Bill Goodwine's Wiki - User contributions [en]

Here in list of arguments in Quanta

2011-04-29T14:33:54Z

John Gallagher:

Post a link to your summary of the brief you read here.

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901330223]]

[[901349446 Quanta Brief]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901471466]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901422128]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary Jacob Marmolejo]]

[[Homework 8 (due Friday 28)~jnosal | Quanta Brief Summary 901438174]]

[[Mitros: Quanta Brief]]

[[Zahm Homework 31: Quanta Brief]]

[[901419437 Quanta v. LGE Brief Summary]]

[[Quanta Brief 901437068]]

[[901281608: Quanta Brief]]

[[901444263: Quanta v. LGE Reply Brief of Petitioners]]

[[901479977: Quanta for Petitioners]]

[[Apr. 29th: Brief Summary (2007 WL 3440937) - Andrew McBride]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901360293]]

[[Quanta Brief Summary 901431048]]

[[Quanta Brief Brobins]]

[[Quanta Brief hwong1]]

[[Quanta Brief: Tennant]]

[[Quanta Brief (John Gallagher)]]

Quanta Brief (John Gallagher)

2011-04-29T14:33:08Z

John Gallagher: /* Appellate Brief by Aerotel (on Behalf of LG Electronics) */

=Appellate Brief by Aerotel (on Behalf of LG Electronics)=

In the CAFC, it was ruled that the LGE patents were not exhausted by the sale of the Intel made products under these patents to Quanta Computer. Therefore, LG had the right to limit the way in which the components were used by Quanta, including prohibiting them from combining the Intel made components with other non-Intel components.

In this brief, Aerotel argues that the holder of a patent can exercise rights over a patented product in the hands of a downstream user under certain conditions. The patent is exhausted only if the maker sells the product unconditionally. In this case however, LG imposed restrictions on the way in which Intel could sell the products, preventing exhaustion.

Aerotel also argues that the theory of exhaustion requires that the holder of the patent has received the full value of the goods in the sale. In this case, there is no way that LG could bargain for and receive the full value for the licenced goods because it is impossible to predict the value of the products as they are sold further downstream. They only way in which LG could receive the full value for its patents is to separately licence Intel's customers to use the products. It would be impossible to obtain the full value of the patent from the Intel licence agreement only, because the full value is unknown until the product reaches the downstream market.

Exhaustion should not apply, therefore, in the case in which the patentee forgoes monetary compensation for his patent, and instead reserves the rights over the patented products against downstream users.

*Back: [[User: John Gallagher]]

Quanta Brief (John Gallagher)

2011-04-29T14:29:46Z

John Gallagher: /* Appellate Brief by Aerotel (on Behalf of LG Electronics) */

Quanta Brief (John Gallagher)

2011-04-29T14:28:20Z

John Gallagher: /* Appellate Brief by Aerotel (on Behalf of LG Electronics) */

=Appellate Brief by Aerotel (on Behalf of LG Electronics)=

In the CAFC, it was ruled that the LGE patents were not exhausted by the sale of the Intel made products under these patents to Quanta Computer. Therefore, LG had the right to limit the way in which the components were used by Quanta, including prohibiting them from combining the Intel made components with other non-Intel components.
In this brief, Aerotel argues that the holder of a patent can exercise rights over a patented product in the hands of a downstream user under certain conditions. The patent is exhausted only if the maker sells the product unconditionally. In this case however, LG imposed restrictions on the way in which Intel could sell the products, preventing exhaustion.
Aerotel also argues that the theory of exhaustion requires that the holder of the patent has received the full value of the goods in the sale. In this case, there is no way that LG could bargain for and receive the full value for the licenced goods because it is impossible to predict the value of the products as they are sold further downstream. They only way in which LG could receive the full value for its patents is to separately licence Intel's customers to use the products. It would be impossible to obtain the full value of the patent from the Intel licence agreement only, because the full value is unknown until the product reaches the downstream market.
Exhaustion should not apply, therefore, in the case in which the patentee forgoes monetary compensation for his patent, and instead reserves the rights over the patented products against downstream users.

