Bill Goodwine's Wiki - User contributions [en]

Quanta Brief: In support of Federal Circuit Ruling (eguilbea)

2011-04-29T15:15:57Z

Eguilbea:

Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Affirmance of the Federal Circuit

* Preserve the distinction between sales and licensing.
** Sales implicate patent exhaustion, licenses do not.
* Rule of patent exhaustion traps unwary sellers, making it more difficult for them to negotiate desirable terms.
* Exhaustion is the default rule, but it should not be an immutable rule
* Market should be allowed to self-regulate and negotiate around patent exhaustion by agreement.
* Petitioner argues that F.C. ruling violates antitrust laws. However, the whole point of patents are to provide a monopoly
* F.C. ruling has following desirable effects:
** It allows parties to bargain around patent exhaustion, respecting their preferences
** Allows parties to negotiate prices for intellectual property rights
** It allows parties to negotiate prices that reflect value of the specific application of the product
* F.C. ruling is consistent with past Supreme Court rulings that held a patentee can grant limited licenses
* The court’s opinion in Univis is not directly applicable because Univis involved an attempt to control prices unrelated to the patentee’s reward, while Quanta involves a company granting less than full rights in a license.
* The court has also changed its view on resale price maintenance since Univis. This is to encourage non-price competition.
* Petitioner argues that Congress reenacted the patent laws but did not modify the court’s patent exhaustion doctrine.
** All parties agree that patentees can get around strict patent exhaustion by skillful drafting of licenses. Since there’s no explicit prohibition of it, it should be understood that the rule can be drafted around.

Here in list of arguments in Quanta

2011-04-29T15:14:47Z

Eguilbea:

Post a link to your summary of the brief you read here.

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901330223]]

[[901349446 Quanta Brief]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901471466]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901422128]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary Jacob Marmolejo]]

[[Homework 8 (due Friday 28)~jnosal | Quanta Brief Summary 901438174]]

[[Mitros: Quanta Brief]]

[[Zahm Homework 31: Quanta Brief]]

[[901419437 Quanta v. LGE Brief Summary]]

[[Quanta Brief 901437068]]

[[901281608: Quanta Brief]]

[[901444263: Quanta v. LGE Reply Brief of Petitioners]]

[[901479977: Quanta for Petitioners]]

[[Apr. 29th: Brief Summary (2007 WL 3440937) - Andrew McBride]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901360293]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901431048]]

[[Quanta Brief Brobins]]

[[Quanta Brief hwong1]]

[[Quanta Brief: Tennant]]

[[Quanta Brief (John Gallagher)]]

[[Quanta brief - 901338276]]

[[Brief of Amici Curiae for Respondent - Eric Leis]]

[[Quanta Brief - Kschlax]]

[[Quanta Brief - Christine Roetzel]]

[[Quanta Brief: In support of Federal Circuit Ruling (eguilbea)]]

Quanta Brief: In support of Federal Circuit Ruling (eguilbea)

2011-04-29T15:13:59Z

Eguilbea: Created page with "* Preserve the distinction between sales and licensing. ** Sales implicate patent exhaustion, licenses do not. * Rule of patent exhaustion traps unwary sellers, making it more ..."

* Preserve the distinction between sales and licensing.
** Sales implicate patent exhaustion, licenses do not.
* Rule of patent exhaustion traps unwary sellers, making it more difficult for them to negotiate desirable terms.
* Exhaustion is the default rule, but it should not be an immutable rule
* Market should be allowed to self-regulate and negotiate around patent exhaustion by agreement.
* Petitioner argues that F.C. ruling violates antitrust laws. However, the whole point of patents are to provide a monopoly
* F.C. ruling has following desirable effects:
** It allows parties to bargain around patent exhaustion, respecting their preferences
** Allows parties to negotiate prices for intellectual property rights
** It allows parties to negotiate prices that reflect value of the specific application of the product
* F.C. ruling is consistent with past Supreme Court rulings that held a patentee can grant limited licenses
* The court’s opinion in Univis is not directly applicable because Univis involved an attempt to control prices unrelated to the patentee’s reward, while Quanta involves a company granting less than full rights in a license.
* The court has also changed its view on resale price maintenance since Univis. This is to encourage non-price competition.
* Petitioner argues that Congress reenacted the patent laws but did not modify the court’s patent exhaustion doctrine.
** All parties agree that patentees can get around strict patent exhaustion by skillful drafting of licenses. Since there’s no explicit prohibition of it, it should be understood that the rule can be drafted around.

User:Eguilbea

2011-04-29T15:13:26Z

Eguilbea:

[[My Selected US Patent, homework for January 24, 2011]]

[[Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon, homework for January 28,2011]]

[[Graham v. John Deere: Analysis concluding obviousness/nonobviousness, homework for 2/4/2011]]

[[Nonobviousness, homework for 2/8/2011]]

[[Quanta Brief: In support of Federal Circuit Ruling (eguilbea)]]

ESB Briefs

2011-03-04T04:47:36Z

Eguilbea:

Here is a list of briefs for the Electric Storage Battery Co v. Shimadzu case. Add your name next to the list for the one with the fewest names and read that one.
* Reply Brief for Respondents. (Feb. 27, 1939)
#Michael Madden
#Hwong1
#croetzel
#kroshak
#Adam Mahood
#Michael Ackroyd
#Sam Karch
#Kyle Tennant
#
#
* Reply Brief for Petitioner. (Feb. 7, 1939)
#Cmadiga1
#90144463
#901422128
#jpotter2
#ewolz
#E W Hitchler
#Davin Sakamoto
#Kevin Godshall
#
#
* Brief for Respondents (Jan. 28, 1939)
#LMiller
#Josh Bradley
#Brobins
#Ebingle
#kyergler
#BCastel1
#Eric Leis
#Eddie Guilbeau
#
#
* Brief for Petitioner. (Jan. 1939)
#Kschlax
#Andy Stulc
#Mzahm
#Rabot
#Peter Mitros
#Jacob Marmolejo
#Greg Torrisi
#Kevin Dacey
#
#

Bilski brief list

2011-02-14T01:07:36Z

Eguilbea:

Choose one of the briefs from this list. Delete it and replace it with your login name. Please be careful editing this page. If you mess up all the formatting it will create work for your colleagues.

