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	<updated>2026-05-19T11:01:07Z</updated>
	<subtitle>User contributions</subtitle>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Here_in_list_of_arguments_in_Quanta&amp;diff=5052</id>
		<title>Here in list of arguments in Quanta</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Here_in_list_of_arguments_in_Quanta&amp;diff=5052"/>
		<updated>2011-04-29T18:53:42Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Post a link to your summary of the brief you read here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief Summary 901330223]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[901349446 Quanta Brief]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief Summary 901471466]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief Summary 901422128]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief Summary Jacob Marmolejo]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Homework 8 (due Friday 28)~jnosal | Quanta Brief Summary 901438174]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros: Quanta Brief]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Zahm Homework 31: Quanta Brief]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[901419437 Quanta v. LGE Brief Summary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief 901437068]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[901281608: Quanta Brief]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[901444263: Quanta v. LGE Reply Brief of Petitioners]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[901479977: Quanta for Petitioners]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Apr. 29th: Brief Summary (2007 WL 3440937) - Andrew McBride]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reply Brief of Petitioners (Quanta) - Adam Mahood]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief Summary 901360293]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief Summary 901431048]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief Brobins]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief hwong1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief: Tennant]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief - Snooki]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief (John Gallagher)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta brief - 901338276]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Brief of Amici Curiae for Respondent - Eric Leis]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief - Kschlax]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief - Christine Roetzel]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief: In support of Federal Circuit Ruling (eguilbea)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief: 901424607]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief - 901425018]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief- Xiao Dong]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief - Ackroyd]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief - Karch]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta_Brief_Carter]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Carter&amp;diff=5051</id>
		<title>Quanta Brief Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Carter&amp;diff=5051"/>
		<updated>2011-04-29T18:52:47Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Quanta Computer Inc. v L.G. Electronics Inc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Supreme Court of the United States&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Appellate Brief&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Interest of the Amicus Curiae&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*The brief is written by Wi-Lan Inc., a publicly traded corporation founded to commercialize breakthroughs in wireless technologies&lt;br /&gt;
*The IEEE has incorporated Wi-Lan&#039;s technologies into several of its wireless standards that make reliable, high rate data transmissions available to the public.&lt;br /&gt;
*Wi-Lan files brief in support of respondent to address legal issues not brought up by members of the court of other amici&lt;br /&gt;
*The company does not approve of the policy adoption the petitioners are advocating due to its likely negative and complicated effect on existing licenses.&lt;br /&gt;
*Most notably, the per se patent exhaustion or &amp;quot;single license rule&amp;quot; put forward by the petitioners and the relief requested by petitioners implicates the freedom to contract of Wi-Lan, its licensees, and others who have relied upon existing law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Argument&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Wi-Lan argues that the rule of law proposed by petitioners will distort market forces and propel electronic component manufacturers into conflict with patent owners because such manufacturers are often unwilling to pay the full value of a patent license for both their own use and the use of others in the distribution chain. The amici argues that the ability of market participants in a vertical chain of distribution to enter into an agreement as they see fit is essential to the system of licensing agreements. &lt;br /&gt;
*Thus, the per se patent exhaustion advocated by petitioners will eliminate the freedom on contract. Such a restriction on the flexibility of the parties involved in a licensing agreement is an obstacle to the apportionment of royalties among those parties and will likely result in an increase in litigation.&lt;br /&gt;
*Wi-Lan argues that a ruling in favor of the petitioners would impose a law for patent exhaustion that would not permit a patent owner to enforce desired conditions on the sale of a patented article or the license of patent rights and would render irrelevant whether the patent owner has received full value for the patented invention. A ruling for this law would be in direct conflict to previous precedents set by the court. Additionally, this would come into conflict with 35 USC, Section 207, which states that conditions imposed by a patent owner on &amp;quot;the sale of a patented product&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;license of any rights to the patent&amp;quot; shall not be per se negated or exhausted&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Carter&amp;diff=5050</id>
		<title>Quanta Brief Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Carter&amp;diff=5050"/>
		<updated>2011-04-29T18:45:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Quanta Computer Inc. v L.G. Electronics Inc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Supreme Court of the United States&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Appellate Brief&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Interest of the Amicus Curiae&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*The brief is written by Wi-Lan Inc., a publicly traded corporation founded to commercialize breakthroughs in wireless technologies&lt;br /&gt;
*The IEEE has incorporated Wi-Lan&#039;s technologies into several of its wireless standards that make reliable, high rate data transmissions available to the public.&lt;br /&gt;
*Wi-Lan files brief in support of respondent to address legal issues not brought up by members of the court of other amici&lt;br /&gt;
*The company does not approve of the policy adoption the petitioners are advocating due to its likely negative and complicated effect on existing licenses.&lt;br /&gt;
*Most notably, the per se patent exhaustion or &amp;quot;single license rule&amp;quot; put forward by the petitioners and the relief requested by petitioners implicates the freedom to contract of Wi-Lan, its licensees, and others who have relied upon existing law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Argument&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Wi-Lan argues that the rule of law proposed by petitioners will distort market forces and propel electronic component manufacturers into conflict with patent owners because such manufacturers are often unwilling to pay the full value of a patent license for both their own use and the use of others in the distribution chain. The amici argues that the ability of market participants in a vertical chain of distribution to enter into an agreement as they see fit is essential to the system of licensing agreements. &lt;br /&gt;
*Thus, the per se patent exhaustion advocated by petitioners will eliminate the freedom on contract. Such a restriction on the flexibility of the parties involved in a licensing agreement is an obstacle to the apportionment of royalties among those parties and will likely result in an increase in litigation.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Carter&amp;diff=5048</id>
		<title>Quanta Brief Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Carter&amp;diff=5048"/>
		<updated>2011-04-29T18:37:02Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Quanta Computer Inc. v L.G. Electronics Inc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Supreme Court of the United States&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Appellate Brief&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Interest of the Amicus Curiae&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*The brief is written by Wi-Lan Inc., a publicly traded corporation founded to commercialize breakthroughs in wireless technologies&lt;br /&gt;
*The IEEE has incorporated Wi-Lan&#039;s technologies into several of its wireless standards that make reliable, high rate data transmissions available to the public.&lt;br /&gt;
*Wi-Lan files brief in support of respondent to address legal issues not brought up by members of the court of other amici&lt;br /&gt;
*The company does not approve of the policy adoption the petitioners are advocating due to its likely negative and complicated effect on existing licenses.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Carter&amp;diff=5047</id>
		<title>Quanta Brief Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Carter&amp;diff=5047"/>
		<updated>2011-04-29T18:36:04Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: Created page with &amp;quot;Quanta Computer Inc. v L.G. Electronics Inc.  Supreme Court of the United States  Appellate Brief  *Interest of the Amicus Curiae  **The brief is written by Wi-Lan Inc., a public...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Quanta Computer Inc. v L.G. Electronics Inc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Supreme Court of the United States&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Appellate Brief&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Interest of the Amicus Curiae&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
**The brief is written by Wi-Lan Inc., a publicly traded corporation founded to commercialize breakthroughs in wireless technologies&lt;br /&gt;
**The IEEE has incorporated Wi-Lan&#039;s technologies into several of its wireless standards that make reliable, high rate data transmissions available to the public.&lt;br /&gt;
**Wi-Lan files brief in support of respondent to address legal issues not brought up by members of the court of other amici&lt;br /&gt;
**The company does not approve of the policy adoption the petitioners are advocating due to its likely negative and complicated effect on existing licenses.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Dcarter2&amp;diff=5041</id>
		<title>User:Dcarter2</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Dcarter2&amp;diff=5041"/>
		<updated>2011-04-29T18:13:24Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== HOMEWORK 1 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 2 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Referenced Patents:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Analysis of Relevant Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Hotchkiss v. Greenwood&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The height adjustable crutch would easily be patentable according to the criteria set forth in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850), as the design instituted required more “skill and ingenuity ….than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic.” Although the cane/crutch allows for the adjustment of height, the newer crutch provides the user with dual levers to raise the height of each crutch, while maintaining the weight bearing support of the device. The “ski crutch” does not even contain a height adjustment feature, as the only real connection between the two designs is the simple premise of manipulating a crutch for various purposes.  While the inventor certainly received inspiration from these previous designs, the improvements made upon the original inventions are significant and by no means “destitute of ingenuity or invention.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the precedent set forth by A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the height adjustable crutch would again be patentable, as it constitutes an invention that is innovative enough to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The design of a crutch that provides the user with the ability to adjust the height through the use of a lever is worthy enough of an invention, as none of the reference patents outline a design that could accomplish the same feat as easily. Furthermore, the height adjustable crutch provides an important service to handicapped individuals, as it is designed specifically for the assistance of an individual attempting to rise from a seated to standing position. Thus, because the new design accomplishes a task that neither of the two previous inventions accomplishes it can be stated that the product upholds the purpose of patents, which is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) addresses the issue of nonobviousness, which stipulates that the change the proposed design is based upon must not be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” The stipulations presented by the nonobviousness clause are more difficult to adhere to for the height adjustable crutch; however, it may still past the test. While it is not unbelievable that an average designer in the field of equipment for disabled individuals could develop an idea for a adjustable crutch that allows the user to rise from a seated to standing position, the combination of developing the concept and instituting the mechanical components is far harder to replicate. Thus, it can be argued that although an average mechanic could have developed the adjustment mechanism utilized in Patent 4252138 and an average crutch designer could have proposed the design idea, the culmination of both the creativity and technology in a single design proposal allows for adherence to the nonobviousness stance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 3 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;U.S. v. Adams&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Litigated Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patent under litigation in U.S. v. Adams is U.S. No. 2,322,210, issued in 1943. The invention is a nonrechargeable electrical battery comprised of two electrodes, one made of magnesium and the other of cuprous chloride, with battery fluid of either plain or salt water. The goal of the aptent was to provide constant voltage without the use of acids or the generation of dangerous fumes. Furthermore, the battery was intended to be relatively light in weight and able to be manufactured and distributed to the trade in a dry condition and rendered serviceable by simply filling the container with water. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Non-Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prior art is based primarily on six patents, including, the Skrivanoff patent, Wensky patent, Codd treatiste, Wood patent, and Niaudet treatise (which consists of the Marie Davy cell adn De La Rue&#039;s subsequent variations). A comparison between the Adams Patent and the prior art reveals that the most significant addition to the battery model made by Adams is the concept of a device that is &amp;quot;water-activated,&amp;quot; as none of the previous patents mention such a design. The use of magnesium is used in several of the previous patents, including  Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff. While coprous chloride is not clearly indicated by any of the patents as a usable electrode, it is referenced by the Wensky patent as a necessary addition (in salt form) to the electrolyte solution. Thus, the Adams patent relies on three major attributes for patent validity, water-activation, coprous chloride (as a electrode), and marketability/commercial success. In Anderson&#039;s Black Rock Inc v. Pavement Co., the distinguishment between commercial success was made, as it was stated that the marketability of the product &amp;quot;is relevant to commercial success, not to invention,&amp;quot; so it can not be used alone to uphold the validity of a patent. Fortunately, the fact that the battery is water activated is enough to separate the Adams invention from the prior art. As none of the previous patents reference this particular attribute, the requirement of novelty is validated. As for nonobviousness, the primary reasons for support can be found in the results produced by the device, as they proved to be both unexpected and far surpassing the then-existing wet batteries. Another important consideration in the conclusion of nonobviousness is the the pre-existing results that would discourage research and subsequent discovery of the conclusions made by Adams. At the time of Adams invention, it is was widely believed that batteries which operate on an open circuit and which heated in normal use were not practial. Also, it had been determined that water-activated batteries were successful only when combined with electrolytes detrimental to the use of magnesium. Thus, it can be concluded that a person with reasonable skill in the art would have been unlikely to ignore these widely accepted conclusions and create the device that Adams created. Further support of nonobviousness can be found in the fact that the Navy expressed disbelief in Adams product at the time of its invention. All of these facts strongly support the conclusion of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A conclusion of obviousness can most easily be realized through the analysis of earlier cases, such as Anderson Black Rock. Pavement Co. and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. As stated in the conclusion for nonobviousness, the marketability and commercial success of the water-activated battery can be nullified in the evaluation of the patent validity, as &amp;quot;that is relevant to commercial success, not invention.&amp;quot; (As stated in Anderson v. Pavement) Furthermore, one of the major attributes of the Adams patent is the combination of magnesium and coprous chloride, both of which had previously been reference in earlier patents. The use of magnesium was referenced by Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff, while coprous chloride was refrenced in Wensky, albeit not as an electrode. However, the existence of both of these elements in the art of battery design supports the conclusion that the combination of both of them (even as electrodes, particularly since magnesium was already used as an electrode) would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. This can be seen in KSR v. Teleflex, as it was determined that the combination of the Asano patent with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor would be obvious to a person to a reasonably skilled individual because there was an existing market place for the development of mechanical pedals into eletronic pedals and prior art provided methods to achieve this advance. Thus, both the Adams patent and the Teleflex patent revolved around the combination of an existing design/element (magnesium for Adams, Asano patent for Teleflex) with an existing, yet unrefined design/element (coprous chloride for Adams, pivot mounted pedal for Teleflex). Similar support can be found in Anderson v. Pavement, as placement of a radiant heat burner on a standard paving machine was declared unpatentable because the use of radiant heat was an old technology and the placement of a mechanism would be obvious to a person of reasonable skill in the field. Similarly, the use of coprous chloride as an electrode, rather than as a salt in the electrolyte, as in the Wensky patent, involves the use of the same element in a different portion of the battery, which should be obvious. Both KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. and Anderson Black Rock.v. Pavement Co. can be used to support the obviousness of the Adams patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Printed_Publication_Carter]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta_Brief_Carter]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Printed_Publication_Carter&amp;diff=4291</id>
		<title>Printed Publication Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Printed_Publication_Carter&amp;diff=4291"/>
		<updated>2011-03-23T07:22:46Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: Created page with &amp;quot;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;MEHL/Biophile Intern. Corp. v. Milgraum (1999)&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;  United States Court of Appeals  Federal Circuit  Patentee brough action for infringement of patent claiming method of hair r...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;MEHL/Biophile Intern. Corp. v. Milgraum (1999)&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
United States Court of Appeals&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Federal Circuit&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patentee brough action for infringement of patent claiming method of hair removal using laser. The United States District Court granted summary judgement of patent invalidity and the patentee appealed. Prior publications under review include an instruction manual for a laser used to remove tattoos and an article documenting study of tissue damage induced by laser pulses on epilated backs of guinea pigs. The manual did not satisfy the anticipation requirements because it did not include the limitation of aligning laser over a hair follicle opening. This particularly alignment was also not inherent in manual&#039;s disclosure. Conversely, it was determined that the prior art article did anticipate the patent for hair removal, as it showed the natural result of aligning the laser directly over the hair follicle. The anticipation requirement is satisfied even though the test subjects were guinea pigs and the goal of hair depilation was not explicitly discussed. In conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that 1) patent was not anticipated by instruction manual for laser used to remove tattoos, but 2) patent was anticipated by prior art article.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Dcarter2&amp;diff=4290</id>
		<title>User:Dcarter2</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Dcarter2&amp;diff=4290"/>
