Bill Goodwine's Wiki - User contributions [en]

https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/api.php?action=feedcontributions&feedformat=atom&user=Cmadiga1 Bill Goodwine's Wiki - User contributions [en] 2026-09-05T17:01:34Z User contributions MediaWiki 1.44.2 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=5089 User:Cmadiga1 2011-05-04T06:03:59Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>==Quanta Brief==<br /> [[CM BriefQuanta|Quanta Brief]]<br /> <br /> ==In re Hall Printed Publication Case==<br /> [[CM InreHall|MIT v Harman]]<br /> <br /> ==Accelerometer Patents==<br /> [[CM Accelerometer|Accelerometer Patentability]]<br /> <br /> ==Brief for Bilski v Kappos==<br /> [[CM_BriefSutton|Brief of Amicus Curiae John Sutton in Support of Petitioners]]<br /> <br /> ==Nonobviousness==<br /> [[CM_NonObviousness|Nonobviousness Homework]]<br /> <br /> == My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Obviousness of the Adams Patent==<br /> *Non-Obvious<br /> **This patent could be considered non-obvious because of two key prior patents. Both of these patents utilize a magnesium electrode, but both Leo Goldenberg in 1868 and Robert T. Wood in 1928. Both of these patents utilize the magnesium electrode, but both dimiss it as a method that will not work. In fact, Wood goes as far as to say "It has been generally accepted that magnesium could not be commercially utilized as a primary cell electrode." This shows how the experiments and inventions had been unsucessful with regards to their experiments, and frankly I do not know how the received patents becasue of the lack of usefulness. Goldenberg writes "Unfortunately experimenters were never able to attain voltages under closed circuit conditions equalling the potential which theoretically should have appeared available. <br /> **Also, as far as the electrolyte, neither of these patents contained cuprous chloride, but they did not use water or indicate it as an option for the electrolyte. Because of this, the water seems to be an innovative and non-obvious aspect of this patent.<br /> <br /> *Obviousness<br /> **It is clear that this is just a combination of prior art, leading to something that had expected results. Magnesium had been used as an electrode by Wood and Goldenberg. Water could have been used by Marie Davy in 1860 and therefore, is just a combination of new innovations. This has a precedent in the Greenwood v Hotchkiss case, and makes the patent obvious.<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> **This patent is of an invention similar to the safety seal described in my patent. The purpose of this invention is to seal a container with a plastic seal that is attached using heat. The seal is removed by pulling on a tab that removes part of the seal, using the remaining part to regulate the amount of contents poured.<br /> **This patent seems to conflict with my patent when it is analyzed using the ruling from Hotchkiss. The ruling from Hotchkiss is that an invention should not be awarded a patent if it is an adaptation that someone of ordinary skill in the craft could have come up with. The only differences between my patent and this one are that the seal can be completely torn off, it is used to prevent tampering instead of using it to preserve the contents, and the seal is made of foil in the tamper resistant seal. These are all innovations that could have been come up with easily by any engineer looking to apply a seal to ensure the safety of the contents, and the change of material is exactly what the ruling was about in Hotchkiss.<br /> **Also, this patent makes my patent obvious being invalid when looked at from the point of view A&P. The A&P case ruled that in order to be issued a patent, an invention can not be the combination of other inventions that simply leads to the sum of the parts. This patent shows a seal with a tab. This, combined with previous foil seals and completely removable seals should lead to my invention having a patent withheld. The sum of these parts leads to exactly what you would expect it to, with is what the A&P case rules as not patentable.<br /> **Also, the law of 35 USC 103 should make my invention un-patentable. According to the code, if someone of ordinary skill could have easily come up with this idea.<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]<br /> **This is a later patent of the safety seal in my patent. This is a seal that also fits under a screw cap that has a double reinforced tab that folds back onto the main seal and fits in place under the cap allowing for the seal to be completely removed when the tab is pulled, with less chance of tearing the tab off due to the extra strength of it.<br /> **Under the ruling from Hotchkiss, it seems as if this is another invention that would not have received a patent. It is obvious to any skilled mechanic to reinforce the seal with two layers to prevent it from tearing. It is better than my patent, but it in no way required a great investment of thought or ingenuity in coming up with the idea. Also, the way of storing the tab under the cap is also obvious and easy to see for any engineer.<br /> **With the A&P ruling in mind, it is also very evident that this is not patentable. The seal was already in common use, and everyone has experienced a case in which double ply was stronger and better than single ply. Therefore, the combination of these two ideas is obvious and adds nothing to the sum of the parts. Because of this, I believe it would not be patented if this ruling was applied to it.<br /> **As far as 35 USC 103, it seems as if any mechanic skilled in the craft (or even not skilled) could have come up with the decisions to add a second layer to the tab to prevent tearing. Everyone has experienced the tab ripping from the seal and felt how frustrating ti can be. So reinforcing the tab is definitely obvious.<br /> *These analyses show that the standards of nonobviousness have changed in recent times. With these inventions in mind, it seems like any invention that improves upon a previous product or combines previous products can be patented. The inventiveness of these new patents may be minimal, but the usefulness and novelty are great. They are important improvements that did take an investment of time and effort, so exclusive rights were granted to them. It shows that the patent office has become more relaxed with its standards, and the court has allowed this to happen. As we have seen in our lifetimes, this leads to very fast innovation in attempts to improve upon previous designs to try and achieve better products. The importance of nonobviousness of the patent has given way to the novelty and usefulness of it.<br /> <br /> ==Honeywell v Sundstrand==<br /> [[CM_Sundstrand|Sundstrand Defense]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=5088 User:Cmadiga1 2011-05-04T06:03:33Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>==Quanta Brief==<br /> [[CM Quanta|Quanta Brief]]<br /> <br /> ==In re Hall Printed Publication Case==<br /> [[CM InreHall|MIT v Harman]]<br /> <br /> ==Accelerometer Patents==<br /> [[CM Accelerometer|Accelerometer Patentability]]<br /> <br /> ==Brief for Bilski v Kappos==<br /> [[CM_BriefSutton|Brief of Amicus Curiae John Sutton in Support of Petitioners]]<br /> <br /> ==Nonobviousness==<br /> [[CM_NonObviousness|Nonobviousness Homework]]<br /> <br /> == My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Obviousness of the Adams Patent==<br /> *Non-Obvious<br /> **This patent could be considered non-obvious because of two key prior patents. Both of these patents utilize a magnesium electrode, but both Leo Goldenberg in 1868 and Robert T. Wood in 1928. Both of these patents utilize the magnesium electrode, but both dimiss it as a method that will not work. In fact, Wood goes as far as to say "It has been generally accepted that magnesium could not be commercially utilized as a primary cell electrode." This shows how the experiments and inventions had been unsucessful with regards to their experiments, and frankly I do not know how the received patents becasue of the lack of usefulness. Goldenberg writes "Unfortunately experimenters were never able to attain voltages under closed circuit conditions equalling the potential which theoretically should have appeared available. <br /> **Also, as far as the electrolyte, neither of these patents contained cuprous chloride, but they did not use water or indicate it as an option for the electrolyte. Because of this, the water seems to be an innovative and non-obvious aspect of this patent.<br /> <br /> *Obviousness<br /> **It is clear that this is just a combination of prior art, leading to something that had expected results. Magnesium had been used as an electrode by Wood and Goldenberg. Water could have been used by Marie Davy in 1860 and therefore, is just a combination of new innovations. This has a precedent in the Greenwood v Hotchkiss case, and makes the patent obvious.<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> **This patent is of an invention similar to the safety seal described in my patent. The purpose of this invention is to seal a container with a plastic seal that is attached using heat. The seal is removed by pulling on a tab that removes part of the seal, using the remaining part to regulate the amount of contents poured.<br /> **This patent seems to conflict with my patent when it is analyzed using the ruling from Hotchkiss. The ruling from Hotchkiss is that an invention should not be awarded a patent if it is an adaptation that someone of ordinary skill in the craft could have come up with. The only differences between my patent and this one are that the seal can be completely torn off, it is used to prevent tampering instead of using it to preserve the contents, and the seal is made of foil in the tamper resistant seal. These are all innovations that could have been come up with easily by any engineer looking to apply a seal to ensure the safety of the contents, and the change of material is exactly what the ruling was about in Hotchkiss.<br /> **Also, this patent makes my patent obvious being invalid when looked at from the point of view A&P. The A&P case ruled that in order to be issued a patent, an invention can not be the combination of other inventions that simply leads to the sum of the parts. This patent shows a seal with a tab. This, combined with previous foil seals and completely removable seals should lead to my invention having a patent withheld. The sum of these parts leads to exactly what you would expect it to, with is what the A&P case rules as not patentable.<br /> **Also, the law of 35 USC 103 should make my invention un-patentable. According to the code, if someone of ordinary skill could have easily come up with this idea.<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]<br /> **This is a later patent of the safety seal in my patent. This is a seal that also fits under a screw cap that has a double reinforced tab that folds back onto the main seal and fits in place under the cap allowing for the seal to be completely removed when the tab is pulled, with less chance of tearing the tab off due to the extra strength of it.<br /> **Under the ruling from Hotchkiss, it seems as if this is another invention that would not have received a patent. It is obvious to any skilled mechanic to reinforce the seal with two layers to prevent it from tearing. It is better than my patent, but it in no way required a great investment of thought or ingenuity in coming up with the idea. Also, the way of storing the tab under the cap is also obvious and easy to see for any engineer.<br /> **With the A&P ruling in mind, it is also very evident that this is not patentable. The seal was already in common use, and everyone has experienced a case in which double ply was stronger and better than single ply. Therefore, the combination of these two ideas is obvious and adds nothing to the sum of the parts. Because of this, I believe it would not be patented if this ruling was applied to it.<br /> **As far as 35 USC 103, it seems as if any mechanic skilled in the craft (or even not skilled) could have come up with the decisions to add a second layer to the tab to prevent tearing. Everyone has experienced the tab ripping from the seal and felt how frustrating ti can be. So reinforcing the tab is definitely obvious.<br /> *These analyses show that the standards of nonobviousness have changed in recent times. With these inventions in mind, it seems like any invention that improves upon a previous product or combines previous products can be patented. The inventiveness of these new patents may be minimal, but the usefulness and novelty are great. They are important improvements that did take an investment of time and effort, so exclusive rights were granted to them. It shows that the patent office has become more relaxed with its standards, and the court has allowed this to happen. As we have seen in our lifetimes, this leads to very fast innovation in attempts to improve upon previous designs to try and achieve better products. The importance of nonobviousness of the patent has given way to the novelty and usefulness of it.<br /> <br /> ==Honeywell v Sundstrand==<br /> [[CM_Sundstrand|Sundstrand Defense]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_InreHall&diff=5087 CM InreHall 2011-05-04T06:01:51Z

<p>Cmadiga1: Created page with "MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, Plaintiff, v. HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant. 584 F.Supp.2d 297 D.Mass.,2008. In this case, Harman International Indust..."</p> <hr /> <div>MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, Plaintiff,<br /> v.<br /> HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant.<br /> <br /> 584 F.Supp.2d 297<br /> D.Mass.,2008.<br /> <br /> In this case, Harman International Industries was sued by MIT for infringing upon a patent of voice recognition software for automobile navigation systems. The program was developed by MIT and no one signed a confidentiality agreement. A thesis was written on the subject by the inventor, Davis, and the thesis was public. Fortunately, the ruling was handed down that the public use bar was not violated, and that the amound of confidentiality and experimentation was enough to hold the standing. The thesis was not publicly available enough to count as published.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Here_in_list_of_arguments_in_Quanta&diff=5086 Here in list of arguments in Quanta 2011-05-04T05:51:12Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>Post a link to your summary of the brief you read here.<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief Summary 901330223]]<br /> <br /> [[901349446 Quanta Brief]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief Summary 901471466]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief Summary 901422128]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief Summary Jacob Marmolejo]]<br /> <br /> [[Homework 8 (due Friday 28)~jnosal | Quanta Brief Summary 901438174]]<br /> <br /> [[Mitros: Quanta Brief]]<br /> <br /> [[Zahm Homework 31: Quanta Brief]]<br /> <br /> [[901419437 Quanta v. LGE Brief Summary]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief 901437068]]<br /> <br /> [[901281608: Quanta Brief]]<br /> <br /> [[901444263: Quanta v. LGE Reply Brief of Petitioners]]<br /> <br /> [[901479977: Quanta for Petitioners]]<br /> <br /> [[Apr. 29th: Brief Summary (2007 WL 3440937) - Andrew McBride]]<br /> <br /> [[Reply Brief of Petitioners (Quanta) - Adam Mahood]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief Summary 901360293]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief Summary 901431048]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief Brobins]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief hwong1]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief: Tennant]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief - Snooki]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief (John Gallagher)]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta brief - 901338276]]<br /> <br /> [[Brief of Amici Curiae for Respondent - Eric Leis]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief - Kschlax]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief - Christine Roetzel]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief: In support of Federal Circuit Ruling (eguilbea)]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief: 901424607]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief - 901425018]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief- Xiao Dong]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief - Ackroyd]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief - Karch]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta_Brief_Carter]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief - ewolz]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief - Andrew Chipouras]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief - Kristen Kemnetz]]<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief - Craig Krzyskowski]]<br /> <br /> [[CM BriefQuanta| CMadiga1 Brief]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_BriefQuanta&diff=5085 CM BriefQuanta 2011-05-04T05:50:05Z

<p>Cmadiga1: Created page with "Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents 2007 WL 4340881 *Patentee has the right to sell or lease a patent's rights *The ri..."</p> <hr /> <div>Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents<br /> <br /> 2007 WL 4340881<br /> <br /> *Patentee has the right to sell or lease a patent's rights<br /> *The rights do not increase or decrease when transferred to the purchaser<br /> *This is regardless of the type of patent, product or method<br /> *Many businesses rely on this leasing/purchasing<br /> *Provides reward to premote the progress of science and useful arts<br /> *The doctrine of patent exaushtion helps prevent "Double Dipping" from the patentee<br /> **The product and its use could both be sold, with either one being infringed by the other<br /> *If there is no allegation of illegal conduct, the doctrine of patent exhaustion should find no application</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_Sundstrand&diff=4663 CM Sundstrand 2011-04-06T05:27:32Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>==Defense of Sundstrand in the Supreme Court==<br /> *The case starts with a great description of the problem at hand: “The patents at issue claim technology to control airflow surge in “APUs.” An APU is a gas turbine engine often used in the tail end of aircraft. Because APUs face rapidly changing demand levels for compressed air during flight, they must control against “surges.” A surge is an aerodynamic phenomenon, which occurs when airflow through the compressor is too low. In a surge condition, the airflow cannot exit the compressor. Instead, the airflow surges back into the compressor, potentially damaging the APU.”<br /> *The key to this case is the foreseeability criterion. While Honeywell did invent the APU technology first, it was clear in their patent that they were aware of the issues that would arise and the ways to control them from a process standpoint. It was common knowledge and there was also a prior precedent for this technology established in earlier patents. The IGVs and their positions were something that an ordinary design engineer for these engines could come up with as a solution to the problem of surges.<br /> *In the first description, it is obvious that Honeywell was well aware of this issue. They knew that surges were a problem for this product, and any product like this one, and that the surges could be avoided with a simple institution of age old “Venetian blinds” for air control. As an expert testified, this is something that any engineer designing the engine could have come up with, with the optimal positions of the IGVs readily available in literature. In fact, even Honeywell's expert stated the following in response to a question: “Q: In fact, going back to the 1970s, it was Honeywell's understanding that in order to efficiently control surge, you would need to take into account inlet guide vane angle and input into your surge control system. Correct? A: Well, by using this information you can incrementally improve the operation of a surge controller, yes.” Honeywell was well aware of the necessity of using IGV in the APUs, but they neglected to patent it. Therefore, it is not infringing to produce a system using IGVs because it is not equivalent. It is a better product that does not have the same problems as the previous invention.<br /> *The court states the following on the foreseeability criterion: “The foreseeability criterion presents an objective inquiry, asking whether the ... equivalent would have been unforeseeable to one of ordinary skill in the art ... Usually, if the alleged equivalent represents later-developed technology (e.g., transistors in relation to vacuum tubes, or Velcro (R) in relation to fasteners) or technology that was not known in the relevant art, then it would not have been foreseeable.” Nothing can change the fact that the innovation applied by Sundstrand was an old technology that had been in use since the 1970's. Because of this simple fact, it cannot be considered an equivalent because this factor was not mentioned in Honeywell's patent. The innovation was not something that completely blind-sided the industry. It was a development that was in use in other areas, but could easily be extrapolated to serve the same purpose for controlling surges in APUs. This shows that the invention of Honeywell was not equivilent with the invention Sundstrand came up with.<br /> *“Because Honeywell did not show that the alleged equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the narrowing amendment or that the narrowing amendment bore no more than a tangential relation to the alleged equivalent, this court affirms.” This is the correct ruling in this case because any engineer worth his weight could have designed this particular solution, and it was omitted from the original patent document where it could have easily been included. There should be no overturning of this ruling in the Supreme Court because of the cut and dry nature of the foreseeability. It was clear to anyone of ordinary skill in the art that this is the solution to the problem of surges in APUs. Because of this, Sundstrand should not be able to file for a patent, but Honeywell should not be able to prosecute them for infringing upon the patent for the original APUs.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_Sundstrand&diff=4662 CM Sundstrand 2011-04-06T05:27:14Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>==Defense of Sundstrand in the Supreme Court==<br /> *The case starts with a great description of the problem at hand: “The patents at issue claim technology to control airflow surge in “APUs.” An APU is a gas turbine engine often used in the tail end of aircraft. Because APUs face rapidly changing demand levels for compressed air during flight, they must control against “surges.” A surge is an aerodynamic phenomenon, which occurs when airflow through the compressor is too low. In a surge condition, the airflow cannot exit the compressor. Instead, the airflow surges back into the compressor, potentially damaging the APU.”<br /> *The key to this case is the foreseeability criterion. While Honeywell did invent the APU technology first, it was clear in their patent that they were aware of the issues that would arise and the ways to control them from a process standpoint. It was common knowledge and there was also a prior precedent for this technology established in earlier patents. The IGVs and their positions were something that an ordinary design engineer for these engines could come up with as a solution to the problem of surges.<br /> *In the first description, it is obvious that Honeywell was well aware of this issue. They knew that surges were a problem for this product, and any product like this one, and that the surges could be avoided with a simple institution of age old “Venetian blinds” for air control. As an expert testified, this is something that any engineer designing the engine could have come up with, with the optimal positions of the IGVs readily available in literature. In fact, even Honeywell's expert stated the following in response to a question: “Q: In fact, going back to the 1970s, it was Honeywell's understanding that in order to efficiently control surge, you would need to take into account inlet guide vane angle and input into your surge control system. Correct? A: Well, by using this information you can incrementally improve the operation of a surge controller, yes.” Honeywell was well aware of the necessity of using IGV in the APUs, but they neglected to patent it. Therefore, it is not infringing to produce a system using IGVs because it is not equivalent. It is a better product that does not have the same problems as the previous invention.<br /> *The court states the following on the foreseeability criterion: “The foreseeability criterion presents an objective inquiry, asking whether the ... equivalent would have been unforeseeable to one of ordinary skill in the art ... Usually, if the alleged equivalent represents later-developed technology (e.g., transistors in relation to vacuum tubes, or Velcro (R) in relation to fasteners) or technology that was not known in the relevant art, then it would not have been foreseeable.” Nothing can change the fact that the innovation applied by Sundstrand was an old technology that had been in use since the 1970's. Because of this simple fact, it cannot be considered an equivalent because this factor was not mentioned in Honeywell's patent. The innovation was not something that completely blind-sided the industry. It was a development that was in use in other areas, but could easily be extrapolated to serve the same purpose for controlling surges in APUs. This shows that the invention of Honeywell was not equivilent with the invention Sundstrand came up with.<br /> “Because Honeywell did not show that the alleged equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the narrowing amendment or that the narrowing amendment bore no more than a tangential relation to the alleged equivalent, this court affirms.” This is the correct ruling in this case because any engineer worth his weight could have designed this particular solution, and it was omitted from the original patent document where it could have easily been included. There should be no overturning of this ruling in the Supreme Court because of the cut and dry nature of the foreseeability. It was clear to anyone of ordinary skill in the art that this is the solution to the problem of surges in APUs. Because of this, Sundstrand should not be able to file for a patent, but Honeywell should not be able to prosecute them for infringing upon the patent for the original APUs.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_Sundstrand&diff=4661 CM Sundstrand 2011-04-06T05:27:02Z

<p>Cmadiga1: Created page with "==Defense of Sundstrand in the Supreme Court *The case starts with a great description of the problem at hand: “The patents at issue claim technology to control airflow surge i..."</p> <hr /> <div>==Defense of Sundstrand in the Supreme Court<br /> *The case starts with a great description of the problem at hand: “The patents at issue claim technology to control airflow surge in “APUs.” An APU is a gas turbine engine often used in the tail end of aircraft. Because APUs face rapidly changing demand levels for compressed air during flight, they must control against “surges.” A surge is an aerodynamic phenomenon, which occurs when airflow through the compressor is too low. In a surge condition, the airflow cannot exit the compressor. Instead, the airflow surges back into the compressor, potentially damaging the APU.”<br /> *The key to this case is the foreseeability criterion. While Honeywell did invent the APU technology first, it was clear in their patent that they were aware of the issues that would arise and the ways to control them from a process standpoint. It was common knowledge and there was also a prior precedent for this technology established in earlier patents. The IGVs and their positions were something that an ordinary design engineer for these engines could come up with as a solution to the problem of surges.<br /> *In the first description, it is obvious that Honeywell was well aware of this issue. They knew that surges were a problem for this product, and any product like this one, and that the surges could be avoided with a simple institution of age old “Venetian blinds” for air control. As an expert testified, this is something that any engineer designing the engine could have come up with, with the optimal positions of the IGVs readily available in literature. In fact, even Honeywell's expert stated the following in response to a question: “Q: In fact, going back to the 1970s, it was Honeywell's understanding that in order to efficiently control surge, you would need to take into account inlet guide vane angle and input into your surge control system. Correct? A: Well, by using this information you can incrementally improve the operation of a surge controller, yes.” Honeywell was well aware of the necessity of using IGV in the APUs, but they neglected to patent it. Therefore, it is not infringing to produce a system using IGVs because it is not equivalent. It is a better product that does not have the same problems as the previous invention.<br /> *The court states the following on the foreseeability criterion: “The foreseeability criterion presents an objective inquiry, asking whether the ... equivalent would have been unforeseeable to one of ordinary skill in the art ... Usually, if the alleged equivalent represents later-developed technology (e.g., transistors in relation to vacuum tubes, or Velcro (R) in relation to fasteners) or technology that was not known in the relevant art, then it would not have been foreseeable.” Nothing can change the fact that the innovation applied by Sundstrand was an old technology that had been in use since the 1970's. Because of this simple fact, it cannot be considered an equivalent because this factor was not mentioned in Honeywell's patent. The innovation was not something that completely blind-sided the industry. It was a development that was in use in other areas, but could easily be extrapolated to serve the same purpose for controlling surges in APUs. This shows that the invention of Honeywell was not equivilent with the invention Sundstrand came up with.<br /> “Because Honeywell did not show that the alleged equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the narrowing amendment or that the narrowing amendment bore no more than a tangential relation to the alleged equivalent, this court affirms.” This is the correct ruling in this case because any engineer worth his weight could have designed this particular solution, and it was omitted from the original patent document where it could have easily been included. There should be no overturning of this ruling in the Supreme Court because of the cut and dry nature of the foreseeability. It was clear to anyone of ordinary skill in the art that this is the solution to the problem of surges in APUs. Because of this, Sundstrand should not be able to file for a patent, but Honeywell should not be able to prosecute them for infringing upon the patent for the original APUs.