#Reply Brief for Petitioners (Oct. 26, 2009)
#jpotter2
#Adam T. Letcher
#Craigkrzyskowski
#dcarter2
#ebingle
#Rabot
#Eric Paul
#Brief of Amici Curiae American Insurance Association, the Hartford Financial Services, Jackson National Life Insurance Company, Pacific Life Insurance Company, Sun Life Assurance Company Of Canada (U.S.), and Transamerica Life Insurance Company in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Brief For Amicus Curiae Computer & Communications Industry Association in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Software & Information Industry Association (SIIA) as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Amici Curiae Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, IP Justice, and Four Global Software Professionals and Business Leaders in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Brief for Free Software Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#eguilbea
#Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Peter S. Menell and Michael J. Meurer In Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Entrepreneurial and Consumer Advocates Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of the Respondent, Submitted on Behalf of Adamas Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Tethys Bioscience, Inc. (Oct. 2, 2009)
#KyleR
#Andy Stulc
#Brief for Amicus Curiae Mark Landesmann in Support of Affirmance (Oct. 2, 2009)
#Amicus Curiae Brief of Center for Advanced Study and Research in Intellectual Property (CASRIP) of the University of Washington School of Law, and of CASRIP Research Affiliate Scholars, in Support of Affirmance of the Judgment in Favor of Respondent (Oct. 1, 2009)
#Kevin Godshall
#Amici Curiae Brief of Internet Retailers in Support of Respondent (Oct. 1, 2009)
#Brief for the Respondent (Sep. 25, 2009)
#Brief of the Intellectual Property Section of the Nevada State Bar, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Sep. 25, 2009)
#Brobins
#Josh Bradley
#Brief of Amici Curiae Entrepreneurial Software Companies in Support of Petitioner (Aug. 6, 2009)
#E W Hitchler
#Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amici Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization, Advanced Medical Technology Association, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation & The Regents of the University of California in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Mzahm
#Brief of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Hamburgler
#Brief of F%21ed%21eration Internationale Des Conseils En Propri%21et%21e Industrielle as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professor Kevin Emerson Collins in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Legal OnRamp in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae John Sutton in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Novartis Corporation Supporting Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief Amicus Curiae of The Federal Circuit Bar Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Regulatory Datacorp, Inc, American Express Company, Palm Inc., Rockwell Automation, Inc., and SAP America, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Double Rock Corporation, Island Intellectual Property LLC, LIDs Capital LLC, Intrasweep LLC, Access Control Advantage, Inc., Ecomp Consultants, Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, Rearden Capital Corporation, Craig Mowry and PCT Capital LLC as Ami ci Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#901422128
#Brief of Amicus Curiae The Houston Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Franklin Pierce Law Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#LMiller
#Brief of TELES AG as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae San Diego Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party on the Merits (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Brief of Robert R. Sachs and Daniel R. Brownstone as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009)
#CRoetzel
#Brief of Amicus Curiae AwakenIP, LLC in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#Pmitros
#Brief of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009)
#901479977
#Brief for Prometheus Laboratories Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief for the Business Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioner (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Bobby Powers
#Brief of Amici Curiae Association Internationale Pour la Protection de la Propriete Intellectuelle and International Association For The Protection Of Intellectual Property (U.S.) in Support of Reversal (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Caris Diagnostics, Inc. in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Monogram Biosciences, Inc. and Genomic Health, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Raymond C. Meiers in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009)
#Xiao Dong
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Conejo Valley Bar Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 3, 2009)
#Brief For Petitioners (Jul. 30, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Telecommunication Systems, Inc. in Support of Neither Party and for Purely Prospective Application of Any Adoption of the New Legal Test Applied Below (Jul. 24, 2009)
#Brief for the State of Oregon as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Jul. 24, 2009)
#ewolz
#kristen kemnetz
#Brief for the Respondent in Opposition (May 1, 2009)
#Brief of Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Accenture and Pitney Bowes Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief Amicus Curiae of Franklin Pierce Law Center in Support of Certiorari (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Amica Curiae Anne E. Barschall, Pro Se in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (Mar. 2, 2009)
#Jmarmole
#Brief of John P. Sutton Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners (Feb. 25, 2009)

Nonobviousness, homework for 2/8/2011

2011-02-11T05:16:32Z

Eguilbea: /* The Formation of the Current Standard for Nonobviousness */

NOTE: This is the new section that I added. I drew the material from the provided nonobviousness page, the documents mentioned below, and my own class notes.

==The Formation of the Current Standard for Nonobviousness==

Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 states: “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” The nonobviousness requirement for patentability as outlined in section 103 is somewhat vague when considered in judicial settings. There has been extensive discussion in the Circuit Courts and in the U.S. Supreme Court that has set precedents for the nonobviousness requirement. This discussion has covered such matters as material substitutions, combinations of old elements in new inventions, changing standards of patentability, the definition of “ordinary skill in the art”, and the relevance of prior art to new inventions. While the Supreme Court tends to avoid producing simplified rules and checklists for patentability and tends favors more expansive and flexible rulings, the discussions in the Courts have set a standard for the nonobviousness requirement in patentability.

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision on Hotchkiss v. Greenwood in 1850 was the first major decision to establish the requirement of nonobviousness for an invention to be patentable. Under consideration in the case was the validity of a patent for a particular type of doorknob. The court determined that the only thing new about the doorknob was the substitution of clay in the place of wood or metal as the material for the knob. The court held that such a simple material substution, even if more effective than other materials, could never be the subject of a patent. The court determined that since there was “no more ingenuity or skill required to construct the knob in this way than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, the patent was invalid.”

In the decision on A & P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment in 1950, the Supreme Court outlines standards for inventions consisting of a combination of known elements. The court stated that in order to be patentable, an invention that combines previously known elements must perform some function additional or different than the elements could perform separately. According to the court, the fact that the invention outlined in the patent fulfilled a long-felt want did not in itself make the invention patentable. For these reasons, the court struck down the sliding grocery store rack patent under consideration in A & P.

In sustaining a patent under consideration in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, in 1955, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged the changing standards of patentability. The Court ruled that Lyon’s added step to a process for coating lenses was patentable because it was not "obvious […] to a person having ordinary skill in the art". The most competent workers in the field had been working for ten years to find a process as effective as Lyon’s, and once it was invented, it took control of the field. The Court cited the nonobviousness language in the Patent Act of 1952 as the foundation for its decision, and it acknowledged that if the case had been reviewed in the 20 years before the Act, the patent would have been declared invalid. This decision signaled a shift away from a standard level of inventiveness to a standard of nonobviousness.

In Graham v. John Deere, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 at length, emphasizing the shift from “inventiveness” to “nonobviousness”. The Court determined patentability in the case by determining the level of skill necessary to bridge the gap between prior art and the patent under consideration. The Court found no nonobvious distinctions or mechanical differences between the prior art and the patent under considerations, and thus declared the patent to be invalid.

In U.S. v. Adams, the Supreme Court ruled that Adams’ battery patent was nonobvious and valid, confirming that small changes resulting in large consequences are relevant in patent consideration. The Court ruled that since the prior art would have discouraged Adams’ combination, and since experts who initially disbelieved the success of Adams’ combination later recognized its usefulness, the combination was not obvious, and the patent was valid.

In the cases of Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co. and KSR v. Teleflex, the Court ruled that the combinations of known elements led to no unexpected or different result.
The Supreme Court thus declared that, since the patents under consideration would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art, they were invalid. Neither patent showed a new synergy using the combination of known elements—each element perform together as it would have separately.

In summary, the standards of patentability have changed over the years, and there has been some inconsistency in applying the test of “inventiveness” versus the test of statutory nonobviousness. However, court rulings and legislation have laid a broad foundation for the conditions of nonobviousness. The chief test for nonobviousness was originally laid out Hotchkiss and later codified in the Patent Act of 1952: “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art […]would have been obvious […] to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” A. & P. established that, in order not to be obvious, combinations of previously known elements must show some additional or different function than the elements could perform separately. The decision delivered in Adams, however, clarified that even small changes can result in large consequences that may not be obvious. A. & P. also established that the invention outlined in the patent fulfilled a long-felt want did not in itself make the invention patentable. The decision in Lyon, acknowledging that it would not have been ruled the same in previous years, stated that though Lyon’s change was simple, it was not obvious, since experts had been looking for a solution to the problem that Lyon’s process solved.

Nonobviousness, homework for 2/8/2011

2011-02-11T05:13:34Z

Eguilbea:

==The Formation of the Current Standard for Nonobviousness==

Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 states: “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” The nonobviousness requirement for patentability as outlined in section 103 is somewhat vague when considered in judicial settings. There has been extensive discussion in the Circuit Courts and in the U.S. Supreme Court that has set precedents for the nonobviousness requirement. This discussion has covered such matters as material substitutions, combinations of old elements in new inventions, changing standards of patentability, the definition of “ordinary skill in the art”, and the relevance of prior art to new inventions. While the Supreme Court tends to avoid producing simplified rules and checklists for patentability and tends favors more expansive and flexible rulings, the discussions in the Courts have set a standard for the nonobviousness requirement in patentability.