		<updated>2011-03-23T06:51:37Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== HOMEWORK 1 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 2 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Referenced Patents:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Analysis of Relevant Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Hotchkiss v. Greenwood&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The height adjustable crutch would easily be patentable according to the criteria set forth in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850), as the design instituted required more “skill and ingenuity ….than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic.” Although the cane/crutch allows for the adjustment of height, the newer crutch provides the user with dual levers to raise the height of each crutch, while maintaining the weight bearing support of the device. The “ski crutch” does not even contain a height adjustment feature, as the only real connection between the two designs is the simple premise of manipulating a crutch for various purposes.  While the inventor certainly received inspiration from these previous designs, the improvements made upon the original inventions are significant and by no means “destitute of ingenuity or invention.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the precedent set forth by A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the height adjustable crutch would again be patentable, as it constitutes an invention that is innovative enough to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The design of a crutch that provides the user with the ability to adjust the height through the use of a lever is worthy enough of an invention, as none of the reference patents outline a design that could accomplish the same feat as easily. Furthermore, the height adjustable crutch provides an important service to handicapped individuals, as it is designed specifically for the assistance of an individual attempting to rise from a seated to standing position. Thus, because the new design accomplishes a task that neither of the two previous inventions accomplishes it can be stated that the product upholds the purpose of patents, which is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) addresses the issue of nonobviousness, which stipulates that the change the proposed design is based upon must not be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” The stipulations presented by the nonobviousness clause are more difficult to adhere to for the height adjustable crutch; however, it may still past the test. While it is not unbelievable that an average designer in the field of equipment for disabled individuals could develop an idea for a adjustable crutch that allows the user to rise from a seated to standing position, the combination of developing the concept and instituting the mechanical components is far harder to replicate. Thus, it can be argued that although an average mechanic could have developed the adjustment mechanism utilized in Patent 4252138 and an average crutch designer could have proposed the design idea, the culmination of both the creativity and technology in a single design proposal allows for adherence to the nonobviousness stance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 3 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;U.S. v. Adams&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Litigated Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patent under litigation in U.S. v. Adams is U.S. No. 2,322,210, issued in 1943. The invention is a nonrechargeable electrical battery comprised of two electrodes, one made of magnesium and the other of cuprous chloride, with battery fluid of either plain or salt water. The goal of the aptent was to provide constant voltage without the use of acids or the generation of dangerous fumes. Furthermore, the battery was intended to be relatively light in weight and able to be manufactured and distributed to the trade in a dry condition and rendered serviceable by simply filling the container with water. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Non-Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prior art is based primarily on six patents, including, the Skrivanoff patent, Wensky patent, Codd treatiste, Wood patent, and Niaudet treatise (which consists of the Marie Davy cell adn De La Rue&#039;s subsequent variations). A comparison between the Adams Patent and the prior art reveals that the most significant addition to the battery model made by Adams is the concept of a device that is &amp;quot;water-activated,&amp;quot; as none of the previous patents mention such a design. The use of magnesium is used in several of the previous patents, including  Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff. While coprous chloride is not clearly indicated by any of the patents as a usable electrode, it is referenced by the Wensky patent as a necessary addition (in salt form) to the electrolyte solution. Thus, the Adams patent relies on three major attributes for patent validity, water-activation, coprous chloride (as a electrode), and marketability/commercial success. In Anderson&#039;s Black Rock Inc v. Pavement Co., the distinguishment between commercial success was made, as it was stated that the marketability of the product &amp;quot;is relevant to commercial success, not to invention,&amp;quot; so it can not be used alone to uphold the validity of a patent. Fortunately, the fact that the battery is water activated is enough to separate the Adams invention from the prior art. As none of the previous patents reference this particular attribute, the requirement of novelty is validated. As for nonobviousness, the primary reasons for support can be found in the results produced by the device, as they proved to be both unexpected and far surpassing the then-existing wet batteries. Another important consideration in the conclusion of nonobviousness is the the pre-existing results that would discourage research and subsequent discovery of the conclusions made by Adams. At the time of Adams invention, it is was widely believed that batteries which operate on an open circuit and which heated in normal use were not practial. Also, it had been determined that water-activated batteries were successful only when combined with electrolytes detrimental to the use of magnesium. Thus, it can be concluded that a person with reasonable skill in the art would have been unlikely to ignore these widely accepted conclusions and create the device that Adams created. Further support of nonobviousness can be found in the fact that the Navy expressed disbelief in Adams product at the time of its invention. All of these facts strongly support the conclusion of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A conclusion of obviousness can most easily be realized through the analysis of earlier cases, such as Anderson Black Rock. Pavement Co. and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. As stated in the conclusion for nonobviousness, the marketability and commercial success of the water-activated battery can be nullified in the evaluation of the patent validity, as &amp;quot;that is relevant to commercial success, not invention.&amp;quot; (As stated in Anderson v. Pavement) Furthermore, one of the major attributes of the Adams patent is the combination of magnesium and coprous chloride, both of which had previously been reference in earlier patents. The use of magnesium was referenced by Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff, while coprous chloride was refrenced in Wensky, albeit not as an electrode. However, the existence of both of these elements in the art of battery design supports the conclusion that the combination of both of them (even as electrodes, particularly since magnesium was already used as an electrode) would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. This can be seen in KSR v. Teleflex, as it was determined that the combination of the Asano patent with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor would be obvious to a person to a reasonably skilled individual because there was an existing market place for the development of mechanical pedals into eletronic pedals and prior art provided methods to achieve this advance. Thus, both the Adams patent and the Teleflex patent revolved around the combination of an existing design/element (magnesium for Adams, Asano patent for Teleflex) with an existing, yet unrefined design/element (coprous chloride for Adams, pivot mounted pedal for Teleflex). Similar support can be found in Anderson v. Pavement, as placement of a radiant heat burner on a standard paving machine was declared unpatentable because the use of radiant heat was an old technology and the placement of a mechanism would be obvious to a person of reasonable skill in the field. Similarly, the use of coprous chloride as an electrode, rather than as a salt in the electrolyte, as in the Wensky patent, involves the use of the same element in a different portion of the battery, which should be obvious. Both KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. and Anderson Black Rock.v. Pavement Co. can be used to support the obviousness of the Adams patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Printed_Publication_Carter]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Bilski_brief_list&amp;diff=3447</id>
		<title>Bilski brief list</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Bilski_brief_list&amp;diff=3447"/>
		<updated>2011-02-13T20:35:27Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Choose one of the briefs from this list.  Delete it and replace it with your login name.  Please be careful editing this page.  If you mess up all the formatting it will create work for your colleagues.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#Reply Brief for Petitioners (Oct. 26, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#jpotter2 &lt;br /&gt;
#Adam T. Letcher&lt;br /&gt;
#Craigkrzyskowski&lt;br /&gt;
#dcarter2&lt;br /&gt;
#ebingle&lt;br /&gt;
#Rabot&lt;br /&gt;
#Eric Paul&lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amici Curiae American Insurance Association, the Hartford Financial Services, Jackson National Life Insurance Company, Pacific Life Insurance Company, Sun Life Assurance Company Of Canada (U.S.), and Transamerica Life Insurance Company in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief For Amicus Curiae Computer &amp;amp; Communications Industry Association in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Software &amp;amp; Information Industry Association (SIIA) as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amici Curiae Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, IP Justice, and Four Global Software Professionals and Business Leaders in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for Free Software Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for Bank of America Corporation, Barclays Capital Inc., The Clearing House Association L.L.C., The Financial Services Roundtable, Google Inc., MetLife, Inc., and Morgan Stanley as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Peter S. Menell and Michael J. Meurer In Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Entrepreneurial and Consumer Advocates Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of the Respondent, Submitted on Behalf of Adamas Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Tethys Bioscience, Inc. (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#KyleR &lt;br /&gt;
#Andy Stulc &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for Amicus Curiae Mark Landesmann in Support of Affirmance (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Amicus Curiae Brief of Center for Advanced Study and Research in Intellectual Property (CASRIP) of the University of Washington School of Law, and of CASRIP Research Affiliate Scholars, in Support of Affirmance of the Judgment in Favor of Respondent (Oct. 1, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Kevin Godshall&lt;br /&gt;
#Amici Curiae Brief of Internet Retailers in Support of Respondent (Oct. 1, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for the Respondent (Sep. 25, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of the Intellectual Property Section of the Nevada State Bar, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Sep. 25, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Professor Lee A. Hollaar and IEEE-USA as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance (Sep. 1, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Austin Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amici Curiae Entrepreneurial Software Companies in Support of Petitioner (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#E W Hitchler&lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amici Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization, Advanced Medical Technology Association, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation &amp;amp; The Regents of the University of California in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Mzahm&lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Hamburgler &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of F%21ed%21eration Internationale Des Conseils En Propri%21et%21e Industrielle as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professor Kevin Emerson Collins in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Legal OnRamp in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae John Sutton in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Novartis Corporation Supporting Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief Amicus Curiae of The Federal Circuit Bar Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Regulatory Datacorp, Inc, American Express Company, Palm Inc., Rockwell Automation, Inc., and SAP America, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Double Rock Corporation, Island Intellectual Property LLC, LIDs Capital LLC, Intrasweep LLC, Access Control Advantage, Inc., Ecomp Consultants, Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, Rearden Capital Corporation, Craig Mowry and PCT Capital LLC as Ami ci Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief Amici Curiae of 20 Law and Business Professors in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae The Houston Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Franklin Pierce Law Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#LMiller&lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of TELES AG as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae San Diego Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party on the Merits (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Robert R. Sachs and Daniel R. Brownstone as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae the University of South Florida in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae AwakenIP, LLC in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Pmitros &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Georgia Biomedical Partnership, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for Prometheus Laboratories Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for the Business Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioner (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Bobby Powers&lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amici Curiae Association Internationale Pour la Protection de la Propriete Intellectuelle and International Association For The Protection Of Intellectual Property (U.S.) in Support of Reversal (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Caris Diagnostics, Inc. in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Monogram Biosciences, Inc. and Genomic Health, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Raymond C. Meiers in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of On Time Systems, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 4, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Conejo Valley Bar Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 3, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief For Petitioners (Jul. 30, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Telecommunication Systems, Inc. in Support of Neither Party and for Purely Prospective Application of Any Adoption of the New Legal Test Applied Below (Jul. 24, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for the State of Oregon as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Jul. 24, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#ewolz &lt;br /&gt;
#kristen kemnetz&lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for the Respondent in Opposition (May 1, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Accenture and Pitney Bowes Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief Amicus Curiae of Franklin Pierce Law Center in Support of Certiorari (Mar. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amica Curiae Anne E. Barschall, Pro Se in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (Mar. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Jmarmole&lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of John P. Sutton Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners (Feb. 25, 2009)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3407</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3407"/>
		<updated>2011-02-11T20:33:51Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* Secondary Considerations */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*First, that the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of a &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson&#039;s outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&amp;amp;P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson&#039;s sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, &amp;quot;the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts,&amp;quot; and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, &amp;quot;patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science,&amp;quot; which make this point very clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court&#039;s outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. &amp;quot;The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
In evaluating nonobviousness of a patent, this is the fundamental evaluation criteria. The cases discussed on this page provide examples of devices that did and did not adhere to section 103. Furthermore, the cases exemplify specific aspects of an invention that can be used in the determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The point discussed by Learned Hand in Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb is an important characteristic of the effects of Section 103. The design in question is for a coating that prevents reflection, which at first glance seems to be a very simple development. Historically, as Learned Hand states, a patent may not have been provided for such a minor improvement, even if the effects of such an improvement are significant. However, the long lasting need for a coating that prevented reflection combined with the inability of skilled designers in the field to produce such an improvement emphasizes that the invention, although minor, is far from obvious and thus worhty of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot; The case revolved around the institution of a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil by John Deere, which Graham argued infringed upon his original patent. The Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision on the grounds that in light of the prior art, the improvements made by Graham would have been obvious to an indiviudal with ordinary skill in the art. The case serves as a prime example of many of the criteria used to evaluate the obviousness of a design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* Scope and content of the prior art&lt;br /&gt;
* Differences between the prior art and the claims at issue&lt;br /&gt;
* Level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of Graham v. John Deere, the most significant contributor to the prior art was a patent that Graham had submitted earlier. The Supreme Court was faced with determining whether Graham&#039;s &#039;811 patent included differences from the &#039;798 patent that were substantially different and effective, but also nonobvious to a person of reasonable skill in the art. Because the primary difference between the two patents was simply a rearrangement of previously used mechanisms (i.e., an inversion of the shank and hinge plate) it was determined that this would be a fairly obvious conclusion to someone who was acquainted with tractor design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, there are also secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
* Commercial success of the invention&lt;br /&gt;
* Long-felt but unsolved needs&lt;br /&gt;
* Failure of others to find a solution&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference between the primary criteria and the secondary considerations is that a strict adherence to the criteria ensures nonobviousness, while accordance with the secondary considerations only supports the case for nonobviousness. If an inventor produces a product that is commercially successful and has long been sought after by the related market, it strongly supports the case for nonobviousness, but a strict reviewal of the prior art will still stand as the final determination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
U.S. v. Adams is one of the few cases related to nonobviousness in which the court upheld the patent under review. In this case, the patent was for a battery designed to provide constant voltage current without the usage of acids and without the generation of dangerous fumes. Most importantly though, the Adams invention was the first practical, water activated, constant potential battery, which could be fabricated and stored indefinitely without any fluid in its cells. A comparison between the Adams patent and prior art reveals very few changes however. Adams uses magnesium and coprous chloride as the electrodes in his battery, which is similar to many of the previous models. The Codd treatise and the Skrivanoff patent both reference magnesium as electrode, while the Wensky patent acknowledges the use of coprous chloride in other areas of the battery. Thus, it can be concluded that neither of these design attributes would be nonobvious to someone with minimal experience in the field of batteries. The lone major difference between Adam&#039;s battery and the prior art is the fact that it is water-activated. Because of this significant performance improvement, the court concluded that the Adams party was nonobvious. Even though the elements of his battery were well known in the prior art, their combination far surpassed then-existing wet batteries and thus the design could not have been obvious.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; and revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable. The question posed by the court is whether the manner in which Anderson combined the old elements would be fairly obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Even if the guideline of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; is satisfied by the placement of the radiant heater upon the side of the standard bituminous paver, the mere relocation of previously used elements cannot satisfy the qualification of nonobviousness. Thus, the court rules against the Anderson patent, stating, &amp;quot;We conclude that while the combination of old elements performed a useful function, it added nothing to the nature and quality of the radiant-heat burner already patented. We conclude further that to those skilled in the art, the use of the old elements in combination was not an invention by the obvious-nonobvious standard.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
The term inventive step is another way to describe the requirement of nonobviousness in the evaluation of patents. While &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; is most often used in the United States, &amp;quot;inventive step&amp;quot; is predominantly expressed in Europe, though the meaning is virtually the same. This alternate means of presenting nonobviousness does assist in explaining the qualifications that the court was attempting to establish in the creation of this precedent though. A design may be undeniably novel, with little relation to the prior art, and may serve a distinct, functional purpose; however, if there is no &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; required to develop the device, then it cannot be patented. For an invention to be patented, it must be a unique and maybe more importantly,&amp;quot;unusual&amp;quot; combination of existing elements. The design must be unexpected to satisfy nonobviousness because even novel, functional devices can be expected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
The relationship between novelty and nonobviousness can be seen in many of th patent cases referenced above. In Anderson v. Pavement, the court determined that although the placement of the radiant heat burner in a specific location upon the vehicle was a novel idea, it was too obvious to anyone with knowledge of the problem to be considered patentable. Many other cases reflect this same sentiment, as it is easy to develop an idea that is new and different, but far more difficult to invent a solution unusual enough that someone with reasonable skill would not also be able to duplicate. In U.S. v. Adams, a ruling was made that the battery developed by Adams was both novel and nonobvious, as it utilized both new and used elements, but more importantly combined them in a manner that was counter to the suggestions of many experts at the time. Because the results of the battery were significantly different than previous models, it was obviously novel, but it was the previously unadvised combination of elements that satisfied the nonobvious clause.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
Unlike the relationship between nonobviousness and novelty, nonobviousness and invention are significantly intertwined. While many patents in the cases we have reviewed adhered to the novelty requirement, but failed the nonobviousness requirement, most patents either exuded the qualities of both invention and nonobviousness or neither. Like nonobviousness, invention requires that a device or process be developed against the grain established by the existing art. The combination of prior art is acceptable, but the mixture of previous elements must be such that it would be unlikely for others in the field to readily attempt such a combination. Similarly, nonobviousness states that the concept must not be obvious to someone with ordrinary skill in the field. Thus, if the design would not be apparent to someone with normal skill in the art, then it can be stated that the designer has &amp;quot;invented&amp;quot; a new, innovative solution to the problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