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=4660 User:Cmadiga1 2011-04-06T05:26:00Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>==Accelerometer Patents==<br /> [[CM Accelerometer|Accelerometer Patentability]]<br /> <br /> ==Brief for Bilski v Kappos==<br /> [[CM_BriefSutton|Brief of Amicus Curiae John Sutton in Support of Petitioners]]<br /> <br /> ==Nonobviousness==<br /> [[CM_NonObviousness|Nonobviousness Homework]]<br /> <br /> == My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Obviousness of the Adams Patent==<br /> *Non-Obvious<br /> **This patent could be considered non-obvious because of two key prior patents. Both of these patents utilize a magnesium electrode, but both Leo Goldenberg in 1868 and Robert T. Wood in 1928. Both of these patents utilize the magnesium electrode, but both dimiss it as a method that will not work. In fact, Wood goes as far as to say "It has been generally accepted that magnesium could not be commercially utilized as a primary cell electrode." This shows how the experiments and inventions had been unsucessful with regards to their experiments, and frankly I do not know how the received patents becasue of the lack of usefulness. Goldenberg writes "Unfortunately experimenters were never able to attain voltages under closed circuit conditions equalling the potential which theoretically should have appeared available. <br /> **Also, as far as the electrolyte, neither of these patents contained cuprous chloride, but they did not use water or indicate it as an option for the electrolyte. Because of this, the water seems to be an innovative and non-obvious aspect of this patent.<br /> <br /> *Obviousness<br /> **It is clear that this is just a combination of prior art, leading to something that had expected results. Magnesium had been used as an electrode by Wood and Goldenberg. Water could have been used by Marie Davy in 1860 and therefore, is just a combination of new innovations. This has a precedent in the Greenwood v Hotchkiss case, and makes the patent obvious.<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> **This patent is of an invention similar to the safety seal described in my patent. The purpose of this invention is to seal a container with a plastic seal that is attached using heat. The seal is removed by pulling on a tab that removes part of the seal, using the remaining part to regulate the amount of contents poured.<br /> **This patent seems to conflict with my patent when it is analyzed using the ruling from Hotchkiss. The ruling from Hotchkiss is that an invention should not be awarded a patent if it is an adaptation that someone of ordinary skill in the craft could have come up with. The only differences between my patent and this one are that the seal can be completely torn off, it is used to prevent tampering instead of using it to preserve the contents, and the seal is made of foil in the tamper resistant seal. These are all innovations that could have been come up with easily by any engineer looking to apply a seal to ensure the safety of the contents, and the change of material is exactly what the ruling was about in Hotchkiss.<br /> **Also, this patent makes my patent obvious being invalid when looked at from the point of view A&P. The A&P case ruled that in order to be issued a patent, an invention can not be the combination of other inventions that simply leads to the sum of the parts. This patent shows a seal with a tab. This, combined with previous foil seals and completely removable seals should lead to my invention having a patent withheld. The sum of these parts leads to exactly what you would expect it to, with is what the A&P case rules as not patentable.<br /> **Also, the law of 35 USC 103 should make my invention un-patentable. According to the code, if someone of ordinary skill could have easily come up with this idea.<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]<br /> **This is a later patent of the safety seal in my patent. This is a seal that also fits under a screw cap that has a double reinforced tab that folds back onto the main seal and fits in place under the cap allowing for the seal to be completely removed when the tab is pulled, with less chance of tearing the tab off due to the extra strength of it.<br /> **Under the ruling from Hotchkiss, it seems as if this is another invention that would not have received a patent. It is obvious to any skilled mechanic to reinforce the seal with two layers to prevent it from tearing. It is better than my patent, but it in no way required a great investment of thought or ingenuity in coming up with the idea. Also, the way of storing the tab under the cap is also obvious and easy to see for any engineer.<br /> **With the A&P ruling in mind, it is also very evident that this is not patentable. The seal was already in common use, and everyone has experienced a case in which double ply was stronger and better than single ply. Therefore, the combination of these two ideas is obvious and adds nothing to the sum of the parts. Because of this, I believe it would not be patented if this ruling was applied to it.<br /> **As far as 35 USC 103, it seems as if any mechanic skilled in the craft (or even not skilled) could have come up with the decisions to add a second layer to the tab to prevent tearing. Everyone has experienced the tab ripping from the seal and felt how frustrating ti can be. So reinforcing the tab is definitely obvious.<br /> *These analyses show that the standards of nonobviousness have changed in recent times. With these inventions in mind, it seems like any invention that improves upon a previous product or combines previous products can be patented. The inventiveness of these new patents may be minimal, but the usefulness and novelty are great. They are important improvements that did take an investment of time and effort, so exclusive rights were granted to them. It shows that the patent office has become more relaxed with its standards, and the court has allowed this to happen. As we have seen in our lifetimes, this leads to very fast innovation in attempts to improve upon previous designs to try and achieve better products. The importance of nonobviousness of the patent has given way to the novelty and usefulness of it.<br /> <br /> ==Honeywell v Sundstrand==<br /> [[CM_Sundstrand|Sundstrand Defense]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Doctrine_of_Equivalents_Case_List&diff=4574 Doctrine of Equivalents Case List 2011-04-04T06:01:25Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>Add your case to the list with a one-paragraph (approximately 250 words) summary of the facts at issues, i.e., "an umbrella is or is not equivalent to a parasol because..."<br /> <br /> Please put the cases in chronological order. If two are from the same year, then put them in alphabetical order. Also put your name, your login name or NDID number with your case. Use the following for a template.<br /> <br /> * Goodwine v. Batill, 123 US 4567 (1066)<br /> This case concerned a patent for an iPad and the patentee sued the maker of an iPod for infringement. The important part of the claim was "a device for playing music and other media comprising a touch screen..." The court held that iPod infringed the iPad patent because the ... was equivalent to the ... because ...<br /> <br /> Bill Goodwine<br /> <br /> * Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968), (67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)<br /> This case was discussed in class and presented by another student, but I read it as well. This case concerned a patent for a gyroscope owned by Adkins, the inventor of an improved gyroscope, and Lear, the company that sells gyroscopes. Lear and Adkins had a written agreement that allowed Lear to sell Adkin’s patented invention, where Adkins received a small percentage of the net sales price as royalties. In 1957, Lear refused to pay royalties to Adkins with the claim that they were selling gyroscopes that differed from Adkin’s invention. However, the “new” gyroscopes differed only in “size, form, and shape,” but “contain[ed] the same elements.” The essential elements were the same between Adkin’s patent and Lear’s other steel gyroscopes, but the scale and exact assembly was different. Since those did not constitute a substantial difference, the jury of the Supreme Court of California held Adkins in favor and required Lear to pay royalties to Adkins for the sales price of the other gyroscopes sold. This case is an example of clear infringement.<br /> <br /> 901431048<br /> <br /> * Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968)(67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)<br /> I am the other student^^^(see case above). Other items of note in the case, aside from the summary above, include that the court ruled that infringing the doctrine of equivalence is a matter of fact and that the jury should be the one to establish it. This brings up an interesting qualification, as it seems almost every other case considered with respect to the doctrine of equivalence was decided by judges, not juries.<br /> <br /> Brobins<br /> <br /> *AMEC Liquidating Trust v. IVAC Corporation, 885 F.2d 1574 (1989)<br /> <br /> AMEC had a patent for a thermometer with a plastic cover held on by a hooking type mechanism. IVAC created a thermometer with a cover held on by a ring that created a friction lock. The CAFC held the IVAC invention was non-infringing on the AMEC patent because under the doctrine of equivalents, it did not perform the same function in the same way. The AMEC thermometer cover used an inscription fit, which created deep scratches in the cover. The IVAC thermometer used a friction fit, which only created superficial scratches in the cover. The CAFC found that the superficial scratches did not constitute an inscription fit. Also, the CAFC decided that AMEC did not present any evidence proving that the ring in the IVAC patent was equivalent to the “hook” in the AMEC patent. Because of this, the patent was non-infringing under the doctrine of equivalents.<br /> <br /> 901444263<br /> <br /> *Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574 (1989)<br /> <br /> The inventor, Turner, invented a thermometer probe cover that stays on (this was owned by AMEC). It kept the cover on via a sharp metal hook to tear into the cover’s plastic. IVAC developed a thermometer that served a similar purpose of keeping the probe cover on, except that it did so with a ring on the probe (to hold the cover via friction). IVAC intentionally left the probe free of any sharp edge to ease the removal of the probe cover when needed. District Court of Southern California ruled in summary judgment that IVAC’s thermometer probe covers do not infringe AMEC’s. On appeal from AMEC, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. A ring that does not tear the plastic cover is not equivalent to the hook that does. [http://campus.westlaw.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/result/default.wl?mt=CampusLaw&db=ALLCASES&rlt=CLID_QRYRLT4121840350313&origin=Search&sp=003654480-2000&method=TNC&cfid=1&rp=%2fwelcome%2fCampusLaw%2fdefault.wl&eq=welcome%2fCampusLaw&rltdb=CLID_DB1095239350313&srch=TRUE&query=TI(JOHNSTON+%26+IVAC)&vr=2.0&fmqv=s&action=Search&fn=_top&service=Search&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.01]<br /> <br /> 901471466<br /> <br /> *Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates (1990)<br /> <br /> Wilson is suing DGA/Dunlop for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents of its patented design for a golf ball. Wilson's patent is for a golf ball modeled as an icosahedron with dimples placed in such a way as to have 6 "great circles" of symmetry instead of the typical 1. The patent specifies where dimples should be placed on the ball and requires that no dimples be placed on the great circles. The accused DGA balls use the same "great circles" design, but with dimples placed on the great circles. DGA's defense is that there is "no principled difference" between its design and a design of the prior art (prior to Wilson's patent). Therefore, allowing Wilson to utilize the doctrine of equivalents would extend protection of claims already in the prior art to Wilson's patent. The CAFC decided that Wilson can only utilize the doctrine of equivalents if it can make a hypothetical claim that literally covers Dunlop's design (in this case, claim a ball with dimples placed on the great circles) and is also nonobvious considering the prior art. Wilson is unable to make such a nonobvious hypothetical claim and therefore no infringement was found.<br /> <br /> 901338276<br /> <br /> * Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202 (1992) <br /> <br /> Lemelson sued Mattel, alleging that Mattel's "Hot Wheels" toy car track infringed on his patented toy track. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of the plaintiff. Mattel appealed to the CAFC. The Court held that the "Hot Wheels" track did not contain all the limitations of the patent; it was equivalent to the prior art. That is, Lemelson's patent could not be both valid in light of the prior art and infringed upon by Mattel. Furthermore, upon his first application, claim 3 of Lemelson's patent had five clauses. The PTO examiner found the patent to be indistinguishable from the prior art. Lemelson added clauses [f] and [g] and received a patent. The important parts of the claim were, "[f] said guide means include a pair of spaced apart runner portions for defining the pathway of a vehicle moving over said track, [g] said spaced apart runner portions include upwardly extending rails for guiding the wheels of a vehicle." The Court held that "Hot wheels" did not contain any elements equivalent to the clauses [f] and [g]. The Court also noted that the public is entitled to the PTO record to determine the scope and meaning of claims. <br /> <br /> 901330223<br /> <br /> *Valmont Industries Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing Company Inc., 983 F.2d 1039 (1993)<br /> <br /> 901316153<br /> <br /> This case concerns an adaption for center-pivot (i.e. rotating) irrigation systems. The adaption (an apparatus that attaches to the main frame of the sprinkler) allows the corners of a field, normally missed by the standard rotating irrigation system, to be watered. The infringement issue relates to the means by which the position of the sprinkler is detected, relative to the field. The patent uses a method of pivot angle encoders, while the "infringing" patent uses buried electromagnetic cables to guide the sprinkler around the field.<br /> <br /> The CAFC ruled that the second device was not infringing, reversing the decision of the district court. The district court argued that the means of controlling the system were equivalent. The CAFC's argument was that while the two irrigation systems performed substantially the same overall function to obtain substantially the same overall result as the claimed invention, the way those results were achieved was substantially different. "Comparison of these two control means compels the conclusion that the claimed control means and Reinke's control means are not structurally equivalent.[...][E]ven though both the control means in the specification and the control means on Reinke's device use electric signals, the structures generating those signals are strikingly different." <br /> <br /> Because the doctrine of equivalence requires that the two devices perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same results, the two control systems were not equivalent under the doctrine of equivalence because they did not meet the "way" requirement of the doctrine of equivalence.<br /> <br /> *William Bradshaw and Robert Shepherd v. Igloo Products Corp. 1997 WL 543109 (US District Court, N.D.Ill.)<br /> <br /> William Bradshaw sued Igloo Products for infringement of a wheeled cooler. Bradshaw’s patent was for a cooler with a pulling handle and two lifting handles, one of which was connected on the same axle as the pulling handle. The Igloo products in question were the Rolling Kool Locker which had a rotatable lifting hand that can also be used to pull the cooler and the Cool Roller which had separate lifting and pulling handles coupled to separate axles. The court decided that the prior art for the Cool Roller was a different patent, the Mason patent. This patent was for a wheeled cooler with separate lifting and pulling handles. The Mason patent was granted before Bradshaw’s patent. The court ruled that the Cool Roller fell under the Mason patent. Therefore, if Bradshaw’s patent were to be expanded to include the Cool Roller’s handles, it would be an invalid patent as a result of the prior art, the Mason patent. This leads to a method of deciding infringement. If the product in question mimics prior art, then it cannot infringe the patent otherwise that patent would be invalid. In deciding infringement for the Rolling Kool Locker, the court decided that it was up to a jury to decide whether the Kool Lockers handles were equivalent to Bradshaw’s patent, since there was no other glaring evidence. <br /> <br /> Eric Paul<br /> <br /> * Dr. Raymond G. Tronzo v. Biomet Inc. 1998 156 F.3d 1154 (United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit)<br /> In this case Biomet was accused of infringement of an artificial hip prosthesis patented by Dr. Tronzo (patent 4,743,262). The alleged infringement revolved around the shape of the artificial hip socket and the hinge that was inserted into the socket. Patent ‘262 claimed a “generally conical” shape of the hip socket. Biomet’s design contained a strictly hemispherical shape. The court heard evidence in which it was claimed that even though the shapes would have at first glance performed in the same manner, the forces generated on the surface of each implant would be different depending on the shape. Additionally, after hearing expert testimony that suggested any shape would have been equivalent to the conical limitations of the patent claims, the court said that such a ruling would have been impermissible under the all-elements rule of Warner Jenkinson because it would write the “generally conical” shape limitation out of the claims. Therefore, the court held that the accused design did not infringe upon the patent claims under the doctrine of equivalence. <br /> <br /> Peter Mitros (901461727)<br /> <br /> *Hale Propeller, L.L.C. v Ryan Marine Products Pty., LTD., et al, 151 F. Supp .2d 183 (2001) Connecticut District Court<br /> Ryan owned patent 4411073, issued on 25 October 1983, which concerned devices to measure the pitch of propeller blades. Ryan originally filed the claim on 13 July 1981 it was rejected and then ammended on 4 October 1982. Hale's device called the "Hale Propeller MRI" was developed in 1997. In question are claims 1(b),(c),(f), and 6. A third party, Michigan Wheel Corporation, a distributor of Hale's invention filed for patent invalidity. The important differences between Hale's and Ryan's device are that Hale's does not use gears or worm-drives to rotate the blade and the device does not give direct readouts of the measurements using electric circuits. The issue with claim 1(b) was if a roller was a necessary part of the structure because it prevents skipping of the probe making the measurements more accurate. The court used means-plus-function to rule that the roller was important and Hale did not infringe. The issue with claim 1(c) deals with whether a worm or gear drive is necessary to rotate the blade. Ryan's patent discloses a hand-cranked device, like Hales, but includes a worm-drive. Part of Ryan's ammendment to his claim was to include worm gear to the hand-cranking device and therefore the court used prosecution history estoppel to make their decision because Ryan forfeited that claim (hand-cranked device without worm-drive) in order to get the patent and therefore cannot use doctrine of equivalents to get the claim back. The issue of claim 1(f) was whether the computer in the claim was a special computer needed for the readouts. The court ruled that the claim was not that narrow, but then the court ruled that claim 6 dealt with a computer that receives measurement data from the optical encoder and therefore Hale did not infringe. The patent was also ruled valid using the roller and worm drive to prove that it was non-obvious §103, definitively disclosed §112, and not anticipated by prior art §102(b).<br /> <br /> Gillian Allsup<br /> <br /> <br /> 901281608<br /> <br /> <br /> *Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc. Nos. 2010-1145, 2010-117. (2001) United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> <br /> <br /> This case began as an infringement lawsuit by Siemens Medical Solutions USA, inc. against Saint-Gobain Ceramics and Plastics, Inc. for the alleged infringement of a patent held by Siemens for a scintillator, a part of an x-ray machine that detects radiation. Saint-Gobain owned a patent for a similar device and the circuit court found that this patent infringed on the patent held by Siemens, which was filed earlier. Though the doctrine of equivalents was used to rule infringement, Saint-Gobain was found to have accidentally, rather than willfully infringed and Siemens was awarded 52.3 million dollars. <br /> <br /> Siemens filed for patent number 4,958,080 on August 4, 1989. This patent was for a scintillator containing cerium-doped- lutetium oxyorthosilicate. This is a component of a radiation detector that absorbs gamma-ray photons from an x-ray machine and converts them to visible light so the results can be interpreted. Saint-Gobain also produces scintillators, filing patent number 6,6424,420 in 2000 for a cerium-doped lutetium-yttrium orthosilicate. The chemical composition differs from that of the Siemens' patent as %10 of the lutetium is substituted for yttrium. These scintillators were sold by Saint-Gobain to Philips Medical Systems, a competitor of Siemens. The circuit court found that the composition of Saint-Gobain's scintillator preformed largely the same function in the same manner as Siemens' patent, and therefore was infringement under the doctrine of equivalence. <br /> <br /> Saint-Gobain filed a motion for a new trail, on the basis that the jury was not told that infringement by the doctrine of equivalence must be proved by clear evidence and argued that damages should be remitted. The Federal Appeals Court did not grant Saint-Gobain a new trial, but did reduces the damages to 44 million. <br /> <br /> <br /> *Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Homedics, Inc., Slip Copy, 2010 WL 5230892 (2010)<br /> <br /> This case involved a patent for a force-transmitting bearing used with a platform scale. Sunbeam held a patent which specified bearings which were attached to the platform via loose tabs which allowed the bearings to move horizontally. The patent claims required the base of the bearing to be oriented parallel to the platform and remain parallel to the platform at all times. The structure of the accused device was such that the bearings were connection to the platforms using dimples on the lower surface of the platform which the bearings fit into. Sunbeam had criticized prior art which used a similar dimple connection during prosecution beacuse of the potential for unwanted force moments applied by the bearing. The CAFC upheld the District Court's finding of no infringement based on the doctrine of equivalents because bearings which rocked and pivoted, as the accused device did, did not fall within the reach of the patent claims because they did not remain parallel to the platform at all times.<br /> <br /> 901422128<br /> <br /> *Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326 (2001)<br /> Kustom Signals held a patent for a multimode traffic radar system which will show either the fastest speed or the strongest signal. Three of the claims used the word "or" in their wording. Kustom claimed that the "or" was a logical operator meaning one, the other, or both. Applied Concepts had designed a radar system which returned both the fastest speed and the strongest signal. The Court held that the word "or" was to hold its traditional, customary meaning as being exclusive, not inclusive, of the two statements.<br /> <br /> 901 41 7852<br /> <br /> *Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc., 126 F. 3d 1420 (1997)<br /> <br /> Sage Products sued Devon Industries for infringement of several patents relating to containers for disposing of hazardous medical waste (needles etc.). Devon counter-sued for infringement of one of its similar patents. The district court held (on summary judgment) that there was no infringement by either party literally or equivalently. The appellate court affirmed. <br /> <br /> <br /> Devon’s first alleged infringement was of Sage’s container claiming an elongated slot "at the top" of the apparatus for which to deposit waste, and a "barrier over the slot" to prevent contamination. Devon's patent involved a type of elongated slot that was embedded within the container and a hinged element at the opening. The court ruled no literal infringement because the Devon patent did not include the "at the top" and "over" features of the Sage claim. Even though the devices perform the same function the court ruled no equivalent infringement because the hinged element did not "substantially constrict access" to the container, and the slot was not "substantially at the top" of the container. The court was adamant that equivalent function could not negate the “at the top” and “over” limitations of the patent, stating that such power would reduce patent claims to "functional abstracts" devoid of meaningful structure limitations for the public to reference. A second infringement involved in this case resulted in the court ruling that if patent claims specify a function and recite its importance the patentee cannot later accuse an invention devoid of the specified function of infringement.<br /> <br /> 901419437<br /> <br /> *Siemens Medical Solutions USA, INC. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics., F.3d, 2011 WL 651790 (2011)<br /> <br /> Siemens developed, manufactured, and sold PET scanners which made use of scintillator crystals consisting of cerium-doped lutetium oxyorthosilicate (LSO). Saint-Gobain manufactures and sells scintillator crystals for use in PET scanners which consisted of cerium-doped lutetium-yttrium orthosilicate (LYSO). This is chemically different from LSO in that some of the lutetium is substituted for by yttrium. In Saint-Gobain's crystals, 10% of the lutetium atoms are substituted for by yttrium atoms (crystals are 10% Y LYSO). In April of 2007, Siemens sued Saint-Gobain for infringement of claims 1 and 2 of Siemens '080 patent for LSO scintillator crystals and photodetectors. Saint-Gobain aregued that its LYSO crystals are not equivalent to those claimed in the '080 patent because their crystals are separately claimed by their '420 patent. A jury trial found Saint-Gobain infringing upon the claims held by Siemens. Saint-Gobains appeals, and claims that the district court erred in jury instructions, claiming that in cases where an alleged equivalent is separately patented, a higher burden of evidence is required. Their reasoning was that the jury's finding of infringement effectively invalidated their '420 patent for LYSO crystals as the ruling of equivalence implied a conclusion of obviousness. The Court of Appeals disagrees, stating that it is well established that separate patentability does not avoid equivalency as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals also disagrees that the jury's finding of infringement invalidates the '420 patent; it only finds the level of LYSO used in practice (10%) is equivalent to Siemen's LSO crystals. Other compositions of LYSO could well be non-equivalent. Using the function-way-result test which asks whether an element of the an accused product performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way, the Court of Appeals affirms the juries finding of infringement. <br /> <br /> Erich Wolz<br /> <br /> *Sunbeam Products Inc. v. Homedics Products Inc. , US Court of Appeals, District Court of Wisconsin (2010)<br /> This case involved a clear example of non-equivalence relating to the doctrine of equivalence. The patent holder Sunbeam Products brought action against competitor Homedics, alleging infringement of its patent for force-transmitting bearings for a platform scale. This case was decided under the district court of Wisconsin. Sunbeam Products had created platform bearings which translated purely horizontally along a platform which transferred all platform loads into purely vertical loads supported by the bearings. A previous patent, ‘326 patent, encompassed bearings which rocked and pivoted. HoMedics's accused scales all include bearings similar to the bearing disclosed in the ′326 patent. Each of the HoMedics bearings is machined with a nose-like protrusion that fits into a corresponding dimple on the underside of the platform. The trial court noted that the accused bearings all rock and pivot within their corresponding dimples in the underside of the platform. Sunbeam did not dispute that the HoMedics bearings rock and pivot in that manner. Sunbeam's argument was that in addition to rocking and pivoting, the HoMedics bearings were capable of some horizontal movement and therefore infringe the ′420 patent.<br /> In light of its claim construction and the undisputed evidence regarding the operation of the bearings in the accused HoMedics products, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. The court determined that no reasonable juror could find that bearings that rock and pivot remain parallel to the underside of the platform; accordingly, it held that the pivoting bearings in all of the accused products do not literally infringe the ′420 patent.<br /> <br /> The most important distinction that was made in this case was the following statement. “The doctrine of equivalents is not a license to rewrite the claims to encompass what a patentee believes to be an equivalent structure. That is especially true in a case such as this one, where the accused product is not later-developed technology that is insubstantially different from the claimed invention, but instead embodies disavowed prior art. Thus, the district court correctly held that the accused bearings do not infringe the ′420 patent under the doctrine of equivalents.”<br /> <br /> Christine Roetzel - 901425022<br /> <br /> *Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. 717 F.2d 1351<br /> <br /> NASA and Department of Defense, were trying to build a satellite that would orbit the earth. However, they were unable to do so they had problems with the attitude control. Williams, a man who was working for Hughes Co. was able to figure out the problem. He was able to have lab model on 4/2/60 and it was called "dynamic wheel." Williams presented it to NASA and then Hughes Co and NASA entered an agreement to build the satellite. Williams filed for a patent on 4/18/60 and that became known as "Williams patent." <br /> However, the govt started to build these spacecrafts that used the same systems from the satellite and did not give compensation to Williams. It went to court and the govt said that Williams patent was invalid because it infringed McLean's telescope. Williams rewrote his claims and stated “McLean's infrared telescope does not indicate the instantaneous spin angle position of his body with reference to a fixed external coordinate system, and it does not indicate the orientation of the axis with reference to a fixed external coordinate system." The court found Williams patent valid.<br /> Then, the court looked at the spacecraft and compared it to Williams satellite. They found the following similarites: "(1) each is spin-stabilized; (2) each contains a jet on the periphery, connected by a valve to a tank containing fluid for expulsion substantially parallel to the spin axis; (3) each employs sun sensors to sense ISA position; (4) each requires knowledge of orientation relative to a fixed external coordinate system; (5) each contains radio equipment for communicating with the ground; (6) each transmits spin rate and sun angle information to a ground crew; and (7) in each, jet firing is synchronized with ISA position to effect controlled precession and thus to achieve a desired orientation."<br /> Needless to say the court ruled that govt infringed Williams patent.