*Back: [[User: John Gallagher]]

Quanta Brief (John Gallagher)

2011-04-29T14:20:54Z

John Gallagher: /* Appellate Brief by Aerotel (on Behalf of LG Electronics) */

=Appellate Brief by Aerotel (on Behalf of LG Electronics)=

In the CAFC, it was ruled that the LGE patents were not exhausted by the sale of the Intel made products under these patents to Quanta Computer. Therefore, LG had the right to limit the way in which the components were used by Quanta, including prohibiting them from combining the Intel made components with other non-Intel components.
In this brief, Aerotel argues that the holder of a patent can exercise rights over a patented product in the hands of a downstream user under certain conditions. The patent is exhausted only if the maker sells the product unconditionally. In this case however, LG imposed restrictions on the way in which Intel could sell the products, preventing exhaustion.
Aerotel also argues that the theory of exhaustion requires that the holder of the patent has received the full value of the goods in the sale. In this case, there is no way that LG could bargain for and receive the full value for the licenced goods because it is impossible to predict the value of the products as they are sold further downstream. They only way in which LG could receive the full value for its patents is to separately licence Intel's customers to use the products. It would be impossible to obtain the full value of the patent from the Intel licence agreement only, because the full value is unknown until the product reaches the downstream market.
Exhaustion should not apply, therefore, in the case in which the patentee forgoes monetary compensation for his patent, and instead reserves the rights over the patented products against downstream users.

*Back: [[User: John Gallagher]]

Quanta Brief (John Gallagher)

2011-04-29T14:20:35Z

John Gallagher: /* Appellate Brief by Aerotel (on Behalf of LG Electronics) */

=Appellate Brief by Aerotel (on Behalf of LG Electronics)=

In the CAFC, it was ruled that the LGE patents were not exhausted by the sale of the Intel made products under these patents to Quanta Computer. Therefore, LG had the right to limit the way in which the components were used by Quanta, including prohibiting them from combining the Intel made components with other non-Intel components.
In this brief, Aerotel argues that the holder of a patent can exercise rights over a patented product in the hands of a downstream user under certain conditions. The patent is exhausted only if the maker sells the product unconditionally. In this case however, LG imposed restrictions on the way in which Intel could sell the products, preventing exhaustion.
Aerotel also argues that the theory of exhaustion requires that the holder of the patent has received the full value of the goods in the sale. In this case, there is no way that LG could bargain for and receive the full value for the licenced goods because it is impossible to predict the value of the products as they are sold further downstream. They only way in which LG could receive the full value for its patents is to separately licence Intel's customers to use the products. It would be impossible to obtain the full value of the patent from the Intel licence agreement only, because the full value is unknown until the product reaches the downstream market.
Exhaustion should not apply, therefore, in the case in which the patentee forgoes monetary compensation for his patent, and instead reserves the rights over the patented products against downstream users.
*Back: [[User: John Gallagher]]

Quanta Brief (John Gallagher)

2011-04-29T14:11:06Z

John Gallagher: /* Appellate Brief by Aerotel (on Behalf of LG Electronics) */

Quanta Brief (John Gallagher)

2011-04-29T13:44:00Z

John Gallagher: Created page with "=Appellate Brief by Aerotel (on Behalf of LG Electronics)= In the CAFC, it was ruled that the LGE patents were not exhausted by the sale of the Intel made products under these p..."

User:John Gallagher

2011-04-29T13:39:14Z

John Gallagher:

John Gallagher

*[[Homework 1/24 (John Gallagher)]]
*[[Homework 1/28 (John Gallagher)]]
*[[Homework 2/4 (John Gallagher)]]
*[[Non-Obviousness (John Gallagher)]]
*[[Homework 3/23 (John Gallagher)]]
*[[Homework 4/4 (John Gallagher)]]
*[[Quanta Brief (John Gallagher)]]

Homework 4/4 (John Gallagher)

2011-04-06T15:28:38Z

John Gallagher:

=Brief on Behalf of Honeywell=

In the CAFC, Honeywell lost because it was ruled that the additional element which Hamilton Sunstrand added to their patented invention was foreseeable at the time that the patent was issued. Hamilton Sunstrand used an inlet guide valve (IGV) in a system to control the air which is bled off in a turbine engine, in order to solve the ‘double solution’ problem which was common in such a system. Honeywell’s case that Sunstrand infringed upon their patent relies upon the Doctrine of Equivalence, which can be used to rule infringement when a patent has not been literally infringed. Sunstrand argued that this additional use of the IGV prevents their system from being equivalent to what is claimed in the Honeywell patent. They claimed that the addition they made to the Honeywell system was ‘foreseeable,’ which under Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Corp. prevents it from being protected under the claims of the Honeywell patent. This case says that equivalents are protected under the claims of a patent unless the equivalent was foreseeable at the time of the invention.

Sunstrand claims that its invention was foreseeable, therefore not protected.
The addition Sunstrand made was made roughly ten years after the Honeywell patent was filed, which itself suggests that there addition was not foreseeable. Testimony showed that the double solution problem was a known issue well before the time Sunstrand added the IGV to their system, and thus it is reasonable to believe that if such a solution to the problem were foreseeable ten years earlier, it would have been used at that time. Further, Sunstrand claims that their invention was both ‘unique’ and ‘foreseeable.’ This also seems to be a contradiction. If it were foreseeable, presumable it would be common in the field. Therefore, the additional element which Sunstrand added was not foreseeable at the time of the Honeywell patent, and thus their system infringes upon Honeywell’s patent.