As outlined in the Graham v. John Deere section above, there are several secondary considerations that the court takes into consideration in their attempt to determine if a patent passes the nonobviousness requiremen, including:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Commercial success of the invention &lt;br /&gt;
*Long-felt but unsolved needs &lt;br /&gt;
*Failure of others to find a solution &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One case that best exemplifies the role of secondary considerations is A&amp;amp;P Tea. v. Supermarket Corp., in which the patent for a design of a tray to move groceries along the counter was ruled invalid. The claim of the petitioners was that the invention had filled a long-time need of the market and had enjoyed great commercial success. The court however, responded by saying, &amp;quot;commecial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot; This ruling makes it clear that although the court will take into consideration the secondary considerations listed above, they cannot be the basis upon which a patent is granted. The final two secondary considerations are used most often to prove nonobviuosness, as petitioners will argue that if no one has found a solution to a long-felt need, then the design could not be obvious. While all three factors are discussed in many of the patent cases, it is clear that the decision to grant a patent never hinges on the evidence provided in support of secondary considerations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3406</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3406"/>
		<updated>2011-02-11T20:20:01Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* Nonobviousness vs. Invention */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*First, that the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of a &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson&#039;s outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&amp;amp;P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson&#039;s sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, &amp;quot;the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts,&amp;quot; and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, &amp;quot;patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science,&amp;quot; which make this point very clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court&#039;s outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. &amp;quot;The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
In evaluating nonobviousness of a patent, this is the fundamental evaluation criteria. The cases discussed on this page provide examples of devices that did and did not adhere to section 103. Furthermore, the cases exemplify specific aspects of an invention that can be used in the determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The point discussed by Learned Hand in Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb is an important characteristic of the effects of Section 103. The design in question is for a coating that prevents reflection, which at first glance seems to be a very simple development. Historically, as Learned Hand states, a patent may not have been provided for such a minor improvement, even if the effects of such an improvement are significant. However, the long lasting need for a coating that prevented reflection combined with the inability of skilled designers in the field to produce such an improvement emphasizes that the invention, although minor, is far from obvious and thus worhty of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot; The case revolved around the institution of a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil by John Deere, which Graham argued infringed upon his original patent. The Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision on the grounds that in light of the prior art, the improvements made by Graham would have been obvious to an indiviudal with ordinary skill in the art. The case serves as a prime example of many of the criteria used to evaluate the obviousness of a design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* Scope and content of the prior art&lt;br /&gt;
* Differences between the prior art and the claims at issue&lt;br /&gt;
* Level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of Graham v. John Deere, the most significant contributor to the prior art was a patent that Graham had submitted earlier. The Supreme Court was faced with determining whether Graham&#039;s &#039;811 patent included differences from the &#039;798 patent that were substantially different and effective, but also nonobvious to a person of reasonable skill in the art. Because the primary difference between the two patents was simply a rearrangement of previously used mechanisms (i.e., an inversion of the shank and hinge plate) it was determined that this would be a fairly obvious conclusion to someone who was acquainted with tractor design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, there are also secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
* Commercial success of the invention&lt;br /&gt;
* Long-felt but unsolved needs&lt;br /&gt;
* Failure of others to find a solution&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference between the primary criteria and the secondary considerations is that a strict adherence to the criteria ensures nonobviousness, while accordance with the secondary considerations only supports the case for nonobviousness. If an inventor produces a product that is commercially successful and has long been sought after by the related market, it strongly supports the case for nonobviousness, but a strict reviewal of the prior art will still stand as the final determination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
U.S. v. Adams is one of the few cases related to nonobviousness in which the court upheld the patent under review. In this case, the patent was for a battery designed to provide constant voltage current without the usage of acids and without the generation of dangerous fumes. Most importantly though, the Adams invention was the first practical, water activated, constant potential battery, which could be fabricated and stored indefinitely without any fluid in its cells. A comparison between the Adams patent and prior art reveals very few changes however. Adams uses magnesium and coprous chloride as the electrodes in his battery, which is similar to many of the previous models. The Codd treatise and the Skrivanoff patent both reference magnesium as electrode, while the Wensky patent acknowledges the use of coprous chloride in other areas of the battery. Thus, it can be concluded that neither of these design attributes would be nonobvious to someone with minimal experience in the field of batteries. The lone major difference between Adam&#039;s battery and the prior art is the fact that it is water-activated. Because of this significant performance improvement, the court concluded that the Adams party was nonobvious. Even though the elements of his battery were well known in the prior art, their combination far surpassed then-existing wet batteries and thus the design could not have been obvious.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; and revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable. The question posed by the court is whether the manner in which Anderson combined the old elements would be fairly obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Even if the guideline of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; is satisfied by the placement of the radiant heater upon the side of the standard bituminous paver, the mere relocation of previously used elements cannot satisfy the qualification of nonobviousness. Thus, the court rules against the Anderson patent, stating, &amp;quot;We conclude that while the combination of old elements performed a useful function, it added nothing to the nature and quality of the radiant-heat burner already patented. We conclude further that to those skilled in the art, the use of the old elements in combination was not an invention by the obvious-nonobvious standard.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
The term inventive step is another way to describe the requirement of nonobviousness in the evaluation of patents. While &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; is most often used in the United States, &amp;quot;inventive step&amp;quot; is predominantly expressed in Europe, though the meaning is virtually the same. This alternate means of presenting nonobviousness does assist in explaining the qualifications that the court was attempting to establish in the creation of this precedent though. A design may be undeniably novel, with little relation to the prior art, and may serve a distinct, functional purpose; however, if there is no &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; required to develop the device, then it cannot be patented. For an invention to be patented, it must be a unique and maybe more importantly,&amp;quot;unusual&amp;quot; combination of existing elements. The design must be unexpected to satisfy nonobviousness because even novel, functional devices can be expected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
The relationship between novelty and nonobviousness can be seen in many of th patent cases referenced above. In Anderson v. Pavement, the court determined that although the placement of the radiant heat burner in a specific location upon the vehicle was a novel idea, it was too obvious to anyone with knowledge of the problem to be considered patentable. Many other cases reflect this same sentiment, as it is easy to develop an idea that is new and different, but far more difficult to invent a solution unusual enough that someone with reasonable skill would not also be able to duplicate. In U.S. v. Adams, a ruling was made that the battery developed by Adams was both novel and nonobvious, as it utilized both new and used elements, but more importantly combined them in a manner that was counter to the suggestions of many experts at the time. Because the results of the battery were significantly different than previous models, it was obviously novel, but it was the previously unadvised combination of elements that satisfied the nonobvious clause.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
Unlike the relationship between nonobviousness and novelty, nonobviousness and invention are significantly intertwined. While many patents in the cases we have reviewed adhered to the novelty requirement, but failed the nonobviousness requirement, most patents either exuded the qualities of both invention and nonobviousness or neither. Like nonobviousness, invention requires that a device or process be developed against the grain established by the existing art. The combination of prior art is acceptable, but the mixture of previous elements must be such that it would be unlikely for others in the field to readily attempt such a combination. Similarly, nonobviousness states that the concept must not be obvious to someone with ordrinary skill in the field. Thus, if the design would not be apparent to someone with normal skill in the art, then it can be stated that the designer has &amp;quot;invented&amp;quot; a new, innovative solution to the problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3405</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3405"/>
		<updated>2011-02-11T20:11:48Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* Relationship with Novelty */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*First, that the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of a &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson&#039;s outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&amp;amp;P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson&#039;s sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, &amp;quot;the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts,&amp;quot; and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, &amp;quot;patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science,&amp;quot; which make this point very clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court&#039;s outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. &amp;quot;The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
In evaluating nonobviousness of a patent, this is the fundamental evaluation criteria. The cases discussed on this page provide examples of devices that did and did not adhere to section 103. Furthermore, the cases exemplify specific aspects of an invention that can be used in the determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The point discussed by Learned Hand in Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb is an important characteristic of the effects of Section 103. The design in question is for a coating that prevents reflection, which at first glance seems to be a very simple development. Historically, as Learned Hand states, a patent may not have been provided for such a minor improvement, even if the effects of such an improvement are significant. However, the long lasting need for a coating that prevented reflection combined with the inability of skilled designers in the field to produce such an improvement emphasizes that the invention, although minor, is far from obvious and thus worhty of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot; The case revolved around the institution of a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil by John Deere, which Graham argued infringed upon his original patent. The Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision on the grounds that in light of the prior art, the improvements made by Graham would have been obvious to an indiviudal with ordinary skill in the art. The case serves as a prime example of many of the criteria used to evaluate the obviousness of a design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* Scope and content of the prior art&lt;br /&gt;
* Differences between the prior art and the claims at issue&lt;br /&gt;
* Level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of Graham v. John Deere, the most significant contributor to the prior art was a patent that Graham had submitted earlier. The Supreme Court was faced with determining whether Graham&#039;s &#039;811 patent included differences from the &#039;798 patent that were substantially different and effective, but also nonobvious to a person of reasonable skill in the art. Because the primary difference between the two patents was simply a rearrangement of previously used mechanisms (i.e., an inversion of the shank and hinge plate) it was determined that this would be a fairly obvious conclusion to someone who was acquainted with tractor design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, there are also secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
* Commercial success of the invention&lt;br /&gt;
* Long-felt but unsolved needs&lt;br /&gt;
* Failure of others to find a solution&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference between the primary criteria and the secondary considerations is that a strict adherence to the criteria ensures nonobviousness, while accordance with the secondary considerations only supports the case for nonobviousness. If an inventor produces a product that is commercially successful and has long been sought after by the related market, it strongly supports the case for nonobviousness, but a strict reviewal of the prior art will still stand as the final determination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
U.S. v. Adams is one of the few cases related to nonobviousness in which the court upheld the patent under review. In this case, the patent was for a battery designed to provide constant voltage current without the usage of acids and without the generation of dangerous fumes. Most importantly though, the Adams invention was the first practical, water activated, constant potential battery, which could be fabricated and stored indefinitely without any fluid in its cells. A comparison between the Adams patent and prior art reveals very few changes however. Adams uses magnesium and coprous chloride as the electrodes in his battery, which is similar to many of the previous models. The Codd treatise and the Skrivanoff patent both reference magnesium as electrode, while the Wensky patent acknowledges the use of coprous chloride in other areas of the battery. Thus, it can be concluded that neither of these design attributes would be nonobvious to someone with minimal experience in the field of batteries. The lone major difference between Adam&#039;s battery and the prior art is the fact that it is water-activated. Because of this significant performance improvement, the court concluded that the Adams party was nonobvious. Even though the elements of his battery were well known in the prior art, their combination far surpassed then-existing wet batteries and thus the design could not have been obvious.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; and revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable. The question posed by the court is whether the manner in which Anderson combined the old elements would be fairly obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Even if the guideline of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; is satisfied by the placement of the radiant heater upon the side of the standard bituminous paver, the mere relocation of previously used elements cannot satisfy the qualification of nonobviousness. Thus, the court rules against the Anderson patent, stating, &amp;quot;We conclude that while the combination of old elements performed a useful function, it added nothing to the nature and quality of the radiant-heat burner already patented. We conclude further that to those skilled in the art, the use of the old elements in combination was not an invention by the obvious-nonobvious standard.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
The term inventive step is another way to describe the requirement of nonobviousness in the evaluation of patents. While &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; is most often used in the United States, &amp;quot;inventive step&amp;quot; is predominantly expressed in Europe, though the meaning is virtually the same. This alternate means of presenting nonobviousness does assist in explaining the qualifications that the court was attempting to establish in the creation of this precedent though. A design may be undeniably novel, with little relation to the prior art, and may serve a distinct, functional purpose; however, if there is no &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; required to develop the device, then it cannot be patented. For an invention to be patented, it must be a unique and maybe more importantly,&amp;quot;unusual&amp;quot; combination of existing elements. The design must be unexpected to satisfy nonobviousness because even novel, functional devices can be expected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
The relationship between novelty and nonobviousness can be seen in many of th patent cases referenced above. In Anderson v. Pavement, the court determined that although the placement of the radiant heat burner in a specific location upon the vehicle was a novel idea, it was too obvious to anyone with knowledge of the problem to be considered patentable. Many other cases reflect this same sentiment, as it is easy to develop an idea that is new and different, but far more difficult to invent a solution unusual enough that someone with reasonable skill would not also be able to duplicate. In U.S. v. Adams, a ruling was made that the battery developed by Adams was both novel and nonobvious, as it utilized both new and used elements, but more importantly combined them in a manner that was counter to the suggestions of many experts at the time. Because the results of the battery were significantly different than previous models, it was obviously novel, but it was the previously unadvised combination of elements that satisfied the nonobvious clause.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3394</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3394"/>
		<updated>2011-02-11T17:30:13Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* The Inventive Step */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*First, that the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of a &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson&#039;s outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&amp;amp;P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson&#039;s sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, &amp;quot;the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts,&amp;quot; and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, &amp;quot;patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science,&amp;quot; which make this point very clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court&#039;s outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. &amp;quot;The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
In evaluating nonobviousness of a patent, this is the fundamental evaluation criteria. The cases discussed on this page provide examples of devices that did and did not adhere to section 103. Furthermore, the cases exemplify specific aspects of an invention that can be used in the determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The point discussed by Learned Hand in Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb is an important characteristic of the effects of Section 103. The design in question is for a coating that prevents reflection, which at first glance seems to be a very simple development. Historically, as Learned Hand states, a patent may not have been provided for such a minor improvement, even if the effects of such an improvement are significant. However, the long lasting need for a coating that prevented reflection combined with the inability of skilled designers in the field to produce such an improvement emphasizes that the invention, although minor, is far from obvious and thus worhty of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot; The case revolved around the institution of a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil by John Deere, which Graham argued infringed upon his original patent. The Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision on the grounds that in light of the prior art, the improvements made by Graham would have been obvious to an indiviudal with ordinary skill in the art. The case serves as a prime example of many of the criteria used to evaluate the obviousness of a design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* Scope and content of the prior art&lt;br /&gt;
* Differences between the prior art and the claims at issue&lt;br /&gt;
* Level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of Graham v. John Deere, the most significant contributor to the prior art was a patent that Graham had submitted earlier. The Supreme Court was faced with determining whether Graham&#039;s &#039;811 patent included differences from the &#039;798 patent that were substantially different and effective, but also nonobvious to a person of reasonable skill in the art. Because the primary difference between the two patents was simply a rearrangement of previously used mechanisms (i.e., an inversion of the shank and hinge plate) it was determined that this would be a fairly obvious conclusion to someone who was acquainted with tractor design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, there are also secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
* Commercial success of the invention&lt;br /&gt;
* Long-felt but unsolved needs&lt;br /&gt;
* Failure of others to find a solution&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference between the primary criteria and the secondary considerations is that a strict adherence to the criteria ensures nonobviousness, while accordance with the secondary considerations only supports the case for nonobviousness. If an inventor produces a product that is commercially successful and has long been sought after by the related market, it strongly supports the case for nonobviousness, but a strict reviewal of the prior art will still stand as the final determination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