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision on Hotchkiss v. Greenwood in 1850 was the first major decision to establish the requirement of nonobviousness for an invention to be patentable. Under consideration in the case was the validity of a patent for a particular type of doorknob. The court determined that the only thing new about the doorknob was the substitution of clay in the place of wood or metal as the material for the knob. The court held that such a simple material substution, even if more effective than other materials, could never be the subject of a patent. The court determined that since there was “no more ingenuity or skill required to construct the knob in this way than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, the patent was invalid.”

In the decision on A & P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment in 1950, the Supreme Court outlines standards for inventions consisting of a combination of known elements. The court stated that in order to be patentable, an invention that combines previously known elements must perform some function additional or different than the elements could perform separately. According to the court, the fact that the invention outlined in the patent fulfilled a long-felt want did not in itself make the invention patentable. For these reasons, the court struck down the sliding grocery store rack patent under consideration in A & P.

In sustaining a patent under consideration in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, in 1955, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged the changing standards of patentability. The Court ruled that Lyon’s added step to a process for coating lenses was patentable because it was not "obvious […] to a person having ordinary skill in the art". The most competent workers in the field had been working for ten years to find a process as effective as Lyon’s, and once it was invented, it took control of the field. The Court cited the nonobviousness language in the Patent Act of 1952 as the foundation for its decision, and it acknowledged that if the case had been reviewed in the 20 years before the Act, the patent would have been declared invalid. This decision signaled a shift away from a standard level of inventiveness to a standard of nonobviousness.

In Graham v. John Deere, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 at length, emphasizing the shift from “inventiveness” to “nonobviousness”. The Court determined patentability in the case by determining the level of skill necessary to bridge the gap between prior art and the patent under consideration. The Court found no nonobvious distinctions or mechanical differences between the prior art and the patent under considerations, and thus declared the patent to be invalid.

In U.S. v. Adams, the Supreme Court ruled that Adams’ battery patent was nonobvious and valid, confirming that small changes resulting in large consequences are relevant in patent consideration. The Court ruled that since the prior art would have discouraged Adams’ combination, and since experts who initially disbelieved the success of Adams’ combination later recognized its usefulness, the combination was not obvious, and the patent was valid.

In the cases of Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co. and KSR v. Teleflex, the Court ruled that the combinations of known elements led to no unexpected or different result.
The Supreme Court thus declared that, since the patents under consideration would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art, they were invalid. Neither patent showed a new synergy using the combination of known elements—each element perform together as it would have separately.

In summary, the standards of patentability have changed over the years, and there has been some inconsistency in applying the test of “inventiveness” versus the test of statutory nonobviousness. However, court rulings and legislation have laid a broad foundation for the conditions of nonobviousness. The chief test for nonobviousness was originally laid out Hotchkiss and later codified in the Patent Act of 1952: “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art […]would have been obvious […] to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” A. & P. established that, in order not to be obvious, combinations of previously known elements must show some additional or different function than the elements could perform separately. The decision delivered in Adams, however, clarified that even small changes can result in large consequences that may not be obvious. A. & P. also established that the invention outlined in the patent fulfilled a long-felt want did not in itself make the invention patentable. The decision in Lyon, acknowledging that it would not have been ruled the same in previous years, stated that though Lyon’s change was simple, it was not obvious, since experts had been looking for a solution to the problem that Lyon’s process solved.

Nonobviousness, homework for 2/8/2011

2011-02-11T05:09:17Z

Eguilbea: /* The Current Standard of Nonobviousness */

==Historical Development==
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.

===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===

Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.

:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.

:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.

:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.

:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.

:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.

:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.

===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===

While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention.
*First the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.

===35 USC 103 (1952)===
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.

===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===

In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4

===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===

In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include
* scope and content of the prior art;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,
* secondary considerations, including:
** commercial success of the invention;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.

===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===

* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.

===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.

==Suggestion to Combine==
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.

:"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."
:"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.

==Objective Tests==
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.
*This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.

==The Inventive Step==

==Relationship with Novelty==
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==
==Secondary Considerations==
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==

[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]

[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]

[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]

[[South Corp. v. US]]

==The Current Standard of Nonobviousness==

Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 states: “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” The nonobviousness requirement for patentability as outlined in section 103 is somewhat vague when considered in judicial settings. There has been extensive discussion in the Circuit Courts and in the U.S. Supreme Court that has set precedents for the nonobviousness requirement. This discussion has covered such matters as material substitutions, combinations of old elements in new inventions, changing standards of patentability, the definition of “ordinary skill in the art”, and the relevance of prior art to new inventions. While the Supreme Court tends to avoid producing simplified rules and checklists for patentability and tends favors more expansive and flexible rulings, the discussions in the Courts have set a standard for the nonobviousness requirement in patentability.

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision on Hotchkiss v. Greenwood in 1850 was the first major decision to establish the requirement of nonobviousness for an invention to be patentable. Under consideration in the case was the validity of a patent for a particular type of doorknob. The court determined that the only thing new about the doorknob was the substitution of clay in the place of wood or metal as the material for the knob. The court held that such a simple material substution, even if more effective than other materials, could never be the subject of a patent. The court determined that since there was “no more ingenuity or skill required to construct the knob in this way than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, the patent was invalid.”

In the decision on A & P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment in 1950, the Supreme Court outlines standards for inventions consisting of a combination of known elements. The court stated that in order to be patentable, an invention that combines previously known elements must perform some function additional or different than the elements could perform separately. According to the court, the fact that the invention outlined in the patent fulfilled a long-felt want did not in itself make the invention patentable. For these reasons, the court struck down the sliding grocery store rack patent under consideration in A & P.

In sustaining a patent under consideration in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, in 1955, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged the changing standards of patentability. The Court ruled that Lyon’s added step to a process for coating lenses was patentable because it was not "obvious […] to a person having ordinary skill in the art". The most competent workers in the field had been working for ten years to find a process as effective as Lyon’s, and once it was invented, it took control of the field. The Court cited the nonobviousness language in the Patent Act of 1952 as the foundation for its decision, and it acknowledged that if the case had been reviewed in the 20 years before the Act, the patent would have been declared invalid. This decision signaled a shift away from a standard level of inventiveness to a standard of nonobviousness.

In Graham v. John Deere, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 at length, emphasizing the shift from “inventiveness” to “nonobviousness”. The Court determined patentability in the case by determining the level of skill necessary to bridge the gap between prior art and the patent under consideration. The Court found no nonobvious distinctions or mechanical differences between the prior art and the patent under considerations, and thus declared the patent to be invalid.

In U.S. v. Adams, the Supreme Court ruled that Adams’ battery patent was nonobvious and valid, confirming that small changes resulting in large consequences are relevant in patent consideration. The Court ruled that since the prior art would have discouraged Adams’ combination, and since experts who initially disbelieved the success of Adams’ combination later recognized its usefulness, the combination was not obvious, and the patent was valid.

In the cases of Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co. and KSR v. Teleflex, the Court ruled that the combinations of known elements led to no unexpected or different result.
The Supreme Court thus declared that, since the patents under consideration would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art, they were invalid. Neither patent showed a new synergy using the combination of known elements—each element perform together as it would have separately.