<br /> <br /> 901439143<br /> <br /> * Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc. 126 F.3d. 1420 (1997)<br /> <br /> In this case, Sage Products sued Devon Industries for infringement of two of its patents and Devon countersued Sage for infringement of one of its own patents, all of which relate to the disposal of medical waste products such as needles. In trial and on appeal, the courts held that there was no literal infringement nor infringement by the doctrine of equivalents by any party. Sage claimed that Devon's '251 for a "tortuous path" disposal container infringed on both its '728 patent for a sharps disposal container and its '849 patent for the removal and storage of syringe needles. Devon claimed that Sage's '728 patent infringed on its '592 patent for a disposal container.<br /> ** The '728 patent consists of an opening with a curved arc extending above it and another below it (inside the container) with a rotatable L-shaped flap such that waste can be deposited without exposing it again.<br /> ** The '849 patent covers a container with notches for removing needles and a "moveable closure" that allows the container to be closed and reopened as needed.<br /> ** The '251 patent covers a disposal container with a slotted opening at the top and 2 overlapping but displaced obstructions within the container to prevent accessing material that has been disposed of. It also has a closure that permanently locks once closed.<br /> ** The 592 patent covers a container that has a slotted opening and another "baffle" within the container that has another slotted opening horizontally displaced from the first<br /> The courts held that the '251 patent did not infringe on the '728 patent because the patent explicitly described a precise configuration of an opening at the "top of the container" with one obstruction "over said slot" and another below, and that '251 configuration was different. They also held that the '251 patent did not infringe on the '849 patent because there was an important difference between permanent closure and closure that can be reopened. Finally, the '728 patent did not infringe on the '592 patents for similar reasons as the first: the configurations were very different. The '592 patent emphasized a horizontal displacement, which was not part of the '728 patent. The courts held that the use of precise language in patents limited the claims and because disposal containers were reasonably simple and straightforward, different configurations could not be equated.<br /> <br /> Julia Potter (jpotter2)<br /> <br /> * Kudlacek v. DBC, Inc. 115 F. Supp. 2d 996 (2000)<br /> <br /> Owner of Patent No. 5,611,325 for an archery bow stabilizer, Donald Kudlacek, brought an infringement suit against competitor DBC, Inc. DBC counterclaimed, stating that its patent for a peep sight targeting system was being infringed. The claim in question was a "threading" limitation on the stabilizer describing how it is adjusted and secured. The District Court decided that neither Kudlacek's stabilizer nor DBC's peep sight target system were infringed. This was because the accused device, the "Super Stix," was found to not be equivalent to the patented device because it did not infringe all the elements of claim 1. Though the accused device performs, basically, the same function, it does so in a substantially different way; therefore the Doctrine of Equivalents does not apply. Note that the invalidity issue was not settled by finding that the patent was not infringed. <br /> <br /> 901437068<br /> <br /> * Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968), (67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)<br /> <br /> Adkins v. Lear discussed the assembly and sale of a certain type of gyroscope. The gyroscope design had originally been borrowed by Lear, from Adkins under the terms that Lear would pay a small percentage of their profits to Adkins since Lear was not the original inventor of the gyroscope mechanical design. Conflicts arose when Lear refused to pay Adkins under the claim that their new gyroscope was a unique design that differed from the original design contracted from Adkins. The judges determined that since the new design was similar to the original in all the necessary inner working components and only differed in the external aesthetic features, the new design infringed on the old since it did not provide any new or useful feature. Based on this judgment Lear was required to pay Adkins for any sales of the new gyroscope.<br /> <br /> 901438174<br /> <br /> * Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968), (67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)<br /> <br /> I hate to be repetitive, but I read the same case. I will reiterate, it is a case about a dispute over profit sharing. Adkins invented the gyroscope and required Lear to share profits if he used the design. The dispute arose when Lear made an improvement upon the designed and refused to pay profits on this "new and improved" design. This design was really just the innards reworked into a new shape without altering the size or scale. This was ruled to be equivalent to the original design, reinforcing the underlying ideas of the doctrine of equivalents.<br /> <br /> cmadiga1</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Doctrine_of_Equivalents_Case_List&diff=4573 Doctrine of Equivalents Case List 2011-04-04T05:43:58Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>Add your case to the list with a one-paragraph (approximately 250 words) summary of the facts at issues, i.e., "an umbrella is or is not equivalent to a parasol because..."<br /> <br /> Please put the cases in chronological order. If two are from the same year, then put them in alphabetical order. Also put your name, your login name or NDID number with your case. Use the following for a template.<br /> <br /> * Goodwine v. Batill, 123 US 4567 (1066)<br /> This case concerned a patent for an iPad and the patentee sued the maker of an iPod for infringement. The important part of the claim was "a device for playing music and other media comprising a touch screen..." The court held that iPod infringed the iPad patent because the ... was equivalent to the ... because ...<br /> <br /> Bill Goodwine<br /> <br /> * Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968), (67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)<br /> This case was discussed in class and presented by another student, but I read it as well. This case concerned a patent for a gyroscope owned by Adkins, the inventor of an improved gyroscope, and Lear, the company that sells gyroscopes. Lear and Adkins had a written agreement that allowed Lear to sell Adkin’s patented invention, where Adkins received a small percentage of the net sales price as royalties. In 1957, Lear refused to pay royalties to Adkins with the claim that they were selling gyroscopes that differed from Adkin’s invention. However, the “new” gyroscopes differed only in “size, form, and shape,” but “contain[ed] the same elements.” The essential elements were the same between Adkin’s patent and Lear’s other steel gyroscopes, but the scale and exact assembly was different. Since those did not constitute a substantial difference, the jury of the Supreme Court of California held Adkins in favor and required Lear to pay royalties to Adkins for the sales price of the other gyroscopes sold. This case is an example of clear infringement.<br /> <br /> 901431048<br /> <br /> * Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968)(67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)<br /> I am the other student^^^(see case above). Other items of note in the case, aside from the summary above, include that the court ruled that infringing the doctrine of equivalence is a matter of fact and that the jury should be the one to establish it. This brings up an interesting qualification, as it seems almost every other case considered with respect to the doctrine of equivalence was decided by judges, not juries.<br /> <br /> Brobins<br /> <br /> *AMEC Liquidating Trust v. IVAC Corporation, 885 F.2d 1574 (1989)<br /> <br /> AMEC had a patent for a thermometer with a plastic cover held on by a hooking type mechanism. IVAC created a thermometer with a cover held on by a ring that created a friction lock. The CAFC held the IVAC invention was non-infringing on the AMEC patent because under the doctrine of equivalents, it did not perform the same function in the same way. The AMEC thermometer cover used an inscription fit, which created deep scratches in the cover. The IVAC thermometer used a friction fit, which only created superficial scratches in the cover. The CAFC found that the superficial scratches did not constitute an inscription fit. Also, the CAFC decided that AMEC did not present any evidence proving that the ring in the IVAC patent was equivalent to the “hook” in the AMEC patent. Because of this, the patent was non-infringing under the doctrine of equivalents.<br /> <br /> 901444263<br /> <br /> *Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574 (1989)<br /> <br /> The inventor, Turner, invented a thermometer probe cover that stays on (this was owned by AMEC). It kept the cover on via a sharp metal hook to tear into the cover’s plastic. IVAC developed a thermometer that served a similar purpose of keeping the probe cover on, except that it did so with a ring on the probe (to hold the cover via friction). IVAC intentionally left the probe free of any sharp edge to ease the removal of the probe cover when needed. District Court of Southern California ruled in summary judgment that IVAC’s thermometer probe covers do not infringe AMEC’s. On appeal from AMEC, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. A ring that does not tear the plastic cover is not equivalent to the hook that does. [http://campus.westlaw.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/result/default.wl?mt=CampusLaw&db=ALLCASES&rlt=CLID_QRYRLT4121840350313&origin=Search&sp=003654480-2000&method=TNC&cfid=1&rp=%2fwelcome%2fCampusLaw%2fdefault.wl&eq=welcome%2fCampusLaw&rltdb=CLID_DB1095239350313&srch=TRUE&query=TI(JOHNSTON+%26+IVAC)&vr=2.0&fmqv=s&action=Search&fn=_top&service=Search&sv=Split&rs=WLW11.01]<br /> <br /> 901471466<br /> <br /> *Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates (1990)<br /> <br /> Wilson is suing DGA/Dunlop for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents of its patented design for a golf ball. Wilson's patent is for a golf ball modeled as an icosahedron with dimples placed in such a way as to have 6 "great circles" of symmetry instead of the typical 1. The patent specifies where dimples should be placed on the ball and requires that no dimples be placed on the great circles. The accused DGA balls use the same "great circles" design, but with dimples placed on the great circles. DGA's defense is that there is "no principled difference" between its design and a design of the prior art (prior to Wilson's patent). Therefore, allowing Wilson to utilize the doctrine of equivalents would extend protection of claims already in the prior art to Wilson's patent. The CAFC decided that Wilson can only utilize the doctrine of equivalents if it can make a hypothetical claim that literally covers Dunlop's design (in this case, claim a ball with dimples placed on the great circles) and is also nonobvious considering the prior art. Wilson is unable to make such a nonobvious hypothetical claim and therefore no infringement was found.<br /> <br /> 901338276<br /> <br /> * Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202 (1992) <br /> <br /> Lemelson sued Mattel, alleging that Mattel's "Hot Wheels" toy car track infringed on his patented toy track. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of the plaintiff. Mattel appealed to the CAFC. The Court held that the "Hot Wheels" track did not contain all the limitations of the patent; it was equivalent to the prior art. That is, Lemelson's patent could not be both valid in light of the prior art and infringed upon by Mattel. Furthermore, upon his first application, claim 3 of Lemelson's patent had five clauses. The PTO examiner found the patent to be indistinguishable from the prior art. Lemelson added clauses [f] and [g] and received a patent. The important parts of the claim were, "[f] said guide means include a pair of spaced apart runner portions for defining the pathway of a vehicle moving over said track, [g] said spaced apart runner portions include upwardly extending rails for guiding the wheels of a vehicle." The Court held that "Hot wheels" did not contain any elements equivalent to the clauses [f] and [g]. The Court also noted that the public is entitled to the PTO record to determine the scope and meaning of claims. <br /> <br /> 901330223<br /> <br /> *Valmont Industries Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing Company Inc., 983 F.2d 1039 (1993)<br /> <br /> 901316153<br /> <br /> This case concerns an adaption for center-pivot (i.e. rotating) irrigation systems. The adaption (an apparatus that attaches to the main frame of the sprinkler) allows the corners of a field, normally missed by the standard rotating irrigation system, to be watered. The infringement issue relates to the means by which the position of the sprinkler is detected, relative to the field. The patent uses a method of pivot angle encoders, while the "infringing" patent uses buried electromagnetic cables to guide the sprinkler around the field.<br /> <br /> The CAFC ruled that the second device was not infringing, reversing the decision of the district court. The district court argued that the means of controlling the system were equivalent. The CAFC's argument was that while the two irrigation systems performed substantially the same overall function to obtain substantially the same overall result as the claimed invention, the way those results were achieved was substantially different. "Comparison of these two control means compels the conclusion that the claimed control means and Reinke's control means are not structurally equivalent.[...][E]ven though both the control means in the specification and the control means on Reinke's device use electric signals, the structures generating those signals are strikingly different." <br /> <br /> Because the doctrine of equivalence requires that the two devices perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same results, the two control systems were not equivalent under the doctrine of equivalence because they did not meet the "way" requirement of the doctrine of equivalence.<br /> <br /> *William Bradshaw and Robert Shepherd v. Igloo Products Corp. 1997 WL 543109 (US District Court, N.D.Ill.)<br /> <br /> William Bradshaw sued Igloo Products for infringement of a wheeled cooler. Bradshaw’s patent was for a cooler with a pulling handle and two lifting handles, one of which was connected on the same axle as the pulling handle. The Igloo products in question were the Rolling Kool Locker which had a rotatable lifting hand that can also be used to pull the cooler and the Cool Roller which had separate lifting and pulling handles coupled to separate axles. The court decided that the prior art for the Cool Roller was a different patent, the Mason patent. This patent was for a wheeled cooler with separate lifting and pulling handles. The Mason patent was granted before Bradshaw’s patent. The court ruled that the Cool Roller fell under the Mason patent. Therefore, if Bradshaw’s patent were to be expanded to include the Cool Roller’s handles, it would be an invalid patent as a result of the prior art, the Mason patent. This leads to a method of deciding infringement. If the product in question mimics prior art, then it cannot infringe the patent otherwise that patent would be invalid. In deciding infringement for the Rolling Kool Locker, the court decided that it was up to a jury to decide whether the Kool Lockers handles were equivalent to Bradshaw’s patent, since there was no other glaring evidence. <br /> <br /> Eric Paul<br /> <br /> * Dr. Raymond G. Tronzo v. Biomet Inc. 1998 156 F.3d 1154 (United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit)<br /> In this case Biomet was accused of infringement of an artificial hip prosthesis patented by Dr. Tronzo (patent 4,743,262). The alleged infringement revolved around the shape of the artificial hip socket and the hinge that was inserted into the socket. Patent ‘262 claimed a “generally conical” shape of the hip socket. Biomet’s design contained a strictly hemispherical shape. The court heard evidence in which it was claimed that even though the shapes would have at first glance performed in the same manner, the forces generated on the surface of each implant would be different depending on the shape. Additionally, after hearing expert testimony that suggested any shape would have been equivalent to the conical limitations of the patent claims, the court said that such a ruling would have been impermissible under the all-elements rule of Warner Jenkinson because it would write the “generally conical” shape limitation out of the claims. Therefore, the court held that the accused design did not infringe upon the patent claims under the doctrine of equivalence. <br /> <br /> Peter Mitros (901461727)<br /> <br /> *Hale Propeller, L.L.C. v Ryan Marine Products Pty., LTD., et al, 151 F. Supp .2d 183 (2001) Connecticut District Court<br /> Ryan owned patent 4411073, issued on 25 October 1983, which concerned devices to measure the pitch of propeller blades. Ryan originally filed the claim on 13 July 1981 it was rejected and then ammended on 4 October 1982. Hale's device called the "Hale Propeller MRI" was developed in 1997. In question are claims 1(b),(c),(f), and 6. A third party, Michigan Wheel Corporation, a distributor of Hale's invention filed for patent invalidity. The important differences between Hale's and Ryan's device are that Hale's does not use gears or worm-drives to rotate the blade and the device does not give direct readouts of the measurements using electric circuits. The issue with claim 1(b) was if a roller was a necessary part of the structure because it prevents skipping of the probe making the measurements more accurate. The court used means-plus-function to rule that the roller was important and Hale did not infringe. The issue with claim 1(c) deals with whether a worm or gear drive is necessary to rotate the blade. Ryan's patent discloses a hand-cranked device, like Hales, but includes a worm-drive. Part of Ryan's ammendment to his claim was to include worm gear to the hand-cranking device and therefore the court used prosecution history estoppel to make their decision because Ryan forfeited that claim (hand-cranked device without worm-drive) in order to get the patent and therefore cannot use doctrine of equivalents to get the claim back. The issue of claim 1(f) was whether the computer in the claim was a special computer needed for the readouts. The court ruled that the claim was not that narrow, but then the court ruled that claim 6 dealt with a computer that receives measurement data from the optical encoder and therefore Hale did not infringe. The patent was also ruled valid using the roller and worm drive to prove that it was non-obvious §103, definitively disclosed §112, and not anticipated by prior art §102(b).<br /> <br /> Gillian Allsup<br /> <br /> <br /> 901281608<br /> <br /> <br /> *Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc. Nos. 2010-1145, 2010-117. (2001) United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> <br /> <br /> This case began as an infringement lawsuit by Siemens Medical Solutions USA, inc. against Saint-Gobain Ceramics and Plastics, Inc. for the alleged infringement of a patent held by Siemens for a scintillator, a part of an x-ray machine that detects radiation. Saint-Gobain owned a patent for a similar device and the circuit court found that this patent infringed on the patent held by Siemens, which was filed earlier. Though the doctrine of equivalents was used to rule infringement, Saint-Gobain was found to have accidentally, rather than willfully infringed and Siemens was awarded 52.3 million dollars. <br /> <br /> Siemens filed for patent number 4,958,080 on August 4, 1989. This patent was for a scintillator containing cerium-doped- lutetium oxyorthosilicate. This is a component of a radiation detector that absorbs gamma-ray photons from an x-ray machine and converts them to visible light so the results can be interpreted. Saint-Gobain also produces scintillators, filing patent number 6,6424,420 in 2000 for a cerium-doped lutetium-yttrium orthosilicate. The chemical composition differs from that of the Siemens' patent as %10 of the lutetium is substituted for yttrium. These scintillators were sold by Saint-Gobain to Philips Medical Systems, a competitor of Siemens. The circuit court found that the composition of Saint-Gobain's scintillator preformed largely the same function in the same manner as Siemens' patent, and therefore was infringement under the doctrine of equivalence. <br /> <br /> Saint-Gobain filed a motion for a new trail, on the basis that the jury was not told that infringement by the doctrine of equivalence must be proved by clear evidence and argued that damages should be remitted. The Federal Appeals Court did not grant Saint-Gobain a new trial, but did reduces the damages to 44 million. <br /> <br /> <br /> *Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Homedics, Inc., Slip Copy, 2010 WL 5230892 (2010)<br /> <br /> This case involved a patent for a force-transmitting bearing used with a platform scale. Sunbeam held a patent which specified bearings which were attached to the platform via loose tabs which allowed the bearings to move horizontally. The patent claims required the base of the bearing to be oriented parallel to the platform and remain parallel to the platform at all times. The structure of the accused device was such that the bearings were connection to the platforms using dimples on the lower surface of the platform which the bearings fit into. Sunbeam had criticized prior art which used a similar dimple connection during prosecution beacuse of the potential for unwanted force moments applied by the bearing. The CAFC upheld the District Court's finding of no infringement based on the doctrine of equivalents because bearings which rocked and pivoted, as the accused device did, did not fall within the reach of the patent claims because they did not remain parallel to the platform at all times.<br /> <br /> 901422128<br /> <br /> *Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326 (2001)<br /> Kustom Signals held a patent for a multimode traffic radar system which will show either the fastest speed or the strongest signal. Three of the claims used the word "or" in their wording. Kustom claimed that the "or" was a logical operator meaning one, the other, or both. Applied Concepts had designed a radar system which returned both the fastest speed and the strongest signal. The Court held that the word "or" was to hold its traditional, customary meaning as being exclusive, not inclusive, of the two statements.<br /> <br /> 901 41 7852<br /> <br /> *Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc., 126 F. 3d 1420 (1997)<br /> <br /> Sage Products sued Devon Industries for infringement of several patents relating to containers for disposing of hazardous medical waste (needles etc.). Devon counter-sued for infringement of one of its similar patents. The district court held (on summary judgment) that there was no infringement by either party literally or equivalently. The appellate court affirmed. <br /> <br /> <br /> Devon’s first alleged infringement was of Sage’s container claiming an elongated slot "at the top" of the apparatus for which to deposit waste, and a "barrier over the slot" to prevent contamination. Devon's patent involved a type of elongated slot that was embedded within the container and a hinged element at the opening. The court ruled no literal infringement because the Devon patent did not include the "at the top" and "over" features of the Sage claim. Even though the devices perform the same function the court ruled no equivalent infringement because the hinged element did not "substantially constrict access" to the container, and the slot was not "substantially at the top" of the container. The court was adamant that equivalent function could not negate the “at the top” and “over” limitations of the patent, stating that such power would reduce patent claims to "functional abstracts" devoid of meaningful structure limitations for the public to reference. A second infringement involved in this case resulted in the court ruling that if patent claims specify a function and recite its importance the patentee cannot later accuse an invention devoid of the specified function of infringement.<br /> <br /> 901419437<br /> <br /> *Siemens Medical Solutions USA, INC. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics., F.3d, 2011 WL 651790 (2011)<br /> <br /> Siemens developed, manufactured, and sold PET scanners which made use of scintillator crystals consisting of cerium-doped lutetium oxyorthosilicate (LSO). Saint-Gobain manufactures and sells scintillator crystals for use in PET scanners which consisted of cerium-doped lutetium-yttrium orthosilicate (LYSO). This is chemically different from LSO in that some of the lutetium is substituted for by yttrium. In Saint-Gobain's crystals, 10% of the lutetium atoms are substituted for by yttrium atoms (crystals are 10% Y LYSO). In April of 2007, Siemens sued Saint-Gobain for infringement of claims 1 and 2 of Siemens '080 patent for LSO scintillator crystals and photodetectors. Saint-Gobain aregued that its LYSO crystals are not equivalent to those claimed in the '080 patent because their crystals are separately claimed by their '420 patent. A jury trial found Saint-Gobain infringing upon the claims held by Siemens. Saint-Gobains appeals, and claims that the district court erred in jury instructions, claiming that in cases where an alleged equivalent is separately patented, a higher burden of evidence is required. Their reasoning was that the jury's finding of infringement effectively invalidated their '420 patent for LYSO crystals as the ruling of equivalence implied a conclusion of obviousness. The Court of Appeals disagrees, stating that it is well established that separate patentability does not avoid equivalency as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals also disagrees that the jury's finding of infringement invalidates the '420 patent; it only finds the level of LYSO used in practice (10%) is equivalent to Siemen's LSO crystals. Other compositions of LYSO could well be non-equivalent. Using the function-way-result test which asks whether an element of the an accused product performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way, the Court of Appeals affirms the juries finding of infringement. <br /> <br /> Erich Wolz<br /> <br /> *Sunbeam Products Inc. v. Homedics Products Inc. , US Court of Appeals, District Court of Wisconsin (2010)<br /> This case involved a clear example of non-equivalence relating to the doctrine of equivalence. The patent holder Sunbeam Products brought action against competitor Homedics, alleging infringement of its patent for force-transmitting bearings for a platform scale. This case was decided under the district court of Wisconsin. Sunbeam Products had created platform bearings which translated purely horizontally along a platform which transferred all platform loads into purely vertical loads supported by the bearings. A previous patent, ‘326 patent, encompassed bearings which rocked and pivoted. HoMedics's accused scales all include bearings similar to the bearing disclosed in the ′326 patent. Each of the HoMedics bearings is machined with a nose-like protrusion that fits into a corresponding dimple on the underside of the platform. The trial court noted that the accused bearings all rock and pivot within their corresponding dimples in the underside of the platform. Sunbeam did not dispute that the HoMedics bearings rock and pivot in that manner. Sunbeam's argument was that in addition to rocking and pivoting, the HoMedics bearings were capable of some horizontal movement and therefore infringe the ′420 patent.<br /> In light of its claim construction and the undisputed evidence regarding the operation of the bearings in the accused HoMedics products, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. The court determined that no reasonable juror could find that bearings that rock and pivot remain parallel to the underside of the platform; accordingly, it held that the pivoting bearings in all of the accused products do not literally infringe the ′420 patent.<br /> <br /> The most important distinction that was made in this case was the following statement. “The doctrine of equivalents is not a license to rewrite the claims to encompass what a patentee believes to be an equivalent structure. That is especially true in a case such as this one, where the accused product is not later-developed technology that is insubstantially different from the claimed invention, but instead embodies disavowed prior art. Thus, the district court correctly held that the accused bearings do not infringe the ′420 patent under the doctrine of equivalents.”<br /> <br /> Christine Roetzel - 901425022<br /> <br /> *Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. 717 F.2d 1351<br /> <br /> NASA and Department of Defense, were trying to build a satellite that would orbit the earth. However, they were unable to do so they had problems with the attitude control. Williams, a man who was working for Hughes Co. was able to figure out the problem. He was able to have lab model on 4/2/60 and it was called "dynamic wheel." Williams presented it to NASA and then Hughes Co and NASA entered an agreement to build the satellite. Williams filed for a patent on 4/18/60 and that became known as "Williams patent." <br /> However, the govt started to build these spacecrafts that used the same systems from the satellite and did not give compensation to Williams. It went to court and the govt said that Williams patent was invalid because it infringed McLean's telescope. Williams rewrote his claims and stated “McLean's infrared telescope does not indicate the instantaneous spin angle position of his body with reference to a fixed external coordinate system, and it does not indicate the orientation of the axis with reference to a fixed external coordinate system." The court found Williams patent valid.<br /> Then, the court looked at the spacecraft and compared it to Williams satellite. They found the following similarites: "(1) each is spin-stabilized; (2) each contains a jet on the periphery, connected by a valve to a tank containing fluid for expulsion substantially parallel to the spin axis; (3) each employs sun sensors to sense ISA position; (4) each requires knowledge of orientation relative to a fixed external coordinate system; (5) each contains radio equipment for communicating with the ground; (6) each transmits spin rate and sun angle information to a ground crew; and (7) in each, jet firing is synchronized with ISA position to effect controlled precession and thus to achieve a desired orientation."<br /> Needless to say the court ruled that govt infringed Williams patent.<br /> <br /> 901439143<br /> <br /> * Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc. 126 F.3d. 1420 (1997)<br /> <br /> In this case, Sage Products sued Devon Industries for infringement of two of its patents and Devon countersued Sage for infringement of one of its own patents, all of which relate to the disposal of medical waste products such as needles. In trial and on appeal, the courts held that there was no literal infringement nor infringement by the doctrine of equivalents by any party. Sage claimed that Devon's '251 for a "tortuous path" disposal container infringed on both its '728 patent for a sharps disposal container and its '849 patent for the removal and storage of syringe needles. Devon claimed that Sage's '728 patent infringed on its '592 patent for a disposal container.