock Corporation, Island Intellectual Property LLC, LIDs Capital LLC, Intrasweep LLC, Access Control Advantage, Inc., Ecomp Consultants, Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, Rearden Capital Corporation, Craig Mowry and PCT Capital LLC as Ami ci Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#901422128
#Brief of Amicus Curiae The Houston Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Franklin Pierce Law Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#LMiller
#Brief of TELES AG as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae San Diego Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party on the Merits (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Robert R. Sachs and Daniel R. Brownstone as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae the University of South Florida in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae AwakenIP, LLC in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Pmitros
#Brief of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#901479977
#Brief for Prometheus Laboratories Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief for the Business Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioner (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Bobby Powers
#Brief of Amici Curiae Association Internationale Pour la Protection de la Propriete Intellectuelle and International Association For The Protection Of Intellectual Property (U.S.) in Support of Reversal (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Caris Diagnostics, Inc. in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Monogram Biosciences, Inc. and Genomic Health, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Raymond C. Meiers in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Xiao Dong
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Conejo Valley Bar Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 3, 2009)
#Brief For Petitioners (Jul. 30, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Telecommunication Systems, Inc. in Support of Neither Party and for Purely Prospective Application of Any Adoption of the New Legal Test Applied Below (Jul. 24, 2009)
#Brief for the State of Oregon as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Jul. 24, 2009)
#ewolz
#kristen kemnetz
#Brief for the Respondent in Opposition (May 1, 2009)
#Brief of Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Accenture and Pitney Bowes Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief Amicus Curiae of Franklin Pierce Law Center in Support of Certiorari (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Amica Curiae Anne E. Barschall, Pro Se in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Jmarmole
#Brief of John P. Sutton Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners (Feb. 25, 2009)

Nonobviousness 901479977

2011-02-11T11:33:58Z

901479977: Created page with "==Historical Development== The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard. ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (185..."

==Historical Development==
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.

===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===

Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.

:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.

:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.

:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.

:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.

:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.

:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.

===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===

While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention.
*First the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by long felt but unsatisfied need for the product as well as commercial success both of which are included as a standard used today for nonobviousness. In this case it was ruled that a long felt need is not enough to make an invention patentable.
*Second, it expressed an emphasis toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like pencil erasers, stamps, etc. It must serve a higher end, the advancement of science, to obtain a patent.
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The combination of old elements can be patentable; it depends on how the elements interact. If the old parts are placed together with no new function, then it is not patentable. If the whole is greater than the sum of it’s parts then the invention is patentable.

===35 USC 103 (1952)===
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.

===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===

In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4

In conclusion, there was a long felt but unsatisfied need for an optical glass having a “hardy tenacious coating” with limited reflection. Due to the fact that no scientific advancement was holding this advancement back and it became common practice to use this manufacturing method, the practice was clearly novel and non-obvious. Also had this patent been created and taken to court prior to the Act of 1953, then it probably would have been rejected.

===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===

In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include
* scope and content of the prior art;
: What was in the previous patents and exactly what range of things they applied to
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art;
: If an average person who works in the field would be able to create and find the invention obvious based on past patents
* secondary considerations, which tend to focus on economic and motivational issues rather than technical ones, including:
** commercial success of the invention;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;
** failure of others to find a successful solution, etc.

===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===

• 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Adams created a wet battery that was significantly better than attempts in the past such as greatly increasing current capacity, conducing constant voltage, performance under extreme circumstances like temperature.
• The Supreme Court concluded that although only small changes were made, Adam’s battery was still patentable. The reasons include that experts in the field were amazed it actually worked, and subsequently improved on his invention through their own patents. The patent office failed to cite any evidence against Adams. Therefore the wet battery was clearly not obvious.

===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===

Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or known elements can become patentable. They rule that the four elements of the patent in question serve no new purpose, and are therefore neither inventive nor nonobvious. Although the secondary consideration of commercial success should be considered, it does not by itself indicate invention. With no invention there is clearly no patent.

==Suggestion to Combine==
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.

:"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."
:"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner."

: In summary, this case establishes that a new suggestion requirement be added in regards to the issue of patent denial when combining prior elements in an invention. This requirement is used to protect against claims that use hindsight to claim patentability of inventions invalid. So if a patent is to be dismissed for the reason of combining old elements, it must prove that not only would a person of ordinary skill in the particular field to find the combination obvious, it must also show that an implication to actually combine those elements existed. Just because a skilled person would find the changes obvious, it does not mean that they would have the initiative to actually apply it.

: By implementing this suggestion, it will prevent inventions from becoming unpatentable because of a high ordinary skill. The US Court of Appeals in this decision establishes that inventions are a process of joining together elements of prior art in a manner that is nonobvious.

==Objective Tests==
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.
: Documenting the process of invention becomes very important. If the procedure for developing an invention is well documented it is admissible evidence in establishing ownership, even if its contents are not known for a considerable amount of time after submission.
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.
: This is significant because it marks a turning point in court cases. It now allows judges to take economic considerations into account, which sometimes lead to decisions that contradicted themselves.
*This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.
: “The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”

==The Inventive Step==

An inventive step is an integral part of any invention. It is determined by considering the obviousness of the “inventive” step in relation to the most relevant prior art and deciding if a skilled person in the art finds the invention obvious. If it is not obvious, an inventive step is taken and the patent is valid. Without an inventive step, there is no achievement in the field, and no patent is warranted.

==Relationship with Novelty==

All things that are nonobvious are novel, however all things that are novel are not nonobvious. Due to this both criterion must be satisfied for an invention to be patented. A novelty requirement is much more concrete and therefore is a nice first obstacle to have to ensure that all patents do not reach the stage of ambiguity that nonobviousness is very near to. This bottleneck allows for more time to be spent on legitimate patents where nonobviousness can be delved into deeper.

==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==

Originally the basis for a patent was inventiveness as well as utility and novelty. By the year 1952 inventiveness had become more difficult to ascertain and made way for nonobviousness as a requirement stated in the Act of 1952. Nonobviousness offered a better idea of whether the invention was an actual advancement in the field. This differentiation is clear in the Adams case where small nonobvious advancements were patentable although overall inventiveness would probably be considered small and thus the invention unpatentable.

==Secondary Considerations==

Secondary considerations were taken into account to help decide if inventions were indeed patentable. Although an object being commercially successful does not indicate a patentable invention (it could just be marketed well), it is a strong indicator that the invention is useful and nonobvious. Some cases may have obvious advancements or infringements, but in cases where patentability is in question, it can be helpful to see how the field reacted to the invention. If it was widely accepted, satisfied a long felt need, or succeeded where others failed, there is strong evidence that society is telling you that an advancement was made.

==Ordinary Skill in the Art==

Section 103 of Article 35 of the US Constitution states that a patentable product must be nonobvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art. A person with ordinary skill in the art is considered an average person who works in the field on a regular basis. If this person with ordinary skill in the art either finds the invention trivial and obvious, or has the skills necessary to create the invention, the invention is not patentable.

User:901479977

2011-02-11T10:42:46Z

901479977:

Homework 2/4/11 901479977

2011-02-04T09:08:03Z

901479977: Created page with "'''Argument for Nonobviousness''' The clamp for vibrating shank plows, patent 2627798, is clearly a novel idea with utility in the world of farming. The question arises however..."

'''Argument for Nonobviousness'''

The clamp for vibrating shank plows, patent 2627798, is clearly a novel idea with utility in the world of farming. The question arises however in whether the patent’s advances were obvious. The new Graham design fixed the shank rigidly to the hinge plate. This stopped the problems of fishtailing rather easily. It is worth stating that the simplicity of a design is not what matters, but rather the obviousness of such a design. I believe it took some skill to tighten the shank to the hinge plate without significantly increasing the forces on this member, and this is not obviously the best method for eliminating fishtailing. Along with this advancement, the design became more compact. Less material being used goes hand in hand with a more compact structure, and thus the new plow is less expensive to manufacture. The new patent 26277798 plow is not only better quality (due to no more fishtailing), but also less expensive should be able to be patented. I am aware that secondary considerations are not taken as seriously as hard evidence, but in the Lyon v. Bausch case, Learned Hand reasoned for them to have an effect on the outcome of patent validity cases. Overall the plow is streamlined with all the minor issues fixed and a better-controlled shank.

'''Argument for Obviousness'''

Most of the claims for nonobviousness were based on secondary considerations. It is clear that the main pieces to take into consideration are how obvious the advancements in the patent are to a person with average skill in the trade. From the 2493811 patent it is obvious that the extra support in the new plow would be advantageous to reduce wear on the flanges. It is also obvious that adding a fastening device enhances stability on the horizontal flanges with a better distribution of forces on the aforementioned flange. A more stable plow will distribute forces in a better manner and reduce the need for repairs. The forces on a critical point always need to be reduced. Therefore a reduction in the force at the pivot pin would be an obvious improvement. This was improved in patent 2627798 by manufacturing the pivot pin above the shank rather than the below. All of the above changes are obvious and simple improvements that are in no way improving the public’s knowledge, or advancing the art in any way, shape, or form. The addition of a stirrup prevented vertical oscillations of the shank. This is necessary to plow the fields more effectively. If the plow constantly oscillated, the field would be tilled unevenly, requiring a second plow. It should appear obvious then that people with average skill in the trade would try to rectify this problem, and they easily could with a simple stirrup being added. The tightening of a part as patent 2627798 does to the shank with respect to the hinge plate, is hardly an advancement either. Overall, this patent is invalid because it offers no true advancements, and more importantly, doesn’t make any improvements that are not extremely obvious.

User:901479977

2011-02-04T07:21:03Z

901479977:

User:901479977

2011-01-28T11:32:28Z

901479977:

Homework 1/28/11

2011-01-28T11:31:27Z

901479977: Created page with "== References Cited == The patent for my selected motorcycle helmet with patent number 4519099 cited eleven other patents as a basis for its completion. Two of the most recen..."

== References Cited ==

The patent for my selected motorcycle helmet with patent number 4519099 cited eleven other patents as a basis for its completion. Two of the most recently patented four citations were especially curious when considering the non-obviousness requirements of patentability. One patent, number 4081865[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=UEAvAAAAEBAJ&dq=helmet&as_drrb_ap=q&as_minm_ap=0&as_miny_ap=&as_maxm_ap=0&as_maxy_ap=&as_drrb_is=b&as_minm_is=1&as_miny_is=1980&as_maxm_is=12&as_maxy_is=1989&num=10], was a protective helmet and ventilating system. Another was a helmet with airflow and perspiration control, patent number 4434514[http://www.google.com/patents?id=Js8yAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]. The visor patent cited, number 1610745[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=rlxpAAAAEBAJ&dq=helmet&as_drrb_ap=q&as_minm_ap=0&as_miny_ap=&as_maxm_ap=0&as_maxy_ap=&as_drrb_is=b&as_minm_is=1&as_miny_is=1980&as_maxm_is=12&as_maxy_is=1989&num=10], was issued in 1926 and therefore is of completely free use to the public; however the other two were issued within 10 years of my motorcycles helmet’s patent and are therefore restricted.

The protective helmet and ventilating system provides a ventilating system for cooling the inside of the helmet. It also controls airflow through the helmet. Suction and other pressure relationships are controlled by a valve mechanism attached to the exterior of the helmet. A multi layer system is utilized to create a cushioning effect. Ventilation is achieved by having ridges inside of the helmet directly in contact with the rider’s head. This provides a snug fit necessary for safety while also offering breatheability and comfort. This also provides additional pathways for the cooling air to ventilate the helmet.

The helmet with airflow and perspiration control is made up of a hard molded plastic outer shell and flexible inner shell with openings to stream air through it as well as a brow perspiration pad. The openings in the outer shell are also open in the inner shell. These openings are made long and narrow from the front of the helmet to the back. The slits are narrow to ensure the helmet remains structurally sound. The slits clearly offer flow through the helmet to cool the user, and offer some aerodynamic effect.

The visor patent is that of a common cap with a visor that can be extended merely by pulling it out. This ability offers the option of shielding one’s eyes from the sun one minute to having a cap with no apparent bill at all. Flexible strips hold the extended visor in place, so it is not very stable, but potentially useful.

These three patents were very necessary for the patent of my selected motorcycle helmet, but a few elements seem a little to similar to those in my patent for mine to advance technology as required in the Hotchkiss or A&P cases. The requirements got better defined in the patent act of 1952, and there may be patent issues when comparing to the Lyon case as well.

== Hotchkiss/A&P ==

Under the Hotchkiss and A&P rulings the motorcycle helmet I selected would have been stripped of its patented status. The law at the time stated that there couldn’t be “an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention.” The bike helmet patent expanded on the idea of pressure relationships being controlled by a valve mechanism by placing the input under the visor, thus reducing drag of air for a much sleeker design. This required no more skill than the ordinary worker has in that field. Although the idea was original, useful, and better than the sum of its parts it is not patentable.

The motorcycle helmet also copied the protective helmet and ventilating system’s airflow idea through the helmet although they expanded it to add ventilation under the eye shield along the sides of the head. This idea was probably not original and promoted some progress although not much. This side ventilation doesn’t require any extra skill and is thus not patentable.

The multi layer system of the same previously mentioned patent was also simplified to fewer layers, which did require skill, and advanced the making of helmets. It would have been patentable if made without these other unpatentable features.

The airflow and perspiration control patent’s airflow was copied in terms of holes for airflow and where they were positioned. The holes in the new patent were somewhat original, but they were similarly shaped to ensure helmet strength. The holes were switched from long strips from front to back, to long strips from side-to-side however the locations were very similar. Therefore that piece is not patentable.

The visor patent is old enough that it no longer has any monopoly rights to the idea and thus it is acceptable for extendible visor to be utilized in this manor. There was no specification in terms of materials used in the motorcycle helmet I am tracking as my own so there are no material problems such as a product that is made better and cheaper, or a new manufacturing process. Both of which would not be worthy of a patent under rulings similar to the Hotchkiss case in 1850.

== Lyon ==

Between the A&P trial and the Lyon trial there was the Patent Act of 1952. This act was made to clarify some ambiguous wording in the requirements to attain a patent. It added in an obviousness requirement saying that it was no longer a requirement to require more skill than the ordinary person in that art, but now it must be a change that would not be obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. This allowed patents to be attained more easily because easy to do things that were not obvious were getting patented. As stated in the Lyon case study, “had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952…it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply.” Under this new viewing of patents the motorcycle helmet I am investigating would have, for the most part, been granted a patent with only a few issues.

The valve mechanism used to ensure the visor didn’t cause a significant inconvenience to the consumer, was unique, was not an obvious combination of materials, and advanced the field of helmets. It provided such good aerodynamics that it allowed the manufacturers to offer a visor that extended and created more drag. The multi-laver cushioning system was simplified to fewer layers, which definitely advanced science, and although it was an obvious concept to simplify I am sure it was not easily simplified.

The two parts that do not change with the better-defined rule is probably the expanded ventilating system is probably still unpatentable for the same reasons listed above and the holes for airflow are still far to similar to those shown in the airflow and perspiration control patent. Overall with a few adjustments the new motorcycle helmet would be eligible for exclusive rights. Most of this can be accredited to the change in process requiring no more skill than an ordinary worker in the specified field to not obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the specified field.

User:901479977

2011-01-28T07:58:34Z

901479977:

User:901479977

2011-01-24T07:53:35Z

901479977:

== '''My Patent''' ==

Patent 4268150 : Disposable camera with simplified film advance and indicator

Issued May 19, 1981

This invention is a small disposable camera with a easy to use film advancing mechanism. It also has a very user friendly indicator of the number of pictures remaining in the preloaded film. I found this patent interesting because I enjoy photography, took a photography class in high school. I am looking forward to seeing the progression of this patent to the disposable cameras used today, which incorporate some of these features among others. Here is a link to the patent on google patent[http://www.google.com/patents?id=5MYwAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false].

User:901479977

2011-01-24T07:50:30Z

901479977: Created page with "Patent 4268150 : Disposable camera with simplified film advance and indicator Issued May 19, 1981 This invention is a small disposable camera with a easy to use film advancing ..."

Patent 4268150 : Disposable camera with simplified film advance and indicator

Issued May 19, 1981

This invention is a small disposable camera with a easy to use film advancing mechanism. It also has a very user friendly indicator of the number of pictures remaining in the preloaded film. I found this patent interesting because I enjoy photography, took a photography class in high school. I am looking forward to seeing the progression of this patent to the disposable cameras used today, which incorporate some of these features among others. Here is a link to the patent on google patent[http://www.google.com/patents?id=5MYwAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false].