U.S. v. Adams is one of the few cases related to nonobviousness in which the court upheld the patent under review. In this case, the patent was for a battery designed to provide constant voltage current without the usage of acids and without the generation of dangerous fumes. Most importantly though, the Adams invention was the first practical, water activated, constant potential battery, which could be fabricated and stored indefinitely without any fluid in its cells. A comparison between the Adams patent and prior art reveals very few changes however. Adams uses magnesium and coprous chloride as the electrodes in his battery, which is similar to many of the previous models. The Codd treatise and the Skrivanoff patent both reference magnesium as electrode, while the Wensky patent acknowledges the use of coprous chloride in other areas of the battery. Thus, it can be concluded that neither of these design attributes would be nonobvious to someone with minimal experience in the field of batteries. The lone major difference between Adam&#039;s battery and the prior art is the fact that it is water-activated. Because of this significant performance improvement, the court concluded that the Adams party was nonobvious. Even though the elements of his battery were well known in the prior art, their combination far surpassed then-existing wet batteries and thus the design could not have been obvious.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; and revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable. The question posed by the court is whether the manner in which Anderson combined the old elements would be fairly obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Even if the guideline of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; is satisfied by the placement of the radiant heater upon the side of the standard bituminous paver, the mere relocation of previously used elements cannot satisfy the qualification of nonobviousness. Thus, the court rules against the Anderson patent, stating, &amp;quot;We conclude that while the combination of old elements performed a useful function, it added nothing to the nature and quality of the radiant-heat burner already patented. We conclude further that to those skilled in the art, the use of the old elements in combination was not an invention by the obvious-nonobvious standard.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
The term inventive step is another way to describe the requirement of nonobviousness in the evaluation of patents. While &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; is most often used in the United States, &amp;quot;inventive step&amp;quot; is predominantly expressed in Europe, though the meaning is virtually the same. This alternate means of presenting nonobviousness does assist in explaining the qualifications that the court was attempting to establish in the creation of this precedent though. A design may be undeniably novel, with little relation to the prior art, and may serve a distinct, functional purpose; however, if there is no &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; required to develop the device, then it cannot be patented. For an invention to be patented, it must be a unique and maybe more importantly,&amp;quot;unusual&amp;quot; combination of existing elements. The design must be unexpected to satisfy nonobviousness because even novel, functional devices can be expected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3388</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3388"/>
		<updated>2011-02-11T17:14:45Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* Anderson&amp;#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*First, that the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of a &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson&#039;s outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&amp;amp;P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson&#039;s sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, &amp;quot;the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts,&amp;quot; and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, &amp;quot;patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science,&amp;quot; which make this point very clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court&#039;s outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. &amp;quot;The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
In evaluating nonobviousness of a patent, this is the fundamental evaluation criteria. The cases discussed on this page provide examples of devices that did and did not adhere to section 103. Furthermore, the cases exemplify specific aspects of an invention that can be used in the determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The point discussed by Learned Hand in Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb is an important characteristic of the effects of Section 103. The design in question is for a coating that prevents reflection, which at first glance seems to be a very simple development. Historically, as Learned Hand states, a patent may not have been provided for such a minor improvement, even if the effects of such an improvement are significant. However, the long lasting need for a coating that prevented reflection combined with the inability of skilled designers in the field to produce such an improvement emphasizes that the invention, although minor, is far from obvious and thus worhty of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot; The case revolved around the institution of a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil by John Deere, which Graham argued infringed upon his original patent. The Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision on the grounds that in light of the prior art, the improvements made by Graham would have been obvious to an indiviudal with ordinary skill in the art. The case serves as a prime example of many of the criteria used to evaluate the obviousness of a design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* Scope and content of the prior art&lt;br /&gt;
* Differences between the prior art and the claims at issue&lt;br /&gt;
* Level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of Graham v. John Deere, the most significant contributor to the prior art was a patent that Graham had submitted earlier. The Supreme Court was faced with determining whether Graham&#039;s &#039;811 patent included differences from the &#039;798 patent that were substantially different and effective, but also nonobvious to a person of reasonable skill in the art. Because the primary difference between the two patents was simply a rearrangement of previously used mechanisms (i.e., an inversion of the shank and hinge plate) it was determined that this would be a fairly obvious conclusion to someone who was acquainted with tractor design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, there are also secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
* Commercial success of the invention&lt;br /&gt;
* Long-felt but unsolved needs&lt;br /&gt;
* Failure of others to find a solution&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference between the primary criteria and the secondary considerations is that a strict adherence to the criteria ensures nonobviousness, while accordance with the secondary considerations only supports the case for nonobviousness. If an inventor produces a product that is commercially successful and has long been sought after by the related market, it strongly supports the case for nonobviousness, but a strict reviewal of the prior art will still stand as the final determination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
U.S. v. Adams is one of the few cases related to nonobviousness in which the court upheld the patent under review. In this case, the patent was for a battery designed to provide constant voltage current without the usage of acids and without the generation of dangerous fumes. Most importantly though, the Adams invention was the first practical, water activated, constant potential battery, which could be fabricated and stored indefinitely without any fluid in its cells. A comparison between the Adams patent and prior art reveals very few changes however. Adams uses magnesium and coprous chloride as the electrodes in his battery, which is similar to many of the previous models. The Codd treatise and the Skrivanoff patent both reference magnesium as electrode, while the Wensky patent acknowledges the use of coprous chloride in other areas of the battery. Thus, it can be concluded that neither of these design attributes would be nonobvious to someone with minimal experience in the field of batteries. The lone major difference between Adam&#039;s battery and the prior art is the fact that it is water-activated. Because of this significant performance improvement, the court concluded that the Adams party was nonobvious. Even though the elements of his battery were well known in the prior art, their combination far surpassed then-existing wet batteries and thus the design could not have been obvious.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; and revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable. The question posed by the court is whether the manner in which Anderson combined the old elements would be fairly obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Even if the guideline of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; is satisfied by the placement of the radiant heater upon the side of the standard bituminous paver, the mere relocation of previously used elements cannot satisfy the qualification of nonobviousness. Thus, the court rules against the Anderson patent, stating, &amp;quot;We conclude that while the combination of old elements performed a useful function, it added nothing to the nature and quality of the radiant-heat burner already patented. We conclude further that to those skilled in the art, the use of the old elements in combination was not an invention by the obvious-nonobvious standard.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3114</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3114"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T08:51:18Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* U.S. v. Adams (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*First, that the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of a &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson&#039;s outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&amp;amp;P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson&#039;s sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, &amp;quot;the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts,&amp;quot; and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, &amp;quot;patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science,&amp;quot; which make this point very clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court&#039;s outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. &amp;quot;The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
In evaluating nonobviousness of a patent, this is the fundamental evaluation criteria. The cases discussed on this page provide examples of devices that did and did not adhere to section 103. Furthermore, the cases exemplify specific aspects of an invention that can be used in the determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The point discussed by Learned Hand in Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb is an important characteristic of the effects of Section 103. The design in question is for a coating that prevents reflection, which at first glance seems to be a very simple development. Historically, as Learned Hand states, a patent may not have been provided for such a minor improvement, even if the effects of such an improvement are significant. However, the long lasting need for a coating that prevented reflection combined with the inability of skilled designers in the field to produce such an improvement emphasizes that the invention, although minor, is far from obvious and thus worhty of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot; The case revolved around the institution of a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil by John Deere, which Graham argued infringed upon his original patent. The Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision on the grounds that in light of the prior art, the improvements made by Graham would have been obvious to an indiviudal with ordinary skill in the art. The case serves as a prime example of many of the criteria used to evaluate the obviousness of a design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* Scope and content of the prior art&lt;br /&gt;
* Differences between the prior art and the claims at issue&lt;br /&gt;
* Level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of Graham v. John Deere, the most significant contributor to the prior art was a patent that Graham had submitted earlier. The Supreme Court was faced with determining whether Graham&#039;s &#039;811 patent included differences from the &#039;798 patent that were substantially different and effective, but also nonobvious to a person of reasonable skill in the art. Because the primary difference between the two patents was simply a rearrangement of previously used mechanisms (i.e., an inversion of the shank and hinge plate) it was determined that this would be a fairly obvious conclusion to someone who was acquainted with tractor design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, there are also secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
* Commercial success of the invention&lt;br /&gt;
* Long-felt but unsolved needs&lt;br /&gt;
* Failure of others to find a solution&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference between the primary criteria and the secondary considerations is that a strict adherence to the criteria ensures nonobviousness, while accordance with the secondary considerations only supports the case for nonobviousness. If an inventor produces a product that is commercially successful and has long been sought after by the related market, it strongly supports the case for nonobviousness, but a strict reviewal of the prior art will still stand as the final determination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
U.S. v. Adams is one of the few cases related to nonobviousness in which the court upheld the patent under review. In this case, the patent was for a battery designed to provide constant voltage current without the usage of acids and without the generation of dangerous fumes. Most importantly though, the Adams invention was the first practical, water activated, constant potential battery, which could be fabricated and stored indefinitely without any fluid in its cells. A comparison between the Adams patent and prior art reveals very few changes however. Adams uses magnesium and coprous chloride as the electrodes in his battery, which is similar to many of the previous models. The Codd treatise and the Skrivanoff patent both reference magnesium as electrode, while the Wensky patent acknowledges the use of coprous chloride in other areas of the battery. Thus, it can be concluded that neither of these design attributes would be nonobvious to someone with minimal experience in the field of batteries. The lone major difference between Adam&#039;s battery and the prior art is the fact that it is water-activated. Because of this significant performance improvement, the court concluded that the Adams party was nonobvious. Even though the elements of his battery were well known in the prior art, their combination far surpassed then-existing wet batteries and thus the design could not have been obvious.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3045</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3045"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T05:28:38Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* Graham v. John Deere (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*First, that the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of a &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson&#039;s outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&amp;amp;P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson&#039;s sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, &amp;quot;the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts,&amp;quot; and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, &amp;quot;patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science,&amp;quot; which make this point very clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court&#039;s outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. &amp;quot;The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
In evaluating nonobviousness of a patent, this is the fundamental evaluation criteria. The cases discussed on this page provide examples of devices that did and did not adhere to section 103. Furthermore, the cases exemplify specific aspects of an invention that can be used in the determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The point discussed by Learned Hand in Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb is an important characteristic of the effects of Section 103. The design in question is for a coating that prevents reflection, which at first glance seems to be a very simple development. Historically, as Learned Hand states, a patent may not have been provided for such a minor improvement, even if the effects of such an improvement are significant. However, the long lasting need for a coating that prevented reflection combined with the inability of skilled designers in the field to produce such an improvement emphasizes that the invention, although minor, is far from obvious and thus worhty of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot; The case revolved around the institution of a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil by John Deere, which Graham argued infringed upon his original patent. The Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision on the grounds that in light of the prior art, the improvements made by Graham would have been obvious to an indiviudal with ordinary skill in the art. The case serves as a prime example of many of the criteria used to evaluate the obviousness of a design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* Scope and content of the prior art&lt;br /&gt;
* Differences between the prior art and the claims at issue&lt;br /&gt;
* Level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of Graham v. John Deere, the most significant contributor to the prior art was a patent that Graham had submitted earlier. The Supreme Court was faced with determining whether Graham&#039;s &#039;811 patent included differences from the &#039;798 patent that were substantially different and effective, but also nonobvious to a person of reasonable skill in the art. Because the primary difference between the two patents was simply a rearrangement of previously used mechanisms (i.e., an inversion of the shank and hinge plate) it was determined that this would be a fairly obvious conclusion to someone who was acquainted with tractor design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, there are also secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
* Commercial success of the invention&lt;br /&gt;
* Long-felt but unsolved needs&lt;br /&gt;
* Failure of others to find a solution&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference between the primary criteria and the secondary considerations is that a strict adherence to the criteria ensures nonobviousness, while accordance with the secondary considerations only supports the case for nonobviousness. If an inventor produces a product that is commercially successful and has long been sought after by the related market, it strongly supports the case for nonobviousness, but a strict reviewal of the prior art will still stand as the final determination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3041</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=3041"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T05:19:50Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* Graham v. John Deere (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*First, that the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of a &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson&#039;s outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&amp;amp;P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson&#039;s sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, &amp;quot;the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts,&amp;quot; and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, &amp;quot;patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science,&amp;quot; which make this point very clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court&#039;s outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. &amp;quot;The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
In evaluating nonobviousness of a patent, this is the fundamental evaluation criteria. The cases discussed on this page provide examples of devices that did and did not adhere to section 103. Furthermore, the cases exemplify specific aspects of an invention that can be used in the determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The point discussed by Learned Hand in Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb is an important characteristic of the effects of Section 103. The design in question is for a coating that prevents reflection, which at first glance seems to be a very simple development. Historically, as Learned Hand states, a patent may not have been provided for such a minor improvement, even if the effects of such an improvement are significant. However, the long lasting need for a coating that prevented reflection combined with the inability of skilled designers in the field to produce such an improvement emphasizes that the invention, although minor, is far from obvious and thus worhty of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot; The case revolved around the institution of a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil by John Deere, which Graham argued infringed upon his original patent. The Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision on the grounds that in light of the prior art, the improvements made by Graham would have been obvious to an indiviudal with ordinary skill in the art. The case serves as a prime example of many of the criteria used to evaluate the obviousness of a design. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* Scope and content of the prior art&lt;br /&gt;
* Differences between the prior art and the claims at issue&lt;br /&gt;
* Level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, there are also secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2812</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2812"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T00:24:52Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*First, that the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of a &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson&#039;s outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&amp;amp;P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson&#039;s sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, &amp;quot;the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts,&amp;quot; and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, &amp;quot;patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science,&amp;quot; which make this point very clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court&#039;s outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. &amp;quot;The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
In evaluating nonobviousness of a patent, this is the fundamental evaluation criteria. The cases discussed on this page provide examples of devices that did and did not adhere to section 103. Furthermore, the cases exemplify specific aspects of an invention that can be used in the determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The point discussed by Learned Hand in Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb is an important characteristic of the effects of Section 103. The design in question is for a coating that prevents reflection, which at first glance seems to be a very simple development. Historically, as Learned Hand states, a patent may not have been provided for such a minor improvement, even if the effects of such an improvement are significant. However, the long lasting need for a coating that prevented reflection combined with the inability of skilled designers in the field to produce such an improvement emphasizes that the invention, although minor, is far from obvious and thus worhty of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot;  The criteria to determine nonobviousness include&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
* secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
** commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2809</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2809"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T00:01:16Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* 35 USC 103 (1952) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*First, that the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of a &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson&#039;s outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&amp;amp;P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson&#039;s sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, &amp;quot;the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts,&amp;quot; and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, &amp;quot;patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science,&amp;quot; which make this point very clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court&#039;s outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. &amp;quot;The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
In evaluating nonobviousness of a patent, this is the fundamental evaluation criteria. The cases discussed on this page provide examples of devices that did and did not adhere to section 103. Furthermore, the cases exemplify specific aspects of an invention that can be used in the determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot;  The criteria to determine nonobviousness include&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
* secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
** commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2799</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2799"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T23:41:52Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*First, that the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of a &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson&#039;s outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&amp;amp;P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson&#039;s sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, &amp;quot;the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts,&amp;quot; and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, &amp;quot;patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science,&amp;quot; which make this point very clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court&#039;s outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. &amp;quot;The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot;  The criteria to determine nonobviousness include&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
* secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
** commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS&amp;diff=2793</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS&amp;diff=2793"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T23:35:17Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*First, that the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of a &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson&#039;s outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&amp;amp;P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson&#039;s sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, &amp;quot;the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts,&amp;quot; and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, &amp;quot;patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science,&amp;quot; which make this point very clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court&#039;s outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. &amp;quot;The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot;  The criteria to determine nonobviousness include&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
* secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
** commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS&amp;diff=2763</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS&amp;diff=2763"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T22:54:31Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*First, that the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot;  The criteria to determine nonobviousness include&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
* secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
** commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS&amp;diff=2758</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS&amp;diff=2758"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T22:49:57Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1) the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot;  The criteria to determine nonobviousness include&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
* secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
** commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS&amp;diff=2752</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS&amp;diff=2752"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T22:45:23Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot;  The criteria to determine nonobviousness include&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
* secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
** commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS&amp;diff=2750</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS&amp;diff=2750"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T22:44:38Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: /* Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; will not be developed for some time, the court&#039;s decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than &#039;&#039;&#039;were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business&#039;&#039;&#039;, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot;  The criteria to determine nonobviousness include&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
* secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
** commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2637</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2637"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T06:53:13Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot;  The criteria to determine nonobviousness include&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
* secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
** commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2636</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2636"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T06:52:34Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: Blanked the page&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Dcarter2&amp;diff=2635</id>
		<title>User:Dcarter2</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Dcarter2&amp;diff=2635"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T06:52:05Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== HOMEWORK 1 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 2 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Referenced Patents:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Analysis of Relevant Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Hotchkiss v. Greenwood&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The height adjustable crutch would easily be patentable according to the criteria set forth in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850), as the design instituted required more “skill and ingenuity ….than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic.” Although the cane/crutch allows for the adjustment of height, the newer crutch provides the user with dual levers to raise the height of each crutch, while maintaining the weight bearing support of the device. The “ski crutch” does not even contain a height adjustment feature, as the only real connection between the two designs is the simple premise of manipulating a crutch for various purposes.  While the inventor certainly received inspiration from these previous designs, the improvements made upon the original inventions are significant and by no means “destitute of ingenuity or invention.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the precedent set forth by A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the height adjustable crutch would again be patentable, as it constitutes an invention that is innovative enough to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The design of a crutch that provides the user with the ability to adjust the height through the use of a lever is worthy enough of an invention, as none of the reference patents outline a design that could accomplish the same feat as easily. Furthermore, the height adjustable crutch provides an important service to handicapped individuals, as it is designed specifically for the assistance of an individual attempting to rise from a seated to standing position. Thus, because the new design accomplishes a task that neither of the two previous inventions accomplishes it can be stated that the product upholds the purpose of patents, which is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) addresses the issue of nonobviousness, which stipulates that the change the proposed design is based upon must not be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” The stipulations presented by the nonobviousness clause are more difficult to adhere to for the height adjustable crutch; however, it may still past the test. While it is not unbelievable that an average designer in the field of equipment for disabled individuals could develop an idea for a adjustable crutch that allows the user to rise from a seated to standing position, the combination of developing the concept and instituting the mechanical components is far harder to replicate. Thus, it can be argued that although an average mechanic could have developed the adjustment mechanism utilized in Patent 4252138 and an average crutch designer could have proposed the design idea, the culmination of both the creativity and technology in a single design proposal allows for adherence to the nonobviousness stance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 3 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;U.S. v. Adams&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Litigated Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patent under litigation in U.S. v. Adams is U.S. No. 2,322,210, issued in 1943. The invention is a nonrechargeable electrical battery comprised of two electrodes, one made of magnesium and the other of cuprous chloride, with battery fluid of either plain or salt water. The goal of the aptent was to provide constant voltage without the use of acids or the generation of dangerous fumes. Furthermore, the battery was intended to be relatively light in weight and able to be manufactured and distributed to the trade in a dry condition and rendered serviceable by simply filling the container with water. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Non-Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prior art is based primarily on six patents, including, the Skrivanoff patent, Wensky patent, Codd treatiste, Wood patent, and Niaudet treatise (which consists of the Marie Davy cell adn De La Rue&#039;s subsequent variations). A comparison between the Adams Patent and the prior art reveals that the most significant addition to the battery model made by Adams is the concept of a device that is &amp;quot;water-activated,&amp;quot; as none of the previous patents mention such a design. The use of magnesium is used in several of the previous patents, including  Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff. While coprous chloride is not clearly indicated by any of the patents as a usable electrode, it is referenced by the Wensky patent as a necessary addition (in salt form) to the electrolyte solution. Thus, the Adams patent relies on three major attributes for patent validity, water-activation, coprous chloride (as a electrode), and marketability/commercial success. In Anderson&#039;s Black Rock Inc v. Pavement Co., the distinguishment between commercial success was made, as it was stated that the marketability of the product &amp;quot;is relevant to commercial success, not to invention,&amp;quot; so it can not be used alone to uphold the validity of a patent. Fortunately, the fact that the battery is water activated is enough to separate the Adams invention from the prior art. As none of the previous patents reference this particular attribute, the requirement of novelty is validated. As for nonobviousness, the primary reasons for support can be found in the results produced by the device, as they proved to be both unexpected and far surpassing the then-existing wet batteries. Another important consideration in the conclusion of nonobviousness is the the pre-existing results that would discourage research and subsequent discovery of the conclusions made by Adams. At the time of Adams invention, it is was widely believed that batteries which operate on an open circuit and which heated in normal use were not practial. Also, it had been determined that water-activated batteries were successful only when combined with electrolytes detrimental to the use of magnesium. Thus, it can be concluded that a person with reasonable skill in the art would have been unlikely to ignore these widely accepted conclusions and create the device that Adams created. Further support of nonobviousness can be found in the fact that the Navy expressed disbelief in Adams product at the time of its invention. All of these facts strongly support the conclusion of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A conclusion of obviousness can most easily be realized through the analysis of earlier cases, such as Anderson Black Rock. Pavement Co. and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. As stated in the conclusion for nonobviousness, the marketability and commercial success of the water-activated battery can be nullified in the evaluation of the patent validity, as &amp;quot;that is relevant to commercial success, not invention.&amp;quot; (As stated in Anderson v. Pavement) Furthermore, one of the major attributes of the Adams patent is the combination of magnesium and coprous chloride, both of which had previously been reference in earlier patents. The use of magnesium was referenced by Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff, while coprous chloride was refrenced in Wensky, albeit not as an electrode. However, the existence of both of these elements in the art of battery design supports the conclusion that the combination of both of them (even as electrodes, particularly since magnesium was already used as an electrode) would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. This can be seen in KSR v. Teleflex, as it was determined that the combination of the Asano patent with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor would be obvious to a person to a reasonably skilled individual because there was an existing market place for the development of mechanical pedals into eletronic pedals and prior art provided methods to achieve this advance. Thus, both the Adams patent and the Teleflex patent revolved around the combination of an existing design/element (magnesium for Adams, Asano patent for Teleflex) with an existing, yet unrefined design/element (coprous chloride for Adams, pivot mounted pedal for Teleflex). Similar support can be found in Anderson v. Pavement, as placement of a radiant heat burner on a standard paving machine was declared unpatentable because the use of radiant heat was an old technology and the placement of a mechanism would be obvious to a person of reasonable skill in the field. Similarly, the use of coprous chloride as an electrode, rather than as a salt in the electrolyte, as in the Wensky patent, involves the use of the same element in a different portion of the battery, which should be obvious. Both KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. and Anderson Black Rock.v. Pavement Co. can be used to support the obviousness of the Adams patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Home_Page&amp;diff=2634</id>
		<title>Home Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Home_Page&amp;diff=2634"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T06:51:17Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: moved Home Page to NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;#REDIRECT [[NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2633</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2633"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T06:51:17Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: moved Home Page to NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== HOMEWORK 1 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 2 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Referenced Patents:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Analysis of Relevant Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Hotchkiss v. Greenwood&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The height adjustable crutch would easily be patentable according to the criteria set forth in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850), as the design instituted required more “skill and ingenuity ….than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic.” Although the cane/crutch allows for the adjustment of height, the newer crutch provides the user with dual levers to raise the height of each crutch, while maintaining the weight bearing support of the device. The “ski crutch” does not even contain a height adjustment feature, as the only real connection between the two designs is the simple premise of manipulating a crutch for various purposes.  While the inventor certainly received inspiration from these previous designs, the improvements made upon the original inventions are significant and by no means “destitute of ingenuity or invention.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the precedent set forth by A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the height adjustable crutch would again be patentable, as it constitutes an invention that is innovative enough to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The design of a crutch that provides the user with the ability to adjust the height through the use of a lever is worthy enough of an invention, as none of the reference patents outline a design that could accomplish the same feat as easily. Furthermore, the height adjustable crutch provides an important service to handicapped individuals, as it is designed specifically for the assistance of an individual attempting to rise from a seated to standing position. Thus, because the new design accomplishes a task that neither of the two previous inventions accomplishes it can be stated that the product upholds the purpose of patents, which is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) addresses the issue of nonobviousness, which stipulates that the change the proposed design is based upon must not be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” The stipulations presented by the nonobviousness clause are more difficult to adhere to for the height adjustable crutch; however, it may still past the test. While it is not unbelievable that an average designer in the field of equipment for disabled individuals could develop an idea for a adjustable crutch that allows the user to rise from a seated to standing position, the combination of developing the concept and instituting the mechanical components is far harder to replicate. Thus, it can be argued that although an average mechanic could have developed the adjustment mechanism utilized in Patent 4252138 and an average crutch designer could have proposed the design idea, the culmination of both the creativity and technology in a single design proposal allows for adherence to the nonobviousness stance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 3 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;U.S. v. Adams&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Litigated Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patent under litigation in U.S. v. Adams is U.S. No. 2,322,210, issued in 1943. The invention is a nonrechargeable electrical battery comprised of two electrodes, one made of magnesium and the other of cuprous chloride, with battery fluid of either plain or salt water. The goal of the aptent was to provide constant voltage without the use of acids or the generation of dangerous fumes. Furthermore, the battery was intended to be relatively light in weight and able to be manufactured and distributed to the trade in a dry condition and rendered serviceable by simply filling the container with water. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Non-Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prior art is based primarily on six patents, including, the Skrivanoff patent, Wensky patent, Codd treatiste, Wood patent, and Niaudet treatise (which consists of the Marie Davy cell adn De La Rue&#039;s subsequent variations). A comparison between the Adams Patent and the prior art reveals that the most significant addition to the battery model made by Adams is the concept of a device that is &amp;quot;water-activated,&amp;quot; as none of the previous patents mention such a design. The use of magnesium is used in several of the previous patents, including  Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff. While coprous chloride is not clearly indicated by any of the patents as a usable electrode, it is referenced by the Wensky patent as a necessary addition (in salt form) to the electrolyte solution. Thus, the Adams patent relies on three major attributes for patent validity, water-activation, coprous chloride (as a electrode), and marketability/commercial success. In Anderson&#039;s Black Rock Inc v. Pavement Co., the distinguishment between commercial success was made, as it was stated that the marketability of the product &amp;quot;is relevant to commercial success, not to invention,&amp;quot; so it can not be used alone to uphold the validity of a patent. Fortunately, the fact that the battery is water activated is enough to separate the Adams invention from the prior art. As none of the previous patents reference this particular attribute, the requirement of novelty is validated. As for nonobviousness, the primary reasons for support can be found in the results produced by the device, as they proved to be both unexpected and far surpassing the then-existing wet batteries. Another important consideration in the conclusion of nonobviousness is the the pre-existing results that would discourage research and subsequent discovery of the conclusions made by Adams. At the time of Adams invention, it is was widely believed that batteries which operate on an open circuit and which heated in normal use were not practial. Also, it had been determined that water-activated batteries were successful only when combined with electrolytes detrimental to the use of magnesium. Thus, it can be concluded that a person with reasonable skill in the art would have been unlikely to ignore these widely accepted conclusions and create the device that Adams created. Further support of nonobviousness can be found in the fact that the Navy expressed disbelief in Adams product at the time of its invention. All of these facts strongly support the conclusion of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A conclusion of obviousness can most easily be realized through the analysis of earlier cases, such as Anderson Black Rock. Pavement Co. and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. As stated in the conclusion for nonobviousness, the marketability and commercial success of the water-activated battery can be nullified in the evaluation of the patent validity, as &amp;quot;that is relevant to commercial success, not invention.&amp;quot; (As stated in Anderson v. Pavement) Furthermore, one of the major attributes of the Adams patent is the combination of magnesium and coprous chloride, both of which had previously been reference in earlier patents. The use of magnesium was referenced by Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff, while coprous chloride was refrenced in Wensky, albeit not as an electrode. However, the existence of both of these elements in the art of battery design supports the conclusion that the combination of both of them (even as electrodes, particularly since magnesium was already used as an electrode) would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. This can be seen in KSR v. Teleflex, as it was determined that the combination of the Asano patent with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor would be obvious to a person to a reasonably skilled individual because there was an existing market place for the development of mechanical pedals into eletronic pedals and prior art provided methods to achieve this advance. Thus, both the Adams patent and the Teleflex patent revolved around the combination of an existing design/element (magnesium for Adams, Asano patent for Teleflex) with an existing, yet unrefined design/element (coprous chloride for Adams, pivot mounted pedal for Teleflex). Similar support can be found in Anderson v. Pavement, as placement of a radiant heat burner on a standard paving machine was declared unpatentable because the use of radiant heat was an old technology and the placement of a mechanism would be obvious to a person of reasonable skill in the field. Similarly, the use of coprous chloride as an electrode, rather than as a salt in the electrolyte, as in the Wensky patent, involves the use of the same element in a different portion of the battery, which should be obvious. Both KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. and Anderson Black Rock.v. Pavement Co. can be used to support the obviousness of the Adams patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[NONOBVIOUSNESS]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Dcarter2&amp;diff=2632</id>