<br /> ** The '728 patent consists of an opening with a curved arc extending above it and another below it (inside the container) with a rotatable L-shaped flap such that waste can be deposited without exposing it again.<br /> ** The '849 patent covers a container with notches for removing needles and a "moveable closure" that allows the container to be closed and reopened as needed.<br /> ** The '251 patent covers a disposal container with a slotted opening at the top and 2 overlapping but displaced obstructions within the container to prevent accessing material that has been disposed of. It also has a closure that permanently locks once closed.<br /> ** The 592 patent covers a container that has a slotted opening and another "baffle" within the container that has another slotted opening horizontally displaced from the first<br /> The courts held that the '251 patent did not infringe on the '728 patent because the patent explicitly described a precise configuration of an opening at the "top of the container" with one obstruction "over said slot" and another below, and that '251 configuration was different. They also held that the '251 patent did not infringe on the '849 patent because there was an important difference between permanent closure and closure that can be reopened. Finally, the '728 patent did not infringe on the '592 patents for similar reasons as the first: the configurations were very different. The '592 patent emphasized a horizontal displacement, which was not part of the '728 patent. The courts held that the use of precise language in patents limited the claims and because disposal containers were reasonably simple and straightforward, different configurations could not be equated.<br /> <br /> Julia Potter (jpotter2)<br /> <br /> * Kudlacek v. DBC, Inc. 115 F. Supp. 2d 996 (2000)<br /> <br /> Owner of Patent No. 5,611,325 for an archery bow stabilizer, Donald Kudlacek, brought an infringement suit against competitor DBC, Inc. DBC counterclaimed, stating that its patent for a peep sight targeting system was being infringed. The claim in question was a "threading" limitation on the stabilizer describing how it is adjusted and secured. The District Court decided that neither Kudlacek's stabilizer nor DBC's peep sight target system were infringed. This was because the accused device, the "Super Stix," was found to not be equivalent to the patented device because it did not infringe all the elements of claim 1. Though the accused device performs, basically, the same function, it does so in a substantially different way; therefore the Doctrine of Equivalents does not apply. Note that the invalidity issue was not settled by finding that the patent was not infringed. <br /> <br /> 901437068<br /> <br /> * Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968), (67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)<br /> <br /> Adkins v. Lear discussed the assembly and sale of a certain type of gyroscope. The gyroscope design had originally been borrowed by Lear, from Adkins under the terms that Lear would pay a small percentage of their profits to Adkins since Lear was not the original inventor of the gyroscope mechanical design. Conflicts arose when Lear refused to pay Adkins under the claim that their new gyroscope was a unique design that differed from the original design contracted from Adkins. The judges determined that since the new design was similar to the original in all the necessary inner working components and only differed in the external aesthetic features, the new design infringed on the old since it did not provide any new or useful feature. Based on this judgment Lear was required to pay Adkins for any sales of the new gyroscope.<br /> <br /> 901438174<br /> <br /> * Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968), (67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)<br /> <br /> I hate to be repetitive, but I read the same case. I will reiterate, it is a case about a dispute over profit sharing. Adkins invented the gyroscope and required Lear to share profits if he used the design. The dispute arose when Lear made an improvement upon the designed and refused to pay profits on this "new and improved" design. This design was really just the innards reworked into a new shape without altering the size or scale. This was ruled to be equivalent to the original design, reinforcing the underlying ideas of the doctrine of equivalents.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=ESB_Briefs&diff=3915 ESB Briefs 2011-03-03T19:09:39Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>Here is a list of briefs for the Electric Storage Battery Co v. Shimadzu case. Add your name next to the list for the one with the fewest names and read that one.<br /> * Reply Brief for Respondents. (Feb. 27, 1939)<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> * Reply Brief for Petitioner. (Feb. 7, 1939)<br /> #Cmadiga1<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> * Brief for Respondents (Jan. 28, 1939)<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> * Brief for Petitioner. (Jan. 1939)<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #<br /> #</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=3806 User:Cmadiga1 2011-02-25T15:53:43Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>==Accelerometer Patents==<br /> [[CM Accelerometer|Accelerometer Patentability]]<br /> <br /> ==Brief for Bilski v Kappos==<br /> [[CM_BriefSutton|Brief of Amicus Curiae John Sutton in Support of Petitioners]]<br /> <br /> ==Nonobviousness==<br /> [[CM_NonObviousness|Nonobviousness Homework]]<br /> <br /> == My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Obviousness of the Adams Patent==<br /> *Non-Obvious<br /> **This patent could be considered non-obvious because of two key prior patents. Both of these patents utilize a magnesium electrode, but both Leo Goldenberg in 1868 and Robert T. Wood in 1928. Both of these patents utilize the magnesium electrode, but both dimiss it as a method that will not work. In fact, Wood goes as far as to say "It has been generally accepted that magnesium could not be commercially utilized as a primary cell electrode." This shows how the experiments and inventions had been unsucessful with regards to their experiments, and frankly I do not know how the received patents becasue of the lack of usefulness. Goldenberg writes "Unfortunately experimenters were never able to attain voltages under closed circuit conditions equalling the potential which theoretically should have appeared available. <br /> **Also, as far as the electrolyte, neither of these patents contained cuprous chloride, but they did not use water or indicate it as an option for the electrolyte. Because of this, the water seems to be an innovative and non-obvious aspect of this patent.<br /> <br /> *Obviousness<br /> **It is clear that this is just a combination of prior art, leading to something that had expected results. Magnesium had been used as an electrode by Wood and Goldenberg. Water could have been used by Marie Davy in 1860 and therefore, is just a combination of new innovations. This has a precedent in the Greenwood v Hotchkiss case, and makes the patent obvious.<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> **This patent is of an invention similar to the safety seal described in my patent. The purpose of this invention is to seal a container with a plastic seal that is attached using heat. The seal is removed by pulling on a tab that removes part of the seal, using the remaining part to regulate the amount of contents poured.<br /> **This patent seems to conflict with my patent when it is analyzed using the ruling from Hotchkiss. The ruling from Hotchkiss is that an invention should not be awarded a patent if it is an adaptation that someone of ordinary skill in the craft could have come up with. The only differences between my patent and this one are that the seal can be completely torn off, it is used to prevent tampering instead of using it to preserve the contents, and the seal is made of foil in the tamper resistant seal. These are all innovations that could have been come up with easily by any engineer looking to apply a seal to ensure the safety of the contents, and the change of material is exactly what the ruling was about in Hotchkiss.<br /> **Also, this patent makes my patent obvious being invalid when looked at from the point of view A&P. The A&P case ruled that in order to be issued a patent, an invention can not be the combination of other inventions that simply leads to the sum of the parts. This patent shows a seal with a tab. This, combined with previous foil seals and completely removable seals should lead to my invention having a patent withheld. The sum of these parts leads to exactly what you would expect it to, with is what the A&P case rules as not patentable.<br /> **Also, the law of 35 USC 103 should make my invention un-patentable. According to the code, if someone of ordinary skill could have easily come up with this idea.<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]<br /> **This is a later patent of the safety seal in my patent. This is a seal that also fits under a screw cap that has a double reinforced tab that folds back onto the main seal and fits in place under the cap allowing for the seal to be completely removed when the tab is pulled, with less chance of tearing the tab off due to the extra strength of it.<br /> **Under the ruling from Hotchkiss, it seems as if this is another invention that would not have received a patent. It is obvious to any skilled mechanic to reinforce the seal with two layers to prevent it from tearing. It is better than my patent, but it in no way required a great investment of thought or ingenuity in coming up with the idea. Also, the way of storing the tab under the cap is also obvious and easy to see for any engineer.<br /> **With the A&P ruling in mind, it is also very evident that this is not patentable. The seal was already in common use, and everyone has experienced a case in which double ply was stronger and better than single ply. Therefore, the combination of these two ideas is obvious and adds nothing to the sum of the parts. Because of this, I believe it would not be patented if this ruling was applied to it.<br /> **As far as 35 USC 103, it seems as if any mechanic skilled in the craft (or even not skilled) could have come up with the decisions to add a second layer to the tab to prevent tearing. Everyone has experienced the tab ripping from the seal and felt how frustrating ti can be. So reinforcing the tab is definitely obvious.<br /> *These analyses show that the standards of nonobviousness have changed in recent times. With these inventions in mind, it seems like any invention that improves upon a previous product or combines previous products can be patented. The inventiveness of these new patents may be minimal, but the usefulness and novelty are great. They are important improvements that did take an investment of time and effort, so exclusive rights were granted to them. It shows that the patent office has become more relaxed with its standards, and the court has allowed this to happen. As we have seen in our lifetimes, this leads to very fast innovation in attempts to improve upon previous designs to try and achieve better products. The importance of nonobviousness of the patent has given way to the novelty and usefulness of it.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_Accelerometer&diff=3805 CM Accelerometer 2011-02-25T15:52:31Z

<p>Cmadiga1: Created page with "==How It Works== *The accelerometer uses the force of acceleration in any direction through a sizemic or inertial piece, and counter balances this force with an electro-magnetic ..."</p> <hr /> <div>==How It Works==<br /> *The accelerometer uses the force of acceleration in any direction through a sizemic or inertial piece, and counter balances this force with an electro-magnetic force by flowing current through a "servo loop" creating the magnetic force that can be read with great accuracy.<br /> <br /> ==What Is Claimed==<br /> *The first self contained miniature accelerometer<br /> *The high precision accelerometer has been suggested, but never made with the small arrangements<br /> *Avoids disadvantages of other servo accelerometers<br /> *Requires little power to operate, high natural frequency, and minimum connections is exclusive to this product<br /> *Highly improved magnet assembly<br /> *Better organization of internals</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_BriefSutton&diff=3515 CM BriefSutton 2011-02-14T16:01:09Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>==Brief of Amicus Curiae John Sutton in Support of the Petitioners==<br /> John Sutton<br /> *Retired patent lawyer<br /> *Worked for office of patents<br /> *Has knowledge of patentable inventions<br /> <br /> Argument<br /> *Sutton argues that the Bilski method is nothing more than commodity trading in an exchange<br /> *It must be the work of an artisan, and simple trade is not, it has been around since people have existed<br /> *It is only having middlemen, the commodity providers, hedge the risk of price fluctuations<br /> *The abstract idea is not something that should be allowed to be patented<br /> *Concludes that the judgement should be vacated</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_BriefSutton&diff=3514 CM BriefSutton 2011-02-14T15:59:34Z

<p>Cmadiga1: Created page with "==Brief of Amicus Curiae John Sutton in Support of the Petitioners== John Sutton *Retired patent lawyer *Worked for office of patents *Has knowledge of patentable inventions Arg..."</p> <hr /> <div>==Brief of Amicus Curiae John Sutton in Support of the Petitioners==<br /> John Sutton<br /> *Retired patent lawyer<br /> *Worked for office of patents<br /> *Has knowledge of patentable inventions<br /> <br /> Argument<br /> *Sutton argues that the Bilski method is nothing more than commodity trading in an exchange<br /> *It must be the work of an artisan, and simple trade is not, it has been around since people have existed<br /> *It is only having middlemen, the commodity providers, hedge the risk of price fluctuations<br /> *Concludes that the judgement should be vacated</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=3511 User:Cmadiga1 2011-02-14T15:54:50Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>==Brief for Bilski v Kappos==<br /> [[CM_BriefSutton|Brief of Amicus Curiae John Sutton in Support of Petitioners]]<br /> <br /> ==Nonobviousness==<br /> [[CM_NonObviousness|Nonobviousness Homework]]<br /> <br /> == My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Obviousness of the Adams Patent==<br /> *Non-Obvious<br /> **This patent could be considered non-obvious because of two key prior patents. Both of these patents utilize a magnesium electrode, but both Leo Goldenberg in 1868 and Robert T. Wood in 1928. Both of these patents utilize the magnesium electrode, but both dimiss it as a method that will not work. In fact, Wood goes as far as to say "It has been generally accepted that magnesium could not be commercially utilized as a primary cell electrode." This shows how the experiments and inventions had been unsucessful with regards to their experiments, and frankly I do not know how the received patents becasue of the lack of usefulness. Goldenberg writes "Unfortunately experimenters were never able to attain voltages under closed circuit conditions equalling the potential which theoretically should have appeared available. <br /> **Also, as far as the electrolyte, neither of these patents contained cuprous chloride, but they did not use water or indicate it as an option for the electrolyte. Because of this, the water seems to be an innovative and non-obvious aspect of this patent.<br /> <br /> *Obviousness<br /> **It is clear that this is just a combination of prior art, leading to something that had expected results. Magnesium had been used as an electrode by Wood and Goldenberg. Water could have been used by Marie Davy in 1860 and therefore, is just a combination of new innovations. This has a precedent in the Greenwood v Hotchkiss case, and makes the patent obvious.<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> **This patent is of an invention similar to the safety seal described in my patent. The purpose of this invention is to seal a container with a plastic seal that is attached using heat. The seal is removed by pulling on a tab that removes part of the seal, using the remaining part to regulate the amount of contents poured.<br /> **This patent seems to conflict with my patent when it is analyzed using the ruling from Hotchkiss. The ruling from Hotchkiss is that an invention should not be awarded a patent if it is an adaptation that someone of ordinary skill in the craft could have come up with. The only differences between my patent and this one are that the seal can be completely torn off, it is used to prevent tampering instead of using it to preserve the contents, and the seal is made of foil in the tamper resistant seal. These are all innovations that could have been come up with easily by any engineer looking to apply a seal to ensure the safety of the contents, and the change of material is exactly what the ruling was about in Hotchkiss.<br /> **Also, this patent makes my patent obvious being invalid when looked at from the point of view A&P. The A&P case ruled that in order to be issued a patent, an invention can not be the combination of other inventions that simply leads to the sum of the parts. This patent shows a seal with a tab. This, combined with previous foil seals and completely removable seals should lead to my invention having a patent withheld. The sum of these parts leads to exactly what you would expect it to, with is what the A&P case rules as not patentable.<br /> **Also, the law of 35 USC 103 should make my invention un-patentable. According to the code, if someone of ordinary skill could have easily come up with this idea.<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]<br /> **This is a later patent of the safety seal in my patent. This is a seal that also fits under a screw cap that has a double reinforced tab that folds back onto the main seal and fits in place under the cap allowing for the seal to be completely removed when the tab is pulled, with less chance of tearing the tab off due to the extra strength of it.<br /> **Under the ruling from Hotchkiss, it seems as if this is another invention that would not have received a patent. It is obvious to any skilled mechanic to reinforce the seal with two layers to prevent it from tearing. It is better than my patent, but it in no way required a great investment of thought or ingenuity in coming up with the idea. Also, the way of storing the tab under the cap is also obvious and easy to see for any engineer.<br /> **With the A&P ruling in mind, it is also very evident that this is not patentable. The seal was already in common use, and everyone has experienced a case in which double ply was stronger and better than single ply. Therefore, the combination of these two ideas is obvious and adds nothing to the sum of the parts. Because of this, I believe it would not be patented if this ruling was applied to it.<br /> **As far as 35 USC 103, it seems as if any mechanic skilled in the craft (or even not skilled) could have come up with the decisions to add a second layer to the tab to prevent tearing. Everyone has experienced the tab ripping from the seal and felt how frustrating ti can be. So reinforcing the tab is definitely obvious.<br /> *These analyses show that the standards of nonobviousness have changed in recent times. With these inventions in mind, it seems like any invention that improves upon a previous product or combines previous products can be patented. The inventiveness of these new patents may be minimal, but the usefulness and novelty are great. They are important improvements that did take an investment of time and effort, so exclusive rights were granted to them. It shows that the patent office has become more relaxed with its standards, and the court has allowed this to happen. As we have seen in our lifetimes, this leads to very fast innovation in attempts to improve upon previous designs to try and achieve better products. The importance of nonobviousness of the patent has given way to the novelty and usefulness of it.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Bilski_brief_list&diff=3509 Bilski brief list 2011-02-14T15:52:44Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>Choose one of the briefs from this list. Delete it and replace it with your login name. Please be careful editing this page. If you mess up all the formatting it will create work for your colleagues.<br /> <br /> #Reply Brief for Petitioners (Oct. 26, 2009) <br /> #jpotter2 <br /> #Adam T. Letcher<br /> #Craigkrzyskowski<br /> #dcarter2<br /> #ebingle<br /> #Rabot<br /> #Eric Paul<br /> #cnorton<br /> #kschlax<br /> #Jnosal <br /> #Mackroyd <br /> #dsakamot<br /> #eguilbea<br /> #901444263 <br /> #shockett <br /> #gallsup <br /> #KyleR <br /> #Andy Stulc <br /> #Brief for Amicus Curiae Mark Landesmann in Support of Affirmance (Oct. 2, 2009) <br /> #Amicus Curiae Brief of Center for Advanced Study and Research in Intellectual Property (CASRIP) of the University of Washington School of Law, and of CASRIP Research Affiliate Scholars, in Support of Affirmance of the Judgment in Favor of Respondent (Oct. 1, 2009) <br /> #Kevin Godshall<br /> #sbonomo <br /> #Brief for the Respondent (Sep. 25, 2009) <br /> #Kriester <br /> #Brobins<br /> #Josh Bradley<br /> #Chuck Talley<br /> #E W Hitchler<br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Amici Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization, Advanced Medical Technology Association, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation & The Regents of the University of California in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #Mzahm<br /> #Adam Mahood <br /> #Hamburgler <br /> #Brief of F%21ed%21eration Internationale Des Conseils En Propri%21et%21e Industrielle as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professor Kevin Emerson Collins in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae Legal OnRamp in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #cmadiga1 <br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae Novartis Corporation Supporting Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #Brief Amicus Curiae of The Federal Circuit Bar Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Regulatory Datacorp, Inc, American Express Company, Palm Inc., Rockwell Automation, Inc., and SAP America, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Double Rock Corporation, Island Intellectual Property LLC, LIDs Capital LLC, Intrasweep LLC, Access Control Advantage, Inc., Ecomp Consultants, Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, Rearden Capital Corporation, Craig Mowry and PCT Capital LLC as Ami ci Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #901422128<br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae The Houston Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Franklin Pierce Law Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #LMiller<br /> #Brief of TELES AG as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae San Diego Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party on the Merits (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Robert R. Sachs and Daniel R. Brownstone as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #CRoetzel <br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae AwakenIP, LLC in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) <br /> #Pmitros <br /> #pfleury<br /> #901479977<br /> #Brief for Prometheus Laboratories Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009) <br /> #Brief for the Business Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance (Aug. 5, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioner (Aug. 5, 2009) <br /> #Bobby Powers<br /> #Brief of Amici Curiae Association Internationale Pour la Protection de la Propriete Intellectuelle and International Association For The Protection Of Intellectual Property (U.S.) in Support of Reversal (Aug. 5, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae Caris Diagnostics, Inc. in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009) <br /> #Brief of the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Monogram Biosciences, Inc. and Genomic Health, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae Raymond C. Meiers in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) <br /> #Xiao Dong <br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae Conejo Valley Bar Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 3, 2009) <br /> #Brief For Petitioners (Jul. 30, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae Telecommunication Systems, Inc. in Support of Neither Party and for Purely Prospective Application of Any Adoption of the New Legal Test Applied Below (Jul. 24, 2009) <br /> #Brief for the State of Oregon as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Jul. 24, 2009) <br /> #ewolz <br /> #kristen kemnetz<br /> #Brief for the Respondent in Opposition (May 1, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Accenture and Pitney Bowes Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009) <br /> #Brief Amicus Curiae of Franklin Pierce Law Center in Support of Certiorari (Mar. 2, 2009) <br /> #Brief of Amica Curiae Anne E. Barschall, Pro Se in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009) <br /> #bcastel1<br /> #Jmarmole<br /> #Gtorrisi</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=3117 User:Cmadiga1 2011-02-09T08:58:24Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* Nonobviousness */</p> <hr /> <div>==Nonobviousness==<br /> [[CM_NonObviousness|Nonobviousness Homework]]<br /> <br /> == My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Obviousness of the Adams Patent==<br /> *Non-Obvious<br /> **This patent could be considered non-obvious because of two key prior patents. Both of these patents utilize a magnesium electrode, but both Leo Goldenberg in 1868 and Robert T. Wood in 1928. Both of these patents utilize the magnesium electrode, but both dimiss it as a method that will not work. In fact, Wood goes as far as to say "It has been generally accepted that magnesium could not be commercially utilized as a primary cell electrode." This shows how the experiments and inventions had been unsucessful with regards to their experiments, and frankly I do not know how the received patents becasue of the lack of usefulness. Goldenberg writes "Unfortunately experimenters were never able to attain voltages under closed circuit conditions equalling the potential which theoretically should have appeared available. <br /> **Also, as far as the electrolyte, neither of these patents contained cuprous chloride, but they did not use water or indicate it as an option for the electrolyte. Because of this, the water seems to be an innovative and non-obvious aspect of this patent.<br /> <br /> *Obviousness<br /> **It is clear that this is just a combination of prior art, leading to something that had expected results. Magnesium had been used as an electrode by Wood and Goldenberg. Water could have been used by Marie Davy in 1860 and therefore, is just a combination of new innovations. This has a precedent in the Greenwood v Hotchkiss case, and makes the patent obvious.<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> **This patent is of an invention similar to the safety seal described in my patent. The purpose of this invention is to seal a container with a plastic seal that is attached using heat. The seal is removed by pulling on a tab that removes part of the seal, using the remaining part to regulate the amount of contents poured.<br /> **This patent seems to conflict with my patent when it is analyzed using the ruling from Hotchkiss. The ruling from Hotchkiss is that an invention should not be awarded a patent if it is an adaptation that someone of ordinary skill in the craft could have come up with. The only differences between my patent and this one are that the seal can be completely torn off, it is used to prevent tampering instead of using it to preserve the contents, and the seal is made of foil in the tamper resistant seal. These are all innovations that could have been come up with easily by any engineer looking to apply a seal to ensure the safety of the contents, and the change of material is exactly what the ruling was about in Hotchkiss.<br /> **Also, this patent makes my patent obvious being invalid when looked at from the point of view A&P. The A&P case ruled that in order to be issued a patent, an invention can not be the combination of other inventions that simply leads to the sum of the parts. This patent shows a seal with a tab. This, combined with previous foil seals and completely removable seals should lead to my invention having a patent withheld. The sum of these parts leads to exactly what you would expect it to, with is what the A&P case rules as not patentable.<br /> **Also, the law of 35 USC 103 should make my invention un-patentable. According to the code, if someone of ordinary skill could have easily come up with this idea.<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]<br /> **This is a later patent of the safety seal in my patent. This is a seal that also fits under a screw cap that has a double reinforced tab that folds back onto the main seal and fits in place under the cap allowing for the seal to be completely removed when the tab is pulled, with less chance of tearing the tab off due to the extra strength of it.<br /> **Under the ruling from Hotchkiss, it seems as if this is another invention that would not have received a patent. It is obvious to any skilled mechanic to reinforce the seal with two layers to prevent it from tearing. It is better than my patent, but it in no way required a great investment of thought or ingenuity in coming up with the idea. Also, the way of storing the tab under the cap is also obvious and easy to see for any engineer.<br /> **With the A&P ruling in mind, it is also very evident that this is not patentable. The seal was already in common use, and everyone has experienced a case in which double ply was stronger and better than single ply. Therefore, the combination of these two ideas is obvious and adds nothing to the sum of the parts. Because of this, I believe it would not be patented if this ruling was applied to it.<br /> **As far as 35 USC 103, it seems as if any mechanic skilled in the craft (or even not skilled) could have come up with the decisions to add a second layer to the tab to prevent tearing. Everyone has experienced the tab ripping from the seal and felt how frustrating ti can be. So reinforcing the tab is definitely obvious.<br /> *These analyses show that the standards of nonobviousness have changed in recent times. With these inventions in mind, it seems like any invention that improves upon a previous product or combines previous products can be patented. The inventiveness of these new patents may be minimal, but the usefulness and novelty are great. They are important improvements that did take an investment of time and effort, so exclusive rights were granted to them. It shows that the patent office has become more relaxed with its standards, and the court has allowed this to happen. As we have seen in our lifetimes, this leads to very fast innovation in attempts to improve upon previous designs to try and achieve better products. The importance of nonobviousness of the patent has given way to the novelty and usefulness of it.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=3116 User:Cmadiga1 2011-02-09T08:58:00Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* Nonobviousness */</p> <hr /> <div>==Nonobviousness==<br /> [[CM_NonObviousness|Nonobviousness]]<br /> <br /> == My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Obviousness of the Adams Patent==<br /> *Non-Obvious<br /> **This patent could be considered non-obvious because of two key prior patents. Both of these patents utilize a magnesium electrode, but both Leo Goldenberg in 1868 and Robert T. Wood in 1928. Both of these patents utilize the magnesium electrode, but both dimiss it as a method that will not work. In fact, Wood goes as far as to say "It has been generally accepted that magnesium could not be commercially utilized as a primary cell electrode." This shows how the experiments and inventions had been unsucessful with regards to their experiments, and frankly I do not know how the received patents becasue of the lack of usefulness. Goldenberg writes "Unfortunately experimenters were never able to attain voltages under closed circuit conditions equalling the potential which theoretically should have appeared available. <br /> **Also, as far as the electrolyte, neither of these patents contained cuprous chloride, but they did not use water or indicate it as an option for the electrolyte. Because of this, the water seems to be an innovative and non-obvious aspect of this patent.<br /> <br /> *Obviousness<br /> **It is clear that this is just a combination of prior art, leading to something that had expected results. Magnesium had been used as an electrode by Wood and Goldenberg. Water could have been used by Marie Davy in 1860 and therefore, is just a combination of new innovations. This has a precedent in the Greenwood v Hotchkiss case, and makes the patent obvious.<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> **This patent is of an invention similar to the safety seal described in my patent. The purpose of this invention is to seal a container with a plastic seal that is attached using heat. The seal is removed by pulling on a tab that removes part of the seal, using the remaining part to regulate the amount of contents poured.<br /> **This patent seems to conflict with my patent when it is analyzed using the ruling from Hotchkiss. The ruling from Hotchkiss is that an invention should not be awarded a patent if it is an adaptation that someone of ordinary skill in the craft could have come up with. The only differences between my patent and this one are that the seal can be completely torn off, it is used to prevent tampering instead of using it to preserve the contents, and the seal is made of foil in the tamper resistant seal. These are all innovations that could have been come up with easily by any engineer looking to apply a seal to ensure the safety of the contents, and the change of material is exactly what the ruling was about in Hotchkiss.<br /> **Also, this patent makes my patent obvious being invalid when looked at from the point of view A&P. The A&P case ruled that in order to be issued a patent, an invention can not be the combination of other inventions that simply leads to the sum of the parts. This patent shows a seal with a tab. This, combined with previous foil seals and completely removable seals should lead to my invention having a patent withheld. The sum of these parts leads to exactly what you would expect it to, with is what the A&P case rules as not patentable.<br /> **Also, the law of 35 USC 103 should make my invention un-patentable. According to the code, if someone of ordinary skill could have easily come up with this idea.<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]<br /> **This is a later patent of the safety seal in my patent. This is a seal that also fits under a screw cap that has a double reinforced tab that folds back onto the main seal and fits in place under the cap allowing for the seal to be completely removed when the tab is pulled, with less chance of tearing the tab off due to the extra strength of it.<br /> **Under the ruling from Hotchkiss, it seems as if this is another invention that would not have received a patent. It is obvious to any skilled mechanic to reinforce the seal with two layers to prevent it from tearing. It is better than my patent, but it in no way required a great investment of thought or ingenuity in coming up with the idea. Also, the way of storing the tab under the cap is also obvious and easy to see for any engineer.<br /> **With the A&P ruling in mind, it is also very evident that this is not patentable. The seal was already in common use, and everyone has experienced a case in which double ply was stronger and better than single ply. Therefore, the combination of these two ideas is obvious and adds nothing to the sum of the parts. Because of this, I believe it would not be patented if this ruling was applied to it.<br /> **As far as 35 USC 103, it seems as if any mechanic skilled in the craft (or even not skilled) could have come up with the decisions to add a second layer to the tab to prevent tearing. Everyone has experienced the tab ripping from the seal and felt how frustrating ti can be. So reinforcing the tab is definitely obvious.<br /> *These analyses show that the standards of nonobviousness have changed in recent times. With these inventions in mind, it seems like any invention that improves upon a previous product or combines previous products can be patented. The inventiveness of these new patents may be minimal, but the usefulness and novelty are great. They are important improvements that did take an investment of time and effort, so exclusive rights were granted to them. It shows that the patent office has become more relaxed with its standards, and the court has allowed this to happen. As we have seen in our lifetimes, this leads to very fast innovation in attempts to improve upon previous designs to try and achieve better products. The importance of nonobviousness of the patent has given way to the novelty and usefulness of it.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=3115 User:Cmadiga1 2011-02-09T08:57:34Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>==Nonobviousness==<br /> [[http://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php/CM_NonObviousness|Nonobviousness]]<br /> <br /> == My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Obviousness of the Adams Patent==<br /> *Non-Obvious<br /> **This patent could be considered non-obvious because of two key prior patents. Both of these patents utilize a magnesium electrode, but both Leo Goldenberg in 1868 and Robert T. Wood in 1928. Both of these patents utilize the magnesium electrode, but both dimiss it as a method that will not work. In fact, Wood goes as far as to say "It has been generally accepted that magnesium could not be commercially utilized as a primary cell electrode." This shows how the experiments and inventions had been unsucessful with regards to their experiments, and frankly I do not know how the received patents becasue of the lack of usefulness. Goldenberg writes "Unfortunately experimenters were never able to attain voltages under closed circuit conditions equalling the potential which theoretically should have appeared available. <br /> **Also, as far as the electrolyte, neither of these patents contained cuprous chloride, but they did not use water or indicate it as an option for the electrolyte. Because of this, the water seems to be an innovative and non-obvious aspect of this patent.<br /> <br /> *Obviousness<br /> **It is clear that this is just a combination of prior art, leading to something that had expected results. Magnesium had been used as an electrode by Wood and Goldenberg. Water could have been used by Marie Davy in 1860 and therefore, is just a combination of new innovations. This has a precedent in the Greenwood v Hotchkiss case, and makes the patent obvious.<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> **This patent is of an invention similar to the safety seal described in my patent. The purpose of this invention is to seal a container with a plastic seal that is attached using heat. The seal is removed by pulling on a tab that removes part of the seal, using the remaining part to regulate the amount of contents poured.<br /> **This patent seems to conflict with my patent when it is analyzed using the ruling from Hotchkiss. The ruling from Hotchkiss is that an invention should not be awarded a patent if it is an adaptation that someone of ordinary skill in the craft could have come up with. The only differences between my patent and this one are that the seal can be completely torn off, it is used to prevent tampering instead of using it to preserve the contents, and the seal is made of foil in the tamper resistant seal. These are all innovations that could have been come up with easily by any engineer looking to apply a seal to ensure the safety of the contents, and the change of material is exactly what the ruling was about in Hotchkiss.<br /> **Also, this patent makes my patent obvious being invalid when looked at from the point of view A&P. The A&P case ruled that in order to be issued a patent, an invention can not be the combination of other inventions that simply leads to the sum of the parts. This patent shows a seal with a tab. This, combined with previous foil seals and completely removable seals should lead to my invention having a patent withheld. The sum of these parts leads to exactly what you would expect it to, with is what the A&P case rules as not patentable.<br /> **Also, the law of 35 USC 103 should make my invention un-patentable. According to the code, if someone of ordinary skill could have easily come up with this idea.<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]<br /> **This is a later patent of the safety seal in my patent. This is a seal that also fits under a screw cap that has a double reinforced tab that folds back onto the main seal and fits in place under the cap allowing for the seal to be completely removed when the tab is pulled, with less chance of tearing the tab off due to the extra strength of it.<br /> **Under the ruling from Hotchkiss, it seems as if this is another invention that would not have received a patent. It is obvious to any skilled mechanic to reinforce the seal with two layers to prevent it from tearing. It is better than my patent, but it in no way required a great investment of thought or ingenuity in coming up with the idea. Also, the way of storing the tab under the cap is also obvious and easy to see for any engineer.<br /> **With the A&P ruling in mind, it is also very evident that this is not patentable. The seal was already in common use, and everyone has experienced a case in which double ply was stronger and better than single ply. Therefore, the combination of these two ideas is obvious and adds nothing to the sum of the parts. Because of this, I believe it would not be patented if this ruling was applied to it.<br /> **As far as 35 USC 103, it seems as if any mechanic skilled in the craft (or even not skilled) could have come up with the decisions to add a second layer to the tab to prevent tearing. Everyone has experienced the tab ripping from the seal and felt how frustrating ti can be. So reinforcing the tab is definitely obvious.<br /> *These analyses show that the standards of nonobviousness have changed in recent times. With these inventions in mind, it seems like any invention that improves upon a previous product or combines previous products can be patented. The inventiveness of these new patents may be minimal, but the usefulness and novelty are great. They are important improvements that did take an investment of time and effort, so exclusive rights were granted to them. It shows that the patent office has become more relaxed with its standards, and the court has allowed this to happen. As we have seen in our lifetimes, this leads to very fast innovation in attempts to improve upon previous designs to try and achieve better products. The importance of nonobviousness of the patent has given way to the novelty and usefulness of it.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_NonObviousness&diff=3100 CM NonObviousness 2011-02-09T07:22:23Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>==Synthesis of the Issues in Non-Obviousness==<br /> Along with being useful and novel, a patent must also not be obvious. This "nonobviousness" is hard to qualify, but the courts and congress have tried over the past 160 years.<br /> <br /> The idea of nonobviousness first originated in the case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850). In this case, it first became clear to the supreme court that something needed to be done to keep simple innovations from acquiring a new patent, all but halting the stream of new ideas that patents are supposed to encourage. Because of this, it is necessary to establish a basis to disqualify inventions based on the obviousness of the invention. In this original case, the important phrase, "ingenuity and skill ... possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business," was first used to describe the basic principle of what made an invention obvious. Using this basis, the laws of nonobvious have been written an rewritten over the past 160 years to bring them to where they are today.<br /> <br /> Another key principle of nonobviousness was established in A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950). It was in this case that the idea of the sum of the parts needs to be improved upon to be awarded a patent. While this idea is not still in use, it lays down a basis for the Patent Act of 1952 to establish an overarching law. Along with this, the idea of secondary criteria for patent obviousness was developed, with a "long felt but unsatisfied need" being present. Thirdly, the very point of a patent was examined, and the consensus was that a patent should be for the advance of science and should not hinder it.<br /> <br /> The Patent Act of 1952 was just an act by congress to record the rules that the judicial branch had laid down. The code states "A patent may not be obtained…if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." This key development in patent law marks the culmination of the nonobviouness idea that had been in the works for 100 years.<br /> <br /> Yet, the work on patent law was not done. In Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) the secondary criteria for nonobviousness was established and spelled out. It was one of the first cases to look at other inventors and analyze their attempts and failures to try and develop a process that would work for coating lenses. Even though thee final result was only one added heating step, the time and effort that previous experimenters had invested proved that it was no small advancement.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere (1966), the idea of "inventiveness" was first introduced. This is the idea that a development must include some level of invention. This is similar to the idea from the A&P case, but it more rigorously defines the criteria. Also, it included secondary considerations to be examined. <br /> <br /> With the case of US v Adams (1966), the courts reconfirmed the idea that even if the parts of an invention were obvious or priorly patented, if it accomplished something that was unexpected in an unexpected way, that is patentable. Even though open cell batteries had been used, and it was possible batteries had used water, it was still not an obvious invention because of the unexpected results.<br /> <br /> In Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969), the rules were turned once again. The supreme court decided that the heated roller (patented) and the paving machine (patented) in combination was not enough to warrant a patent. The combination of the two patents was not enough to issue a new patent, and the use of the burner is infringement. This seems like a reasonable ruling, because it was not an improvement, but rather seems like a way to try to avoid dealing with the patent for the burner. But, it was still a case that upended the previous notion on nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> This ruling was confirmed once again in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (2007). The "Adjustable Pedal Assembly with Electronic Throttle Control" was a combination of an adjustable pedal assembly, a support pivot, and an electronic control. This combination had been taught, suggested, and motivated (TSM) by the prior art, so it was an obvious configuration of the prior art. These elements of TSM are key to determine obviousness, but they cannot be applied too rigorously because that is not the law to be followed as congress and previous cases decided.<br /> <br /> All of these rulings have lead to the formation of the nonoviousness of patents. Elements of the sum of parts being greater than the whole, a normal mechanic's skill in the art, TSM, a long-felt, unmet need, and previous failures all contributed to what the courts and patent office now use to judge the obviousness of inventions. This will most definitely continue to evolve, but we are much closer to a rigorous definition than before 1850. A patent is something that must be earned, and not something that is found easily and hinders the progress of science.<br /> <br /> ==Historical Development==<br /> The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.<br /> <br /> ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===<br /> <br /> Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.<br /> <br /> :...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.<br /> <br /> :The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.<br /> <br /> :But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.<br /> <br /> :Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.<br /> <br /> :But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.<br /> <br /> :The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.<br /> <br /> It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term "nonobviousness" will not be developed for some time, the court's decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,<br /> <br /> :"....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than ''were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business'', there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."<br /> <br /> Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.<br /> <br /> ===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===<br /> <br /> While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:<br /> <br /> *First, that the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> The importance of a "long felt but unsatisfied need" in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.<br /> <br /> *Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson's outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson's sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, "the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts," and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, "patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science," which make this point very clear.<br /> <br /> *Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.<br /> <br /> The court's outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. "The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable."<br /> <br /> ===35 USC 103 (1952)===<br /> This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where<br /> :the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.<br /> <br /> ===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===<br /> <br /> In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:<br /> :Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4<br /> <br /> ===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===<br /> <br /> In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include<br /> * scope and content of the prior art;<br /> * differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;<br /> * level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,<br /> * secondary considerations, including:<br /> ** commercial success of the invention;<br /> ** long-felt but unsolved needs;<br /> ** failure of others to find a solution, etc.<br /> <br /> ===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===<br /> <br /> * 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> ===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===<br /> Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.<br /> <br /> ==Suggestion to Combine==<br /> [[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.<br /> <br /> :"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."<br /> :"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.<br /> <br /> ==Objective Tests==<br /> Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].<br /> *A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.<br /> *The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.<br /> *This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.<br /> <br /> ==The Inventive Step==<br /> *This is the step that it takes to go beyond what the average mechanic in the art could come up with. A key example of this is in the Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) case where many had tried, but the step of heating the glass during coating made the ultimate difference, and was therefore the inventive step in the process.<br /> <br /> ==Relationship with Novelty==<br /> *Novelty is very similar to nonobviousness. Novelty describes a product that is just new and has not been seen before, while nonoviousness describes a new development on a product that does make it novel, but also must make it novel enough to meet the criteria.<br /> <br /> ==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==<br /> *In order for an invention to be nonobviousness, it must be inventive. If the invention required no real ingenuity, then it is not inventive.<br /> <br /> ==Secondary Considerations==<br /> *These are ideas that can be used to aid in the decision of obviousness. They can help describe where the invention came from and how it was either obvious or not. Despite this, it is still secondary to the primary concerns of 35 USC 103.<br /> **Long-felt unsatisfied need<br /> **Commercial success<br /> **Failure of others<br /> **Skepticism of experts<br /> **Teaching away of others<br /> **Unexpected results<br /> **etc.<br /> <br /> ==Ordinary Skill in the Art==<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_NonObviousness&diff=3098 CM NonObviousness 2011-02-09T07:20:05Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* Secondary Considerations */</p> <hr /> <div><br /> ==Synthesis of the Issues in Non-Obviousness==<br /> Along with being useful and novel, a patent must also not be obvious. This "nonobviousness" is hard to qualify, but the courts and congress have tried over the past 160 years.<br /> <br /> The idea of nonobviousness first originated in the case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850). In this case, it first became clear to the supreme court that something needed to be done to keep simple innovations from acquiring a new patent, all but halting the stream of new ideas that patents are supposed to encourage. Because of this, it is necessary to establish a basis to disqualify inventions based on the obviousness of the invention. In this original case, the important phrase, "ingenuity and skill ... possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business," was first used to describe the basic principle of what made an invention obvious. Using this basis, the laws of nonobvious have been written an rewritten over the past 160 years to bring them to where they are today.<br /> <br /> Another key principle of nonobviousness was established in A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950). It was in this case that the idea of the sum of the parts needs to be improved upon to be awarded a patent. While this idea is not still in use, it lays down a basis for the Patent Act of 1952 to establish an overarching law. Along with this, the idea of secondary criteria for patent obviousness was developed, with a "long felt but unsatisfied need" being present. Thirdly, the very point of a patent was examined, and the consensus was that a patent should be for the advance of science and should not hinder it.<br /> <br /> The Patent Act of 1952 was just an act by congress to record the rules that the judicial branch had laid down. The code states "A patent may not be obtained…if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." This key development in patent law marks the culmination of the nonobviouness idea that had been in the works for 100 years.<br /> <br /> Yet, the work on patent law was not done. In Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) the secondary criteria for nonobviousness was established and spelled out. It was one of the first cases to look at other inventors and analyze their attempts and failures to try and develop a process that would work for coating lenses. Even though thee final result was only one added heating step, the time and effort that previous experimenters had invested proved that it was no small advancement.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere (1966), the idea of "inventiveness" was first introduced. This is the idea that a development must include some level of invention. This is similar to the idea from the A&P case, but it more rigorously defines the criteria.<br /> <br /> With the case of US v Adams (1966), the courts reconfirmed the idea that even if the parts of an invention were obvious or priorly patented, if it accomplished something that was unexpected in an unexpected way, that is patentable. Even though open cell batteries had been used, and it was possible batteries had used water, it was still not an obvious invention because of the unexpected results.<br /> <br /> In Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969), the rules were turned once again. The supreme court decided that the heated roller (patented) and the paving machine (patented) in combination was not enough to warrant a patent. The combination of the two patents was not enough to issue a new patent, and the use of the burner is infringement. This seems like a reasonable ruling, because it was not an improvement, but rather seems like a way to try to avoid dealing with the patent for the burner. But, it was still a case that upended the previous notion on nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> This ruling was confirmed once again in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (2007). The "Adjustable Pedal Assembly with Electronic Throttle Control" was a combination of an adjustable pedal assembly, a support pivot, and an electronic control. This combination had been taught, suggested, and motivated (TSM) by the prior art, so it was an obvious configuration of the prior art. These elements of TSM are key to determine obviousness, but they cannot be applied too rigorously because that is not the law to be followed as congress and previous cases decided.<br /> <br /> All of these rulings have lead to the formation of the nonoviousness of patents. Elements of the sum of parts being greater than the whole, a normal mechanic's skill in the art, TSM, a long-felt, unmet need, and previous failures all contributed to what the courts and patent office now use to judge the obviousness of inventions. This will most definitely continue to evolve, but we are much closer to a rigorous definition than before 1850. A patent is something that must be earned, and not something that is found easily and hinders the progress of science.<br /> <br /> ==Historical Development==<br /> The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.<br /> <br /> ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===<br /> <br /> Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.<br /> <br /> :...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.<br /> <br /> :The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.<br /> <br /> :But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.<br /> <br /> :Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.<br /> <br /> :But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.<br /> <br /> :The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.<br /> <br /> It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term "nonobviousness" will not be developed for some time, the court's decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,<br /> <br /> :"....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than ''were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business'', there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."<br /> <br /> Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.<br /> <br /> ===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===<br /> <br /> While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:<br /> <br /> *First, that the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> The importance of a "long felt but unsatisfied need" in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.<br /> <br /> *Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson's outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson's sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, "the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts," and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, "patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science," which make this point very clear.<br /> <br /> *Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.<br /> <br /> The court's outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. "The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable."<br /> <br /> ===35 USC 103 (1952)===<br /> This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where<br /> :the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.<br /> <br /> ===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===<br /> <br /> In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:<br /> :Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4<br /> <br /> ===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===<br /> <br /> In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include<br /> * scope and content of the prior art;<br /> * differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;<br /> * level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,<br /> * secondary considerations, including:<br /> ** commercial success of the invention;<br /> ** long-felt but unsolved needs;<br /> ** failure of others to find a solution, etc.<br /> <br /> ===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===<br /> <br /> * 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> ===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===<br /> Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.<br /> <br /> ==Suggestion to Combine==<br /> [[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.<br /> <br /> :"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."<br /> :"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.<br /> <br /> ==Objective Tests==<br /> Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].<br /> *A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.<br /> *The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.<br /> *This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.<br /> <br /> ==The Inventive Step==<br /> *This is the step that it takes to go beyond what the average mechanic in the art could come up with. A key example of this is in the Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) case where many had tried, but the step of heating the glass during coating made the ultimate difference, and was therefore the inventive step in the process.<br /> <br /> ==Relationship with Novelty==<br /> *Novelty is very similar to nonobviousness. Novelty describes a product that is just new and has not been seen before, while nonoviousness describes a new development on a product that does make it novel, but also must make it novel enough to meet the criteria.<br /> <br /> ==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==<br /> *In order for an invention to be nonobviousness, it must be inventive. If the invention required no real ingenuity, then it is not inventive.<br /> <br /> ==Secondary Considerations==<br /> *These are ideas that can be used to aid in the decision of obviousness. They can help describe where the invention came from and how it was either obvious or not. Despite this, it is still secondary to the primary concerns of 35 USC 103.<br /> **Long-felt unsatisfied need<br /> **Commercial success<br /> **Failure of others<br /> **Skepticism of experts<br /> **Teaching away of others<br /> **Unexpected results<br /> **etc.<br /> <br /> ==Ordinary Skill in the Art==<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_NonObviousness&diff=3096 CM NonObviousness 2011-02-09T07:16:33Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* Nonobviousness vs. Invention */</p> <hr /> <div><br /> ==Synthesis of the Issues in Non-Obviousness==<br /> Along with being useful and novel, a patent must also not be obvious. This "nonobviousness" is hard to qualify, but the courts and congress have tried over the past 160 years.<br /> <br /> The idea of nonobviousness first originated in the case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850). In this case, it first became clear to the supreme court that something needed to be done to keep simple innovations from acquiring a new patent, all but halting the stream of new ideas that patents are supposed to encourage. Because of this, it is necessary to establish a basis to disqualify inventions based on the obviousness of the invention. In this original case, the important phrase, "ingenuity and skill ... possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business," was first used to describe the basic principle of what made an invention obvious. Using this basis, the laws of nonobvious have been written an rewritten over the past 160 years to bring them to where they are today.<br /> <br /> Another key principle of nonobviousness was established in A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950). It was in this case that the idea of the sum of the parts needs to be improved upon to be awarded a patent. While this idea is not still in use, it lays down a basis for the Patent Act of 1952 to establish an overarching law. Along with this, the idea of secondary criteria for patent obviousness was developed, with a "long felt but unsatisfied need" being present. Thirdly, the very point of a patent was examined, and the consensus was that a patent should be for the advance of science and should not hinder it.<br /> <br /> The Patent Act of 1952 was just an act by congress to record the rules that the judicial branch had laid down. The code states "A patent may not be obtained…if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." This key development in patent law marks the culmination of the nonobviouness idea that had been in the works for 100 years.<br /> <br /> Yet, the work on patent law was not done. In Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) the secondary criteria for nonobviousness was established and spelled out. It was one of the first cases to look at other inventors and analyze their attempts and failures to try and develop a process that would work for coating lenses. Even though thee final result was only one added heating step, the time and effort that previous experimenters had invested proved that it was no small advancement.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere (1966), the idea of "inventiveness" was first introduced. This is the idea that a development must include some level of invention. This is similar to the idea from the A&P case, but it more rigorously defines the criteria.<br /> <br /> With the case of US v Adams (1966), the courts reconfirmed the idea that even if the parts of an invention were obvious or priorly patented, if it accomplished something that was unexpected in an unexpected way, that is patentable. Even though open cell batteries had been used, and it was possible batteries had used water, it was still not an obvious invention because of the unexpected results.<br /> <br /> In Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969), the rules were turned once again. The supreme court decided that the heated roller (patented) and the paving machine (patented) in combination was not enough to warrant a patent. The combination of the two patents was not enough to issue a new patent, and the use of the burner is infringement. This seems like a reasonable ruling, because it was not an improvement, but rather seems like a way to try to avoid dealing with the patent for the burner. But, it was still a case that upended the previous notion on nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> This ruling was confirmed once again in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (2007). The "Adjustable Pedal Assembly with Electronic Throttle Control" was a combination of an adjustable pedal assembly, a support pivot, and an electronic control. This combination had been taught, suggested, and motivated (TSM) by the prior art, so it was an obvious configuration of the prior art. These elements of TSM are key to determine obviousness, but they cannot be applied too rigorously because that is not the law to be followed as congress and previous cases decided.<br /> <br /> All of these rulings have lead to the formation of the nonoviousness of patents. Elements of the sum of parts being greater than the whole, a normal mechanic's skill in the art, TSM, a long-felt, unmet need, and previous failures all contributed to what the courts and patent office now use to judge the obviousness of inventions. This will most definitely continue to evolve, but we are much closer to a rigorous definition than before 1850. A patent is something that must be earned, and not something that is found easily and hinders the progress of science.<br /> <br /> ==Historical Development==<br /> The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.<br /> <br /> ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===<br /> <br /> Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.<br /> <br /> :...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.<br /> <br /> :The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.<br /> <br /> :But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.<br /> <br /> :Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.<br /> <br /> :But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.<br /> <br /> :The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.<br /> <br /> It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term "nonobviousness" will not be developed for some time, the court's decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,<br /> <br /> :"....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than ''were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business'', there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."<br /> <br /> Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.<br /> <br /> ===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===<br /> <br /> While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:<br /> <br /> *First, that the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> The importance of a "long felt but unsatisfied need" in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.<br /> <br /> *Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson's outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson's sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, "the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts," and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, "patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science," which make this point very clear.<br /> <br /> *Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.<br /> <br /> The court's outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. "The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable."<br /> <br /> ===35 USC 103 (1952)===<br /> This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where<br /> :the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.<br /> <br /> ===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===<br /> <br /> In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:<br /> :Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4<br /> <br /> ===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===<br /> <br /> In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include<br /> * scope and content of the prior art;<br /> * differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;<br /> * level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,<br /> * secondary considerations, including:<br /> ** commercial success of the invention;<br /> ** long-felt but unsolved needs;<br /> ** failure of others to find a solution, etc.<br /> <br /> ===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===<br /> <br /> * 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> ===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===<br /> Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.<br /> <br /> ==Suggestion to Combine==<br /> [[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.<br /> <br /> :"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."<br /> :"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.<br /> <br /> ==Objective Tests==<br /> Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].<br /> *A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.<br /> *The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.<br /> *This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.<br /> <br /> ==The Inventive Step==<br /> *This is the step that it takes to go beyond what the average mechanic in the art could come up with. A key example of this is in the Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) case where many had tried, but the step of heating the glass during coating made the ultimate difference, and was therefore the inventive step in the process.<br /> <br /> ==Relationship with Novelty==<br /> *Novelty is very similar to nonobviousness. Novelty describes a product that is just new and has not been seen before, while nonoviousness describes a new development on a product that does make it novel, but also must make it novel enough to meet the criteria.<br /> <br /> ==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==<br /> *In order for an invention to be nonobviousness, it must be inventive. If the invention required no real ingenuity, then it is not inventive.<br /> <br /> ==Secondary Considerations==<br /> ==Ordinary Skill in the Art==<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_NonObviousness&diff=3095 CM NonObviousness 2011-02-09T07:14:47Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* Synthesis of the Issues in Non-Obviousness */</p> <hr /> <div><br /> ==Synthesis of the Issues in Non-Obviousness==<br /> Along with being useful and novel, a patent must also not be obvious. This "nonobviousness" is hard to qualify, but the courts and congress have tried over the past 160 years.<br /> <br /> The idea of nonobviousness first originated in the case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850). In this case, it first became clear to the supreme court that something needed to be done to keep simple innovations from acquiring a new patent, all but halting the stream of new ideas that patents are supposed to encourage. Because of this, it is necessary to establish a basis to disqualify inventions based on the obviousness of the invention. In this original case, the important phrase, "ingenuity and skill ... possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business," was first used to describe the basic principle of what made an invention obvious. Using this basis, the laws of nonobvious have been written an rewritten over the past 160 years to bring them to where they are today.<br /> <br /> Another key principle of nonobviousness was established in A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950). It was in this case that the idea of the sum of the parts needs to be improved upon to be awarded a patent. While this idea is not still in use, it lays down a basis for the Patent Act of 1952 to establish an overarching law. Along with this, the idea of secondary criteria for patent obviousness was developed, with a "long felt but unsatisfied need" being present. Thirdly, the very point of a patent was examined, and the consensus was that a patent should be for the advance of science and should not hinder it.<br /> <br /> The Patent Act of 1952 was just an act by congress to record the rules that the judicial branch had laid down. The code states "A patent may not be obtained…if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." This key development in patent law marks the culmination of the nonobviouness idea that had been in the works for 100 years.<br /> <br /> Yet, the work on patent law was not done. In Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) the secondary criteria for nonobviousness was established and spelled out. It was one of the first cases to look at other inventors and analyze their attempts and failures to try and develop a process that would work for coating lenses. Even though thee final result was only one added heating step, the time and effort that previous experimenters had invested proved that it was no small advancement.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere (1966), the idea of "inventiveness" was first introduced. This is the idea that a development must include some level of invention. This is similar to the idea from the A&P case, but it more rigorously defines the criteria.<br /> <br /> With the case of US v Adams (1966), the courts reconfirmed the idea that even if the parts of an invention were obvious or priorly patented, if it accomplished something that was unexpected in an unexpected way, that is patentable. Even though open cell batteries had been used, and it was possible batteries had used water, it was still not an obvious invention because of the unexpected results.<br /> <br /> In Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969), the rules were turned once again. The supreme court decided that the heated roller (patented) and the paving machine (patented) in combination was not enough to warrant a patent. The combination of the two patents was not enough to issue a new patent, and the use of the burner is infringement. This seems like a reasonable ruling, because it was not an improvement, but rather seems like a way to try to avoid dealing with the patent for the burner. But, it was still a case that upended the previous notion on nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> This ruling was confirmed once again in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (2007). The "Adjustable Pedal Assembly with Electronic Throttle Control" was a combination of an adjustable pedal assembly, a support pivot, and an electronic control. This combination had been taught, suggested, and motivated (TSM) by the prior art, so it was an obvious configuration of the prior art. These elements of TSM are key to determine obviousness, but they cannot be applied too rigorously because that is not the law to be followed as congress and previous cases decided.<br /> <br /> All of these rulings have lead to the formation of the nonoviousness of patents. Elements of the sum of parts being greater than the whole, a normal mechanic's skill in the art, TSM, a long-felt, unmet need, and previous failures all contributed to what the courts and patent office now use to judge the obviousness of inventions. This will most definitely continue to evolve, but we are much closer to a rigorous definition than before 1850. A patent is something that must be earned, and not something that is found easily and hinders the progress of science.<br /> <br /> ==Historical Development==<br /> The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.<br /> <br /> ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===<br /> <br /> Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.<br /> <br /> :...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.<br /> <br /> :The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.<br /> <br /> :But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.<br /> <br /> :Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.<br /> <br /> :But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.<br /> <br /> :The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.<br /> <br /> It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term "nonobviousness" will not be developed for some time, the court's decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,<br /> <br /> :"....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than ''were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business'', there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."<br /> <br /> Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.<br /> <br /> ===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===<br /> <br /> While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:<br /> <br /> *First, that the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> The importance of a "long felt but unsatisfied need" in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.<br /> <br /> *Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson's outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson's sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, "the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts," and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, "patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science," which make this point very clear.<br /> <br /> *Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.<br /> <br /> The court's outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. "The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable."<br /> <br /> ===35 USC 103 (1952)===<br /> This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where<br /> :the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.<br /> <br /> ===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===<br /> <br /> In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:<br /> :Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4<br /> <br /> ===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===<br /> <br /> In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include<br /> * scope and content of the prior art;<br /> * differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;<br /> * level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,<br /> * secondary considerations, including:<br /> ** commercial success of the invention;<br /> ** long-felt but unsolved needs;<br /> ** failure of others to find a solution, etc.<br /> <br /> ===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===<br /> <br /> * 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> ===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===<br /> Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.<br /> <br /> ==Suggestion to Combine==<br /> [[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.<br /> <br /> :"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."<br /> :"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.<br /> <br /> ==Objective Tests==<br /> Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].<br /> *A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.<br /> *The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.<br /> *This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.<br /> <br /> ==The Inventive Step==<br /> *This is the step that it takes to go beyond what the average mechanic in the art could come up with. A key example of this is in the Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) case where many had tried, but the step of heating the glass during coating made the ultimate difference, and was therefore the inventive step in the process.<br /> <br /> ==Relationship with Novelty==<br /> *Novelty is very similar to nonobviousness. Novelty describes a product that is just new and has not been seen before, while nonoviousness describes a new development on a product that does make it novel, but also must make it novel enough to meet the criteria.<br /> <br /> ==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==<br /> ==Secondary Considerations==<br /> ==Ordinary Skill in the Art==<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_NonObviousness&diff=3094 CM NonObviousness 2011-02-09T07:12:24Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* Relationship with Novelty */</p> <hr /> <div><br /> ==Synthesis of the Issues in Non-Obviousness==<br /> Along with being useful and novel, a patent must also not be obvious. This "nonobviousness" is hard to qualify, but the courts and congress have tried over the past 160 years.<br /> <br /> The idea of nonobviousness first originated in the case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850). In this case, it first became clear to the supreme court that something needed to be done to keep simple innovations from acquiring a new patent, all but halting the stream of new ideas that patents are supposed to encourage. Because of this, it is necessary to establish a basis to disqualify inventions based on the obviousness of the invention. In this original case, the important phrase, "ingenuity and skill ... possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business," was first used to describe the basic principle of what made an invention obvious. Using this basis, the laws of nonobvious have been written an rewritten over the past 160 years to bring them to where they are today.<br /> <br /> Another key principle of nonobviousness was established in A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950). It was in this case that the idea of the sum of the parts needs to be improved upon to be awarded a patent. While this idea is not still in use, it lays down a basis for the Patent Act of 1952 to establish an overarching law. Along with this, the idea of secondary criteria for patent obviousness was developed, with a "long felt but unsatisfied need" being present. Thirdly, the very point of a patent was examined, and the consensus was that a patent should be for the advance of science and should not hinder it.<br /> <br /> The Patent Act of 1952 was just an act by congress to record the rules that the judicial branch had laid down. The code states "A patent may not be obtained…if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." This key development in patent law marks the culmination of the nonobviouness idea that had been in the works for 100 years.<br /> <br /> Yet, the work on patent law was not done. In Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) the secondary criteria for nonobviousness was established and spelled out. It was one of the first cases to look at other inventors and analyze their attempts and failures to try and develop a process that would work for coating lenses. Even though thee final result was only one added heating step, the time and effort that previous experimenters had invested proved that it was no small advancement.<br /> <br /> With the case of US v Adams (1966), the courts reconfirmed the idea that even if the parts of an invention were obvious or priorly patented, if it accomplished something that was unexpected in an unexpected way, that is patentable. Even though open cell batteries had been used, and it was possible batteries had used water, it was still not an obvious invention because of the unexpected results.<br /> <br /> In Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969), the rules were turned once again. The supreme court decided that the heated roller (patented) and the paving machine (patented) in combination was not enough to warrant a patent. The combination of the two patents was not enough to issue a new patent, and the use of the burner is infringement. This seems like a reasonable ruling, because it was not an improvement, but rather seems like a way to try to avoid dealing with the patent for the burner. But, it was still a case that upended the previous notion on nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> This ruling was confirmed once again in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (2007). The "Adjustable Pedal Assembly with Electronic Throttle Control" was a combination of an adjustable pedal assembly, a support pivot, and an electronic control. This combination had been taught, suggested, and motivated (TSM) by the prior art, so it was an obvious configuration of the prior art. These elements of TSM are key to determine obviousness, but they cannot be applied too rigorously because that is not the law to be followed as congress and previous cases decided.<br /> <br /> All of these rulings have lead to the formation of the nonoviousness of patents. Elements of the sum of parts being greater than the whole, a normal mechanic's skill in the art, TSM, a long-felt, unmet need, and previous failures all contributed to what the courts and patent office now use to judge the obviousness of inventions. This will most definitely continue to evolve, but we are much closer to a rigorous definition than before 1850. A patent is something that must be earned, and not something that is found easily and hinders the progress of science.<br /> <br /> ==Historical Development==<br /> The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.<br /> <br /> ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===<br /> <br /> Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.<br /> <br /> :...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.<br /> <br /> :The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.<br /> <br /> :But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.<br /> <br /> :Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.<br /> <br /> :But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.<br /> <br /> :The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.<br /> <br /> It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term "nonobviousness" will not be developed for some time, the court's decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,<br /> <br /> :"....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than ''were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business'', there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."<br /> <br /> Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.<br /> <br /> ===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===<br /> <br /> While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:<br /> <br /> *First, that the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> The importance of a "long felt but unsatisfied need" in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.<br /> <br /> *Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson's outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson's sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, "the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts," and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, "patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science," which make this point very clear.<br /> <br /> *Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.<br /> <br /> The court's outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. "The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable."<br /> <br /> ===35 USC 103 (1952)===<br /> This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where<br /> :the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.<br /> <br /> ===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===<br /> <br /> In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:<br /> :Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4<br /> <br /> ===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===<br /> <br /> In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include<br /> * scope and content of the prior art;<br /> * differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;<br /> * level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,<br /> * secondary considerations, including:<br /> ** commercial success of the invention;<br /> ** long-felt but unsolved needs;<br /> ** failure of others to find a solution, etc.<br /> <br /> ===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===<br /> <br /> * 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> ===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===<br /> Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.<br /> <br /> ==Suggestion to Combine==<br /> [[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.<br /> <br /> :"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."<br /> :"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.<br /> <br /> ==Objective Tests==<br /> Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].<br /> *A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.<br /> *The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.<br /> *This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.<br /> <br /> ==The Inventive Step==<br /> *This is the step that it takes to go beyond what the average mechanic in the art could come up with. A key example of this is in the Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) case where many had tried, but the step of heating the glass during coating made the ultimate difference, and was therefore the inventive step in the process.<br /> <br /> ==Relationship with Novelty==<br /> *Novelty is very similar to nonobviousness. Novelty describes a product that is just new and has not been seen before, while nonoviousness describes a new development on a product that does make it novel, but also must make it novel enough to meet the criteria.<br /> <br /> ==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==<br /> ==Secondary Considerations==<br /> ==Ordinary Skill in the Art==<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_NonObviousness&diff=3092 CM NonObviousness 2011-02-09T07:10:32Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* The Inventive Step */</p> <hr /> <div><br /> ==Synthesis of the Issues in Non-Obviousness==<br /> Along with being useful and novel, a patent must also not be obvious. This "nonobviousness" is hard to qualify, but the courts and congress have tried over the past 160 years.<br /> <br /> The idea of nonobviousness first originated in the case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850). In this case, it first became clear to the supreme court that something needed to be done to keep simple innovations from acquiring a new patent, all but halting the stream of new ideas that patents are supposed to encourage. Because of this, it is necessary to establish a basis to disqualify inventions based on the obviousness of the invention. In this original case, the important phrase, "ingenuity and skill ... possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business," was first used to describe the basic principle of what made an invention obvious. Using this basis, the laws of nonobvious have been written an rewritten over the past 160 years to bring them to where they are today.<br /> <br /> Another key principle of nonobviousness was established in A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950). It was in this case that the idea of the sum of the parts needs to be improved upon to be awarded a patent. While this idea is not still in use, it lays down a basis for the Patent Act of 1952 to establish an overarching law. Along with this, the idea of secondary criteria for patent obviousness was developed, with a "long felt but unsatisfied need" being present. Thirdly, the very point of a patent was examined, and the consensus was that a patent should be for the advance of science and should not hinder it.<br /> <br /> The Patent Act of 1952 was just an act by congress to record the rules that the judicial branch had laid down. The code states "A patent may not be obtained…if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." This key development in patent law marks the culmination of the nonobviouness idea that had been in the works for 100 years.<br /> <br /> Yet, the work on patent law was not done. In Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) the secondary criteria for nonobviousness was established and spelled out. It was one of the first cases to look at other inventors and analyze their attempts and failures to try and develop a process that would work for coating lenses. Even though thee final result was only one added heating step, the time and effort that previous experimenters had invested proved that it was no small advancement.<br /> <br /> With the case of US v Adams (1966), the courts reconfirmed the idea that even if the parts of an invention were obvious or priorly patented, if it accomplished something that was unexpected in an unexpected way, that is patentable. Even though open cell batteries had been used, and it was possible batteries had used water, it was still not an obvious invention because of the unexpected results.<br /> <br /> In Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969), the rules were turned once again. The supreme court decided that the heated roller (patented) and the paving machine (patented) in combination was not enough to warrant a patent. The combination of the two patents was not enough to issue a new patent, and the use of the burner is infringement. This seems like a reasonable ruling, because it was not an improvement, but rather seems like a way to try to avoid dealing with the patent for the burner. But, it was still a case that upended the previous notion on nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> This ruling was confirmed once again in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (2007). The "Adjustable Pedal Assembly with Electronic Throttle Control" was a combination of an adjustable pedal assembly, a support pivot, and an electronic control. This combination had been taught, suggested, and motivated (TSM) by the prior art, so it was an obvious configuration of the prior art. These elements of TSM are key to determine obviousness, but they cannot be applied too rigorously because that is not the law to be followed as congress and previous cases decided.<br /> <br /> All of these rulings have lead to the formation of the nonoviousness of patents. Elements of the sum of parts being greater than the whole, a normal mechanic's skill in the art, TSM, a long-felt, unmet need, and previous failures all contributed to what the courts and patent office now use to judge the obviousness of inventions. This will most definitely continue to evolve, but we are much closer to a rigorous definition than before 1850. A patent is something that must be earned, and not something that is found easily and hinders the progress of science.<br /> <br /> ==Historical Development==<br /> The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.<br /> <br /> ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===<br /> <br /> Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.<br /> <br /> :...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.<br /> <br /> :The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.<br /> <br /> :But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.<br /> <br /> :Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.<br /> <br /> :But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.<br /> <br /> :The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.<br /> <br /> It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term "nonobviousness" will not be developed for some time, the court's decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,<br /> <br /> :"....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than ''were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business'', there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."<br /> <br /> Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.<br /> <br /> ===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===<br /> <br /> While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:<br /> <br /> *First, that the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> The importance of a "long felt but unsatisfied need" in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.<br /> <br /> *Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson's outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson's sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, "the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts," and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, "patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science," which make this point very clear.<br /> <br /> *Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.<br /> <br /> The court's outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. "The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable."<br /> <br /> ===35 USC 103 (1952)===<br /> This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where<br /> :the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.<br /> <br /> ===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===<br /> <br /> In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:<br /> :Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4<br /> <br /> ===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===<br /> <br /> In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include<br /> * scope and content of the prior art;<br /> * differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;<br /> * level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,<br /> * secondary considerations, including:<br /> ** commercial success of the invention;<br /> ** long-felt but unsolved needs;<br /> ** failure of others to find a solution, etc.<br /> <br /> ===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===<br /> <br /> * 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> ===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===<br /> Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.<br /> <br /> ==Suggestion to Combine==<br /> [[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.<br /> <br /> :"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."<br /> :"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.<br /> <br /> ==Objective Tests==<br /> Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].<br /> *A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.<br /> *The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.<br /> *This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.<br /> <br /> ==The Inventive Step==<br /> *This is the step that it takes to go beyond what the average mechanic in the art could come up with. A key example of this is in the Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) case where many had tried, but the step of heating the glass during coating made the ultimate difference, and was therefore the inventive step in the process.<br /> <br /> ==Relationship with Novelty==<br /> ==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==<br /> ==Secondary Considerations==<br /> ==Ordinary Skill in the Art==<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_NonObviousness&diff=3091 CM NonObviousness 2011-02-09T07:08:23Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* Synthesis of the Issues in Non-Obviousness */</p> <hr /> <div><br /> ==Synthesis of the Issues in Non-Obviousness==<br /> Along with being useful and novel, a patent must also not be obvious. This "nonobviousness" is hard to qualify, but the courts and congress have tried over the past 160 years.<br /> <br /> The idea of nonobviousness first originated in the case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850). In this case, it first became clear to the supreme court that something needed to be done to keep simple innovations from acquiring a new patent, all but halting the stream of new ideas that patents are supposed to encourage. Because of this, it is necessary to establish a basis to disqualify inventions based on the obviousness of the invention. In this original case, the important phrase, "ingenuity and skill ... possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business," was first used to describe the basic principle of what made an invention obvious. Using this basis, the laws of nonobvious have been written an rewritten over the past 160 years to bring them to where they are today.<br /> <br /> Another key principle of nonobviousness was established in A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950). It was in this case that the idea of the sum of the parts needs to be improved upon to be awarded a patent. While this idea is not still in use, it lays down a basis for the Patent Act of 1952 to establish an overarching law. Along with this, the idea of secondary criteria for patent obviousness was developed, with a "long felt but unsatisfied need" being present. Thirdly, the very point of a patent was examined, and the consensus was that a patent should be for the advance of science and should not hinder it.<br /> <br /> The Patent Act of 1952 was just an act by congress to record the rules that the judicial branch had laid down. The code states "A patent may not be obtained…if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." This key development in patent law marks the culmination of the nonobviouness idea that had been in the works for 100 years.<br /> <br /> Yet, the work on patent law was not done. In Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) the secondary criteria for nonobviousness was established and spelled out. It was one of the first cases to look at other inventors and analyze their attempts and failures to try and develop a process that would work for coating lenses. Even though thee final result was only one added heating step, the time and effort that previous experimenters had invested proved that it was no small advancement.<br /> <br /> With the case of US v Adams (1966), the courts reconfirmed the idea that even if the parts of an invention were obvious or priorly patented, if it accomplished something that was unexpected in an unexpected way, that is patentable. Even though open cell batteries had been used, and it was possible batteries had used water, it was still not an obvious invention because of the unexpected results.<br /> <br /> In Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969), the rules were turned once again. The supreme court decided that the heated roller (patented) and the paving machine (patented) in combination was not enough to warrant a patent. The combination of the two patents was not enough to issue a new patent, and the use of the burner is infringement. This seems like a reasonable ruling, because it was not an improvement, but rather seems like a way to try to avoid dealing with the patent for the burner. But, it was still a case that upended the previous notion on nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> This ruling was confirmed once again in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (2007). The "Adjustable Pedal Assembly with Electronic Throttle Control" was a combination of an adjustable pedal assembly, a support pivot, and an electronic control. This combination had been taught, suggested, and motivated (TSM) by the prior art, so it was an obvious configuration of the prior art. These elements of TSM are key to determine obviousness, but they cannot be applied too rigorously because that is not the law to be followed as congress and previous cases decided.<br /> <br /> All of these rulings have lead to the formation of the nonoviousness of patents. Elements of the sum of parts being greater than the whole, a normal mechanic's skill in the art, TSM, a long-felt, unmet need, and previous failures all contributed to what the courts and patent office now use to judge the obviousness of inventions. This will most definitely continue to evolve, but we are much closer to a rigorous definition than before 1850. A patent is something that must be earned, and not something that is found easily and hinders the progress of science.<br /> <br /> ==Historical Development==<br /> The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.<br /> <br /> ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===<br /> <br /> Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.<br /> <br /> :...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.<br /> <br /> :The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.<br /> <br /> :But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.<br /> <br /> :Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.<br /> <br /> :But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.<br /> <br /> :The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.<br /> <br /> It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term "nonobviousness" will not be developed for some time, the court's decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,<br /> <br /> :"....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than ''were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business'', there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."<br /> <br /> Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.<br /> <br /> ===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===<br /> <br /> While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:<br /> <br /> *First, that the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> The importance of a "long felt but unsatisfied need" in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.<br /> <br /> *Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson's outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson's sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, "the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts," and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, "patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science," which make this point very clear.<br /> <br /> *Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.<br /> <br /> The court's outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. "The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable."<br /> <br /> ===35 USC 103 (1952)===<br /> This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where<br /> :the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.<br /> <br /> ===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===<br /> <br /> In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:<br /> :Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4<br /> <br /> ===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===<br /> <br /> In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include<br /> * scope and content of the prior art;<br /> * differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;<br /> * level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,<br /> * secondary considerations, including:<br /> ** commercial success of the invention;<br /> ** long-felt but unsolved needs;<br /> ** failure of others to find a solution, etc.<br /> <br /> ===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===<br /> <br /> * 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> ===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===<br /> Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.<br /> <br /> ==Suggestion to Combine==<br /> [[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.<br /> <br /> :"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."<br /> :"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.<br /> <br /> ==Objective Tests==<br /> Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].<br /> *A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.<br /> *The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.<br /> *This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.<br /> <br /> ==The Inventive Step==<br /> <br /> ==Relationship with Novelty==<br /> ==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==<br /> ==Secondary Considerations==<br /> ==Ordinary Skill in the Art==<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_NonObviousness&diff=3090 CM NonObviousness 2011-02-09T07:06:51Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* Synthesis of the Issues in Non-Obviousness */</p> <hr /> <div><br /> ==Synthesis of the Issues in Non-Obviousness==<br /> Along with being useful and novel, a patent must also not be obvious. This "nonobviousness" is hard to qualify, but the courts and congress have tried over the past 160 years.<br /> <br /> The idea of nonobviousness first originated in the case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850). In this case, it first became clear to the supreme court that something needed to be done to keep simple innovations from acquiring a new patent, all but halting the stream of new ideas that patents are supposed to encourage. Because of this, it is necessary to establish a basis to disqualify inventions based on the obviousness of the invention. In this original case, the important phrase, "ingenuity and skill ... possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business," was first used to describe the basic principle of what made an invention obvious. Using this basis, the laws of nonobvious have been written an rewritten over the past 160 years to bring them to where they are today.<br /> <br /> Another key principle of nonobviousness was established in A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950). It was in this case that the idea of the sum of the parts needs to be improved upon to be awarded a patent. While this idea is not still in use, it lays down a basis for the Patent Act of 1952 to establish an overarching law. Along with this, the idea of secondary criteria for patent obviousness was developed, with a "long felt but unsatisfied need" being present. Thirdly, the very point of a patent was examined, and the consensus was that a patent should be for the advance of science and should not hinder it.<br /> <br /> The Patent Act of 1952 was just an act by congress to record the rules that the judicial branch had laid down. The code states "A patent may not be obtained…if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." This key development in patent law marks the culmination of the nonobviouness idea that had been in the works for 100 years.<br /> <br /> Yet, the work on patent law was not done. In Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955) the secondary criteria for nonobviousness was established and spelled out. It was one of the first cases to look at other inventors and analyze their attempts and failures to try and develop a process that would work for coating lenses. Even though thee final result was only one added heating step, the time and effort that previous experimenters had invested proved that it was no small advancement.<br /> <br /> With the case of US v Adams (1966), the courts reconfirmed the idea that even if the parts of an invention were obvious or priorly patented, if it accomplished something that was unexpected in an unexpected way, that is patentable. Even though open cell batteries had been used, and it was possible batteries had used water, it was still not an obvious invention because of the unexpected results.<br /> <br /> In Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969), the rules were turned once again. The supreme court decided that the heated roller (patented) and the paving machine (patented) in combination was not enough to warrant a patent. The combination of the two patents was not enough to issue a new patent, and the use of the burner is infringement. This seems like a reasonable ruling, because it was not an improvement, but rather seems like a way to try to avoid dealing with the patent for the burner. But, it was still a case that upended the previous notion on nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> This ruling was confirmed once again in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (2007). The "Adjustable Pedal Assembly with Electronic Throttle Control" was a combination of an adjustable pedal assembly, a support pivot, and an electronic control. This combination had been taught, suggested, and motivated (TSM) by the prior art, so it was an obvious configuration of the prior art. These elements of TSM are key to determine obviousness, but they cannot be applied too rigorously because that is not the law to be followed as congress and previous cases decided.<br /> <br /> All of these rulings have lead to the formation of the nonoviousness of patents. Elements of the sum of parts being greater than the whole, a normal mechanic's skill in the art, TSM, a long-felt, unmet need, and previous failures all contributed to what the courts and patent office now use to judge the obviousness of inventions. This will most definitely continue to evolve, but we are much closer to a rigorous definition than before 1850.<br /> <br /> ==Historical Development==<br /> The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.<br /> <br /> ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===<br /> <br /> Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.<br /> <br /> :...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.<br /> <br /> :The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.<br /> <br /> :But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.<br /> <br /> :Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.<br /> <br /> :But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.<br /> <br /> :The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.<br /> <br /> It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term "nonobviousness" will not be developed for some time, the court's decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,<br /> <br /> :"....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than ''were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business'', there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."<br /> <br /> Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.<br /> <br /> ===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===<br /> <br /> While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:<br /> <br /> *First, that the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> The importance of a "long felt but unsatisfied need" in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.<br /> <br /> *Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson's outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson's sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, "the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts," and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, "patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science," which make this point very clear.<br /> <br /> *Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.<br /> <br /> The court's outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. "The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable."<br /> <br /> ===35 USC 103 (1952)===<br /> This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where<br /> :the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.<br /> <br /> ===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===<br /> <br /> In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:<br /> :Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4<br /> <br /> ===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===<br /> <br /> In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include<br /> * scope and content of the prior art;<br /> * differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;<br /> * level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,<br /> * secondary considerations, including:<br /> ** commercial success of the invention;<br /> ** long-felt but unsolved needs;<br /> ** failure of others to find a solution, etc.<br /> <br /> ===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===<br /> <br /> * 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> ===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===<br /> Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.<br /> <br /> ==Suggestion to Combine==<br /> [[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.<br /> <br /> :"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."<br /> :"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.<br /> <br /> ==Objective Tests==<br /> Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].<br /> *A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.<br /> *The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.<br /> *This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.<br /> <br /> ==The Inventive Step==<br /> <br /> ==Relationship with Novelty==<br /> ==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==<br /> ==Secondary Considerations==<br /> ==Ordinary Skill in the Art==<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_NonObviousness&diff=3084 CM NonObviousness 2011-02-09T06:25:22Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div><br /> ==Synthesis of the Issues in Non-Obviousness==<br /> <br /> ==Historical Development==<br /> The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.<br /> <br /> ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===<br /> <br /> Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.<br /> <br /> :...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.<br /> <br /> :The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.<br /> <br /> :But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.<br /> <br /> :Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.<br /> <br /> :But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.<br /> <br /> :The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.<br /> <br /> It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term "nonobviousness" will not be developed for some time, the court's decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,<br /> <br /> :"....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than ''were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business'', there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."<br /> <br /> Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.<br /> <br /> ===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===<br /> <br /> While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:<br /> <br /> *First, that the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> The importance of a "long felt but unsatisfied need" in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.<br /> <br /> *Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson's outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson's sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, "the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts," and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, "patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science," which make this point very clear.<br /> <br /> *Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.<br /> <br /> The court's outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. "The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable."<br /> <br /> ===35 USC 103 (1952)===<br /> This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where<br /> :the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.<br /> <br /> ===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===<br /> <br /> In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:<br /> :Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4<br /> <br /> ===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===<br /> <br /> In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include<br /> * scope and content of the prior art;<br /> * differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;<br /> * level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,<br /> * secondary considerations, including:<br /> ** commercial success of the invention;<br /> ** long-felt but unsolved needs;<br /> ** failure of others to find a solution, etc.<br /> <br /> ===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===<br /> <br /> * 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> ===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===<br /> Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.<br /> <br /> ==Suggestion to Combine==<br /> [[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.<br /> <br /> :"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."<br /> :"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.<br /> <br /> ==Objective Tests==<br /> Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].<br /> *A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.<br /> *The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.<br /> *This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.<br /> <br /> ==The Inventive Step==<br /> <br /> ==Relationship with Novelty==<br /> ==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==<br /> ==Secondary Considerations==<br /> ==Ordinary Skill in the Art==<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_NonObviousness&diff=3082 CM NonObviousness 2011-02-09T06:24:35Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>==Synthesis of the Issues of Non-Obviousness<br /> <br /> ==Historical Development==<br /> The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.<br /> <br /> ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===<br /> <br /> Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.<br /> <br /> :...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.<br /> <br /> :The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.<br /> <br /> :But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.<br /> <br /> :Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.<br /> <br /> :But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.<br /> <br /> :The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.<br /> <br /> It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term "nonobviousness" will not be developed for some time, the court's decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,<br /> <br /> :"....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than ''were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business'', there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."<br /> <br /> Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.<br /> <br /> ===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===<br /> <br /> While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:<br /> <br /> *First, that the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> The importance of a "long felt but unsatisfied need" in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.<br /> <br /> *Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson's outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson's sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, "the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts," and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, "patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science," which make this point very clear.<br /> <br /> *Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.<br /> <br /> The court's outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. "The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable."<br /> <br /> ===35 USC 103 (1952)===<br /> This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where<br /> :the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.<br /> <br /> ===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===<br /> <br /> In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:<br /> :Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4<br /> <br /> ===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===<br /> <br /> In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include<br /> * scope and content of the prior art;<br /> * differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;<br /> * level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,<br /> * secondary considerations, including:<br /> ** commercial success of the invention;<br /> ** long-felt but unsolved needs;<br /> ** failure of others to find a solution, etc.<br /> <br /> ===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===<br /> <br /> * 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> ===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===<br /> Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.<br /> <br /> ==Suggestion to Combine==<br /> [[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.<br /> <br /> :"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."<br /> :"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.<br /> <br /> ==Objective Tests==<br /> Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].<br /> *A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.<br /> *The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.<br /> *This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.<br /> <br /> ==The Inventive Step==<br /> <br /> ==Relationship with Novelty==<br /> ==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==<br /> ==Secondary Considerations==<br /> ==Ordinary Skill in the Art==<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=CM_NonObviousness&diff=3080 CM NonObviousness 2011-02-09T06:20:17Z

<p>Cmadiga1: Created page with "==Historical Development== The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard. ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (185..."</p> <hr /> <div>==Historical Development==<br /> The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.<br /> <br /> ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===<br /> <br /> Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.<br /> <br /> :...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.<br /> <br /> :The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.<br /> <br /> :But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.<br /> <br /> :Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.<br /> <br /> :But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.<br /> <br /> :The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.<br /> <br /> It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term "nonobviousness" will not be developed for some time, the court's decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,<br /> <br /> :"....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than ''were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business'', there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."<br /> <br /> Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.<br /> <br /> ===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===<br /> <br /> While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:<br /> <br /> *First, that the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> The importance of a "long felt but unsatisfied need" in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.<br /> <br /> *Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.<br /> <br /> In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson's outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson's sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, "the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts," and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, "patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science," which make this point very clear.<br /> <br /> *Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.<br /> <br /> The court's outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. "The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable."<br /> <br /> ===35 USC 103 (1952)===<br /> This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where<br /> :the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.<br /> <br /> ===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===<br /> <br /> In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:<br /> :Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4<br /> <br /> ===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===<br /> <br /> In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include<br /> * scope and content of the prior art;<br /> * differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;<br /> * level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,<br /> * secondary considerations, including:<br /> ** commercial success of the invention;<br /> ** long-felt but unsolved needs;<br /> ** failure of others to find a solution, etc.<br /> <br /> ===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===<br /> <br /> * 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.<br /> <br /> ===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===<br /> Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.<br /> <br /> ==Suggestion to Combine==<br /> [[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.<br /> <br /> :"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."<br /> :"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.<br /> <br /> ==Objective Tests==<br /> Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].<br /> *A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.<br /> *The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.<br /> *This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.<br /> <br /> ==The Inventive Step==<br /> <br /> ==Relationship with Novelty==<br /> ==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==<br /> ==Secondary Considerations==<br /> ==Ordinary Skill in the Art==<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]<br /> <br /> [[South Corp. v. US]]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=2421 User:Cmadiga1 2011-02-04T17:39:01Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* Obviousness of the Adams Patent */</p> <hr /> <div>== My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Obviousness of the Adams Patent==<br /> *Non-Obvious<br /> **This patent could be considered non-obvious because of two key prior patents. Both of these patents utilize a magnesium electrode, but both Leo Goldenberg in 1868 and Robert T. Wood in 1928. Both of these patents utilize the magnesium electrode, but both dimiss it as a method that will not work. In fact, Wood goes as far as to say "It has been generally accepted that magnesium could not be commercially utilized as a primary cell electrode." This shows how the experiments and inventions had been unsucessful with regards to their experiments, and frankly I do not know how the received patents becasue of the lack of usefulness. Goldenberg writes "Unfortunately experimenters were never able to attain voltages under closed circuit conditions equalling the potential which theoretically should have appeared available. <br /> **Also, as far as the electrolyte, neither of these patents contained cuprous chloride, but they did not use water or indicate it as an option for the electrolyte. Because of this, the water seems to be an innovative and non-obvious aspect of this patent.<br /> <br /> *Obviousness<br /> **It is clear that this is just a combination of prior art, leading to something that had expected results. Magnesium had been used as an electrode by Wood and Goldenberg. Water could have been used by Marie Davy in 1860 and therefore, is just a combination of new innovations. This has a precedent in the Greenwood v Hotchkiss case, and makes the patent obvious.<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> **This patent is of an invention similar to the safety seal described in my patent. The purpose of this invention is to seal a container with a plastic seal that is attached using heat. The seal is removed by pulling on a tab that removes part of the seal, using the remaining part to regulate the amount of contents poured.<br /> **This patent seems to conflict with my patent when it is analyzed using the ruling from Hotchkiss. The ruling from Hotchkiss is that an invention should not be awarded a patent if it is an adaptation that someone of ordinary skill in the craft could have come up with. The only differences between my patent and this one are that the seal can be completely torn off, it is used to prevent tampering instead of using it to preserve the contents, and the seal is made of foil in the tamper resistant seal. These are all innovations that could have been come up with easily by any engineer looking to apply a seal to ensure the safety of the contents, and the change of material is exactly what the ruling was about in Hotchkiss.<br /> **Also, this patent makes my patent obvious being invalid when looked at from the point of view A&P. The A&P case ruled that in order to be issued a patent, an invention can not be the combination of other inventions that simply leads to the sum of the parts. This patent shows a seal with a tab. This, combined with previous foil seals and completely removable seals should lead to my invention having a patent withheld. The sum of these parts leads to exactly what you would expect it to, with is what the A&P case rules as not patentable.<br /> **Also, the law of 35 USC 103 should make my invention un-patentable. According to the code, if someone of ordinary skill could have easily come up with this idea.<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]<br /> **This is a later patent of the safety seal in my patent. This is a seal that also fits under a screw cap that has a double reinforced tab that folds back onto the main seal and fits in place under the cap allowing for the seal to be completely removed when the tab is pulled, with less chance of tearing the tab off due to the extra strength of it.<br /> **Under the ruling from Hotchkiss, it seems as if this is another invention that would not have received a patent. It is obvious to any skilled mechanic to reinforce the seal with two layers to prevent it from tearing. It is better than my patent, but it in no way required a great investment of thought or ingenuity in coming up with the idea. Also, the way of storing the tab under the cap is also obvious and easy to see for any engineer.<br /> **With the A&P ruling in mind, it is also very evident that this is not patentable. The seal was already in common use, and everyone has experienced a case in which double ply was stronger and better than single ply. Therefore, the combination of these two ideas is obvious and adds nothing to the sum of the parts. Because of this, I believe it would not be patented if this ruling was applied to it.<br /> **As far as 35 USC 103, it seems as if any mechanic skilled in the craft (or even not skilled) could have come up with the decisions to add a second layer to the tab to prevent tearing. Everyone has experienced the tab ripping from the seal and felt how frustrating ti can be. So reinforcing the tab is definitely obvious.<br /> *These analyses show that the standards of nonobviousness have changed in recent times. With these inventions in mind, it seems like any invention that improves upon a previous product or combines previous products can be patented. The inventiveness of these new patents may be minimal, but the usefulness and novelty are great. They are important improvements that did take an investment of time and effort, so exclusive rights were granted to them. It shows that the patent office has become more relaxed with its standards, and the court has allowed this to happen. As we have seen in our lifetimes, this leads to very fast innovation in attempts to improve upon previous designs to try and achieve better products. The importance of nonobviousness of the patent has given way to the novelty and usefulness of it.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=2420 User:Cmadiga1 2011-02-04T17:38:33Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* Obviousness of the Adams Patent */</p> <hr /> <div>== My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Obviousness of the Adams Patent==<br /> *Non-Obvious<br /> **This patent could be considered non-obvious because of two key prior patents. Both of these patents utilize a magnesium electrode, but both Leo Goldenberg in 1868 and Robert T. Wood in 1928. Both of these patents utilize the magnesium electrode, but both dimiss it as a method that will not work. In fact, Wood goes as far as to say "It has been generally accepted that magnesium could not be commercially utilized as a primary cell electrode." This shows how the experiments and inventions had been unsucessful with regards to their experiments, and frankly I do not know how the received patents becasue of the lack of usefulness. Goldenberg writes "Unfortunately experimenters were never able to attain voltages under closed circuit conditions equalling the potential which theoretically should have appeared available. <br /> <br /> **Also, as far as the electrolyte, neither of these patents contained cuprous chloride, but they did not use water or indicate it as an option for the electrolyte. Because of this, the water seems to be an innovative and non-obvious aspect of this patent.<br /> <br /> *Obviousness<br /> **It is clear that this is just a combination of prior art, leading to something that had expected results. Magnesium had been used as an electrode by Wood and Goldenberg. Water could have been used by Marie Davy in 1860 and therefore, is just a combination of new innovations. This has a precedent in the Greenwood v Hotchkiss case, and makes the patent obvious.<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> **This patent is of an invention similar to the safety seal described in my patent. The purpose of this invention is to seal a container with a plastic seal that is attached using heat. The seal is removed by pulling on a tab that removes part of the seal, using the remaining part to regulate the amount of contents poured.<br /> **This patent seems to conflict with my patent when it is analyzed using the ruling from Hotchkiss. The ruling from Hotchkiss is that an invention should not be awarded a patent if it is an adaptation that someone of ordinary skill in the craft could have come up with. The only differences between my patent and this one are that the seal can be completely torn off, it is used to prevent tampering instead of using it to preserve the contents, and the seal is made of foil in the tamper resistant seal. These are all innovations that could have been come up with easily by any engineer looking to apply a seal to ensure the safety of the contents, and the change of material is exactly what the ruling was about in Hotchkiss.<br /> **Also, this patent makes my patent obvious being invalid when looked at from the point of view A&P. The A&P case ruled that in order to be issued a patent, an invention can not be the combination of other inventions that simply leads to the sum of the parts. This patent shows a seal with a tab. This, combined with previous foil seals and completely removable seals should lead to my invention having a patent withheld. The sum of these parts leads to exactly what you would expect it to, with is what the A&P case rules as not patentable.<br /> **Also, the law of 35 USC 103 should make my invention un-patentable. According to the code, if someone of ordinary skill could have easily come up with this idea.<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]<br /> **This is a later patent of the safety seal in my patent. This is a seal that also fits under a screw cap that has a double reinforced tab that folds back onto the main seal and fits in place under the cap allowing for the seal to be completely removed when the tab is pulled, with less chance of tearing the tab off due to the extra strength of it.<br /> **Under the ruling from Hotchkiss, it seems as if this is another invention that would not have received a patent. It is obvious to any skilled mechanic to reinforce the seal with two layers to prevent it from tearing. It is better than my patent, but it in no way required a great investment of thought or ingenuity in coming up with the idea. Also, the way of storing the tab under the cap is also obvious and easy to see for any engineer.<br /> **With the A&P ruling in mind, it is also very evident that this is not patentable. The seal was already in common use, and everyone has experienced a case in which double ply was stronger and better than single ply. Therefore, the combination of these two ideas is obvious and adds nothing to the sum of the parts. Because of this, I believe it would not be patented if this ruling was applied to it.<br /> **As far as 35 USC 103, it seems as if any mechanic skilled in the craft (or even not skilled) could have come up with the decisions to add a second layer to the tab to prevent tearing. Everyone has experienced the tab ripping from the seal and felt how frustrating ti can be. So reinforcing the tab is definitely obvious.<br /> *These analyses show that the standards of nonobviousness have changed in recent times. With these inventions in mind, it seems like any invention that improves upon a previous product or combines previous products can be patented. The inventiveness of these new patents may be minimal, but the usefulness and novelty are great. They are important improvements that did take an investment of time and effort, so exclusive rights were granted to them. It shows that the patent office has become more relaxed with its standards, and the court has allowed this to happen. As we have seen in our lifetimes, this leads to very fast innovation in attempts to improve upon previous designs to try and achieve better products. The importance of nonobviousness of the patent has given way to the novelty and usefulness of it.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=2419 User:Cmadiga1 2011-02-04T17:38:15Z

<p>Cmadiga1: </p> <hr /> <div>== My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Obviousness of the Adams Patent==<br /> *Non-Obvious<br /> **This patent could be considered non-obvious because of two key prior patents. Both of these patents utilize a magnesium electrode, but both Leo Goldenberg in 1868 and Robert T. Wood in 1928. Both of these patents utilize the magnesium electrode, but both dimiss it as a method that will not work. In fact, Wood goes as far as to say "It has been generally accepted that magnesium could not be commercially utilized as a primary cell electrode." This shows how the experiments and inventions had been unsucessful with regards to their experiments, and frankly I do not know how the received patents becasue of the lack of usefulness. Goldenberg writes "Unfortunately experimenters were never able to attain voltages under closed circuit conditions equalling the potential which theoretically should have appeared available. <br /> <br /> Also, as far as the electrolyte, neither of these patents contained cuprous chloride, but they did not use water or indicate it as an option for the electrolyte. Because of this, the water seems to be an innovative and non-obvious aspect of this patent.<br /> <br /> *Obviousness<br /> **It is clear that this is just a combination of prior art, leading to something that had expected results. Magnesium had been used as an electrode by Wood and Goldenberg. Water could have been used by Marie Davy in 1860 and therefore, is just a combination of new innovations. This has a precedent in the Greenwood v Hotchkiss case, and makes the patent obvious.<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> **This patent is of an invention similar to the safety seal described in my patent. The purpose of this invention is to seal a container with a plastic seal that is attached using heat. The seal is removed by pulling on a tab that removes part of the seal, using the remaining part to regulate the amount of contents poured.<br /> **This patent seems to conflict with my patent when it is analyzed using the ruling from Hotchkiss. The ruling from Hotchkiss is that an invention should not be awarded a patent if it is an adaptation that someone of ordinary skill in the craft could have come up with. The only differences between my patent and this one are that the seal can be completely torn off, it is used to prevent tampering instead of using it to preserve the contents, and the seal is made of foil in the tamper resistant seal. These are all innovations that could have been come up with easily by any engineer looking to apply a seal to ensure the safety of the contents, and the change of material is exactly what the ruling was about in Hotchkiss.<br /> **Also, this patent makes my patent obvious being invalid when looked at from the point of view A&P. The A&P case ruled that in order to be issued a patent, an invention can not be the combination of other inventions that simply leads to the sum of the parts. This patent shows a seal with a tab. This, combined with previous foil seals and completely removable seals should lead to my invention having a patent withheld. The sum of these parts leads to exactly what you would expect it to, with is what the A&P case rules as not patentable.<br /> **Also, the law of 35 USC 103 should make my invention un-patentable. According to the code, if someone of ordinary skill could have easily come up with this idea.<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]<br /> **This is a later patent of the safety seal in my patent. This is a seal that also fits under a screw cap that has a double reinforced tab that folds back onto the main seal and fits in place under the cap allowing for the seal to be completely removed when the tab is pulled, with less chance of tearing the tab off due to the extra strength of it.<br /> **Under the ruling from Hotchkiss, it seems as if this is another invention that would not have received a patent. It is obvious to any skilled mechanic to reinforce the seal with two layers to prevent it from tearing. It is better than my patent, but it in no way required a great investment of thought or ingenuity in coming up with the idea. Also, the way of storing the tab under the cap is also obvious and easy to see for any engineer.<br /> **With the A&P ruling in mind, it is also very evident that this is not patentable. The seal was already in common use, and everyone has experienced a case in which double ply was stronger and better than single ply. Therefore, the combination of these two ideas is obvious and adds nothing to the sum of the parts. Because of this, I believe it would not be patented if this ruling was applied to it.<br /> **As far as 35 USC 103, it seems as if any mechanic skilled in the craft (or even not skilled) could have come up with the decisions to add a second layer to the tab to prevent tearing. Everyone has experienced the tab ripping from the seal and felt how frustrating ti can be. So reinforcing the tab is definitely obvious.<br /> *These analyses show that the standards of nonobviousness have changed in recent times. With these inventions in mind, it seems like any invention that improves upon a previous product or combines previous products can be patented. The inventiveness of these new patents may be minimal, but the usefulness and novelty are great. They are important improvements that did take an investment of time and effort, so exclusive rights were granted to them. It shows that the patent office has become more relaxed with its standards, and the court has allowed this to happen. As we have seen in our lifetimes, this leads to very fast innovation in attempts to improve upon previous designs to try and achieve better products. The importance of nonobviousness of the patent has given way to the novelty and usefulness of it.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=1526 User:Cmadiga1 2011-01-28T05:30:09Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* Citations of Conflicting Patents */</p> <hr /> <div>== My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> **This patent is of an invention similar to the safety seal described in my patent. The purpose of this invention is to seal a container with a plastic seal that is attached using heat. The seal is removed by pulling on a tab that removes part of the seal, using the remaining part to regulate the amount of contents poured.<br /> **This patent seems to conflict with my patent when it is analyzed using the ruling from Hotchkiss. The ruling from Hotchkiss is that an invention should not be awarded a patent if it is an adaptation that someone of ordinary skill in the craft could have come up with. The only differences between my patent and this one are that the seal can be completely torn off, it is used to prevent tampering instead of using it to preserve the contents, and the seal is made of foil in the tamper resistant seal. These are all innovations that could have been come up with easily by any engineer looking to apply a seal to ensure the safety of the contents, and the change of material is exactly what the ruling was about in Hotchkiss.<br /> **Also, this patent makes my patent obvious being invalid when looked at from the point of view A&P. The A&P case ruled that in order to be issued a patent, an invention can not be the combination of other inventions that simply leads to the sum of the parts. This patent shows a seal with a tab. This, combined with previous foil seals and completely removable seals should lead to my invention having a patent withheld. The sum of these parts leads to exactly what you would expect it to, with is what the A&P case rules as not patentable.<br /> **Also, the law of 35 USC 103 should make my invention un-patentable. According to the code, if someone of ordinary skill could have easily come up with this idea.<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]<br /> **This is a later patent of the safety seal in my patent. This is a seal that also fits under a screw cap that has a double reinforced tab that folds back onto the main seal and fits in place under the cap allowing for the seal to be completely removed when the tab is pulled, with less chance of tearing the tab off due to the extra strength of it.<br /> **Under the ruling from Hotchkiss, it seems as if this is another invention that would not have received a patent. It is obvious to any skilled mechanic to reinforce the seal with two layers to prevent it from tearing. It is better than my patent, but it in no way required a great investment of thought or ingenuity in coming up with the idea. Also, the way of storing the tab under the cap is also obvious and easy to see for any engineer.<br /> **With the A&P ruling in mind, it is also very evident that this is not patentable. The seal was already in common use, and everyone has experienced a case in which double ply was stronger and better than single ply. Therefore, the combination of these two ideas is obvious and adds nothing to the sum of the parts. Because of this, I believe it would not be patented if this ruling was applied to it.<br /> **As far as 35 USC 103, it seems as if any mechanic skilled in the craft (or even not skilled) could have come up with the decisions to add a second layer to the tab to prevent tearing. Everyone has experienced the tab ripping from the seal and felt how frustrating ti can be. So reinforcing the tab is definitely obvious.<br /> *These analyses show that the standards of nonobviousness have changed in recent times. With these inventions in mind, it seems like any invention that improves upon a previous product or combines previous products can be patented. The inventiveness of these new patents may be minimal, but the usefulness and novelty are great. They are important improvements that did take an investment of time and effort, so exclusive rights were granted to them. It shows that the patent office has become more relaxed with its standards, and the court has allowed this to happen. As we have seen in our lifetimes, this leads to very fast innovation in attempts to improve upon previous designs to try and achieve better products. The importance of nonobviousness of the patent has given way to the novelty and usefulness of it.</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=1517 User:Cmadiga1 2011-01-28T05:12:02Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* Citations of Conflicting Patents */</p> <hr /> <div>== My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> **This patent is of an invention similar to the safety seal described in my patent. The purpose of this invention is to seal a container with a plastic seal that is attached using heat. The seal is removed by pulling on a tab that removes part of the seal, using the remaining part to regulate the amount of contents poured.<br /> **This patent seems to conflict with my patent when it is analyzed using the ruling from Hotchkiss. The ruling from Hotchkiss is that an invention should not be awarded a patent if it is an adaptation that someone of ordinary skill in the craft could have come up with. The only differences between my patent and this one are that the seal can be completely torn off, it is used to prevent tampering instead of using it to preserve the contents, and the seal is made of foil in the tamper resistant seal. These are all innovations that could have been come up with easily by any engineer looking to apply a seal to ensure the safety of the contents, and the change of material is exactly what the ruling was about in Hotchkiss.<br /> **Also, this patent makes my patent obvious being invalid when looked at from the point of view A&P. The A&P case ruled that in order to be issued a patent, an invention can not be the combination of other inventions that simply leads to the sum of the parts. This patent shows a seal with a tab. This, combined with previous foil seals and completely removable seals should lead to my invention having a patent withheld. The sum of these parts leads to exactly what you would expect it to, with is what the A&P case rules as not patentable.<br /> **Also, the law of 35 USC 103 should make my invention un-patentable. According to the code, if someone of ordinary skill could have easily come up with this idea.<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]<br /> **This</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=1503 User:Cmadiga1 2011-01-28T04:37:40Z

<p>Cmadiga1: /* My U.S. Patent */</p> <hr /> <div>== My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]<br /> <br /> ==Citations of Conflicting Patents==<br /> *Patch Top Closure Member Including a Monoaxially Oriented Film Layer [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=M900AAAAEBAJ]<br /> *Container Closed by a Membrane Type Seal [http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=Jn4zAAAAEBAJ]<br /> *Tamper Evident Safety Seal<br /> [http://www.google.com/patents?id=Tx44AAAAEBAJ&printsec=drawing&zoom=4#v=onepage&q&f=false]</div>

Cmadiga1 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Cmadiga1&diff=982 User:Cmadiga1 2011-01-24T05:07:06Z

<p>Cmadiga1: Created page with "== My U.S. Patent == *Patent Number: 4605136 **Date Issued: August 12, 1986 *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The se..."</p> <hr /> <div>== My U.S. Patent ==<br /> *Patent Number: 4605136<br /> **Date Issued: August 12, 1986<br /> *The patent is for a tamper resistant seal with a tear tab that fits under the cap of a bottle. The seal allows for the contents of the bottle to remain secured with no way of accessing the inside without tearing off the seal. The seal includes a tab that can be pulled to remove the seal once the product is purchased. This was developed in the fallout of new safety requirements after the Tylenol tampering issues of 1982.[http://www.google.com/patents/about?id=DqMuAAAAEBAJ]</div>

Cmadiga1