*Back: [[User: John Gallagher]]

Homework 4/4 (John Gallagher)

2011-04-06T15:27:59Z

John Gallagher: Created page with "-Brief on Behalf of Honeywell- In the CAFC, Honeywell lost because it was ruled that the additional element which Hamilton Sunstrand added to their patented invention was fores..."

-Brief on Behalf of Honeywell-

In the CAFC, Honeywell lost because it was ruled that the additional element which Hamilton Sunstrand added to their patented invention was foreseeable at the time that the patent was issued. Hamilton Sunstrand used an inlet guide valve (IGV) in a system to control the air which is bled off in a turbine engine, in order to solve the ‘double solution’ problem which was common in such a system. Honeywell’s case that Sunstrand infringed upon their patent relies upon the Doctrine of Equivalence, which can be used to rule infringement when a patent has not been literally infringed. Sunstrand argued that this additional use of the IGV prevents their system from being equivalent to what is claimed in the Honeywell patent. They claimed that the addition they made to the Honeywell system was ‘foreseeable,’ which under Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Corp. prevents it from being protected under the claims of the Honeywell patent. This case says that equivalents are protected under the claims of a patent unless the equivalent was foreseeable at the time of the invention.

Sunstrand claims that its invention was foreseeable, therefore not protected.
The addition Sunstrand made was made roughly ten years after the Honeywell patent was filed, which itself suggests that there addition was not foreseeable. Testimony showed that the double solution problem was a known issue well before the time Sunstrand added the IGV to their system, and thus it is reasonable to believe that if such a solution to the problem were foreseeable ten years earlier, it would have been used at that time. Further, Sunstrand claims that their invention was both ‘unique’ and ‘foreseeable.’ This also seems to be a contradiction. If it were foreseeable, presumable it would be common in the field. Therefore, the additional element which Sunstrand added was not foreseeable at the time of the Honeywell patent, and thus their system infringes upon Honeywell’s patent.

2011-02-11T13:15:54Z

John Gallagher:

Non-Obviousness (John Gallagher)

2011-02-11T13:05:29Z

John Gallagher:

Non-Obviousness (John Gallagher)

2011-02-09T13:54:50Z

John Gallagher: Created page with "==Historical Development== The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard. ===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (185..."

==Historical Development==
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.

===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===

Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel. This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of ''nonobviousness''.

:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.

:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.

:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.

:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.

:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.

:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.

It can be seen in this pronouncement of the court opinion by Justice Nelson, that the original requirement of novelty is not satisfactory, as the knob designed by Hotchkiss is a new product. Although the term "nonobviousness" will not be developed for some time, the court's decision hinges on the fact that the mere substitution of better suited materials is too obvious a development to warrant a patent. The fundamental premise of nonobviousness is presented a few paragraphs later, as Justice Nelson states,

:"....unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than ''were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business'', there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingeunity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."

Thus, it is made clear that an invention must not only be novel, but must require a level of ingenuity that exceeds that of an individual with ordinary skill in the related field.

===A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===

While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention. In particular, this case dealt with three significant issues related to the process of determining patentability:

*First, that the "level of invention" was partly evidenced by "long felt but unsatisfied need" which is a standard used today for nonobviousness.

The importance of a "long felt but unsatisfied need" in the determination of nonobviousness is that it is difficult to claim that an invention is obvious if there has been a demand for a certain product and no one has been able to fulfill that need. However, it is important to note that there are two requirements that must be met here. There must be a need for the product and the need must have existed for a long time. If the need is relatively new, then it is difficult to claim that a person with ordinary skill in the field would have not developed such a design had he been aware of demand for such a device. On the other hand, if the market related to a certain field has provided no sign that there is a need for such an improvement, then it can be argued that the design would have been obvious had anyone expressed interest in the proposed device.

*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.

In Graham v. John Deere, the history of the patent process is discussed, particularly Thomas Jefferson's outlook on the purpose of providing a patent. Jefferson made it clear that patents were only to be granted for inventions that furthered human knowledge and were new and useful. The granting of patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices was neither worthwhile nor helpful. In A&P v. Supermarket Corp., Jefferson's sentiment is echoed, except the focus of the court is narrowed further to the important frontier of science and engineering. As Justice Douglas states, "the purpose is to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts," and the two disciplines most associated with progress at that time (and still currently) are science and engineering. Even later, the court states, "patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science," which make this point very clear.