In summary, the standards of patentability have changed over the years, and there has been some inconsistency in applying the test of “inventiveness” versus the test of statutory nonobviousness. However, court rulings and legislation have laid a broad foundation for the conditions of nonobviousness. The chief test for nonobviousness was originally laid out Hotchkiss and later codified in the Patent Act of 1952: “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art […]would have been obvious […] to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” A. & P. established that, in order not to be obvious, combinations of previously known elements must show some additional or different function than the elements could perform separately. The decision delivered in Adams, however, clarified that even small changes can result in large consequences that may not be obvious. A. & P. also established that the invention outlined in the patent fulfilled a long-felt want did not in itself make the invention patentable. The decision in Lyon, acknowledging that it would not have been ruled the same in previous years, stated that though Lyon’s change was simple, it was not obvious, since experts had been looking for a solution to the problem that Lyon’s process solved.

Nonobviousness, homework for 2/8/2011

2011-02-11T05:07:34Z

Eguilbea: /* The Current Standard of Nonobviousness */

==Historical Development==
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.

===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===

Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.

:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.

:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.

:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.

:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.

:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.

:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.

===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===

While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention.
*First the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.

===35 USC 103 (1952)===
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.

===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===

In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4

===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===

In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include
* scope and content of the prior art;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,
* secondary considerations, including:
** commercial success of the invention;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.

===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===

* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.

===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.

==Suggestion to Combine==
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.

:"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."
:"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.

==Objective Tests==
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.
*This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.

==The Inventive Step==

==Relationship with Novelty==
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==
==Secondary Considerations==
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==

[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]

[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]

[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]

[[South Corp. v. US]]

==The Current Standard of Nonobviousness==

Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 states: “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” The nonobviousness requirement for patentability as outlined in section 103 is quite vague when considered in judicial settings. There has been extensive discussion in the Circuit Courts and in the U.S. Supreme Court that has set precedents for the nonobviousness requirement. This discussion has covered such matters as material substitutions, combinations of old elements in new inventions, changing standards of patentability, the definition of “ordinary skill in the art”, and the relevance of prior art to new inventions. While the Supreme Court tends to avoid producing simplified rules and checklists for patentability and tends favors more expansive and flexible rulings, the discussions in the Courts have set a standard for the nonobviousness requirement in patentability.

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision on Hotchkiss v. Greenwood in 1850 was the first major decision to establish the requirement of nonobviousness for an invention to be patentable. Under consideration in the case was the validity of a patent for a particular type of doorknob. The court determined that the only thing new about the doorknob was the substitution of clay in the place of wood or metal as the material for the knob. The court held that such a simple material substution, even if more effective than other materials, could never be the subject of a patent. The court determined that since there was “no more ingenuity or skill required to construct the knob in this way than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, the patent was invalid.”

In the decision on A & P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment in 1950, the Supreme Court outlines standards for inventions consisting of a combination of known elements. The court stated that in order to be patentable, an invention that combines previously known elements must perform some function additional or different than the elements could perform separately. According to the court, the fact that the invention outlined in the patent fulfilled a long-felt want did not in itself make the invention patentable. For these reasons, the court struck down the sliding grocery store rack patent under consideration in A & P.

In sustaining a patent under consideration in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, in 1955, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged the changing standards of patentability. The Court ruled that Lyon’s added step to a process for coating lenses was patentable subject because it was not "obvious […] to a person having ordinary skill in the art". The most competent workers in the field had been working for ten years to find a process as effective as Lyon’s, and once it was invented, it took control of the field. The Court cited the nonobviousness language in the Patent Act of 1952 as the foundation for its decision, and it acknowledged that if the case had been reviewed in the 20 years before the Act, the patent would have been declared invalid. This decision signaled a shift away from a standard level of inventiveness to a standard of nonobviousness.

In Graham v. John Deere, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 at length, emphasizing the shift from “inventiveness” to “nonobviousness”. The Court determined patentability in the case by determining the level of skill necessary to bridge the gap between prior art and the patent under consideration. The Court found no nonobvious distinctions or mechanical differences between the prior art and the patent under considerations, and thus declared the patent to be invalid.

In U.S. v. Adams, the Supreme Court ruled that Adams’ battery patent was nonobvious and valid, confirming that small changes resulting in large consequences are relevant in patent consideration. The Court ruled that since the prior art would have discouraged Adams’ combination, and since experts who initially disbelieved the success of Adams’ combination later recognized its usefulness, the combination was not obvious, and the patent was valid.

In the cases of Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co. and KSR v. Teleflex, the Court ruled that the combinations of known elements led to no unexpected or different result.
The Supreme Court thus declared that, since the patents under consideration would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art, they were invalid. Neither patent showed a new synergy using the combination of known elements—each element perform together as it would have separately.

In summary, the standards of patentability have changed over the years, and there has been some inconsistency in applying the test of “inventiveness” versus the test of statutory nonobviousness. However, court rulings and legislation have laid a broad foundation for the conditions of nonobviousness. The chief test for nonobviousness was originally laid out Hotchkiss and later codified in the Patent Act of 1952: “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art […]would have been obvious […] to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” A. & P. established that, in order not to be obvious, combinations of previously known elements must show some additional or different function than the elements could perform separately. The decision delivered in Adams, however, clarified that even small changes can result in large consequences that may not be obvious. A. & P. also established that the invention outlined in the patent fulfilled a long-felt want did not in itself make the invention patentable. The decision in Lyon, acknowledging that it would not have been ruled the same in previous years, stated that though Lyon’s change was simple, it was not obvious, since experts had been looking for a solution to the problem that Lyon’s process solved.

Nonobviousness, homework for 2/8/2011

2011-02-11T04:25:10Z

Eguilbea: /* The Current Standard of Nonobviousness */

==Historical Development==
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.

===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===

Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.

:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.

:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.

:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.

:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.

:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.

:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.

===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===

While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention.
*First the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.

===35 USC 103 (1952)===
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.

===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===

In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4

===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===

In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include
* scope and content of the prior art;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,
* secondary considerations, including:
** commercial success of the invention;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.

===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===

* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.

===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.

==Suggestion to Combine==
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.

:"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."
:"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.

==Objective Tests==
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.
*This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.

==The Inventive Step==

==Relationship with Novelty==
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==
==Secondary Considerations==
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==

[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]

[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]

[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]

[[South Corp. v. US]]

==The Current Standard of Nonobviousness==

Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 states: “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” The nonobviousness requirement for patentability as outlined in section 103 is quite vague when considered in judicial settings. There has been extensive discussion in the Circuit Courts and in the U.S. Supreme Court that has set precedents for the nonobviousness requirement. This discussion has covered such matters as material substitutions, combinations of old elements in new inventions, changing standards of patentability, the definition of “ordinary skill in the art”, and the relevance of prior art to new inventions. While the Supreme Court tends to avoid producing simplified rules and checklists for patentability and tends favors more expansive and flexible rulings, the discussions in the Courts have set a standard for the nonobviousness requirement in patentability.

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision on Hotchkiss v. Greenwood in 1850 was the first major decision to establish the requirement of nonobviousness for an invention to be patentable. Under consideration in the case was the validity of a patent for a particular type of doorknob. The court determined that the only thing new about the doorknob was the substitution of clay in the place of wood or metal as the material for the knob. The court held that such a simple material substution, even if more effective than other materials, could never be the subject of a patent. The court determined that since there was “no more ingenuity or skill required to construct the knob in this way than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, the patent was invalid.”

In the decision on A & P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment in 1950, the Supreme Court outlines standards for inventions consisting of a combination of known elements. The court stated that in order to be patentable, an invention that combines previously known elements must perform some function additional or different than the elements could perform separately. According to the court, the fact that the invention outlined in the patent fulfilled a long-felt want did not in itself make the invention patentable. For these reasons, the court struck down the sliding grocery store rack patent under consideration in A & P.

In sustaining a patent under consideration in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, in 1955, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged the changing standards of patentability. The Court ruled that Lyon’s added step to a process for coating lenses was patentable subject because it was not "obvious […]to a person having ordinary skill in the art". The most competent workers in the field had been working for ten years to find a process as effective as Lyon’s, and once it was invented, it took control of the field. The Court cited the nonobviousness language in the Patent Act of 1952 as the foundation for its decision, and it acknowledged that if the case had been reviewed in the 20 years before the Act, the patent would have been declared invalid. This decision signaled a shift away from a standard level of inventiveness to a standard of nonobviousness.

In Graham v. John Deere, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 at length, emphasizing the shift from “inventiveness” to “nonobviousness”. The Court determined patentability in the case by determining the level of skill necessary to bridge the gap between prior art and the patent under consideration. The Court found no nonobvious distinctions or mechanical differences between the prior art and the patent under considerations, and thus declared the patent to be invalid.

In U.S. v. Adams, the Supreme Court ruled that Adams’ battery patent was nonobvious and valid, confirming that small changes resulting in large consequences are relevant in patent consideration. The Court ruled that since the prior art would have discouraged Adams’ combination, and since experts who initially disbelieved the success of Adams’ combination later recognized its usefulness, the combination was not obvious, and the patent was valid.

In the cases of Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co. and KSR v. Teleflex.

-------
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution states simply that Congress shall have the power “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” The Patent Act of 1790 establishes the subject matter to be considered for patents: "any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement thereon not before known or used." This wording establishes a requirement of novelty and utility in order for an invention to be eligible for a patent.

Nonobviousness, homework for 2/8/2011

2011-02-11T03:09:50Z

Eguilbea: /* The Current Standard of Nonobviousness */

==Historical Development==
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.

===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===

Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.

:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.

:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.

:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.

:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.

:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.

:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.

===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===

While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention.
*First the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.

===35 USC 103 (1952)===
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.

===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===

In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4

===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===

In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include
* scope and content of the prior art;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,
* secondary considerations, including:
** commercial success of the invention;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.

===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===

* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.

===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.

==Suggestion to Combine==
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.

:"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."
:"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.

==Objective Tests==
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.
*This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.

==The Inventive Step==

==Relationship with Novelty==
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==
==Secondary Considerations==
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==

[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]

[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]

[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]

[[South Corp. v. US]]

==The Current Standard of Nonobviousness==

Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 states: “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” The nonobviousness requirement for patentability as outlined in section 103 is quite vague when considered in judicial settings. There has been extensive discussion in the Circuit Courts and in the U.S. Supreme Court that has set precedents for the nonobviousness requirement. This discussion has covered such matters as material substitutions, combinations of old elements in new inventions, changing standards of patentability, the definition of “ordinary skill in the art”, and the relevance of prior art to new inventions. While the Supreme Court tends to avoid producing simplified rules and checklists for patentability and tends favors more expansive and flexible rulings, the discussions in the Courts have set a standard for the nonobviousness requirement in patentability.

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision on Hotchkiss v. Greenwood in 1850 was the first major decision to establish the requirement of nonobviousness for an invention to be patentable. Under consideration in the case was the validity of a patent for a particular type of doorknob. The court determined that the only thing new about the doorknob was the substitution of clay in the place of wood or metal as the material for the knob. The court held that such a simple material substution, even if more effective than other materials, could never be the subject of a patent. The court determined that since there was “no more ingenuity or skill required to construct the knob in this way than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, the patent was invalid.”

In the decision on A & P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment in 1950, the Supreme Court outlines standards for inventions consisting of a combination of known elements. The court stated that in order to be patentable, an invention that combines previously known elements must perform some function additional or different than the elements could perform separately. According to the court, the fact that the invention outlined in the patent fulfilled a long-felt want did not in itself make the invention patentable. For these reasons, the court struck down the sliding grocery store rack patent under consideration in A & P.

In sustaining a patent under consideration in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, in 1955, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged the changing standards of invention.

-------
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution states simply that Congress shall have the power “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” The Patent Act of 1790 establishes the subject matter to be considered for patents: "any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement thereon not before known or used." This wording establishes a requirement of novelty and utility in order for an invention to be eligible for a patent.

Nonobviousness, homework for 2/8/2011

2011-02-10T21:59:20Z

Eguilbea:

==Historical Development==
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.

===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===

Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.

:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.

:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.

:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.

:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.

:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.

:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.

===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===

While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention.
*First the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.

===35 USC 103 (1952)===
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.

===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===

In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4

===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===

In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include
* scope and content of the prior art;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,
* secondary considerations, including:
** commercial success of the invention;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.

===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===

* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.

===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.

==Suggestion to Combine==
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.

:"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."
:"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.

==Objective Tests==
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.
*This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.

==The Inventive Step==

==Relationship with Novelty==
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==
==Secondary Considerations==
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==

[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]

[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]

[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]

[[South Corp. v. US]]

==The Current Standard of Nonobviousness==

Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 states: “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” The nonobviousness requirement for patentability as outlined in section 103 is quite vague when considered in judicial settings. There has been extensive discussion in the Circuit Courts and in the U.S. Supreme Court that has set precedents for the nonobviousness requirement. This discussion has covered such matters as material substitutions, combinations of old elements in new inventions, changing standards of patentability, the definition of “ordinary skill in the art”, and the relevance of prior art to new inventions. While the Supreme Court tends to avoid producing simplified rules and checklists for patentability and tends favors more expansive and flexible rulings, the discussions in the Courts have set a standard for the nonobviousness requirement in patentability.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision on Hotchkiss v. Greenwood in 1850 was the first major decision to establish the requirement of nonobviousness for an invention to be patentable. Under consideration in the case was the validity of a patent for a particular type of doorknob. The court determined that the only thing new about the doorknob was the substitution of clay in the place of wood or metal as the material for the knob. The court held that such a simple material substution, even if more effective than other materials, could never be the subject of a patent. The court determined that since there was “no more ingenuity or skill required to construct the knob in this way than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, the patent was invalid.”
In the decision on A & P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment in 1950, the Supreme Court outlines standards for inventions consisting of a combination of known elements. The court stated that in order to be patentable, an invention that combines previously known elements must perform some function additional or different than the elements could perform separately. By this test, the court struck down the sliding grocery store rack patent under consideration in A & P. Using the same test, he Supreme Court affirmed.
In 1955, Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb applied language from the Patent Act of 1952 and acknowledged the changing standards of invention.

-------
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution states simply that Congress shall have the power “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” The Patent Act of 1790 establishes the subject matter to be considered for patents: "any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement thereon not before known or used." This wording establishes a requirement of novelty and utility in order for an invention to be eligible for a patent.

Nonobviousness, homework for 2/8/2011

2011-02-08T20:57:18Z

Eguilbea: Created page with "==Historical Development== The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard. ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (185..."

User:Eguilbea

2011-02-08T20:57:07Z

Eguilbea:

Graham v. John Deere: Analysis concluding obviousness/nonobviousness, homework for 2/4/2011

2011-02-04T16:27:02Z

Eguilbea:

==Conclusion of invalidity==
Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act states on the subject of nonobviousness in patentable subject matter: "A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. " The ‘798 patent does provide improved wear resistance over the ‘811 patent, but the improvements made in the ‘798 patent provide no unexpected outcome and would have been an obvious solution to a person of ordinary skill in the art who was familiar with the ‘811 patent and its practical wear problems. Other than the improved wear resistance, there are no major differences in the performance of the ‘811 patent and the ‘798 patent. Thus there are no nonobvious facets in the ‘798 patent.

==Conclusion of validity==
Though the improvements made to the design seem obvious in hindsight after viewing patent ‘798 , they were not obvious at the time the patent was filed. The arrangement placing the shank below the hinge plate is not disclosed in any of the prior art. This arrangement offers wear resistance and flexural advantages that the prior art failed to achieve. Since these valuable advantages were not achieved anywhere in the prior art, it is reasonable to conclude that the improvements made in the '798 patent are not obvious.

Graham v. John Deere: Analysis concluding obviousness/nonobviousness, homework for 2/4/2011

2011-02-04T16:21:37Z

Eguilbea:

Graham v. John Deere: Analysis concluding obviousness/nonobviousness, homework for 2/4/2011

2011-02-04T16:01:23Z

Eguilbea:

==Conclusion of invalidity==
Although the arrangement of some of the parts was changed, and some parts (such as an extra bolt and cotter pins) were added in the ‘798 design, there is no significant change in the functioning of the mechanism as a whole. The ‘798 patent does provide improved wear resistance over the ‘811 patent, but the improvements made in the ‘798 patent would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art who was familiar with the ‘811 patent and its practical wear problems.

==Conclusion of validity==
Though the modifications to the design seem obvious in hindsight after viewing patent ‘798 , they were not obvious at the time the patent was filed. The arrangement placing the shank below the hinge plate is not disclosed in any of the prior art. So, this arrangement along with the addition of the bolt into the shank provide improved wear resistance in a way that has not previously been disclosed.

Graham v. John Deere: Analysis concluding obviousness/nonobviousness, homework for 2/4/2011

2011-02-04T16:01:01Z

Eguilbea:

--Conclusion of invalidity--
Although the arrangement of some of the parts was changed, and some parts (such as an extra bolt and cotter pins) were added in the ‘798 design, there is no significant change in the functioning of the mechanism as a whole. The ‘798 patent does provide improved wear resistance over the ‘811 patent, but the improvements made in the ‘798 patent would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art who was familiar with the ‘811 patent and its practical wear problems.

--Conclusion of validity--
Though the modifications to the design seem obvious in hindsight after viewing patent ‘798 , they were not obvious at the time the patent was filed. The arrangement placing the shank below the hinge plate is not disclosed in any of the prior art. So, this arrangement along with the addition of the bolt into the shank provide improved wear resistance in a way that has not previously been disclosed.

Graham v. John Deere: Analysis concluding obviousness/nonobviousness, homework for 2/4/2011

2011-02-04T16:00:11Z

Eguilbea: Created page with "Conclusion of invalidity: Although the arrangement of some of the parts was changed, and some parts (such as an extra bolt and cotter pins) were added in the ‘798 design, ther..."

Conclusion of invalidity: Although the arrangement of some of the parts was changed, and some parts (such as an extra bolt and cotter pins) were added in the ‘798 design, there is no significant change in the functioning of the mechanism as a whole. The ‘798 patent does provide improved wear resistance over the ‘811 patent, but the improvements made in the ‘798 patent would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art who was familiar with the ‘811 patent and its practical wear problems.

Conclusion of validity: Though the modifications to the design seem obvious in hindsight after viewing patent ‘798 , they were not obvious at the time the patent was filed. The arrangement placing the shank below the hinge plate is not disclosed in any of the prior art. So, this arrangement along with the addition of the bolt into the shank provide improved wear resistance in a way that has not previously been disclosed.

User:Eguilbea

2011-02-04T15:59:59Z

Eguilbea:

Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon, homework for January 28,2011

2011-01-28T16:33:02Z

Eguilbea:

The patent being examined is patent 4,535,953. It is a patent for a spinning-type fishing reel with an axially adjustable spool. In spinning type fishing reels, use of large or small gauge lines results in uneven wrapping of the line around the spool, with excessive line wrapping around the front or back end of the spool. The reel design being examined relieves this problem by employing a spool that can be adjusted relative to the spindle that carries it. Previous patents which it references are patent 2,734,693, patent 3,119,573, and patent 3,138,344. All three of these referenced patents are designs for "improved" spinning-type reels that are based upon a common basic design.

A&P would hold that the patent being examined would not be valid, since the design is a combination of old elements that perform no new or different function than they otherwise would have. The U.S. Supreme court commented in its decision on A&P that "This case is wanting in any unusual or surprising consequences from the unification of the elements here concerned." Spinning fishing reels were known and commonly used at the time of the patent. Adding a capability for axial adjustment to the spool would not have significant or novel enough consequences to warrant a new patent. Although the new reel design is useful, it performs essentially the same function that any spinning reel would. The design may employ mechanisms and numbers of parts different from other spinning-type reels, but the concept remains the same: (simplified) a crank shaft turns a rotor which can be engaged or disengaged to feed line onto the spool or allow line to leave the spool. Therefore, applying the Supreme Court's judgment in A&P, the improvements made to the spinning reel are useful, but this new combination of previously existing elements does not supply a sufficiently novel consequence to warrant a new patent.

The judgment given in Lyon would hold that since the modifications to existing spinning reels were useful not "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art,” in accordance with section 103 of U.S. Code, the patents would be valid. Lyon's added step to the already existing coating process was enough to warrant a patent. Since the reel provides a useful improvement that is not obvious to a person having ordinary skills in the art, they are valid patents under the judgment delivered in Lyon. The judgment given in Hotchkiss would uphold the patents for similar reasons: application of the improvements to older designs required ingenuity beyond that possessed by someone skilled in the business.

Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon, homework for January 28,2011

2011-01-28T16:32:32Z

Eguilbea:

The patent being examined is patent 4,535,953. It is a patent for a spinning-type fishing reel with an axially adjustable spool. In spinning type fishing reels, use of large or small gauge lines results in uneven wrapping of the line around the spool, with excessive line wrapping around the front or back end of the spool. The reel design being examined relieves this problem by employing a spool that can be adjusted relative to the spindle that carries it. Previous patents which it references are patent 2,734,693, patent 3,119,573, and patent 3,138,344. All three of these referenced patents are designs for "improved" spinning-type reels that are based upon a common basic design.

A&P would hold that the patent being examined would not be valid, since the design is a combination of old elements that perform no new or different function than they otherwise would have. The U.S. Supreme court commented in its decision on A&P that "This case is wanting in any unusual or surprising consequences from the unification of the elements here concerned." Spinning fishing reels were known and commonly used at the time of the patent. Adding a capability for axial adjustment to the spool would not have significant or novel enough consequences to warrant a new patent. Although the new reel design is useful, it performs essentially the same function that any spinning reel would. The design may employ mechanisms and numbers of parts different from other spinning-type reels, but the concept remains the same: (simplified) a crank shaft turns a rotor which can be engaged or disengaged to feed line onto the spool or allow line to leave the spool. Therefore, applying the Supreme Court's judgment in A&P, the improvements made to the spinning reel are useful, but this new combination of previously existing elements does not supply a sufficiently novel consequence to warrant a new patent.

The judgment given in Lyon would hold that since the modifications to existing spinning reels were useful not "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art,” in accordance with section 103, the patents would be valid. Lyon's added step to the already existing coating process was enough to warrant a patent. Since the reel provides a useful improvement that is not obvious to a person having ordinary skills in the art, they are valid patents under the judgment delivered in Lyon. The judgment given in Hotchkiss would uphold the patents for similar reasons: application of the improvements to older designs required ingenuity beyond that possessed by someone skilled in the business.

Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon, homework for January 28,2011

2011-01-28T16:31:12Z

Eguilbea:

The patent being examined is patent 4,535,953. It is a patent for a spinning-type fishing reel with an axially adjustable spool. In spinning type fishing reels, use of large or small gauge lines results in uneven wrapping of the line around the spool, with excessive line wrapping around the front or back end of the spool. The reel design being examined relieves this problem by employing a spool that can be adjusted relative to the spindle that carries it. Previous patents which it references are patent 2,734,693, patent 3,119,573, and patent 3,138,344. All three of these referenced patents are designs for "improved" spinning-type reels that are based upon a common basic design.

A&P would hold that the patent being examined would not be valid, since the design is a combination of old elements that perform no new or different function than they otherwise would have. The U.S. Supreme court commented in its decision on A&P that "This case is wanting in any unusual or surprising consequences from the unification of the elements here concerned." Spinning fishing reels were known and commonly used at the time of the patent. Adding a capability for axial adjustment to the spool would not have significant or novel enough consequences to warrant a new patent. Although the new reel design is useful, it performs essentially the same function that any spinning reel would. The design may employ mechanisms and numbers of parts different from other spinning-type reels, but the concept remains the same: (simplified) a crank shaft turns a rotor which can be engaged or disengaged to feed line onto the spool or allow line to leave the spool. Therefore, applying the Supreme Court's judgment in A&P, the improvements made to the spinning reel are useful, but the new combination of old elements does not supply a sufficiently novel consequence to warrant a new patent.

The judgment given in Lyon would hold that since the modifications to existing spinning reels were useful not "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art,” in accordance with section 103, the patents would be valid. Lyon's added step to the already existing coating process was enough to warrant a patent. Since the reel provides a useful improvement that is not obvious to a person having ordinary skills in the art, they are valid patents under the judgment delivered in Lyon. The judgment given in Hotchkiss would uphold the patents for similar reasons: application of the improvements to older designs required ingenuity beyond that possessed by someone skilled in the business.

Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon, homework for January 28,2011

2011-01-28T16:29:19Z

Eguilbea:

The patent being examined is patent 4,535,953. It is a patent for a spinning-type fishing reel with an axially adjustable spool. In spinning type fishing reels, use of large or small gauge lines results in uneven wrapping of the line around the spool, with excessive line wrapping around the front or back end of the spool. The reel design being examined relieves this problem by employing a spool that can be adjusted relative to the spindle that carries it. Previous patents which it references are patent 2,734,693, patent 3,119,573, and patent 3,138,344. All three of these referenced patents are designs for "improved" spinning-type reels that are based upon a common basic design.

A&P would hold that the patent being examined would not be valid, since the design is a combination of old elements that perform no new or different function than they otherwise would have. The U.S. Supreme court commented in its decision on A&P that "This case is wanting in any unusual or surprising consequences from the unification of the elements here concerned." Spinning fishing reels were known and commonly used at the time of the patent. Adding a capability for axial adjustment to the spool would not have significant or novel enough consequences to warrant a new patent. Although the new reel design is useful, it performs essentially the same function that any spinning reel would. The design may employ mechanisms and numbers of parts different from other spinning-type reels, but the concept remains the same: (simplified) a crank shaft turns a rotor which can be engaged or disengaged to feed line onto the spool or allow line to leave the spool. Therefore, applying the Supreme Court's judgment in A&P, the improvements made to the spinning reel are useful, but the new combination of old elements does not supply a sufficiently novel consequence to warrant a new patent.

The judgment given in Lyon would hold that since the modifications to existing spinning reels were useful not "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art,” in accordance with section 103, the patents would be valid. Lyon's added step to the already existing coating process was enough to warrant a patent. Since each reel provides a useful improvement that is not obvious to a person having ordinary skills in the art, they are valid patents under the judgment delivered in Lyon. The judgment given in Hotchkiss would uphold the patents for similar reasons: application of the improvements to older designs required ingenuity beyond that possessed by someone skilled in the business.

Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon, homework for January 28,2011

2011-01-28T16:17:06Z

Eguilbea:

The patent being examined is patent 4,535,953. It is a patent for a spinning-type fishing reel with an axially adjustable spool. In spinning type fishing reels, use of large or small gauge lines results in uneven wrapping of the line around the spool, with excessive line wrapping around the front or back end of the spool. The reel design being examined relieves this problem by employing a spool that can be adjusted relative to the spindle that carries it. Previous patents which it references are patent 2,734,693, patent 3,119,573, and patent 3,138,344. All three of these referenced patents are designs for "improved" spinning-type reels that are based upon a common basic design.

A&P would hold that none of the patents mentioned here would be valid, since the fishing reels are combinations of old elements that perform no new or different function than they would have otherwise. The U.S. Supreme court commented in its decision on A&P that "This case is wanting in any unusual or surprising consequences from the unification of the elements here concerned." Applying that judgment here, one concludes that although the new reel designs are all useful, they all perform essentially the same function that any spinning reel would. Every design performs the same overall function. Each design employs different mechanisms and numbers of parts, but the concept is always the same: (simplified) a crank shaft turns a rotor which can be engaged or disengaged to feed line onto the spool or allow line to leave the spool. The improvements made to this overall function are useful, but do not supply a sufficiently novel consequence to warrant a new patent.

The judgment given in Lyon would hold that since the modifications to existing spinning reels were useful not "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art,” in accordance with section 103, the patents would be valid. Lyon's added step to the already existing coating process was enough to warrant a patent. Since each reel provides a useful improvement that is not obvious to a person having ordinary skills in the art, they are valid patents. The judgment given in Hotchkiss would uphold the patents for similar reasons: application of the improvements to older designs required ingenuity beyond that possessed by someone skilled in the business.

Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon, homework for January 28,2011

2011-01-28T16:16:35Z

Eguilbea:

The patent being examined is patent 4,535,953. It is a patent for a spinning-type fishing reel with an axially adjustable spool. In spinning type fishing reels, use of large or small gauge lines results in uneven wrapping of the line around the spool, with excessive line wrapping around the front or back end of the spool. The reel design being examined relieves this problem by employing a spool that can be adjusted relative to the spindle that carries it. Previous patents which it references are patent 2,734,693, patent 3,119,573, and patent 3,138,344. All three of these referenced patents are designs for "improved" spinning-type reels that are based upon a common basic design.

A&P would hold that none of the patents mentioned here would be valid, since the fishing reels are combinations of old elements that perform no new or different function than they would have otherwise. The U.S. Supreme court commented in its decision on A&P that "This case is wanting in any unusual or surprising consequences from the unification of the elements here concerned." Applying that judgment here, one concludes that although the new reel designs are all useful, they all perform essentially the same function that any spinning reel would. Every design performs the same overall function. Each design employs different mechanisms and numbers of parts, but the concept is always the same: (simplified) a crank shaft turns a rotor which can be engaged or disengaged to feed line onto the spool or allow line to leave the spool. The improvements made to this overall function are useful, but do not supply a sufficiently novel consequence to warrant a new patent.

Lyon would hold that since the modifications to existing spinning reels were useful not "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art,” in accordance with section 103, the patents would be valid. Lyon's added step to the already existing coating process was enough to warrant a patent. Since each reel provides a useful improvement that is not obvious to a person having ordinary skills in the art, they are valid patents. The judgment given in Hotchkiss would uphold the patents for similar reasons: application of the improvements to older designs required ingenuity beyond that possessed by someone skilled in the business.

Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon, homework for January 28,2011

2011-01-28T16:10:04Z

Eguilbea:

The patent being examined is patent 4,535,953. It is a patent for a spinning-type fishing reel with an axially adjustable spool. In spinning type fishing reels, use of large or small gauge lines results in uneven wrapping of the line around the spool, with excessive line wrapping around the front or back end of the spool. The reel design being examined relieves this problem by employing a spool that can be adjusted relative to the spindle that carries it. Previous patents which it references are patent 2,734,693, patent 3,119,573, and patent 3,138,344. All three of these referenced patents are designs for "improved" spinning-type reels that are based upon a common basic design.

A&P would hold that none of the patents mentioned here would be valid, since the fishing reels are combinations of old elements that perform no new or different function than they would have otherwise. The U.S. Supreme court commented in its decision on A&P that "This case is wanting in any unusual or surprising consequences from the unification of the elements here concerned." Applying that judgment here, one concludes that although the new reel designs are all useful, they all perform essentially the same function that any spinning reel would. Every design performs the same overall function. Each design employs different mechanisms and numbers of parts, but the concept is always the same: (simplified) a crank shaft turns a rotor which can be engaged or disengaged to feed line onto the spool or allow line to leave the spool. The improvements made to this overall function are useful, but do not supply a sufficiently novel consequence to warrant a new patent.

Lyon would hold that since the modifications to existing spinning reels were useful not "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art,” in accordance with section 103, the patents would be valid. Lyon's added step to the already existing coating process was enough to warrant a patent. Since each reel provides a useful improvement that is not obvious to a person having ordinary skills in the art, they are valid patents.

Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon, homework for January 28,2011

2011-01-28T15:33:02Z

Eguilbea:

The patent being examined is patent 4,535,953. It is a patent for a spinning-type fishing reel with an axially adjustable spool. In spinning type fishing reels, use of large or small gauge lines results in uneven wrapping of the line around the spool, with excessive line wrapping around the front or back end of the spool. The reel design being examined relieves this problem by employing a spool that can be adjusted relative to the spindle that carries it. Previous patents which it references are patent 2,734,693, patent 3,119,573, and patent 3,138,344. All three of these referenced patents are designs for "improved" spinnging-type reels that are based upon a common basic design.

A&P would hold that only the earliest patent mentioned would be valid (unless there are further patents which we have not examined that would invalidate it, too), since the newer fishing reels consist of old elements that perform no new or different function than they would have otherwise. Though the new designs are all useful, they do not perform a significantly different or novel function from the first spinning-reel patent. The U.S. Supreme court commented in its decision on A&P that "This case is wanting in any unusual or surprising consequences from the unification of the elements here concerned." That judgment also applies here. Every design uses the same concept to perform the same function. Each design employs different mechanisms numbers of parts, but the concept is always the same: (simplified) a crank shaft turns a rotor which can be engaged or disengaged to feed line onto the spool or allow line to leave the spool. The small improvements made to this overall function are useful, but do not supply a sufficiently novel consequence to warrant a new patent.

Lyon would hold that since there was an obvious need for the given additions to the design of a spinning-type fishing reel, and no one had yet filled the need in the way claimed, the idea is not "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art,” in accordance with section 103. Thus the patents would be valid.

Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon, homework for January 28,2011

2011-01-28T15:22:10Z

Eguilbea:

Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon, homework for January 28,2011

2011-01-28T14:06:10Z

Eguilbea:

Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon, homework for January 28,2011

2011-01-28T14:05:51Z

Eguilbea: Created page with "The patent being examined is patent 4,535,953. It is a patent for a spinning-type fishing reel with an axially adjustable spool. In spinning type fishing reels, use of large or..."

User:Eguilbea

2011-01-28T14:05:29Z

Eguilbea:

[[My Selected US Patent, homework for January 24, 2011]]

[[Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon, homework for January 28,2011]]

User:Eguilbea

2011-01-28T14:05:06Z

Eguilbea:

[[My Selected US Patent, homework for January 24, 2011]]
[[Comparison of Hotchkiss, A&P, and Lyon in relation to my chosen patent and its references, homework for January 28,2011]]

User:Eguilbea

2011-01-28T05:15:17Z

Eguilbea: Replaced content with "My Selected US Patent, homework for January 24, 2011"

[[My Selected US Patent, homework for January 24, 2011]]

My Selected US Patent, homework for January 24, 2011

2011-01-28T05:14:39Z

Eguilbea: /* My Selected US Patent, homework for January 24, 2011 */

*Patent 4535953: Spinning Type Fishing Reel With Axially Adjustable Spool
*Date issued: August 20, 1985
*This invention improves upon a basic design for spinning type fishing reels. A common problem with spinning type fishing reels is that using unusually large or small diameter line will result in the line becoming unevenly wound around the spool, with more line wound around the front of the spool or back of the spool, depending on the size of the line. The invention employs a knob to adjust the spool axially along the the reel's spindle in order to alleviate the front wound or back wound condition. The patent can be found on Google Patents: [http://www.google.com/patents?id=-cAxAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4&source=gbs_overview_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false].

My Selected US Patent, homework for January 24, 2011

2011-01-28T05:14:27Z

Eguilbea: Created page with "=My Selected US Patent, homework for January 24, 2011= *Patent 4535953: Spinning Type Fishing Reel With Axially Adjustable Spool *Date issued: August 20, 1985 *This invention imp..."

=My Selected US Patent, homework for January 24, 2011=
*Patent 4535953: Spinning Type Fishing Reel With Axially Adjustable Spool
*Date issued: August 20, 1985
*This invention improves upon a basic design for spinning type fishing reels. A common problem with spinning type fishing reels is that using unusually large or small diameter line will result in the line becoming unevenly wound around the spool, with more line wound around the front of the spool or back of the spool, depending on the size of the line. The invention employs a knob to adjust the spool axially along the the reel's spindle in order to alleviate the front wound or back wound condition. The patent can be found on Google Patents: [http://www.google.com/patents?id=-cAxAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4&source=gbs_overview_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false].

User:Eguilbea

2011-01-28T05:14:11Z

Eguilbea:

[[My Selected US Patent, homework for January 24, 2011]]
*Patent 4535953: Spinning Type Fishing Reel With Axially Adjustable Spool
*Date issued: August 20, 1985
*This invention improves upon a basic design for spinning type fishing reels. A common problem with spinning type fishing reels is that using unusually large or small diameter line will result in the line becoming unevenly wound around the spool, with more line wound around the front of the spool or back of the spool, depending on the size of the line. The invention employs a knob to adjust the spool axially along the the reel's spindle in order to alleviate the front wound or back wound condition. The patent can be found on Google Patents: [http://www.google.com/patents?id=-cAxAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4&source=gbs_overview_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false].

User:Eguilbea

2011-01-24T06:50:03Z

Eguilbea:

User:Eguilbea

2011-01-24T06:49:29Z

=My Selected US Patent, homework for January 24, 2011=
*Patent 4535953: Spinning Type Fishing Reel With Axially Adjustable Spool
*Date issued: August 20, 1985
*This invention improves upon a basic design for spinning type fishing reels. A common problem with spinning type fishing reels is that using unusually large or small diameter line will result in the line becoming unevenly wound around the spool, with more line wound around the front of the spool or back of the spool depending on the size of the line. The invention employs a knob to adjust the spool axially along the the reel's spindle in order to alleviate the front wound or back wound condition. The patent can be found on Google Patents: [http://www.google.com/patents?id=-cAxAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4&source=gbs_overview_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false].