		<title>User:Dcarter2</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Dcarter2&amp;diff=2632"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T06:49:47Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== HOMEWORK 1 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 2 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Referenced Patents:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Analysis of Relevant Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Hotchkiss v. Greenwood&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The height adjustable crutch would easily be patentable according to the criteria set forth in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850), as the design instituted required more “skill and ingenuity ….than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic.” Although the cane/crutch allows for the adjustment of height, the newer crutch provides the user with dual levers to raise the height of each crutch, while maintaining the weight bearing support of the device. The “ski crutch” does not even contain a height adjustment feature, as the only real connection between the two designs is the simple premise of manipulating a crutch for various purposes.  While the inventor certainly received inspiration from these previous designs, the improvements made upon the original inventions are significant and by no means “destitute of ingenuity or invention.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the precedent set forth by A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the height adjustable crutch would again be patentable, as it constitutes an invention that is innovative enough to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The design of a crutch that provides the user with the ability to adjust the height through the use of a lever is worthy enough of an invention, as none of the reference patents outline a design that could accomplish the same feat as easily. Furthermore, the height adjustable crutch provides an important service to handicapped individuals, as it is designed specifically for the assistance of an individual attempting to rise from a seated to standing position. Thus, because the new design accomplishes a task that neither of the two previous inventions accomplishes it can be stated that the product upholds the purpose of patents, which is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) addresses the issue of nonobviousness, which stipulates that the change the proposed design is based upon must not be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” The stipulations presented by the nonobviousness clause are more difficult to adhere to for the height adjustable crutch; however, it may still past the test. While it is not unbelievable that an average designer in the field of equipment for disabled individuals could develop an idea for a adjustable crutch that allows the user to rise from a seated to standing position, the combination of developing the concept and instituting the mechanical components is far harder to replicate. Thus, it can be argued that although an average mechanic could have developed the adjustment mechanism utilized in Patent 4252138 and an average crutch designer could have proposed the design idea, the culmination of both the creativity and technology in a single design proposal allows for adherence to the nonobviousness stance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 3 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;U.S. v. Adams&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Litigated Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patent under litigation in U.S. v. Adams is U.S. No. 2,322,210, issued in 1943. The invention is a nonrechargeable electrical battery comprised of two electrodes, one made of magnesium and the other of cuprous chloride, with battery fluid of either plain or salt water. The goal of the aptent was to provide constant voltage without the use of acids or the generation of dangerous fumes. Furthermore, the battery was intended to be relatively light in weight and able to be manufactured and distributed to the trade in a dry condition and rendered serviceable by simply filling the container with water. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Non-Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prior art is based primarily on six patents, including, the Skrivanoff patent, Wensky patent, Codd treatiste, Wood patent, and Niaudet treatise (which consists of the Marie Davy cell adn De La Rue&#039;s subsequent variations). A comparison between the Adams Patent and the prior art reveals that the most significant addition to the battery model made by Adams is the concept of a device that is &amp;quot;water-activated,&amp;quot; as none of the previous patents mention such a design. The use of magnesium is used in several of the previous patents, including  Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff. While coprous chloride is not clearly indicated by any of the patents as a usable electrode, it is referenced by the Wensky patent as a necessary addition (in salt form) to the electrolyte solution. Thus, the Adams patent relies on three major attributes for patent validity, water-activation, coprous chloride (as a electrode), and marketability/commercial success. In Anderson&#039;s Black Rock Inc v. Pavement Co., the distinguishment between commercial success was made, as it was stated that the marketability of the product &amp;quot;is relevant to commercial success, not to invention,&amp;quot; so it can not be used alone to uphold the validity of a patent. Fortunately, the fact that the battery is water activated is enough to separate the Adams invention from the prior art. As none of the previous patents reference this particular attribute, the requirement of novelty is validated. As for nonobviousness, the primary reasons for support can be found in the results produced by the device, as they proved to be both unexpected and far surpassing the then-existing wet batteries. Another important consideration in the conclusion of nonobviousness is the the pre-existing results that would discourage research and subsequent discovery of the conclusions made by Adams. At the time of Adams invention, it is was widely believed that batteries which operate on an open circuit and which heated in normal use were not practial. Also, it had been determined that water-activated batteries were successful only when combined with electrolytes detrimental to the use of magnesium. Thus, it can be concluded that a person with reasonable skill in the art would have been unlikely to ignore these widely accepted conclusions and create the device that Adams created. Further support of nonobviousness can be found in the fact that the Navy expressed disbelief in Adams product at the time of its invention. All of these facts strongly support the conclusion of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A conclusion of obviousness can most easily be realized through the analysis of earlier cases, such as Anderson Black Rock. Pavement Co. and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. As stated in the conclusion for nonobviousness, the marketability and commercial success of the water-activated battery can be nullified in the evaluation of the patent validity, as &amp;quot;that is relevant to commercial success, not invention.&amp;quot; (As stated in Anderson v. Pavement) Furthermore, one of the major attributes of the Adams patent is the combination of magnesium and coprous chloride, both of which had previously been reference in earlier patents. The use of magnesium was referenced by Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff, while coprous chloride was refrenced in Wensky, albeit not as an electrode. However, the existence of both of these elements in the art of battery design supports the conclusion that the combination of both of them (even as electrodes, particularly since magnesium was already used as an electrode) would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. This can be seen in KSR v. Teleflex, as it was determined that the combination of the Asano patent with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor would be obvious to a person to a reasonably skilled individual because there was an existing market place for the development of mechanical pedals into eletronic pedals and prior art provided methods to achieve this advance. Thus, both the Adams patent and the Teleflex patent revolved around the combination of an existing design/element (magnesium for Adams, Asano patent for Teleflex) with an existing, yet unrefined design/element (coprous chloride for Adams, pivot mounted pedal for Teleflex). Similar support can be found in Anderson v. Pavement, as placement of a radiant heat burner on a standard paving machine was declared unpatentable because the use of radiant heat was an old technology and the placement of a mechanism would be obvious to a person of reasonable skill in the field. Similarly, the use of coprous chloride as an electrode, rather than as a salt in the electrolyte, as in the Wensky patent, involves the use of the same element in a different portion of the battery, which should be obvious. Both KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. and Anderson Black Rock.v. Pavement Co. can be used to support the obviousness of the Adams patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Home Page]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Dcarter2&amp;diff=2631</id>
		<title>User:Dcarter2</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Dcarter2&amp;diff=2631"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T06:49:10Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== HOMEWORK 1 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 2 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Referenced Patents:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Analysis of Relevant Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Hotchkiss v. Greenwood&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The height adjustable crutch would easily be patentable according to the criteria set forth in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850), as the design instituted required more “skill and ingenuity ….than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic.” Although the cane/crutch allows for the adjustment of height, the newer crutch provides the user with dual levers to raise the height of each crutch, while maintaining the weight bearing support of the device. The “ski crutch” does not even contain a height adjustment feature, as the only real connection between the two designs is the simple premise of manipulating a crutch for various purposes.  While the inventor certainly received inspiration from these previous designs, the improvements made upon the original inventions are significant and by no means “destitute of ingenuity or invention.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the precedent set forth by A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the height adjustable crutch would again be patentable, as it constitutes an invention that is innovative enough to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The design of a crutch that provides the user with the ability to adjust the height through the use of a lever is worthy enough of an invention, as none of the reference patents outline a design that could accomplish the same feat as easily. Furthermore, the height adjustable crutch provides an important service to handicapped individuals, as it is designed specifically for the assistance of an individual attempting to rise from a seated to standing position. Thus, because the new design accomplishes a task that neither of the two previous inventions accomplishes it can be stated that the product upholds the purpose of patents, which is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) addresses the issue of nonobviousness, which stipulates that the change the proposed design is based upon must not be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” The stipulations presented by the nonobviousness clause are more difficult to adhere to for the height adjustable crutch; however, it may still past the test. While it is not unbelievable that an average designer in the field of equipment for disabled individuals could develop an idea for a adjustable crutch that allows the user to rise from a seated to standing position, the combination of developing the concept and instituting the mechanical components is far harder to replicate. Thus, it can be argued that although an average mechanic could have developed the adjustment mechanism utilized in Patent 4252138 and an average crutch designer could have proposed the design idea, the culmination of both the creativity and technology in a single design proposal allows for adherence to the nonobviousness stance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 3 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;U.S. v. Adams&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Litigated Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patent under litigation in U.S. v. Adams is U.S. No. 2,322,210, issued in 1943. The invention is a nonrechargeable electrical battery comprised of two electrodes, one made of magnesium and the other of cuprous chloride, with battery fluid of either plain or salt water. The goal of the aptent was to provide constant voltage without the use of acids or the generation of dangerous fumes. Furthermore, the battery was intended to be relatively light in weight and able to be manufactured and distributed to the trade in a dry condition and rendered serviceable by simply filling the container with water. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Non-Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prior art is based primarily on six patents, including, the Skrivanoff patent, Wensky patent, Codd treatiste, Wood patent, and Niaudet treatise (which consists of the Marie Davy cell adn De La Rue&#039;s subsequent variations). A comparison between the Adams Patent and the prior art reveals that the most significant addition to the battery model made by Adams is the concept of a device that is &amp;quot;water-activated,&amp;quot; as none of the previous patents mention such a design. The use of magnesium is used in several of the previous patents, including  Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff. While coprous chloride is not clearly indicated by any of the patents as a usable electrode, it is referenced by the Wensky patent as a necessary addition (in salt form) to the electrolyte solution. Thus, the Adams patent relies on three major attributes for patent validity, water-activation, coprous chloride (as a electrode), and marketability/commercial success. In Anderson&#039;s Black Rock Inc v. Pavement Co., the distinguishment between commercial success was made, as it was stated that the marketability of the product &amp;quot;is relevant to commercial success, not to invention,&amp;quot; so it can not be used alone to uphold the validity of a patent. Fortunately, the fact that the battery is water activated is enough to separate the Adams invention from the prior art. As none of the previous patents reference this particular attribute, the requirement of novelty is validated. As for nonobviousness, the primary reasons for support can be found in the results produced by the device, as they proved to be both unexpected and far surpassing the then-existing wet batteries. Another important consideration in the conclusion of nonobviousness is the the pre-existing results that would discourage research and subsequent discovery of the conclusions made by Adams. At the time of Adams invention, it is was widely believed that batteries which operate on an open circuit and which heated in normal use were not practial. Also, it had been determined that water-activated batteries were successful only when combined with electrolytes detrimental to the use of magnesium. Thus, it can be concluded that a person with reasonable skill in the art would have been unlikely to ignore these widely accepted conclusions and create the device that Adams created. Further support of nonobviousness can be found in the fact that the Navy expressed disbelief in Adams product at the time of its invention. All of these facts strongly support the conclusion of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A conclusion of obviousness can most easily be realized through the analysis of earlier cases, such as Anderson Black Rock. Pavement Co. and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. As stated in the conclusion for nonobviousness, the marketability and commercial success of the water-activated battery can be nullified in the evaluation of the patent validity, as &amp;quot;that is relevant to commercial success, not invention.&amp;quot; (As stated in Anderson v. Pavement) Furthermore, one of the major attributes of the Adams patent is the combination of magnesium and coprous chloride, both of which had previously been reference in earlier patents. The use of magnesium was referenced by Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff, while coprous chloride was refrenced in Wensky, albeit not as an electrode. However, the existence of both of these elements in the art of battery design supports the conclusion that the combination of both of them (even as electrodes, particularly since magnesium was already used as an electrode) would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. This can be seen in KSR v. Teleflex, as it was determined that the combination of the Asano patent with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor would be obvious to a person to a reasonably skilled individual because there was an existing market place for the development of mechanical pedals into eletronic pedals and prior art provided methods to achieve this advance. Thus, both the Adams patent and the Teleflex patent revolved around the combination of an existing design/element (magnesium for Adams, Asano patent for Teleflex) with an existing, yet unrefined design/element (coprous chloride for Adams, pivot mounted pedal for Teleflex). Similar support can be found in Anderson v. Pavement, as placement of a radiant heat burner on a standard paving machine was declared unpatentable because the use of radiant heat was an old technology and the placement of a mechanism would be obvious to a person of reasonable skill in the field. Similarly, the use of coprous chloride as an electrode, rather than as a salt in the electrolyte, as in the Wensky patent, involves the use of the same element in a different portion of the battery, which should be obvious. Both KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. and Anderson Black Rock.v. Pavement Co. can be used to support the obviousness of the Adams patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[NONOBVIOUSNESS]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Dcarter2&amp;diff=2630</id>
		<title>User:Dcarter2</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Dcarter2&amp;diff=2630"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T06:48:06Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: moved User:Dcarter2 to Home Page&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;#REDIRECT [[Home Page]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2629</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2629"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T06:48:06Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: moved User:Dcarter2 to Home Page&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== HOMEWORK 1 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 2 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Referenced Patents:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Analysis of Relevant Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Hotchkiss v. Greenwood&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The height adjustable crutch would easily be patentable according to the criteria set forth in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850), as the design instituted required more “skill and ingenuity ….than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic.” Although the cane/crutch allows for the adjustment of height, the newer crutch provides the user with dual levers to raise the height of each crutch, while maintaining the weight bearing support of the device. The “ski crutch” does not even contain a height adjustment feature, as the only real connection between the two designs is the simple premise of manipulating a crutch for various purposes.  While the inventor certainly received inspiration from these previous designs, the improvements made upon the original inventions are significant and by no means “destitute of ingenuity or invention.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the precedent set forth by A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the height adjustable crutch would again be patentable, as it constitutes an invention that is innovative enough to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The design of a crutch that provides the user with the ability to adjust the height through the use of a lever is worthy enough of an invention, as none of the reference patents outline a design that could accomplish the same feat as easily. Furthermore, the height adjustable crutch provides an important service to handicapped individuals, as it is designed specifically for the assistance of an individual attempting to rise from a seated to standing position. Thus, because the new design accomplishes a task that neither of the two previous inventions accomplishes it can be stated that the product upholds the purpose of patents, which is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) addresses the issue of nonobviousness, which stipulates that the change the proposed design is based upon must not be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” The stipulations presented by the nonobviousness clause are more difficult to adhere to for the height adjustable crutch; however, it may still past the test. While it is not unbelievable that an average designer in the field of equipment for disabled individuals could develop an idea for a adjustable crutch that allows the user to rise from a seated to standing position, the combination of developing the concept and instituting the mechanical components is far harder to replicate. Thus, it can be argued that although an average mechanic could have developed the adjustment mechanism utilized in Patent 4252138 and an average crutch designer could have proposed the design idea, the culmination of both the creativity and technology in a single design proposal allows for adherence to the nonobviousness stance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 3 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;U.S. v. Adams&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Litigated Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patent under litigation in U.S. v. Adams is U.S. No. 2,322,210, issued in 1943. The invention is a nonrechargeable electrical battery comprised of two electrodes, one made of magnesium and the other of cuprous chloride, with battery fluid of either plain or salt water. The goal of the aptent was to provide constant voltage without the use of acids or the generation of dangerous fumes. Furthermore, the battery was intended to be relatively light in weight and able to be manufactured and distributed to the trade in a dry condition and rendered serviceable by simply filling the container with water. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Non-Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prior art is based primarily on six patents, including, the Skrivanoff patent, Wensky patent, Codd treatiste, Wood patent, and Niaudet treatise (which consists of the Marie Davy cell adn De La Rue&#039;s subsequent variations). A comparison between the Adams Patent and the prior art reveals that the most significant addition to the battery model made by Adams is the concept of a device that is &amp;quot;water-activated,&amp;quot; as none of the previous patents mention such a design. The use of magnesium is used in several of the previous patents, including  Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff. While coprous chloride is not clearly indicated by any of the patents as a usable electrode, it is referenced by the Wensky patent as a necessary addition (in salt form) to the electrolyte solution. Thus, the Adams patent relies on three major attributes for patent validity, water-activation, coprous chloride (as a electrode), and marketability/commercial success. In Anderson&#039;s Black Rock Inc v. Pavement Co., the distinguishment between commercial success was made, as it was stated that the marketability of the product &amp;quot;is relevant to commercial success, not to invention,&amp;quot; so it can not be used alone to uphold the validity of a patent. Fortunately, the fact that the battery is water activated is enough to separate the Adams invention from the prior art. As none of the previous patents reference this particular attribute, the requirement of novelty is validated. As for nonobviousness, the primary reasons for support can be found in the results produced by the device, as they proved to be both unexpected and far surpassing the then-existing wet batteries. Another important consideration in the conclusion of nonobviousness is the the pre-existing results that would discourage research and subsequent discovery of the conclusions made by Adams. At the time of Adams invention, it is was widely believed that batteries which operate on an open circuit and which heated in normal use were not practial. Also, it had been determined that water-activated batteries were successful only when combined with electrolytes detrimental to the use of magnesium. Thus, it can be concluded that a person with reasonable skill in the art would have been unlikely to ignore these widely accepted conclusions and create the device that Adams created. Further support of nonobviousness can be found in the fact that the Navy expressed disbelief in Adams product at the time of its invention. All of these facts strongly support the conclusion of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A conclusion of obviousness can most easily be realized through the analysis of earlier cases, such as Anderson Black Rock. Pavement Co. and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. As stated in the conclusion for nonobviousness, the marketability and commercial success of the water-activated battery can be nullified in the evaluation of the patent validity, as &amp;quot;that is relevant to commercial success, not invention.&amp;quot; (As stated in Anderson v. Pavement) Furthermore, one of the major attributes of the Adams patent is the combination of magnesium and coprous chloride, both of which had previously been reference in earlier patents. The use of magnesium was referenced by Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff, while coprous chloride was refrenced in Wensky, albeit not as an electrode. However, the existence of both of these elements in the art of battery design supports the conclusion that the combination of both of them (even as electrodes, particularly since magnesium was already used as an electrode) would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. This can be seen in KSR v. Teleflex, as it was determined that the combination of the Asano patent with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor would be obvious to a person to a reasonably skilled individual because there was an existing market place for the development of mechanical pedals into eletronic pedals and prior art provided methods to achieve this advance. Thus, both the Adams patent and the Teleflex patent revolved around the combination of an existing design/element (magnesium for Adams, Asano patent for Teleflex) with an existing, yet unrefined design/element (coprous chloride for Adams, pivot mounted pedal for Teleflex). Similar support can be found in Anderson v. Pavement, as placement of a radiant heat burner on a standard paving machine was declared unpatentable because the use of radiant heat was an old technology and the placement of a mechanism would be obvious to a person of reasonable skill in the field. Similarly, the use of coprous chloride as an electrode, rather than as a salt in the electrolyte, as in the Wensky patent, involves the use of the same element in a different portion of the battery, which should be obvious. Both KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. and Anderson Black Rock.v. Pavement Co. can be used to support the obviousness of the Adams patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[NONOBVIOUSNESS]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2628</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2628"/>
		<updated>2011-02-08T06:41:32Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== HOMEWORK 1 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 2 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Referenced Patents:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Analysis of Relevant Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Hotchkiss v. Greenwood&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The height adjustable crutch would easily be patentable according to the criteria set forth in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850), as the design instituted required more “skill and ingenuity ….than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic.” Although the cane/crutch allows for the adjustment of height, the newer crutch provides the user with dual levers to raise the height of each crutch, while maintaining the weight bearing support of the device. The “ski crutch” does not even contain a height adjustment feature, as the only real connection between the two designs is the simple premise of manipulating a crutch for various purposes.  While the inventor certainly received inspiration from these previous designs, the improvements made upon the original inventions are significant and by no means “destitute of ingenuity or invention.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the precedent set forth by A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the height adjustable crutch would again be patentable, as it constitutes an invention that is innovative enough to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The design of a crutch that provides the user with the ability to adjust the height through the use of a lever is worthy enough of an invention, as none of the reference patents outline a design that could accomplish the same feat as easily. Furthermore, the height adjustable crutch provides an important service to handicapped individuals, as it is designed specifically for the assistance of an individual attempting to rise from a seated to standing position. Thus, because the new design accomplishes a task that neither of the two previous inventions accomplishes it can be stated that the product upholds the purpose of patents, which is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) addresses the issue of nonobviousness, which stipulates that the change the proposed design is based upon must not be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” The stipulations presented by the nonobviousness clause are more difficult to adhere to for the height adjustable crutch; however, it may still past the test. While it is not unbelievable that an average designer in the field of equipment for disabled individuals could develop an idea for a adjustable crutch that allows the user to rise from a seated to standing position, the combination of developing the concept and instituting the mechanical components is far harder to replicate. Thus, it can be argued that although an average mechanic could have developed the adjustment mechanism utilized in Patent 4252138 and an average crutch designer could have proposed the design idea, the culmination of both the creativity and technology in a single design proposal allows for adherence to the nonobviousness stance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 3 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;U.S. v. Adams&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Litigated Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patent under litigation in U.S. v. Adams is U.S. No. 2,322,210, issued in 1943. The invention is a nonrechargeable electrical battery comprised of two electrodes, one made of magnesium and the other of cuprous chloride, with battery fluid of either plain or salt water. The goal of the aptent was to provide constant voltage without the use of acids or the generation of dangerous fumes. Furthermore, the battery was intended to be relatively light in weight and able to be manufactured and distributed to the trade in a dry condition and rendered serviceable by simply filling the container with water. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Non-Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prior art is based primarily on six patents, including, the Skrivanoff patent, Wensky patent, Codd treatiste, Wood patent, and Niaudet treatise (which consists of the Marie Davy cell adn De La Rue&#039;s subsequent variations). A comparison between the Adams Patent and the prior art reveals that the most significant addition to the battery model made by Adams is the concept of a device that is &amp;quot;water-activated,&amp;quot; as none of the previous patents mention such a design. The use of magnesium is used in several of the previous patents, including  Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff. While coprous chloride is not clearly indicated by any of the patents as a usable electrode, it is referenced by the Wensky patent as a necessary addition (in salt form) to the electrolyte solution. Thus, the Adams patent relies on three major attributes for patent validity, water-activation, coprous chloride (as a electrode), and marketability/commercial success. In Anderson&#039;s Black Rock Inc v. Pavement Co., the distinguishment between commercial success was made, as it was stated that the marketability of the product &amp;quot;is relevant to commercial success, not to invention,&amp;quot; so it can not be used alone to uphold the validity of a patent. Fortunately, the fact that the battery is water activated is enough to separate the Adams invention from the prior art. As none of the previous patents reference this particular attribute, the requirement of novelty is validated. As for nonobviousness, the primary reasons for support can be found in the results produced by the device, as they proved to be both unexpected and far surpassing the then-existing wet batteries. Another important consideration in the conclusion of nonobviousness is the the pre-existing results that would discourage research and subsequent discovery of the conclusions made by Adams. At the time of Adams invention, it is was widely believed that batteries which operate on an open circuit and which heated in normal use were not practial. Also, it had been determined that water-activated batteries were successful only when combined with electrolytes detrimental to the use of magnesium. Thus, it can be concluded that a person with reasonable skill in the art would have been unlikely to ignore these widely accepted conclusions and create the device that Adams created. Further support of nonobviousness can be found in the fact that the Navy expressed disbelief in Adams product at the time of its invention. All of these facts strongly support the conclusion of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A conclusion of obviousness can most easily be realized through the analysis of earlier cases, such as Anderson Black Rock. Pavement Co. and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. As stated in the conclusion for nonobviousness, the marketability and commercial success of the water-activated battery can be nullified in the evaluation of the patent validity, as &amp;quot;that is relevant to commercial success, not invention.&amp;quot; (As stated in Anderson v. Pavement) Furthermore, one of the major attributes of the Adams patent is the combination of magnesium and coprous chloride, both of which had previously been reference in earlier patents. The use of magnesium was referenced by Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff, while coprous chloride was refrenced in Wensky, albeit not as an electrode. However, the existence of both of these elements in the art of battery design supports the conclusion that the combination of both of them (even as electrodes, particularly since magnesium was already used as an electrode) would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. This can be seen in KSR v. Teleflex, as it was determined that the combination of the Asano patent with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor would be obvious to a person to a reasonably skilled individual because there was an existing market place for the development of mechanical pedals into eletronic pedals and prior art provided methods to achieve this advance. Thus, both the Adams patent and the Teleflex patent revolved around the combination of an existing design/element (magnesium for Adams, Asano patent for Teleflex) with an existing, yet unrefined design/element (coprous chloride for Adams, pivot mounted pedal for Teleflex). Similar support can be found in Anderson v. Pavement, as placement of a radiant heat burner on a standard paving machine was declared unpatentable because the use of radiant heat was an old technology and the placement of a mechanism would be obvious to a person of reasonable skill in the field. Similarly, the use of coprous chloride as an electrode, rather than as a salt in the electrolyte, as in the Wensky patent, involves the use of the same element in a different portion of the battery, which should be obvious. Both KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. and Anderson Black Rock.v. Pavement Co. can be used to support the obviousness of the Adams patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[NONOBVIOUSNESS]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2456</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2456"/>
		<updated>2011-02-05T21:55:07Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== HOMEWORK 1 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 2 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Referenced Patents:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Analysis of Relevant Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Hotchkiss v. Greenwood&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The height adjustable crutch would easily be patentable according to the criteria set forth in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850), as the design instituted required more “skill and ingenuity ….than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic.” Although the cane/crutch allows for the adjustment of height, the newer crutch provides the user with dual levers to raise the height of each crutch, while maintaining the weight bearing support of the device. The “ski crutch” does not even contain a height adjustment feature, as the only real connection between the two designs is the simple premise of manipulating a crutch for various purposes.  While the inventor certainly received inspiration from these previous designs, the improvements made upon the original inventions are significant and by no means “destitute of ingenuity or invention.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the precedent set forth by A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the height adjustable crutch would again be patentable, as it constitutes an invention that is innovative enough to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The design of a crutch that provides the user with the ability to adjust the height through the use of a lever is worthy enough of an invention, as none of the reference patents outline a design that could accomplish the same feat as easily. Furthermore, the height adjustable crutch provides an important service to handicapped individuals, as it is designed specifically for the assistance of an individual attempting to rise from a seated to standing position. Thus, because the new design accomplishes a task that neither of the two previous inventions accomplishes it can be stated that the product upholds the purpose of patents, which is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) addresses the issue of nonobviousness, which stipulates that the change the proposed design is based upon must not be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” The stipulations presented by the nonobviousness clause are more difficult to adhere to for the height adjustable crutch; however, it may still past the test. While it is not unbelievable that an average designer in the field of equipment for disabled individuals could develop an idea for a adjustable crutch that allows the user to rise from a seated to standing position, the combination of developing the concept and instituting the mechanical components is far harder to replicate. Thus, it can be argued that although an average mechanic could have developed the adjustment mechanism utilized in Patent 4252138 and an average crutch designer could have proposed the design idea, the culmination of both the creativity and technology in a single design proposal allows for adherence to the nonobviousness stance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 3 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;U.S. v. Adams&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Litigated Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patent under litigation in U.S. v. Adams is U.S. No. 2,322,210, issued in 1943. The invention is a nonrechargeable electrical battery comprised of two electrodes, one made of magnesium and the other of cuprous chloride, with battery fluid of either plain or salt water. The goal of the aptent was to provide constant voltage without the use of acids or the generation of dangerous fumes. Furthermore, the battery was intended to be relatively light in weight and able to be manufactured and distributed to the trade in a dry condition and rendered serviceable by simply filling the container with water. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Non-Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prior art is based primarily on six patents, including, the Skrivanoff patent, Wensky patent, Codd treatiste, Wood patent, and Niaudet treatise (which consists of the Marie Davy cell adn De La Rue&#039;s subsequent variations). A comparison between the Adams Patent and the prior art reveals that the most significant addition to the battery model made by Adams is the concept of a device that is &amp;quot;water-activated,&amp;quot; as none of the previous patents mention such a design. The use of magnesium is used in several of the previous patents, including  Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff. While coprous chloride is not clearly indicated by any of the patents as a usable electrode, it is referenced by the Wensky patent as a necessary addition (in salt form) to the electrolyte solution. Thus, the Adams patent relies on three major attributes for patent validity, water-activation, coprous chloride (as a electrode), and marketability/commercial success. In Anderson&#039;s Black Rock Inc v. Pavement Co., the distinguishment between commercial success was made, as it was stated that the marketability of the product &amp;quot;is relevant to commercial success, not to invention,&amp;quot; so it can not be used alone to uphold the validity of a patent. Fortunately, the fact that the battery is water activated is enough to separate the Adams invention from the prior art. As none of the previous patents reference this particular attribute, the requirement of novelty is validated. As for nonobviousness, the primary reasons for support can be found in the results produced by the device, as they proved to be both unexpected and far surpassing the then-existing wet batteries. Another important consideration in the conclusion of nonobviousness is the the pre-existing results that would discourage research and subsequent discovery of the conclusions made by Adams. At the time of Adams invention, it is was widely believed that batteries which operate on an open circuit and which heated in normal use were not practial. Also, it had been determined that water-activated batteries were successful only when combined with electrolytes detrimental to the use of magnesium. Thus, it can be concluded that a person with reasonable skill in the art would have been unlikely to ignore these widely accepted conclusions and create the device that Adams created. Further support of nonobviousness can be found in the fact that the Navy expressed disbelief in Adams product at the time of its invention. All of these facts strongly support the conclusion of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A conclusion of obviousness can most easily be realized through the analysis of earlier cases, such as Anderson Black Rock. Pavement Co. and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. As stated in the conclusion for nonobviousness, the marketability and commercial success of the water-activated battery can be nullified in the evaluation of the patent validity, as &amp;quot;that is relevant to commercial success, not invention.&amp;quot; (As stated in Anderson v. Pavement) Furthermore, one of the major attributes of the Adams patent is the combination of magnesium and coprous chloride, both of which had previously been reference in earlier patents. The use of magnesium was referenced by Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff, while coprous chloride was refrenced in Wensky, albeit not as an electrode. However, the existence of both of these elements in the art of battery design supports the conclusion that the combination of both of them (even as electrodes, particularly since magnesium was already used as an electrode) would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. This can be seen in KSR v. Teleflex, as it was determined that the combination of the Asano patent with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor would be obvious to a person to a reasonably skilled individual because there was an existing market place for the development of mechanical pedals into eletronic pedals and prior art provided methods to achieve this advance. Thus, both the Adams patent and the Teleflex patent revolved around the combination of an existing design/element (magnesium for Adams, Asano patent for Teleflex) with an existing, yet unrefined design/element (coprous chloride for Adams, pivot mounted pedal for Teleflex). Similar support can be found in Anderson v. Pavement, as placement of a radiant heat burner on a standard paving machine was declared unpatentable because the use of radiant heat was an old technology and the placement of a mechanism would be obvious to a person of reasonable skill in the field. Similarly, the use of coprous chloride as an electrode, rather than as a salt in the electrolyte, as in the Wensky patent, involves the use of the same element in a different portion of the battery, which should be obvious. Both KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. and Anderson Black Rock.v. Pavement Co. can be used to support the obviousness of the Adams patent.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2455</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2455"/>
		<updated>2011-02-05T21:23:02Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== HOMEWORK 1 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 2 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Referenced Patents:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Analysis of Relevant Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Hotchkiss v. Greenwood&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The height adjustable crutch would easily be patentable according to the criteria set forth in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850), as the design instituted required more “skill and ingenuity ….than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic.” Although the cane/crutch allows for the adjustment of height, the newer crutch provides the user with dual levers to raise the height of each crutch, while maintaining the weight bearing support of the device. The “ski crutch” does not even contain a height adjustment feature, as the only real connection between the two designs is the simple premise of manipulating a crutch for various purposes.  While the inventor certainly received inspiration from these previous designs, the improvements made upon the original inventions are significant and by no means “destitute of ingenuity or invention.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the precedent set forth by A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the height adjustable crutch would again be patentable, as it constitutes an invention that is innovative enough to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The design of a crutch that provides the user with the ability to adjust the height through the use of a lever is worthy enough of an invention, as none of the reference patents outline a design that could accomplish the same feat as easily. Furthermore, the height adjustable crutch provides an important service to handicapped individuals, as it is designed specifically for the assistance of an individual attempting to rise from a seated to standing position. Thus, because the new design accomplishes a task that neither of the two previous inventions accomplishes it can be stated that the product upholds the purpose of patents, which is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) addresses the issue of nonobviousness, which stipulates that the change the proposed design is based upon must not be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” The stipulations presented by the nonobviousness clause are more difficult to adhere to for the height adjustable crutch; however, it may still past the test. While it is not unbelievable that an average designer in the field of equipment for disabled individuals could develop an idea for a adjustable crutch that allows the user to rise from a seated to standing position, the combination of developing the concept and instituting the mechanical components is far harder to replicate. Thus, it can be argued that although an average mechanic could have developed the adjustment mechanism utilized in Patent 4252138 and an average crutch designer could have proposed the design idea, the culmination of both the creativity and technology in a single design proposal allows for adherence to the nonobviousness stance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 3 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;U.S. v. Adams&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Litigated Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patent under litigation in U.S. v. Adams is U.S. No. 2,322,210, issued in 1943. The invention is a nonrechargeable electrical battery comprised of two electrodes, one made of magnesium and the other of cuprous chloride, with battery fluid of either plain or salt water. The goal of the aptent was to provide constant voltage without the use of acids or the generation of dangerous fumes. Furthermore, the battery was intended to be relatively light in weight and able to be manufactured and distributed to the trade in a dry condition and rendered serviceable by simply filling the container with water. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Non-Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prior art is based primarily on six patents, including, the Skrivanoff patent, Wensky patent, Codd treatiste, Wood patent, and Niaudet treatise (which consists of the Marie Davy cell adn De La Rue&#039;s subsequent variations). A comparison between the Adams Patent and the prior art reveals that the most significant addition to the battery model made by Adams is the concept of a device that is &amp;quot;water-activated,&amp;quot; as none of the previous patents mention such a design. The use of magnesium is used in several of the previous patents, including  Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff. While coprous chloride is not clearly indicated by any of the patents as a usable electrode, it is referenced by the Wensky patent as a necessary addition (in salt form) to the electrolyte solution. Thus, the Adams patent relies on three major attributes for patent validity, water-activation, coprous chloride (as a electrode), and marketability/commercial success. In Anderson&#039;s Black Rock Inc v. Pavement Co., the distinguishment between commercial success was made, as it was stated that the marketability of the product &amp;quot;is relevant to commercial success, not to invention,&amp;quot; so it can not be used alone to uphold the validity of a patent. Fortunately, the fact that the battery is water activated is enough to separate the Adams invention from the prior art. As none of the previous patents reference this particular attribute, the requirement of novelty is validated. As for nonobviousness, the primary reasons for support can be found in the results produced by the device, as they proved to be both unexpected and far surpassing the then-existing wet batteries. Another important consideration in the conclusion of nonobviousness is the the pre-existing results that would discourage research and subsequent discovery of the conclusions made by Adams. At the time of Adams invention, it is was widely believed that batteries which operate on an open circuit and which heated in normal use were not practial. Also, it had been determined that water-activated batteries were successful only when combined with electrolytes detrimental to the use of magnesium. Thus, it can be concluded that a person with reasonable skill in the art would have been unlikely to ignore these widely accepted conclusions and create the device that Adams created. Further support of nonobviousness can be found in the fact that the Navy expressed disbelief in Adams product at the time of its invention. All of these facts strongly support the conclusion of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A conclusion of obviousness can most easily be realized through the analysis of earlier cases, such as Anderson Black Rock. Pavement Co. and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. As stated in the conclusion for nonobviousness, the marketability and commercial success of the water-activated battery can be nullified in the evaluation of the patent validity, as &amp;quot;that is relevant to commercial success, not invention.&amp;quot; (As stated in Anderson v. Pavement) Furthermore, one of the major attributes of the Adams patent is the combination of magnesium and coprous chloride, both of which had previously been reference in earlier patents. The use of magnesium was referenced by Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff, while coprous chloride was refrenced in Wensky, albeit not as an electrode.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2454</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2454"/>
		<updated>2011-02-05T21:02:26Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== HOMEWORK 1 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 2 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Referenced Patents:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Analysis of Relevant Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Hotchkiss v. Greenwood&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The height adjustable crutch would easily be patentable according to the criteria set forth in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850), as the design instituted required more “skill and ingenuity ….than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic.” Although the cane/crutch allows for the adjustment of height, the newer crutch provides the user with dual levers to raise the height of each crutch, while maintaining the weight bearing support of the device. The “ski crutch” does not even contain a height adjustment feature, as the only real connection between the two designs is the simple premise of manipulating a crutch for various purposes.  While the inventor certainly received inspiration from these previous designs, the improvements made upon the original inventions are significant and by no means “destitute of ingenuity or invention.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the precedent set forth by A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the height adjustable crutch would again be patentable, as it constitutes an invention that is innovative enough to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The design of a crutch that provides the user with the ability to adjust the height through the use of a lever is worthy enough of an invention, as none of the reference patents outline a design that could accomplish the same feat as easily. Furthermore, the height adjustable crutch provides an important service to handicapped individuals, as it is designed specifically for the assistance of an individual attempting to rise from a seated to standing position. Thus, because the new design accomplishes a task that neither of the two previous inventions accomplishes it can be stated that the product upholds the purpose of patents, which is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) addresses the issue of nonobviousness, which stipulates that the change the proposed design is based upon must not be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” The stipulations presented by the nonobviousness clause are more difficult to adhere to for the height adjustable crutch; however, it may still past the test. While it is not unbelievable that an average designer in the field of equipment for disabled individuals could develop an idea for a adjustable crutch that allows the user to rise from a seated to standing position, the combination of developing the concept and instituting the mechanical components is far harder to replicate. Thus, it can be argued that although an average mechanic could have developed the adjustment mechanism utilized in Patent 4252138 and an average crutch designer could have proposed the design idea, the culmination of both the creativity and technology in a single design proposal allows for adherence to the nonobviousness stance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 3 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;U.S. v. Adams&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Litigated Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patent under litigation in U.S. v. Adams is U.S. No. 2,322,210, issued in 1943. The invention is a nonrechargeable electrical battery comprised of two electrodes, one made of magnesium and the other of cuprous chloride, with battery fluid of either plain or salt water. The goal of the aptent was to provide constant voltage without the use of acids or the generation of dangerous fumes. Furthermore, the battery was intended to be relatively light in weight and able to be manufactured and distributed to the trade in a dry condition and rendered serviceable by simply filling the container with water. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Non-Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
The prior art is based primarily on six patents, including, the Skrivanoff patent, Wensky patent, Codd treatiste, Wood patent, and Niaudet treatise (which consists of the Marie Davy cell adn De La Rue&#039;s subsequent variations). A comparison between the Adams Patent and the prior art reveals that the most significant addition to the battery model made by Adams is the concept of a device that is &amp;quot;water-activated,&amp;quot; as none of the previous patents mention such a design. The use of magnesium is used in several of the previous patents, including  Wood, Codd, and Skrivanoff. While coprous chloride is not clearly indicated by any of the patents as a usable electrode, it is referenced by the Wensky patent as a necessary addition (in salt form) to the electrolyte solution. Thus, the Adams patent relies on three major attributes for patent validity, water-activation, coprous chloride (as a electrode), and marketability/commercial success. In Anderson&#039;s Black Rock Inc v. Pavement Co., the distinguishment between commercial success was made, as it was stated that the marketability of the product &amp;quot;is relevant to commercial success, not to invention,&amp;quot; so it can not be used alone to uphold the validity of a patent. Fortunately, the fact that the battery is water activated is enough to separate the Adams invention from the prior art. As none of the previous patents reference this particular attribute, the requirement of novelty is validated. As for nonobviousness, the primary reasons for support can be found in the results produced by the device, as they proved to be both unexpected and far surpassing the then-existing wet batteries. Another important consideration in the conclusion of nonobviousness is the the pre-existing results that would discourage research and subsequent discovery of the conclusions made by Adams. At the time of Adams invention, it is was widely believed that batteries which operate on an open circuit and which heated in normal use were not practial. Also, it had been determined that water-activated batteries were successful only when combined with electrolytes detrimental to the use of magnesium. Thus, it can be concluded that a person with reasonable skill in the art would have been unlikely to ignore these widely accepted conclusions and create the device that Adams created. Further support of nonobviousness can be found in the fact that the Navy expressed disbelief in Adams product at the time of its invention. All of these facts strongly support the conclusion of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion of Obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2442</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=2442"/>
		<updated>2011-02-04T20:42:20Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 1 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOMEWORK 2 ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Referenced Patents:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Analysis of Relevant Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Hotchkiss v. Greenwood&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The height adjustable crutch would easily be patentable according to the criteria set forth in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850), as the design instituted required more “skill and ingenuity ….than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic.” Although the cane/crutch allows for the adjustment of height, the newer crutch provides the user with dual levers to raise the height of each crutch, while maintaining the weight bearing support of the device. The “ski crutch” does not even contain a height adjustment feature, as the only real connection between the two designs is the simple premise of manipulating a crutch for various purposes.  While the inventor certainly received inspiration from these previous designs, the improvements made upon the original inventions are significant and by no means “destitute of ingenuity or invention.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the precedent set forth by A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the height adjustable crutch would again be patentable, as it constitutes an invention that is innovative enough to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The design of a crutch that provides the user with the ability to adjust the height through the use of a lever is worthy enough of an invention, as none of the reference patents outline a design that could accomplish the same feat as easily. Furthermore, the height adjustable crutch provides an important service to handicapped individuals, as it is designed specifically for the assistance of an individual attempting to rise from a seated to standing position. Thus, because the new design accomplishes a task that neither of the two previous inventions accomplishes it can be stated that the product upholds the purpose of patents, which is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) addresses the issue of nonobviousness, which stipulates that the change the proposed design is based upon must not be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” The stipulations presented by the nonobviousness clause are more difficult to adhere to for the height adjustable crutch; however, it may still past the test. While it is not unbelievable that an average designer in the field of equipment for disabled individuals could develop an idea for a adjustable crutch that allows the user to rise from a seated to standing position, the combination of developing the concept and instituting the mechanical components is far harder to replicate. Thus, it can be argued that although an average mechanic could have developed the adjustment mechanism utilized in Patent 4252138 and an average crutch designer could have proposed the design idea, the culmination of both the creativity and technology in a single design proposal allows for adherence to the nonobviousness stance.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=1579</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=1579"/>
		<updated>2011-01-28T08:34:00Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Overview of Referenced Patents:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Analysis of Relevant Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Hotchkiss v. Greenwood&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The height adjustable crutch would easily be patentable according to the criteria set forth in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850), as the design instituted required more “skill and ingenuity ….than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic.” Although the cane/crutch allows for the adjustment of height, the newer crutch provides the user with dual levers to raise the height of each crutch, while maintaining the weight bearing support of the device. The “ski crutch” does not even contain a height adjustment feature, as the only real connection between the two designs is the simple premise of manipulating a crutch for various purposes.  While the inventor certainly received inspiration from these previous designs, the improvements made upon the original inventions are significant and by no means “destitute of ingenuity or invention.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the precedent set forth by A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., the height adjustable crutch would again be patentable, as it constitutes an invention that is innovative enough to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The design of a crutch that provides the user with the ability to adjust the height through the use of a lever is worthy enough of an invention, as none of the reference patents outline a design that could accomplish the same feat as easily. Furthermore, the height adjustable crutch provides an important service to handicapped individuals, as it is designed specifically for the assistance of an individual attempting to rise from a seated to standing position. Thus, because the new design accomplishes a task that neither of the two previous inventions accomplishes it can be stated that the product upholds the purpose of patents, which is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) addresses the issue of nonobviousness, which stipulates that the change the proposed design is based upon must not be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” The stipulations presented by the nonobviousness clause are more difficult to adhere to for the height adjustable crutch; however, it may still past the test. While it is not unbelievable that an average designer in the field of equipment for disabled individuals could develop an idea for a adjustable crutch that allows the user to rise from a seated to standing position, the combination of developing the concept and instituting the mechanical components is far harder to replicate. Thus, it can be argued that although an average mechanic could have developed the adjustment mechanism utilized in Patent 4252138 and an average crutch designer could have proposed the design idea, the culmination of both the creativity and technology in a single design proposal allows for adherence to the nonobviousness stance.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=1578</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=1578"/>
		<updated>2011-01-28T08:32:25Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Overview of Referenced Patents:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 3738674&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most recent reference cited by Patent 4252138, the height adjustable crutch, was Patent 3738674, the “ski equipped crutch,” which describes an invention predicated on the design of an instrument that can be utilized as both a ski/ski pole and a crutch. The patent for the “ski crutch” highlights the ability of the ski portion of the instrument to fold up and essentially form a regular shaped forearm crutch. Also included in the design outline is the presence of a slip-resistant member to prevent slippage in snowy conditions and a claw like appendage that can be employed as a brake when the “ski crutch” is used for downhill skiing. Like the height-adjustable crutch, the “ski crutch” is aimed at not only facilitating the typical motion of a handicapped individual, but also assisting the individual in situations where a typical crutch cannot provide such help. The focus of this design on the ability to manipulate the crutch to fit two specific purposes is the most crucial element. While Patent 4252138 has no ski attachment or brake mechanism, it utilizes the same concept of adjusting the shape and size of the crutch for two specific scenarios: standing and sitting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Patent 2960095&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another patent referenced is Patent 2960095, which describes a walking cane that can easily be converted into a crutch. Using sliding and revolute joints, the handle of the walking stick can be converted into the arm rest for the crutch and the height of the support device can be adjusted to meet the needs of the user. The major connection between this patent and the height adjustable crutch is the ability of the crutch to be easily adjusted, specifically the overall height of the instrument. The way in which the crutch is adjusted though is different for each design, as the walking cane/crutch has to be adjusted near the center of the cane by the user, an action that cannot be done easily while maintaining one’s balance. The more recent design allows for adjustment of the crutch height through the manual operation of a lever, which allows for the handicapped individual to rise from a seated to standing position. Both designs however maintain the same shape (only reduced or increased in length) during the adjustment process.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=1577</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=1577"/>
		<updated>2011-01-28T08:31:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Regarding Cases:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=1576</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=1576"/>
		<updated>2011-01-28T08:30:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Evaluation of Patent with regard to Cases:&lt;br /&gt;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwod, A&amp;amp;P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon vs. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=992</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=992"/>
		<updated>2011-01-24T05:46:06Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=991</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=991"/>
		<updated>2011-01-24T05:45:54Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138: Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
Date Issued: February 24, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=989</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=989"/>
		<updated>2011-01-24T05:43:57Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138 - Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=988</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=988"/>
		<updated>2011-01-24T05:43:47Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chosen Invention&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
Patent 4252138 - Adjustable Crutch for Raising From Seated to Standing Position&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foundation of the invention is a crutch with a length that can be manually adjusted through the use of a lever. The user reduces the height of both crutches to a minimum while in a seated position and then places his weight upon both crutches. In order to raise to a standing position, the user alternately shifts his weight from one crutch to the other, while operating the lever on the crutch that is not supporting any weight. By operating the lever of the non supportive crutch, the user can increase the length iteratively until both crutches are at the proper height for standing position.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=985</id>
		<title>NONOBVIOUSNESS Carter</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=NONOBVIOUSNESS_Carter&amp;diff=985"/>
		<updated>2011-01-24T05:34:02Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Dcarter2: Created page with &amp;quot;Patent 4252138 - Adjustable Crutch for raising from seated to standing position&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Patent 4252138 - Adjustable Crutch for raising from seated to standing position&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Dcarter2</name></author>
	</entry>
</feed>