*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements.

The court's outlook on the evaluation of patents in regard to the combination of prior elements is best summarized in the following explanation. "The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, peform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them is not patentable invention....only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable."

===35 USC 103 (1952)===
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.

===Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb (1955)===

In [[Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art" — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4

===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===

In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of "inventiveness" to the statutory language of "nonobviousness." The criteria to determine nonobviousness include
* scope and content of the prior art;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,
* secondary considerations, including:
** commercial success of the invention;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.

===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===

* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered. Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.

===Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to "inventiveness" by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.

==Suggestion to Combine==
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements. The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.

:"When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references."
:"[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.

==Objective Tests==
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks. The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations. If evidence is available pertaining to them, they ''must'' be considered by the court.
*This case also considers the concept of ''enablement'' which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention. Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.

==The Inventive Step==

==Relationship with Novelty==
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==
==Secondary Considerations==
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==

[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]

[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]

[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]

[[South Corp. v. US]]

User:John Gallagher

2011-02-09T13:54:40Z

John Gallagher:

John Gallagher

*[[Homework 1/24 (John Gallagher)]]
*[[Homework 1/28 (John Gallagher)]]
*[[Homework 2/4 (John Gallagher)]]
*[[Non-Obviousness (John Gallagher)]]

Homework 2/4 (John Gallagher)

2011-02-04T19:57:50Z

John Gallagher:

== Argument For Patentability (for non-obviousness) ==
Graham's invention of a clamp for vibrating shank plows qualifies for a patent under 35 U.S.C 103, that is to say, it is non obvious. In a prior patent, 2,493,811 ('811), Graham disclose the invention of a mounting for a vibrating plow which shared some similar features. The '811 patent describes a mounting for a plow shank which allows the pivot upward if the shank encounters enough resistance in the ground. This allows the shank to move upward instead of breaking. The shank was placed atop the hinge plate, but not rigidly attached to it, being held in place instead by the spring rod. The arrangement caused the shank to wobble because it was not firmly attached to the hinge plate. In this set up, the shank also caused wear of the upper plate. In this new invention, Graham has eliminated both these problems by placing the shank below the hinge plate, using bolts to rigidly attach it to the hinge plate. The problems in the '811 arrangement were significant, and no others had been able to solve them. Therefore, there was a 'long-felt unmet need' in the industry for this product, and it took several years to find a suitable solution, the solution could not be considered obvious. Graham's latest invention, then, qualifies for a patent under section 103.
== Argument Against Patentability (for obviousness) ==
Graham's latest invention does not meet the standard of non-obviousness required under section 103. The design is an improvement on his previous invention, the clamp for vibrating shanks. That arrangement had several flaws which this design fixes by mounting the shank below the hinge plate and attaching it rigidly to that plate. In this new arrangement, there are no new elements however. It uses all the elements which were present in the previous invention, but places them more advantageously. Further, no unexpected results result from this arrangement. Therefore, this new arrangement could have be designed not by an inventor, but by anyone with the knowledge and skill of a mechanical engineer, and that person could have predicted the improvements that would result. This new innovation of Graham's then, while useful and novel, does not qualify for a patent, because it is obvious under the standards laid out in section 103.
*Back: [[User:John Gallagher]]

2011-02-04T18:22:22Z

2011-01-28T15:11:21Z

John Gallagher:

==Homework 2==
The patent I choose, number 4304169, was for a method of noise reduction in a Maypole type braiding machine, the invention of Francis S. Cimprich et al. This improvement of the braiding machine was found to be worthy of a patent in 1981 when the patent was granted, but it may not have been at various other points in U.S. history, due to the changing standards for patentability. We will consider here whether this invention would be considered patentable under the different standards in the cases Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., and Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb.
Certainly the idea of this type of braiding machine was not new at the time of Cimprich's patent. The machine employs spools of wires or fibers which are wrapped around a thin core in order to produce rope, candle wicks, or in this case, hose. The spools move in a circle around the hose, wrapping the wires or fibers in criss-crossed pattern. This criss-cross is achieved by weaving the spools in and out from each other as they move around the hose. This motion is guided by two interwoven sinusoidal paths cut in the supporting rings. The spools move along these paths and the fibers are interwoven, much in the same way ribbons are wrapped around a Maypole. This idea had existed at least since 1934, since it was patented in patent number [http://www.google.com/patents?id=jmt5AAAAEBAJ&pg=PA1&dq=1983222&source=gbs_selected_pages&cad=1#v=onepage&q&f=false].

*[[User: John Gallagher]]

Homework 1/28 (John Gallagher)

2011-01-28T15:09:50Z

John Gallagher: