<?xml version="1.0"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
	<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/api.php?action=feedcontributions&amp;feedformat=atom&amp;user=Pmitros</id>
	<title>Bill Goodwine&#039;s Wiki - User contributions [en]</title>
	<link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/api.php?action=feedcontributions&amp;feedformat=atom&amp;user=Pmitros"/>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php/Special:Contributions/Pmitros"/>
	<updated>2026-05-30T15:57:34Z</updated>
	<subtitle>User contributions</subtitle>
	<generator>MediaWiki 1.44.2</generator>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Here_in_list_of_arguments_in_Quanta&amp;diff=4898</id>
		<title>Here in list of arguments in Quanta</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Here_in_list_of_arguments_in_Quanta&amp;diff=4898"/>
		<updated>2011-04-28T23:50:55Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Post a link to your summary of the brief you read here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief Summary 901330223]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[901349446 Quanta Brief]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief Summary 901471466]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief Summary 901422128]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quanta Brief Summary Jacob Marmolejo]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Homework 8 (due Friday 28)~jnosal | Quanta Brief Summary 901438174]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros: Quanta Brief]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4897</id>
		<title>Mitros: Quanta Brief</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4897"/>
		<updated>2011-04-28T23:49:29Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners==&lt;br /&gt;
Nokia argued that the previous decisions of the courts should be reversed or vacated for the following reasons:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* The patent laws were designed to generate a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition and prevent the advancement of progress of science in the useful art.&lt;br /&gt;
* A patent grants its owner “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the patented invention in the United States. When a patent holder first sells patented goods or authorizes licenses to sell these goods, they surrender their right to exclude and its patent rights are said to be exhausted. &lt;br /&gt;
**The Court’s precedents indicate that patent rights extinguished when a patent owner has received full value for parting with its right to exclude others from practicing the invention. At the same time they allow patent holders to contract freely with purchasers or licensees with respect to patent rights. &lt;br /&gt;
*** United States v. Univis Lens Co.: “where a patentee makes a patented article, and sells it, he can exercise no future control over what the purchaser may wish to do with the article after his purchase” because “it has passed beyond the scope of the patentee&#039;s rights.”&lt;br /&gt;
* The patent exhaustion doctrine is important in the modern technology industry which relies on complex, global supply chains to assemble their products.&lt;br /&gt;
** In modern electronic devices, numerous parties are relevant to the manufacturing process at different steps in the process. With such a complex system, it is important that supply chains be able to avoid patent “hold-ups” wherein a patent is directed at a single low value component or feature of a complex device may put the entire device at risk for patent infringement. &lt;br /&gt;
*** These hold-ups undermind the intended purpose of the patent system by providing protection to the patent owners far in excess of their actual innovation.&lt;br /&gt;
** Patent exhaustion is an important doctrine to allow manufacturers the ability to purchase various components free of patent rights that put their entire project at risk.&lt;br /&gt;
* Enforcement of the patent exhaustion doctrine will prevent patent holders from “double dipping” and extracting multiple royalties for the right to exclude the same invention. &lt;br /&gt;
** The patent holder should be permitted to pick a point within its supply chain at which it extracts these royalties, but once they do, the patent holder should be bound to their choice.&lt;br /&gt;
* In the present case, the previous rulings have allowed patent owners to extend patent rights past the point of first sale to downstream users of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
** The Supreme Court’s rulings have been to the contrary and should be enforced in this case to prevent the patent owner from “double dipping” on their patent rights.&lt;br /&gt;
* However, the Court should allow flexibility in patent owner’s rights to have flexibility in contracting their property rights.&lt;br /&gt;
** ie- patent owners should be free to restrict licensees in certain ways that fall within the legal rights of each party. These include limiting the geographic distribution of an invention or setting the price at which the licensee sells a manufactured product.&lt;br /&gt;
*** In General Electric Co. 272 U.S. 476 the Supreme Court held that GE’s contract with Westinghouse to make and sell modern light bulbs made with  GE’s patented methods only at the prices set by GE was valid.&lt;br /&gt;
*** The anti-trust laws provide a check to prevent a patent holder from enforcing restrictions via contract that are beyond the reasonable scope of a patent grant.&lt;br /&gt;
* A license provides “authority” for someone other than the patent owner to practice or manufacture the specific patent.&lt;br /&gt;
** The importance of a sale being authorized is demonstrated in the Supreme Court’s previous rulings on a property owner’s right to repair a patented article he or she owns.&lt;br /&gt;
*** For example, it is permissible for automobile owners to have their car taken into a shop for repairs. It is fine for a shop to repair individual components of a patented item, however, they cannot completely construct a patented item to replace an old one.&lt;br /&gt;
* In the case at hand, the court’s gave the patent owners restrictions that were unilaterally imposed on downstream purchasers which gave the patent holders windfalls and undue leverage because it permits royalties to be extracted multiple times for the same invention at various points within its supply chain.&lt;br /&gt;
** For the reasons mentioned above, the decision of the courts should be reversed.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4892</id>
		<title>Mitros: Quanta Brief</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4892"/>
		<updated>2011-04-28T23:44:40Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners==&lt;br /&gt;
Nokia argued that the previous decisions of the courts should be reversed or vacated for the following reasons:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* The patent laws were designed to generate a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition and prevent the advancement of progress of science in the useful art.&lt;br /&gt;
* A patent grants its owner “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the patented invention in the United States. When a patent holder first sells patented goods or authorizes licenses to sell these goods, they surrender their right to exclude and its patent rights are said to be exhausted. &lt;br /&gt;
**The Court’s precedents indicate that patent rights extinguished when a patent owner has received full value for parting with its right to exclude others from practicing the invention. At the same time they allow patent holders to contract freely with purchasers or licensees with respect to patent rights. &lt;br /&gt;
*** United States v. Univis Lens Co.: “where a patentee makes a patented article, and sells it, he can exercise no future control over what the purchaser may wish to do with the article after his purchase” because “it has passed beyond the scope of the patentee&#039;s rights.”&lt;br /&gt;
* The patent exhaustion doctrine is important in the modern technology industry which relies on complex, global supply chains to assemble their products.&lt;br /&gt;
** In modern electronic devices, numerous parties are relevant to the manufacturing process at different steps in the process. With such a complex system, it is important that supply chains be able to avoid patent “hold-ups” wherein a patent is directed at a single low value component or feature of a complex device may put the entire device at risk for patent infringement. &lt;br /&gt;
*** These hold-ups undermind the intended purpose of the patent system by providing protection to the patent owners far in excess of their actual innovation.&lt;br /&gt;
** Patent exhaustion is an important doctrine to allow manufacturers the ability to purchase various components free of patent rights that put their entire project at risk.&lt;br /&gt;
* Enforcement of the patent exhaustion doctrine will prevent patent holders from “double dipping” and extracting multiple royalties for the right to exclude the same invention. &lt;br /&gt;
** The patent holder should be permitted to pick a point within its supply chain at which it extracts these royalties, but once they do, the patent holder should be bound to their choice.&lt;br /&gt;
* In the present case, the previous rulings have allowed patent owners to extend patent rights past the point of first sale to downstream users of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
** The Supreme Court’s rulings have been to the contrary and should be enforced in this case to prevent the patent owner from “double dipping” on their patent rights.&lt;br /&gt;
* However, the Court should allow flexibility in patent owner’s rights to have flexibility in contracting their property rights.&lt;br /&gt;
** ie- patent owners should be free to restrict licensees in certain ways that fall within the legal rights of each party. These include limiting the geographic distribution of an invention or setting the price at which the licensee sells a manufactured product.&lt;br /&gt;
*** In General Electric Co. 272 U.S. 476 the Supreme Court held that GE’s contract with Westinghouse to make and sell modern light bulbs made with  GE’s patented methods only at the prices set by GE was valid.&lt;br /&gt;
*** The anti-trust laws provide a check to prevent a patent holder from enforcing restrictions via contract that are beyond the reasonable scope of a patent grant.&lt;br /&gt;
* A license provides “authority” for someone other than the patent owner to practice or manufacture the specific patent.&lt;br /&gt;
** The importance of a sale being authorized is demonstrated in the Supreme Court’s previous rulings on a property owner’s right to repair a patented article he or she owns.&lt;br /&gt;
*** For example, it is permissible for automobile owners to have their car taken into a shop for repairs. It is fine for a shop to repair individual components of a patented item, however, they cannot completely construct a patented item to replace an old one.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4888</id>
		<title>Mitros: Quanta Brief</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4888"/>
		<updated>2011-04-28T23:39:09Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners==&lt;br /&gt;
* The patent laws were designed to generate a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition and prevent the advancement of progress of science in the useful art.&lt;br /&gt;
* A patent grants its owner “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the patented invention in the United States. When a patent holder first sells patented goods or authorizes licenses to sell these goods, they surrender their right to exclude and its patent rights are said to be exhausted. &lt;br /&gt;
**The Court’s precedents indicate that patent rights extinguished when a patent owner has received full value for parting with its right to exclude others from practicing the invention. At the same time they allow patent holders to contract freely with purchasers or licensees with respect to patent rights. &lt;br /&gt;
*** United States v. Univis Lens Co.: “where a patentee makes a patented article, and sells it, he can exercise no future control over what the purchaser may wish to do with the article after his purchase” because “it has passed beyond the scope of the patentee&#039;s rights.”&lt;br /&gt;
* The patent exhaustion doctrine is important in the modern technology industry which relies on complex, global supply chains to assemble their products.&lt;br /&gt;
** In modern electronic devices, numerous parties are relevant to the manufacturing process at different steps in the process. With such a complex system, it is important that supply chains be able to avoid patent “hold-ups” wherein a patent is directed at a single low value component or feature of a complex device may put the entire device at risk for patent infringement. &lt;br /&gt;
*** These hold-ups undermind the intended purpose of the patent system by providing protection to the patent owners far in excess of their actual innovation.&lt;br /&gt;
** Patent exhaustion is an important doctrine to allow manufacturers the ability to purchase various components free of patent rights that put their entire project at risk.&lt;br /&gt;
* Enforcement of the patent exhaustion doctrine will prevent patent holders from “double dipping” and extracting multiple royalties for the right to exclude the same invention. &lt;br /&gt;
** The patent holder should be permitted to pick a point within its supply chain at which it extracts these royalties, but once they do, the patent holder should be bound to their choice.&lt;br /&gt;
* In the present case, the previous rulings have allowed patent owners to extend patent rights past the point of first sale to downstream users of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
** The Supreme Court’s rulings have been to the contrary and should be enforced in this case to prevent the patent owner from “double dipping” on their patent rights.&lt;br /&gt;
* However, the Court should allow flexibility in patent owner’s rights to have flexibility in contracting their property rights.&lt;br /&gt;
** ie- patent owners should be free to restrict licensees in certain ways that fall within the legal rights of each party. These include limiting the geographic distribution of an invention or setting the price at which the licensee sells a manufactured product.&lt;br /&gt;
*** In General Electric Co. 272 U.S. 476 the Supreme Court held that GE’s contract with Westinghouse to make and sell modern light bulbs made with  GE’s patented methods only at the prices set by GE was valid.&lt;br /&gt;
*** The anti-trust laws provide a check to prevent a patent holder from enforcing restrictions via contract that are beyond the reasonable scope of a patent grant.&lt;br /&gt;
* A license provides “authority” for someone other than the patent owner to practice or manufacture the specific patent.&lt;br /&gt;
** The importance of a sale being authorized is demonstrated in the Supreme Court’s previous rulings on a property owner’s right to repair a patented article he or she owns.&lt;br /&gt;
*** For example, it is permissible for automobile owners to have their car taken into a shop for repairs. It is fine for a shop to repair individual components of a patented item, however, they cannot completely construct a patented item to replace an old one.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4885</id>
		<title>Mitros: Quanta Brief</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4885"/>
		<updated>2011-04-28T23:37:43Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners==&lt;br /&gt;
* The patent laws were designed to generate a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition and prevent the advancement of progress of science in the useful art.&lt;br /&gt;
* A patent grants its owner “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the patented invention in the United States. When a patent holder first sells patented goods or authorizes licenses to sell these goods, they surrender their right to exclude and its patent rights are said to be exhausted. &lt;br /&gt;
**The Court’s precedents indicate that patent rights extinguished when a patent owner has received full value for parting with its right to exclude others from practicing the invention. At the same time they allow patent holders to contract freely with purchasers or licensees with respect to patent rights. &lt;br /&gt;
*** United States v. Univis Lens Co.: “where a patentee makes a patented article, and sells it, he can exercise no future control over what the purchaser may wish to do with the article after his purchase” because “it has passed beyond the scope of the patentee&#039;s rights.”&lt;br /&gt;
* The patent exhaustion doctrine is important in the modern technology industry which relies on complex, global supply chains to assemble their products.&lt;br /&gt;
** In modern electronic devices, numerous parties are relevant to the manufacturing process at different steps in the process. With such a complex system, it is important that supply chains be able to avoid patent “hold-ups” wherein a patent is directed at a single low value component or feature of a complex device may put the entire device at risk for patent infringement. &lt;br /&gt;
*** These hold-ups undermind the intended purpose of the patent system by providing protection to the patent owners far in excess of their actual innovation.&lt;br /&gt;
* Enforcement of the patent exhaustion doctrine will prevent patent holders from “double dipping” and extracting multiple royalties for the right to exclude the same invention. &lt;br /&gt;
** The patent holder should be permitted to pick a point within its supply chain at which it extracts these royalties, but once they do, the patent holder should be bound to their choice.&lt;br /&gt;
* In the present case, the previous rulings have allowed patent owners to extend patent rights past the point of first sale to downstream users of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
** The Supreme Court’s rulings have been to the contrary and should be enforced in this case to prevent the patent owner from “double dipping” on their patent rights.&lt;br /&gt;
* However, the Court should allow flexibility in patent owner’s rights to have flexibility in contracting their property rights.&lt;br /&gt;
** ie- patent owners should be free to restrict licensees in certain ways that fall within the legal rights of each party. These include limiting the geographic distribution of an invention or setting the price at which the licensee sells a manufactured product.&lt;br /&gt;
*** In General Electric Co. 272 U.S. 476 the Supreme Court held that GE’s contract with Westinghouse to make and sell modern light bulbs made with  GE’s patented methods only at the prices set by GE was valid.&lt;br /&gt;
*** The anti-trust laws provide a check to prevent a patent holder from enforcing restrictions via contract that are beyond the reasonable scope of a patent grant.&lt;br /&gt;
* A license provides “authority” for someone other than the patent owner to practice or manufacture the specific patent.&lt;br /&gt;
** The importance of a sale being authorized is demonstrated in the Supreme Court’s previous rulings on a property owner’s right to repair a patented article he or she owns.&lt;br /&gt;
*** For example, it is permissible for automobile owners to have their car taken into a shop for repairs. It is fine for a shop to repair individual components of a patented item, however, they cannot completely construct a patented item to replace an old one.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4884</id>
		<title>Mitros: Quanta Brief</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4884"/>
		<updated>2011-04-28T23:30:15Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners==&lt;br /&gt;
* The patent laws were designed to generate a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition and prevent the advancement of progress of science in the useful art.&lt;br /&gt;
* A patent grants its owner “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the patented invention in the United States. When a patent holder first sells patented goods or authorizes licenses to sell these goods, they surrender their right to exclude and its patent rights are said to be exhausted. &lt;br /&gt;
**The Court’s precedents indicate that patent rights extinguished when a patent owner has received full value for parting with its right to exclude others from practicing the invention. At the same time they allow patent holders to contract freely with purchasers or licensees with respect to patent rights. &lt;br /&gt;
*** United States v. Univis Lens Co.: “where a patentee makes a patented article, and sells it, he can exercise no future control over what the purchaser may wish to do with the article after his purchase” because “it has passed beyond the scope of the patentee&#039;s rights.”&lt;br /&gt;
* The patent exhaustion doctrine is important in the modern technology industry which relies on complex, global supply chains to assemble their products.&lt;br /&gt;
* Enforcement of the patent exhaustion doctrine will prevent patent holders from “double dipping” and extracting multiple royalties for the right to exclude the same invention. &lt;br /&gt;
** The patent holder should be permitted to pick a point within its supply chain at which it extracts these royalties, but once they do, the patent holder should be bound to their choice.&lt;br /&gt;
* In the present case, the previous rulings have allowed patent owners to extend patent rights past the point of first sale to downstream users of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
** The Supreme Court’s rulings have been to the contrary and should be enforced in this case to prevent the patent owner from “double dipping” on their patent rights.&lt;br /&gt;
* However, the Court should allow flexibility in patent owner’s rights to have flexibility in contracting their property rights.&lt;br /&gt;
** ie- patent owners should be free to restrict licensees in certain ways that fall within the legal rights of each party. These include limiting the geographic distribution of an invention or setting the price at which the licensee sells a manufactured product.&lt;br /&gt;
*** In General Electric Co. 272 U.S. 476 the Supreme Court held that GE’s contract with Westinghouse to make and sell modern light bulbs made with  GE’s patented methods only at the prices set by GE was valid.&lt;br /&gt;
*** The anti-trust laws provide a check to prevent a patent holder from enforcing restrictions via contract that are beyond the reasonable scope of a patent grant.&lt;br /&gt;
* A license provides “authority” for someone other than the patent owner to practice or manufacture the specific patent.&lt;br /&gt;
** The importance of a sale being authorized is demonstrated in the Supreme Court’s previous rulings on a property owner’s right to repair a patented article he or she owns.&lt;br /&gt;
*** For example, it is permissible for automobile owners to have their car taken into a shop for repairs. It is fine for a shop to repair individual components of a patented item, however, they cannot completely construct a patented item to replace an old one.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4883</id>
		<title>Mitros: Quanta Brief</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4883"/>
		<updated>2011-04-28T23:25:50Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners==&lt;br /&gt;
•	The patent laws were designed to generate a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition and prevent the advancement of progress of science in the useful art&lt;br /&gt;
•	A patent grants its owner “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the patented invention in the United States. When a patent holder first sells patented goods or authorizes licenses to sell these goods, they surrender their right to exclude and its patent rights are said to be exhausted. &lt;br /&gt;
o	The Court’s precedents indicate that patent rights extinguished when a patent owner has received full value for parting with its right to exclude others from practicing the invention. At the same time they allow patent holders to contract freely with purchasers or licensees with respect to patent rights. &lt;br /&gt;
	United States v. Univis Lens Co.: “where a patentee makes a patented article, and sells it, he can exercise no future control over what the purchaser may wish to do with the article after his purchase” because “it has passed beyond the scope of the patentee&#039;s rights.”&lt;br /&gt;
•	The patent exhaustion doctrine is important in the modern technology industry which relies on complex, global supply chains to assemble their products.&lt;br /&gt;
•	Enforcement of the patent exhaustion doctrine will prevent patent holders from “double dipping” and extracting multiple royalties for the right to exclude the same invention. &lt;br /&gt;
o	The patent holder should be permitted to pick a point within its supply chain at which it extracts these royalties, but once they do, the patent holder should be bound to their choice.&lt;br /&gt;
•	In the present case, the previous rulings have allowed patent owners to extend patent rights past the point of first sale to downstream users of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
o	The Supreme Court’s rulings have been to the contrary and should be enforced in this case to prevent the patent owner from “double dipping” on their patent rights.&lt;br /&gt;
•	However, the Court should allow flexibility in patent owner’s rights to have flexibility in contracting their property rights.&lt;br /&gt;
o	ie- patent owners should be free to restrict licensees in certain ways that fall within the legal rights of each party. These include limiting the geographic distribution of an invention or setting the price at which the licensee sells a manufactured product.&lt;br /&gt;
	In General Electric Co. 272 U.S. 476 the Supreme Court held that GE’s contract with Westinghouse to make and sell modern light bulbs made with  GE’s patented methods only at the prices set by GE was valid.&lt;br /&gt;
	The anti-trust laws provide a check to prevent a patent holder from enforcing restrictions via contract that are beyond the reasonable scope of a patent grant.&lt;br /&gt;
•	A license provides “authority” for someone other than the patent owner to practice or manufacture the specific patent.&lt;br /&gt;
o	The importance of a sale being authorized is demonstrated in the Supreme Court’s previous rulings on a property owner’s right to repair a patented article he or she owns.&lt;br /&gt;
	For example, it is permissible for automobile owners to have their car taken into a shop for repairs. It is fine for a shop to repair individual components of a patented item, however, they cannot completely construct a patented item to replace an old one.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4858</id>
		<title>Mitros: Quanta Brief</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Quanta_Brief&amp;diff=4858"/>
		<updated>2011-04-28T20:05:15Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: Created page with &amp;quot;==Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners==&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Brief of Amici Curiae Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. in Support of Petitioners==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Pmitros&amp;diff=4857</id>
		<title>User:Pmitros</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Pmitros&amp;diff=4857"/>
		<updated>2011-04-28T20:04:44Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;=== Homework Assignments ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework 1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework 2]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework 3 (2/4/2011)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework (3/23/11)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros: Defense of Hamilton Sundstrand (4/4/2011)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros: Quanta Brief]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Doctrine_of_Equivalents_Case_List&amp;diff=4571</id>
		<title>Doctrine of Equivalents Case List</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Doctrine_of_Equivalents_Case_List&amp;diff=4571"/>
		<updated>2011-04-04T04:53:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Add your case to the list with a one-paragraph (approximately 250 words) summary of the facts at issues, i.e., &amp;quot;an umbrella is or is not equivalent to a parasol because...&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Please put the cases in chronological order.  If two are from the same year, then put them in alphabetical order.  Also put your name, your login name or NDID number with your case.  Use the following for a template.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Goodwine v. Batill, 123 US 4567 (1066)&lt;br /&gt;
This case concerned a patent for an iPad and the patentee sued the maker of an iPod for infringement.  The important part of the claim was &amp;quot;a device for playing music and other media comprising a touch screen...&amp;quot; The court held that iPod infringed the iPad patent because the ... was equivalent to the ... because ...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bill Goodwine&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968), (67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)&lt;br /&gt;
This case was discussed in class and presented by another student, but I read it as well.  This case concerned a patent for a gyroscope owned by Adkins, the inventor of an improved gyroscope, and Lear, the company that sells gyroscopes. Lear and Adkins had a written agreement that allowed Lear to sell Adkin’s patented invention, where Adkins received a small percentage of the net sales price as royalties. In 1957, Lear refused to pay royalties to Adkins with the claim that they were selling gyroscopes that differed from Adkin’s invention. However, the “new” gyroscopes differed only in “size, form, and shape,” but “contain[ed] the same elements.” The essential elements were the same between Adkin’s patent and Lear’s other steel gyroscopes, but the scale and exact assembly was different. Since those did not constitute a substantial difference, the jury of the Supreme Court of California held Adkins in favor and required Lear to pay royalties to Adkins for the sales price of the other gyroscopes sold. This case is an example of clear infringement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
901431048&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Adkins v. Lear, Inc. (1968)(67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545)&lt;br /&gt;
I am the other student^^^(see case above). Other items of note in the case, aside from the summary above, include that the court ruled that infringing the doctrine of equivalence is a matter of fact and that the jury should be the one to establish it.  This brings up an interesting qualification, as it seems almost every other case considered with respect to the doctrine of equivalence was decided by judges, not juries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Brobins&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*AMEC Liquidating Trust v. IVAC Corporation, 885 F.2d 1574 (1989)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AMEC had a patent for a thermometer with a plastic cover held on by a hooking type mechanism. IVAC created a thermometer with a cover held on by a ring that created a friction lock. The CAFC held the IVAC invention was non-infringing on the AMEC patent because under the doctrine of equivalents, it did not perform the same function in the same way. The AMEC thermometer cover used an inscription fit, which created deep scratches in the cover. The IVAC thermometer used a friction fit, which only created superficial scratches in the cover. The CAFC found that the superficial scratches did not constitute an inscription fit. Also, the CAFC decided that AMEC did not present any evidence proving that the ring in the IVAC patent was equivalent to the “hook” in the AMEC patent. Because of this, the patent was non-infringing under the doctrine of equivalents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
901444263&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574 (1989)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The inventor, Turner, invented a thermometer probe cover that stays on (this was owned by AMEC).  It kept the cover on via a sharp metal hook to tear into the cover’s plastic.  IVAC developed a thermometer that served a similar purpose of keeping the probe cover on, except that it did so with a ring on the probe (to hold the cover via friction).  IVAC intentionally left the probe free of any sharp edge to ease the removal of the probe cover when needed.  District Court of Southern California ruled in summary judgment that IVAC’s thermometer probe covers do not infringe AMEC’s.  On appeal from AMEC, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.  A ring that does not tear the plastic cover is not equivalent to the hook that does. [http://campus.westlaw.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/result/default.wl?mt=CampusLaw&amp;amp;db=ALLCASES&amp;amp;rlt=CLID_QRYRLT4121840350313&amp;amp;origin=Search&amp;amp;sp=003654480-2000&amp;amp;method=TNC&amp;amp;cfid=1&amp;amp;rp=%2fwelcome%2fCampusLaw%2fdefault.wl&amp;amp;eq=welcome%2fCampusLaw&amp;amp;rltdb=CLID_DB1095239350313&amp;amp;srch=TRUE&amp;amp;query=TI(JOHNSTON+%26+IVAC)&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;fmqv=s&amp;amp;action=Search&amp;amp;fn=_top&amp;amp;service=Search&amp;amp;sv=Split&amp;amp;rs=WLW11.01]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
901471466&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey &amp;amp; Associates (1990)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wilson is suing DGA/Dunlop for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents of its patented design for a golf ball. Wilson&#039;s patent is for a golf ball modeled as an icosahedron with dimples placed in such a way as to have 6 &amp;quot;great circles&amp;quot; of symmetry instead of the typical 1. The patent specifies where dimples should be placed on the ball and requires that no dimples be placed on the great circles. The accused DGA balls use the same &amp;quot;great circles&amp;quot; design, but with dimples placed on the great circles. DGA&#039;s defense is that there is &amp;quot;no principled difference&amp;quot; between its design and a design of the prior art (prior to Wilson&#039;s patent). Therefore, allowing Wilson to utilize the doctrine of equivalents would extend protection of claims already in the prior art to Wilson&#039;s patent. The CAFC decided that Wilson can only utilize the doctrine of equivalents if it can make a hypothetical claim that literally covers Dunlop&#039;s design (in this case, claim a ball with dimples placed on the great circles) and is also nonobvious considering the prior art. Wilson is unable to make such a nonobvious hypothetical claim and therefore no infringement was found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
901338276&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202 (1992) &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lemelson sued Mattel, alleging that Mattel&#039;s &amp;quot;Hot Wheels&amp;quot; toy car track infringed on his patented toy track. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of the plaintiff. Mattel appealed to the CAFC. The Court held that the &amp;quot;Hot Wheels&amp;quot; track did not contain all the limitations of the patent; it was equivalent to the prior art. That is, Lemelson&#039;s patent could not be both valid in light of the prior art and infringed upon by Mattel. Furthermore, upon his first application, claim 3 of Lemelson&#039;s patent had five clauses. The PTO examiner found the patent to be indistinguishable from the prior art. Lemelson added clauses [f] and [g] and received a patent. The important parts of the claim were, &amp;quot;[f] said guide means include a pair of spaced apart runner portions for defining the pathway of a vehicle moving over said track, [g] said spaced apart runner portions include upwardly extending rails for guiding the wheels of a vehicle.&amp;quot; The Court held that &amp;quot;Hot wheels&amp;quot; did not contain any elements equivalent to the clauses [f] and [g]. The Court also noted that the public is entitled to the PTO record to determine the scope and meaning of claims. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
901330223&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Valmont Industries Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing Company Inc., 983 F.2d 1039 (1993)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
901316153&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This case concerns an adaption for center-pivot (i.e. rotating) irrigation systems. The adaption (an apparatus that attaches to the main frame of the sprinkler) allows the corners of a field, normally missed by the standard rotating irrigation system, to be watered. The infringement issue relates to the means by which the position of the sprinkler is detected, relative to the field. The patent uses a method of pivot angle encoders, while the &amp;quot;infringing&amp;quot; patent uses buried electromagnetic cables to guide the sprinkler around the field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The CAFC ruled that the second device was not infringing, reversing the decision of the district court. The district court argued that the means of controlling the system were equivalent. The CAFC&#039;s argument was that while the two irrigation systems performed substantially the same overall function to obtain substantially the same overall result as the claimed invention, the way those results were achieved was substantially different. &amp;quot;Comparison of these two control means compels the conclusion that the claimed control means and Reinke&#039;s control means are not structurally equivalent.[...][E]ven though both the control means in the specification and the control means on Reinke&#039;s device use electric signals, the structures generating those signals are strikingly different.&amp;quot; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because the doctrine of equivalence requires that the two devices perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same results, the two control systems were not equivalent under the doctrine of equivalence because they did not meet the &amp;quot;way&amp;quot; requirement of the doctrine of equivalence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*William Bradshaw and Robert Shepherd v. Igloo Products Corp. 1997 WL 543109 (US District Court, N.D.Ill.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
William Bradshaw sued Igloo Products for infringement of a wheeled cooler. Bradshaw’s patent was for a cooler with a pulling handle and two lifting handles, one of which was connected on the same axle as the pulling handle. The Igloo products in question were the Rolling Kool Locker which had a rotatable lifting hand that can also be used to pull the cooler and the Cool Roller which had separate lifting and pulling handles coupled to separate axles. The court decided that the prior art for the Cool Roller was a different patent, the Mason patent. This patent was for a wheeled cooler with separate lifting and pulling handles. The Mason patent was granted before Bradshaw’s patent. The court ruled that the Cool Roller fell under the Mason patent. Therefore, if Bradshaw’s patent were to be expanded to include the Cool Roller’s handles, it would be an invalid patent as a result of the prior art, the Mason patent. This leads to a method of deciding infringement. If the product in question mimics prior art, then it cannot infringe the patent otherwise that patent would be invalid. In deciding infringement for the Rolling Kool Locker, the court decided that it was up to a jury to decide whether the Kool Lockers handles were equivalent to Bradshaw’s patent, since there was no other glaring evidence. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Eric Paul&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Dr. Raymond G. Tronzo v. Biomet Inc. 1998 156 F.3d 1154 (United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit)&lt;br /&gt;
In this case Biomet was accused of infringement of an artificial hip prosthesis patented by Dr. Tronzo (patent 4,743,262). The alleged infringement revolved around the shape of the artificial hip socket and the hinge that was inserted into the socket. Patent ‘262 claimed a “generally conical” shape of the hip socket. Biomet’s design contained a strictly hemispherical shape. The court heard evidence in which it was claimed that even though the shapes would have at first glance performed in the same manner, the forces generated on the surface of each implant would be different depending on the shape. Additionally, after hearing expert testimony that suggested any shape would have been equivalent to the conical limitations of the patent claims, the court said that such a ruling would have been impermissible under the all-elements rule of Warner Jenkinson because it would write the “generally conical” shape limitation out of the claims. Therefore, the court held that the accused design did not infringe upon the patent claims under the doctrine of equivalence. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peter Mitros (901461727)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Hale Propeller, L.L.C. v Ryan Marine Products Pty., LTD., et al, 151 F. Supp .2d 183 (2001) Connecticut District Court&lt;br /&gt;
Ryan owned patent 4411073, issued on 25 October 1983, which concerned devices to measure the pitch of propeller blades. Ryan originally filed the claim on 13 July 1981 it was rejected and then ammended on 4 October 1982. Hale&#039;s device called the &amp;quot;Hale Propeller MRI&amp;quot; was developed in 1997. In question are claims 1(b),(c),(f), and 6. A third party, Michigan Wheel Corporation, a distributor of Hale&#039;s invention filed for patent invalidity.  The important differences between Hale&#039;s and Ryan&#039;s device are that Hale&#039;s does not use gears or worm-drives to rotate the blade and the device does not give direct readouts of the measurements using electric circuits. The issue with claim 1(b) was if a roller was a necessary part of the structure because it prevents skipping of the probe making the measurements more accurate. The court used means-plus-function to rule that the roller was important and Hale did not infringe. The issue with claim 1(c) deals with whether a worm or gear drive is necessary to rotate the blade. Ryan&#039;s patent discloses a hand-cranked device, like Hales, but includes a worm-drive. Part of Ryan&#039;s ammendment to his claim was to include worm gear to the hand-cranking device and therefore the court used prosecution history estoppel to make their decision because Ryan forfeited that claim (hand-cranked device without worm-drive) in order to get the patent and therefore cannot use doctrine of equivalents to get the claim back. The issue of claim 1(f) was whether the computer in the claim was a special computer needed for the readouts. The court ruled that the claim was not that narrow, but then the court ruled that claim 6 dealt with a computer that receives measurement data from the optical encoder and therefore Hale did not infringe. The patent was also ruled valid using the roller and worm drive to prove that it was non-obvious §103, definitively disclosed §112, and not anticipated by prior art §102(b).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gillian Allsup&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
901281608&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics &amp;amp; Plastics, Inc. Nos. 2010-1145, 2010-117. (2001) United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
	This case began as an infringement lawsuit by Siemens Medical Solutions USA, inc. against Saint-Gobain Ceramics and Plastics, Inc. for the alleged infringement of a patent held by Siemens for a scintillator, a part of an x-ray machine that detects radiation. Saint-Gobain owned a patent for a similar device and the circuit court found that this patent infringed on the patent held by Siemens, which was filed earlier. Though the doctrine of equivalents was used to rule infringement, Saint-Gobain was found to have accidentally, rather than willfully infringed and Siemens was awarded 52.3 million dollars.   &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
Siemens filed for patent number 4,958,080 on August 4, 1989. This patent was for a scintillator containing cerium-doped- lutetium oxyorthosilicate. This is a component of a radiation detector that absorbs  gamma-ray photons from an x-ray machine and converts them to visible light so the results can be interpreted. Saint-Gobain also produces scintillators, filing patent number 6,6424,420 in 2000 for a cerium-doped lutetium-yttrium orthosilicate. The chemical composition differs from that of the Siemens&#039; patent as %10 of the lutetium is substituted for yttrium. These scintillators were sold by Saint-Gobain to Philips Medical Systems, a competitor of Siemens. The circuit court found that the composition of Saint-Gobain&#039;s scintillator preformed largely the same function in the same manner as Siemens&#039; patent, and therefore was infringement under the doctrine of equivalence. &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
Saint-Gobain filed a motion for a new trail, on the basis that the jury was not told that infringement by the doctrine of equivalence must be proved by clear evidence and argued that damages should be remitted. The Federal Appeals Court did not grant Saint-Gobain a new trial, but did reduces the damages to 44 million. &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Homedics, Inc., Slip Copy, 2010 WL 5230892 (2010)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This case involved a patent for a force-transmitting bearing used with a platform scale. Sunbeam held a patent which specified bearings which were attached to the platform via loose tabs which allowed the bearings to move horizontally. The patent claims required the base of the bearing to be oriented parallel to the platform and remain parallel to the platform at all times. The structure of the accused device was such that the bearings were connection to the platforms using dimples on the lower surface of the platform which the bearings fit into. Sunbeam had criticized prior art which used a similar dimple connection during prosecution beacuse of the potential for unwanted force moments applied by the bearing. The CAFC upheld the District Court&#039;s finding of no infringement based on the doctrine of equivalents because bearings which rocked and pivoted, as the accused device did, did not fall within the reach of the patent claims because they did not remain parallel to the platform at all times.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
901422128&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326 (2001)&lt;br /&gt;
Kustom Signals held a patent for a multimode traffic radar system which will show either the fastest speed or the strongest signal. Three of the claims used the word &amp;quot;or&amp;quot; in their wording. Kustom claimed that the &amp;quot;or&amp;quot; was a logical operator meaning one, the other, or both. Applied Concepts had designed a radar system which returned both the fastest speed and the strongest signal. The Court held that the word &amp;quot;or&amp;quot; was to hold its traditional, customary meaning as being exclusive, not inclusive, of the two statements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
901 41 7852&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc., 126 F. 3d 1420 (1997)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sage Products sued Devon Industries for infringement of several patents relating to containers for disposing of hazardous medical waste (needles etc.). Devon counter-sued for infringement of one of its similar patents. The district court held (on summary judgment) that there was no infringement by either party literally or equivalently. The appellate court affirmed. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Devon’s first alleged infringement was of Sage’s container claiming an elongated slot &amp;quot;at the top&amp;quot; of the apparatus for which to deposit waste, and a &amp;quot;barrier over the slot&amp;quot; to prevent contamination. Devon&#039;s patent involved a type of elongated slot that was embedded within the container and a hinged element at the opening. The court ruled no literal infringement because the Devon patent did not include the &amp;quot;at the top&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;over&amp;quot; features of the Sage claim. Even though the devices perform the same function the court ruled no equivalent infringement because the hinged element did not &amp;quot;substantially constrict access&amp;quot; to the container, and the slot was not &amp;quot;substantially at the top&amp;quot; of the container. The court was adamant that equivalent function could not negate the “at the top” and “over” limitations of the patent, stating  that such power would reduce patent claims to &amp;quot;functional abstracts&amp;quot; devoid of meaningful structure limitations for the public to reference. A second infringement involved in this case resulted in the court ruling that if patent claims specify a function and recite its importance the patentee cannot later accuse an invention devoid of the specified function of infringement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
901419437&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Siemens Medical Solutions USA, INC. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics &amp;amp; Plastics., F.3d, 2011 WL 651790 (2011)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Siemens developed, manufactured, and sold PET scanners which made use of scintillator crystals consisting of cerium-doped lutetium oxyorthosilicate (LSO). Saint-Gobain manufactures and sells scintillator crystals for use in PET scanners which consisted of cerium-doped lutetium-yttrium orthosilicate (LYSO). This is chemically different from LSO in that some of the lutetium is substituted for by yttrium. In Saint-Gobain&#039;s crystals, 10% of the lutetium atoms are substituted for by yttrium atoms (crystals are 10% Y LYSO). In April of 2007, Siemens sued Saint-Gobain for infringement of claims 1 and 2 of Siemens &#039;080 patent for LSO scintillator crystals and photodetectors. Saint-Gobain aregued that its LYSO crystals are  not equivalent to those claimed in the &#039;080 patent because their crystals are separately claimed by their &#039;420 patent. A jury trial found Saint-Gobain infringing upon the claims held by Siemens. Saint-Gobains appeals, and claims that the district court erred in jury instructions, claiming that in cases where an alleged equivalent is separately patented, a higher burden of evidence is required. Their reasoning was that the jury&#039;s finding of infringement effectively invalidated their &#039;420 patent for LYSO crystals as the ruling of equivalence implied a conclusion of obviousness. The Court of Appeals disagrees, stating that it is well established that separate patentability does not avoid equivalency as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals also disagrees that the jury&#039;s finding of infringement invalidates the &#039;420 patent; it only finds the level of LYSO used in practice (10%) is equivalent to Siemen&#039;s LSO crystals. Other compositions of LYSO could well be non-equivalent. Using the function-way-result test which asks whether an element of the an accused product performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way, the Court of Appeals affirms the juries finding of infringement. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Erich Wolz&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sunbeam Products Inc. v. Homedics Products Inc. , US Court of Appeals, District Court of Wisconsin (2010)&lt;br /&gt;
This case involved a clear example of non-equivalence relating to the doctrine of equivalence. The patent holder Sunbeam Products brought action against competitor Homedics, alleging infringement of its patent for force-transmitting bearings for a platform scale. This case was decided under the district court of Wisconsin. Sunbeam Products had created platform bearings which translated purely horizontally along a platform which transferred all platform loads into purely vertical loads supported by the bearings. A previous patent, ‘326 patent, encompassed bearings which rocked and pivoted. HoMedics&#039;s accused scales all include bearings similar to the bearing disclosed in the ′326 patent. Each of the HoMedics bearings is machined with a nose-like protrusion that fits into a corresponding dimple on the underside of the platform. The trial court noted that the accused bearings all rock and pivot within their corresponding dimples in the underside of the platform. Sunbeam did not dispute that the HoMedics bearings rock and pivot in that manner. Sunbeam&#039;s argument was that in addition to rocking and pivoting, the HoMedics bearings were capable of some horizontal movement and therefore infringe the ′420 patent.&lt;br /&gt;
In light of its claim construction and the undisputed evidence regarding the operation of the bearings in the accused HoMedics products, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. The court determined that no reasonable juror could find that bearings that rock and pivot remain parallel to the underside of the platform; accordingly, it held that the pivoting bearings in all of the accused products do not literally infringe the ′420 patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most important distinction that was made in this case was the following statement. “The doctrine of equivalents is not a license to rewrite the claims to encompass what a patentee believes to be an equivalent structure. That is especially true in a case such as this one, where the accused product is not later-developed technology that is insubstantially different from the claimed invention, but instead embodies disavowed prior art. Thus, the district court correctly held that the accused bearings do not infringe the ′420 patent under the doctrine of equivalents.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Christine Roetzel - 901425022&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. 717 F.2d 1351&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
NASA and Department of Defense, were trying to build a satellite that would orbit the earth.  However, they were unable to do so they had problems with the attitude control.  Williams, a man who was working for Hughes Co. was able to figure out the problem.  He was able to have lab model on 4/2/60 and it was called &amp;quot;dynamic wheel.&amp;quot;  Williams presented it to NASA and then Hughes Co and NASA entered an agreement to build the satellite.  Williams filed for a patent on 4/18/60 and that became known as &amp;quot;Williams patent.&amp;quot;  &lt;br /&gt;
However, the govt started to build these spacecrafts that used the same systems from the satellite and did not give compensation to Williams.  It went to court and the govt said that Williams patent was invalid because it infringed McLean&#039;s telescope.  Williams rewrote his claims and stated “McLean&#039;s infrared telescope does not indicate the instantaneous spin angle position of his body with reference to a fixed external coordinate system, and it does not indicate the orientation of the axis with reference to a fixed external coordinate system.&amp;quot;  The court found Williams patent valid.&lt;br /&gt;
Then, the court looked at the spacecraft and compared it to Williams satellite.  They found the following similarites:  &amp;quot;(1) each is spin-stabilized; (2) each contains a jet on the periphery, connected by a valve to a tank containing fluid for expulsion substantially parallel to the spin axis; (3) each employs sun sensors to sense ISA position; (4) each requires knowledge of orientation relative to a fixed external coordinate system; (5) each contains radio equipment for communicating with the ground; (6) each transmits spin rate and sun angle information to a ground crew; and (7) in each, jet firing is synchronized with ISA position to effect controlled precession and thus to achieve a desired orientation.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
Needless to say the court ruled that govt infringed Williams patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
901439143&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc. 126 F.3d. 1420 (1997)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this case, Sage Products sued Devon Industries for infringement of two of its patents and Devon countersued Sage for infringement of one of its own patents, all of which relate to the disposal of medical waste products such as needles.  In trial and on appeal, the courts held that there was no literal infringement nor infringement by the doctrine of equivalents by any party.   Sage claimed that Devon&#039;s &#039;251 for a &amp;quot;tortuous path&amp;quot; disposal container infringed on both its &#039;728 patent for a sharps disposal container and its &#039;849 patent for the removal and storage of syringe needles.  Devon claimed that Sage&#039;s &#039;728 patent infringed on its &#039;592 patent for a disposal container.&lt;br /&gt;
** The &#039;728 patent consists of an opening with a curved arc extending above it and another below it (inside the container) with a rotatable L-shaped flap such that waste can be deposited without exposing it again.&lt;br /&gt;
** The &#039;849 patent covers a container with notches for removing needles and a &amp;quot;moveable closure&amp;quot; that allows the container to be closed and reopened as needed.&lt;br /&gt;
** The &#039;251 patent covers a disposal container with a slotted opening at the top and 2 overlapping but displaced obstructions within the container to prevent accessing material that has been disposed of.  It also has a closure that permanently locks once closed.&lt;br /&gt;
** The 592 patent covers a container that has a slotted opening and another &amp;quot;baffle&amp;quot; within the container that has another slotted opening horizontally displaced from the first&lt;br /&gt;
The courts held that the &#039;251 patent did not infringe on the &#039;728 patent because the patent explicitly described a precise configuration of  an opening at the &amp;quot;top of the container&amp;quot; with one obstruction &amp;quot;over said slot&amp;quot; and another below, and that &#039;251 configuration was different.  They also held that the &#039;251 patent did not infringe on the &#039;849 patent because there was an important difference between permanent closure and closure that can be reopened.  Finally, the &#039;728 patent did not infringe on the &#039;592 patents for similar reasons as the first: the configurations were very different.  The &#039;592 patent emphasized a horizontal displacement, which was not part of the &#039;728 patent.  The courts held that the use of precise language in patents limited the claims and because disposal containers were reasonably simple and straightforward, different configurations could not be equated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Julia Potter (jpotter2)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Kudlacek v. DBC, Inc. 115 F. Supp. 2d 996 (2000)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Owner of Patent No. 5,611,325 for an archery bow stabilizer, Donald Kudlacek, brought an infringement suit against competitor DBC, Inc. DBC counterclaimed, stating that its patent for a peep sight targeting system was being infringed. The claim in question was a &amp;quot;threading&amp;quot; limitation on the stabilizer describing how it is adjusted and secured.  The District Court decided that neither Kudlacek&#039;s stabilizer nor DBC&#039;s peep sight target system were infringed. This was because the accused device, the &amp;quot;Super Stix,&amp;quot; was found to not be equivalent to the patented device because it did not infringe all the elements of claim 1. Though the accused device performs, basically, the same function, it does so in a substantially different way; therefore the Doctrine of Equivalents does not apply. Note that the invalidity issue was not settled by finding that the patent was not infringed. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
901437068&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Defense_of_Hamilton_Sundstrand_(4/4/2011)&amp;diff=4566</id>
		<title>Mitros: Defense of Hamilton Sundstrand (4/4/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Defense_of_Hamilton_Sundstrand_(4/4/2011)&amp;diff=4566"/>
		<updated>2011-04-04T04:31:19Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Defense of Hamilton Sundstrand==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The basis of the defense for Hamilton Sundstrand revolves around two issues. These two issues are whether Hamilton’s invention APS 3200 infringed upon Honeywell’s ‘194 and ‘893 patents by the doctrine of equivalence based off of foreseeability and tangential relation. This argument will focus specifically on the issue of foreseeability. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before focusing on this issue, it is important to remember that it is the responsibility of the patentee to fully disclose and document their invention under section 112 such that a person containing ordinary skill in the art would be able to replicate the invention without further experimentation. Additionally, as set forth in the case of Graver Tank v. Linde Air Products, a patentee can claim infringement through the doctrine of equivalence if an invention accomplishes essentially the same result through essentially the same means. As further put forth in the case of Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis, the best way to determine equivalence is to examine each claim on an element by element basis in order to determine equivalence between the elements of two different inventions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As related to this case, the foreseeability criterion weakens Honeywell’s claims of infringement through equivalence. The foreseeability criterion asks whether the alleged equivalent would have been unforeseeable to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the amendment. Since it would be unreasonable to expect someone to anticipate the state of technology a few years in the future from their initial filing, foreseeability gives the patentee some leadway in their patent claims in conjunction with the doctrine of equivalence. However, the emphasis here is whether the equivalent element would have been obvious to the fictional person of ordinary skill in the art, not whether the equivalent was obvious to the patentee at the time of their application. Because the purpose of the patent laws are to advance the scientific arts and provide a means of informing the public of what is considered to be publicly available for use, our concern is not with placating the patentee, but accomplishing these two primary goals. The foreseeability criterion attempts to strike a balance between these two goals and protecting the patentee to such an extent as to encourage them to file for a patent. In the case at hand, there has been expert testimony claiming that in 1982, the year of Honeywell’s invention, the items found within the Hamilton Sundstrand invention would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Additionally, the prior art contains the L1011 device as well as the Glennon patent, both of which were developed in the 1970’s and contain some of the key teachings that the Sundstrand invention utilizes. Therefore, in light of the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, one would have to assume that the items of the Sundstrand invention would have been foreseeable to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In light of this evidence, the Court must find that the development of the Sundstrand device was foreseeable to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time Honeywell filed its patents. As a result of this, it was the responsibility of Honeywell to draft its claims in such a manner as to contain the elements found in Sundstrand invention as well as their orientation and use within the Sundstrand invention if they desired protection on the item. Although Honeywell claims ignorance on the topic, what Honeywell knew is irrelevant to the purpose of the patent laws and the issue at the heart of this debate. Rather, the key issue is on the ordinary person in the art. In light of this and the evidence presented, one must conclude that Sundstrand is innocent of the charges of infringement brought against it.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Defense_of_Hamilton_Sundstrand_(4/4/2011)&amp;diff=4565</id>
		<title>Mitros: Defense of Hamilton Sundstrand (4/4/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:_Defense_of_Hamilton_Sundstrand_(4/4/2011)&amp;diff=4565"/>
		<updated>2011-04-04T04:30:31Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: Created page with &amp;quot;The basis of the defense for Hamilton Sundstrand revolves around two issues. These two issues are whether Hamilton’s invention APS 3200 infringed upon Honeywell’s ‘194 and ...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The basis of the defense for Hamilton Sundstrand revolves around two issues. These two issues are whether Hamilton’s invention APS 3200 infringed upon Honeywell’s ‘194 and ‘893 patents by the doctrine of equivalence based off of foreseeability and tangential relation. This argument will focus specifically on the issue of foreseeability. &lt;br /&gt;
Before focusing on this issue, it is important to remember that it is the responsibility of the patentee to fully disclose and document their invention under section 112 such that a person containing ordinary skill in the art would be able to replicate the invention without further experimentation. Additionally, as set forth in the case of Graver Tank v. Linde Air Products, a patentee can claim infringement through the doctrine of equivalence if an invention accomplishes essentially the same result through essentially the same means. As further put forth in the case of Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis, the best way to determine equivalence is to examine each claim on an element by element basis in order to determine equivalence between the elements of two different inventions.&lt;br /&gt;
As related to this case, the foreseeability criterion weakens Honeywell’s claims of infringement through equivalence. The foreseeability criterion asks whether the alleged equivalent would have been unforeseeable to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the amendment. Since it would be unreasonable to expect someone to anticipate the state of technology a few years in the future from their initial filing, foreseeability gives the patentee some leadway in their patent claims in conjunction with the doctrine of equivalence. However, the emphasis here is whether the equivalent element would have been obvious to the fictional person of ordinary skill in the art, not whether the equivalent was obvious to the patentee at the time of their application. Because the purpose of the patent laws are to advance the scientific arts and provide a means of informing the public of what is considered to be publicly available for use, our concern is not with placating the patentee, but accomplishing these two primary goals. The foreseeability criterion attempts to strike a balance between these two goals and protecting the patentee to such an extent as to encourage them to file for a patent. In the case at hand, there has been expert testimony claiming that in 1982, the year of Honeywell’s invention, the items found within the Hamilton Sundstrand invention would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Additionally, the prior art contains the L1011 device as well as the Glennon patent, both of which were developed in the 1970’s and contain some of the key teachings that the Sundstrand invention utilizes. Therefore, in light of the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, one would have to assume that the items of the Sundstrand invention would have been foreseeable to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art.&lt;br /&gt;
In light of this evidence, the Court must find that the development of the Sundstrand device was foreseeable to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time Honeywell filed its patents. As a result of this, it was the responsibility of Honeywell to draft its claims in such a manner as to contain the elements found in Sundstrand invention as well as their orientation and use within the Sundstrand invention if they desired protection on the item. Although Honeywell claims ignorance on the topic, what Honeywell knew is irrelevant to the purpose of the patent laws and the issue at the heart of this debate. Rather, the key issue is on the ordinary person in the art. In light of this and the evidence presented, one must conclude that Sundstrand is innocent of the charges of infringement brought against it.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Pmitros&amp;diff=4564</id>
		<title>User:Pmitros</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Pmitros&amp;diff=4564"/>
		<updated>2011-04-04T04:30:22Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;=== Homework Assignments ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework 1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework 2]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework 3 (2/4/2011)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework (3/23/11)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros: Defense of Hamilton Sundstrand (4/4/2011)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4215</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework (3/23/11)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4215"/>
		<updated>2011-03-22T21:34:38Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America (2010) [605 F.3d 967] */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America (2010) [605 F.3d 967] ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This case was held in the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit. In this case, Orion was suing Hyundai alleging that Hyundai&#039;s online sales system (hyundaiusa.com and hyundaidealer.com) infringed upon two of Orion&#039;s patents (referred to as patents &#039;627 and &#039;342). Prior to reaching the court of appeals, the district court had ruled the Hyundai had infringed upon the patents and ruled that patent &#039;627 was valid. Therefore, the district court had entitled Orion to damages and royalties. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;627 patent contained a method for assisting a salesperson in selecting appropriate parts corresponding to a customer&#039;s particularized need using a computerized system in place of paper catalogs and order forms. Essentially, the system&#039;s user would enter the type of part desired along with the desired characteristics of the part and the system would identify all parts that would meet the user&#039;s particular needs. Then, the system would compile all the parts into a proposal that would include, among other things, the price of the parts as well as images of the parts. Hyundai responded to Orion&#039;s allegations by claiming that the &#039;627 patent was invalid because of the prior existence of a different database system which contained the same steps and procedures as the &#039;627 patent. This system known as the IDB2000 was developed by a different party prior to patent &#039;627.  The district court had ruled that the critical date of the &#039;627 patent was November 10 1988. The Court of Appeals upheld this date as the critical date. The Court was able to determine that the IDB2000 was developed and sold by the company Bell &amp;amp; Howell to Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds in 1987. Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds then began to demonstrate and sell the system to car dealerships through a promotional publication entitled &amp;quot;Electronic Parts Catalog&amp;quot;. The Court sought to determine if this catalog satisfied the requirements of section 102 (b) to invalidate patent &#039;627. Specifically, the court wanted to determine if the invention was in a printed publication more than a year before the critical date and whether or not the publication was made accessible to persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter to which the advertisement relates. Through testimony it was shown that the catalog was copyrighted in 1987 and that the catalog was used as a mail piece to car dealerships and by salesmen to demonstrate the machine to potential buyers. As such, the Court ruled the invention was contained within a readily available publication more than a year before the filing date of the &#039;627 patent. Additionally, the court had to determine if the catalog properly disclosed the invention such that one of ordinary skill in the art could make the invention without further undue experimentation. It was determined that the catalog, which contained an example of the process used by the salesmen, sufficiently demonstrated the process used. Therefore, in light of all this, the court found the prior art publication anticipated the disputed claims of the patent and barred patentability of &#039;627&#039;s claims.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Also worth noting, on appeal Hyundai had also accused Orion of inequitable conduct. The Court ruled that Hyundai did not provide sufficient evidence that Orion did not disclose any critical evidence and found them innocent of the charges.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, the Court&#039;s final ruling was that they affirmed the prior ruling that the &#039;627 patent was not unenforcable due to inequitable conduct, Reversed the district court&#039;s ruling on the validity of the &#039;627 patent claims, finding them invalid, and vacated the the remainder of the district court&#039;s rulings (ie, the damages and royalty fees awarded to Orion).&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4214</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework (3/23/11)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4214"/>
		<updated>2011-03-22T21:34:17Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America (2010) [605 F.3d 967] */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America (2010) [605 F.3d 967] ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This case was held in the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit. In this case, Orion was suing Hyundai alleging that Hyundai&#039;s online sales system (hyundaiusa.com and hyundaidealer.com) infringed upon two of Orion&#039;s patents (referred to as patents &#039;627 and &#039;342). Prior to reaching the court of appeals, the district court had ruled the Hyundai had infringed upon the patents and ruled that patent &#039;627 was valid. Therefore, the district court had entitled Orion to damages and royalties. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;627 patent contained a method for assisting a salesperson in selecting appropriate parts corresponding to a customer&#039;s particularized need using a computerized system in place of paper catalogs and order forms. Essentially, the system&#039;s user would enter the type of part desired along with the desired characteristics of the part and the system would identify all parts that would meet the user&#039;s particular needs. Then, the system would compile all the parts into a proposal that would include, among other things, the price of the parts as well as images of the parts. Hyundai responded to Orion&#039;s allegations by claiming that the &#039;627 patent was invalid because of the prior existence of a different database system which contained the same steps and procedures as the &#039;627 patent. This system known as the IDB2000 was developed by a different party prior to patent &#039;627.  The district court had ruled that the critical date of the &#039;627 patent was November 10 1988. The Court of Appeals upheld this date as the critical date. The Court was able to determine that the IDB2000 was developed and sold by the company Bell &amp;amp; Howell to Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds in 1987. Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds then began to demonstrate and sell the system to car dealerships through a promotional publication entitled &amp;quot;Electronic Parts Catalog&amp;quot;. The Court sought to determine if this catalog satisfied the requirements of section 102 (b) to invalidate patent &#039;627. Specifically, the court wanted to determine if the invention was in a printed publication more than a year before the critical date and whether or not the publication was made accessible to persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter to which the advertisement relates. Through testimony it was shown that the catalog was copyrighted in 1987 and that the catalog was used as a mail piece to car dealerships and by salesmen to demonstrate the machine to potential buyers. As such, the Court ruled the invention was contained within a readily available publication more than a year before the filing date of the &#039;627 patent. Additionally, the court had to determine if the catalog properly disclosed the invention such that one of ordinary skill in the art could make the invention without further undue experimentation. It was determined that the catalog, which contained an example of the process used by the salesmen, sufficiently demonstrated the process used. Therefore, in light of all this, the court found the prior art publication anticipated the disputed claims of the patent and barred patentability of &#039;627&#039;s claims.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Also worth noting, on appeal Hyundai had also accused Orion of inequitable conduct. The Court ruled that Hyundai did not provide sufficient evidence that Orion did not disclose any critical evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, the Court&#039;s final ruling was that they affirmed the prior ruling that the &#039;627 patent was not unenforcable due to inequitable conduct, Reversed the district court&#039;s ruling on the validity of the &#039;627 patent claims, finding them invalid, and vacated the the remainder of the district court&#039;s rulings (ie, the damages and royalty fees awarded to Orion).&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4213</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework (3/23/11)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4213"/>
		<updated>2011-03-22T21:33:58Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America (2010) [605 F.3d 967] ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This case was held in the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit. In this case, Orion was suing Hyundai alleging that Hyundai&#039;s online sales system (hyundaiusa.com and hyundaidealer.com) infringed upon two of Orion&#039;s patents (referred to as patents &#039;627 and &#039;342). Prior to reaching the court of appeals, the district court had ruled the Hyundai had infringed upon the patents and ruled that patent &#039;627 was valid. Therefore, the district court had entitled Orion to damages and royalties. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;627 patent contained a method for assisting a salesperson in selecting appropriate parts corresponding to a customer&#039;s particularized need using a computerized system in place of paper catalogs and order forms. Essentially, the system&#039;s user would enter the type of part desired along with the desired characteristics of the part and the system would identify all parts that would meet the user&#039;s particular needs. Then, the system would compile all the parts into a proposal that would include, among other things, the price of the parts as well as images of the parts. Hyundai responded to Orion&#039;s allegations by claiming that the &#039;627 patent was invalid because of the prior existence of a different database system which contained the same steps and procedures as the &#039;627 patent. This system known as the IDB2000 was developed by a different party prior to patent &#039;627.  The district court had ruled that the critical date of the &#039;627 patent was November 10 1988. The Court of Appeals upheld this date as the critical date. The Court was able to determine that the IDB2000 was developed and sold by the company Bell &amp;amp; Howell to Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds in 1987. Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds then began to demonstrate and sell the system to car dealerships through a promotional publication entitled &amp;quot;Electronic Parts Catalog&amp;quot;. The Court sought to determine if this catalog satisfied the requirements of section 102 (b) to invalidate patent &#039;627. Specifically, the court wanted to determine if the invention was in a printed publication more than a year before the critical date and whether or not the publication was made accessible to persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter to which the advertisement relates. Through testimony it was shown that the catalog was copyrighted in 1987 and that the catalog was used as a mail piece to car dealerships and by salesmen to demonstrate the machine to potential buyers. As such, the Court ruled the invention was contained within a readily available publication more than a year before the filing date of the &#039;627 patent. Additionally, the court had to determine if the catalog properly disclosed the invention such that one of ordinary skill in the art could make the invention without further undue experimentation. It was determined that the catalog, which contained an example of the process used by the salesmen, sufficiently demonstrated the process used. Therefore, in light of all this, the court found the prior art publication anticipated the disputed claims of the patent and barred patentability of &#039;627&#039;s claims.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Also worth noting, on appeal Hyundai also had accused Orion of inequitable conduct. The Court ruled that Hyundai did not provide sufficient evidence that Orion did not disclose any critical evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, the Court&#039;s final ruling was that they affirmed the prior ruling that the &#039;627 patent was not unenforcable due to inequitable conduct, Reversed the district court&#039;s ruling on the validity of the &#039;627 patent claims, finding them invalid, and vacated the the remainder of the district court&#039;s rulings (ie, the damages and royalty fees awarded to Orion).&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4212</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework (3/23/11)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4212"/>
		<updated>2011-03-22T21:33:43Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America (2010) [605 F.3d 967] ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This case was held in the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit. In this case, Orion was suing Hyundai alleging that Hyundai&#039;s online sales system (hyundaiusa.com and hyundaidealer.com) infringed upon two of Orion&#039;s patents (referred to as patents &#039;627 and &#039;342). Prior to reaching the court of appeals, the district court had ruled the Hyundai had infringed upon the patents and ruled that patent &#039;627 was valid. Therefore, the district court had entitled Orion to damages and royalties. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;627 patent contained a method for assisting a salesperson in selecting appropriate parts corresponding to a customer&#039;s particularized need using a computerized system in place of paper catalogs and order forms. Essentially, the system&#039;s user would enter the type of part desired along with the desired characteristics of the part and the system would identify all parts that would meet the user&#039;s particular needs. Then, the system would compile all the parts into a proposal that would include, among other things, the price of the parts as well as images of the parts. Hyundai responded to Orion&#039;s allegations by claiming that the &#039;627 patent was invalid because of the prior existence of a different database system which contained the same steps and procedures as the &#039;627 patent. This system known as the IDB2000 was developed by a different party prior to patent &#039;627.  The district court had ruled that the critical date of the &#039;627 patent was November 10 1988. The Court of Appeals upheld this date as the critical date. The Court was able to determine that the IDB2000 was developed and sold by the company Bell &amp;amp; Howell to Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds in 1987. Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds then began to demonstrate and sell the system to car dealerships through a promotional publication entitled &amp;quot;Electronic Parts Catalog&amp;quot;. The Court sought to determine if this catalog satisfied the requirements of section 102 (b) to invalidate patent &#039;627. Specifically, the court wanted to determine if the invention was in a printed publication more than a year before the critical date and whether or not the publication was made accessible to persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter to which the advertisement relates. Through testimony it was shown that the catalog was copyrighted in 1987 and that the catalog was used as a mail piece to car dealerships and by salesmen to demonstrate the machine to potential buyers. As such, the Court ruled the invention was contained within a readily available publication more than a year before the filing date of the &#039;627 patent. Additionally, the court had to determine if the catalog properly disclosed the invention such that one of ordinary skill in the art could make the invention without further undue experimentation. It was determined that the catalog, which contained an example of the process used by the salesmen, sufficiently demonstrated the process used. Therefore, in light of all this, the court found the prior art publication anticipated the disputed claims of the patent and barred patentability of &#039;627&#039;s claims&lt;br /&gt;
Also worth noting, on appeal Hyundai also had accused Orion of inequitable conduct. The Court ruled that Hyundai did not provide sufficient evidence that Orion did not disclose any critical evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, the Court&#039;s final ruling was that they affirmed the prior ruling that the &#039;627 patent was not unenforcable due to inequitable conduct, Reversed the district court&#039;s ruling on the validity of the &#039;627 patent claims, finding them invalid, and vacated the the remainder of the district court&#039;s rulings (ie, the damages and royalty fees awarded to Orion).&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4211</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework (3/23/11)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4211"/>
		<updated>2011-03-22T21:32:33Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America (2010) [605 F.3d 967] ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This case was held in the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit. In this case, Orion was suing Hyundai alleging that Hyundai&#039;s online sales system (hyundaiusa.com and hyundaidealer.com) infringed upon two of Orion&#039;s patents (referred to as patents &#039;627 and &#039;342). Prior to reaching the court of appeals, the district court had ruled the Hyundai had infringed upon the patents and ruled that patent &#039;627 was valid. Therefore, the district court had entitled Orion to damages and royalties. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;627 patent contained a method for assisting a salesperson in selecting appropriate parts corresponding to a customer&#039;s particularized need using a computerized system in place of paper catalogs and order forms. Essentially, the system&#039;s user would enter the type of part desired along with the desired characteristics of the part and the system would identify all parts that would meet the user&#039;s particular needs. Then, the system would compile all the parts into a proposal that would include, among other things, the price of the parts as well as images of the parts. Hyundai responded to Orion&#039;s allegations by claiming that the &#039;627 patent was invalid because of the prior existence of a different database system which contained the same steps and procedures as the &#039;627 patent. This system known as the IDB2000 was developed by a different party prior to patent &#039;627.  The district court had ruled that the critical date of the &#039;627 patent was November 10 1988. The Court of Appeals upheld this date as the critical date. The Court was able to determine that the IDB2000 was developed and sold by the company Bell &amp;amp; Howell to Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds in 1987. Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds then began to demonstrate and sell the system to car dealerships through a promotional publication entitled &amp;quot;Electronic Parts Catalog&amp;quot;. The Court sought to determine if this catalog satisfied the requirements of section 102 (b) to invalidate patent &#039;627. Specifically, the court wanted to determine if the invention was in a printed publication more than a year before the critical date and whether or not the publication was made accessible to persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter to which the advertisement relates. Through testimony it was shown that the catalog was copyrighted in 1987 and that the catalog was used as a mail piece to car dealerships and by salesmen to demonstrate the machine to potential buyers. As such, the Court ruled the invention was contained within a readily available publication more than a year before the filing date of the &#039;627 patent. Additionally, the court had to determine if the catalog properly disclosed the invention such that one of ordinary skill in the art could make the invention without further undue experimentation. It was determined that the catalog, which contained an example of the process used by the salesmen, sufficiently demonstrated the process used. Therefore, in light of all this, the court found the prior art publication anticipated the disputed claims of the patent and ruled these claims to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Also worth noting, on appeal Hyundai also had accused Orion of inequitable conduct. The Court ruled that Hyundai did not provide sufficient evidence that Orion did not disclose any critical evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, the Court&#039;s final ruling was that they affirmed the prior ruling that the &#039;627 patent was not unenforcable due to inequitable conduct, Reversed the district court&#039;s ruling on the validity of the &#039;627 patent claims, finding them invalid, and vacated the the remainder of the district court&#039;s rulings (ie, the damages and royalty fees awarded to Orion).&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4210</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework (3/23/11)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4210"/>
		<updated>2011-03-22T21:31:49Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America (2010) [605 F.3d 967] ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This case was held in the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit. In this case, Orion was suing Hyundai alleging that Hyundai&#039;s online sales system (hyundaiusa.com and hyundaidealer.com) infringed upon two of Orion&#039;s patents (referred to as patents &#039;627 and &#039;342). Prior to reaching the court of appeals, the district court had ruled the Hyundai had infringed upon the patent and ruled that the patent was valid. Therefore, the district court had entitled Orion to damages and royalties. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;627 patent contained a method for assisting a salesperson in selecting appropriate parts corresponding to a customer&#039;s particularized need using a computerized system in place of paper catalogs and order forms. Essentially, the system&#039;s user would enter the type of part desired along with the desired characteristics of the part and the system would identify all parts that would meet the user&#039;s particular needs. Then, the system would compile all the parts into a proposal that would include, among other things, the price of the parts as well as images of the parts. Hyundai responded to Orion&#039;s allegations by claiming that the &#039;627 patent was invalid because of the prior existence of a different database system which contained the same steps and procedures as the &#039;627 patent. This system known as the IDB2000 was developed by a different party prior to patent &#039;627.  The district court had ruled that the critical date of the &#039;627 patent was November 10 1988. The Court of Appeals upheld this date as the critical date. The Court was able to determine that the IDB2000 was developed and sold by the company Bell &amp;amp; Howell to Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds in 1987. Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds then began to demonstrate and sell the system to car dealerships through a promotional publication entitled &amp;quot;Electronic Parts Catalog&amp;quot;. The Court sought to determine if this catalog satisfied the requirements of section 102 (b) to invalidate patent &#039;627. Specifically, the court wanted to determine if the invention was in a printed publication more than a year before the critical date and whether or not the publication was made accessible to persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter to which the advertisement relates. Through testimony it was shown that the catalog was copyrighted in 1987 and that the catalog was used as a mail piece to car dealerships and by salesmen to demonstrate the machine to potential buyers. As such, the Court ruled the invention was contained within a readily available publication more than a year before the filing date of the &#039;627 patent. Additionally, the court had to determine if the catalog properly disclosed the invention such that one of ordinary skill in the art could make the invention without further undue experimentation. It was determined that the catalog, which contained an example of the process used by the salesmen, sufficiently demonstrated the process used. Therefore, in light of all this, the court found the prior art publication anticipated the disputed claims of the patent and ruled these claims to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Also worth noting, on appeal Hyundai also had accused Orion of inequitable conduct. The Court ruled that Hyundai did not provide sufficient evidence that Orion did not disclose any critical evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, the Court&#039;s final ruling was that they affirmed the prior ruling that the &#039;627 patent was not unenforcable due to inequitable conduct, Reversed the district court&#039;s ruling on the validity of the &#039;627 patent claims, finding them invalid, and vacated the the remainder of the district court&#039;s rulings (ie, the damages and royalty fees awarded to Orion).&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4208</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework (3/23/11)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4208"/>
		<updated>2011-03-22T21:31:32Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America (2010) [605 F.3d 967] ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This case was held in the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.In this case, Orion was suing Hyundai alleging that Hyundai&#039;s online sales system (hyundaiusa.com and hyundaidealer.com) infringed upon two of Orion&#039;s patents (referred to as patents &#039;627 and &#039;342). Prior to reaching the court of appeals, the district court had ruled the Hyundai had infringed upon the patent and ruled that the patent was valid. Therefore, the district court had entitled Orion to damages and royalties. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;627 patent contained a method for assisting a salesperson in selecting appropriate parts corresponding to a customer&#039;s particularized need using a computerized system in place of paper catalogs and order forms. Essentially, the system&#039;s user would enter the type of part desired along with the desired characteristics of the part and the system would identify all parts that would meet the user&#039;s particular needs. Then, the system would compile all the parts into a proposal that would include, among other things, the price of the parts as well as images of the parts. Hyundai responded to Orion&#039;s allegations by claiming that the &#039;627 patent was invalid because of the prior existence of a different database system which contained the same steps and procedures as the &#039;627 patent. This system known as the IDB2000 was developed by a different party prior to patent &#039;627.  The district court had ruled that the critical date of the &#039;627 patent was November 10 1988. The Court of Appeals upheld this date as the critical date. The Court was able to determine that the IDB2000 was developed and sold by the company Bell &amp;amp; Howell to Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds in 1987. Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds then began to demonstrate and sell the system to car dealerships through a promotional publication entitled &amp;quot;Electronic Parts Catalog&amp;quot;. The Court sought to determine if this catalog satisfied the requirements of section 102 (b) to invalidate patent &#039;627. Specifically, the court wanted to determine if the invention was in a printed publication more than a year before the critical date and whether or not the publication was made accessible to persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter to which the advertisement relates. Through testimony it was shown that the catalog was copyrighted in 1987 and that the catalog was used as a mail piece to car dealerships and by salesmen to demonstrate the machine to potential buyers. As such, the Court ruled the invention was contained within a readily available publication more than a year before the filing date of the &#039;627 patent. Additionally, the court had to determine if the catalog properly disclosed the invention such that one of ordinary skill in the art could make the invention without further undue experimentation. It was determined that the catalog, which contained an example of the process used by the salesmen, sufficiently demonstrated the process used. Therefore, in light of all this, the court found the prior art publication anticipated the disputed claims of the patent and ruled these claims to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Also worth noting, on appeal Hyundai also had accused Orion of inequitable conduct. The Court ruled that Hyundai did not provide sufficient evidence that Orion did not disclose any critical evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, the Court&#039;s final ruling was that they affirmed the prior ruling that the &#039;627 patent was not unenforcable due to inequitable conduct, Reversed the district court&#039;s ruling on the validity of the &#039;627 patent claims, finding them invalid, and vacated the the remainder of the district court&#039;s rulings (ie, the damages and royalty fees awarded to Orion).&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4200</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework (3/23/11)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4200"/>
		<updated>2011-03-22T21:11:27Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America (2010) [605 F.3d 967] ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This case was held in the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit. In this case, Orion sued Hyundai alleging that their online sales system (hyundaiusa.com and hyundaidealer.com) infringed two of Orion&#039;s patents (referred to as patents &#039;627 and &#039;342). The &#039;627 patent contained a method for assisting a salesperson in selecting appropriate parts corresponding to a customer&#039;s particularized need using a computerized system in place of paper catalogs and order forms. Essentially, the system&#039;s user would enter the type of part desired, the system would identify all parts that would meet the user&#039;s particular needs, then compile all the parts into a proposal that would include, among other things, the price of the parts and images of the parts. Among other claims, Hyundai claimed that the &#039;627 patent was invalid because a different database system which contained the same steps and procedures as the &#039;627 patent. This system was known as the IDB2000. Previously, the district court had ruled that the critical date of the &#039;627 patent was November 10 1988. The Court of Appeals upheld this date as the critical date. The Court was able to determine that the IDB2000 was developed and sold by the company Bell &amp;amp; Howell to Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds in 1987. Reynolds &amp;amp; Reynolds then began to demonstrate and sell the system to car dealerships through a promotional publication entitled &amp;quot;Electronic Parts Catalog&amp;quot;. The Court sought to determine if this catalog satisfied the requirements of section 102 (b). Specifically, the court wanted to determine if the invention was in a printed publication more than a year before the critical date and whether or not the publication was made accessible to persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter to which the advertisement relates. Through testimony it was shown that the catalog was copyrighted in 1987 and that the catalog was used as a mail piece to car dealerships and by salesmen to demonstrate the machine to potential buyers. Additionally, the court had to determine if the catalog properly disclosed the invention such that one of ordinary skill in the art could make the invention without further undue experimentation. It was determined that the catalog, which contained an example of the process used by the salesmen, sufficiently demonstrated the process used. Therefore, in light of all this, the court found the prior art publication anticipated the disputed claims of the patent and therefore invalid.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4198</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework (3/23/11)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4198"/>
		<updated>2011-03-22T20:42:49Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America (2010) [605 F.3d 967] ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4197</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework (3/23/11)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_(3/23/11)&amp;diff=4197"/>
		<updated>2011-03-22T20:42:32Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: Created page with &amp;quot;== Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America (2010) 605 F.3d 967 ==&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America (2010) 605 F.3d 967 ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Pmitros&amp;diff=4196</id>
		<title>User:Pmitros</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Pmitros&amp;diff=4196"/>
		<updated>2011-03-22T20:40:46Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;=== Homework Assignments ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework 1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework 2]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework 3 (2/4/2011)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mitros:Homework (3/23/11)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=ESB_Briefs&amp;diff=3937</id>
		<title>ESB Briefs</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=ESB_Briefs&amp;diff=3937"/>
		<updated>2011-03-03T22:57:01Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Here is a list of briefs for the Electric Storage Battery Co v. Shimadzu case.  Add your name next to the list for the one with the fewest names and read that one.&lt;br /&gt;
* Reply Brief for Respondents. (Feb. 27, 1939)&lt;br /&gt;
#Michael Madden&lt;br /&gt;
#Hwong1&lt;br /&gt;
#croetzel&lt;br /&gt;
#kroshak&lt;br /&gt;
#Adam Mahood&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
* Reply Brief for Petitioner. (Feb. 7, 1939)&lt;br /&gt;
#Cmadiga1&lt;br /&gt;
#90144463&lt;br /&gt;
#901422128&lt;br /&gt;
#jpotter2&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
* Brief for Respondents (Jan. 28, 1939)&lt;br /&gt;
#LMiller&lt;br /&gt;
#Josh Bradley&lt;br /&gt;
#Brobins&lt;br /&gt;
#Ebingle&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
* Brief for Petitioner. (Jan. 1939)&lt;br /&gt;
#Kschlax&lt;br /&gt;
#Andy Stulc&lt;br /&gt;
#Mzahm&lt;br /&gt;
#Rabot&lt;br /&gt;
#Peter Mitros&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;br /&gt;
#&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Bilski_brief_list&amp;diff=3437</id>
		<title>Bilski brief list</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Bilski_brief_list&amp;diff=3437"/>
		<updated>2011-02-13T17:38:24Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Choose one of the briefs from this list.  Delete it and replace it with your login name.  Please be careful editing this page.  If you mess up all the formatting it will create work for your colleagues.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#Reply Brief for Petitioners (Oct. 26, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#jpotter2 &lt;br /&gt;
#Adam T. Letcher&lt;br /&gt;
#Craigkrzyskowski&lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae William Mitchell College of Law Intellectual Property Institute in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#ebingle&lt;br /&gt;
#Rabot&lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for Amicus Curiae Mark Landesmann in Support of Affirmance (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amici Curiae American Insurance Association, the Hartford Financial Services, Jackson National Life Insurance Company, Pacific Life Insurance Company, Sun Life Assurance Company Of Canada (U.S.), and Transamerica Life Insurance Company in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief For Amicus Curiae Computer &amp;amp; Communications Industry Association in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Software &amp;amp; Information Industry Association (SIIA) as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amici Curiae Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, IP Justice, and Four Global Software Professionals and Business Leaders in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for Free Software Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for Bank of America Corporation, Barclays Capital Inc., The Clearing House Association L.L.C., The Financial Services Roundtable, Google Inc., MetLife, Inc., and Morgan Stanley as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Peter S. Menell and Michael J. Meurer In Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Entrepreneurial and Consumer Advocates Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of the Respondent, Submitted on Behalf of Adamas Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Tethys Bioscience, Inc. (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#KyleR &lt;br /&gt;
#Andy Stulc &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for Amicus Curiae Mark Landesmann in Support of Affirmance (Oct. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Amicus Curiae Brief of Center for Advanced Study and Research in Intellectual Property (CASRIP) of the University of Washington School of Law, and of CASRIP Research Affiliate Scholars, in Support of Affirmance of the Judgment in Favor of Respondent (Oct. 1, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Kevin Godshall&lt;br /&gt;
#Amici Curiae Brief of Internet Retailers in Support of Respondent (Oct. 1, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for the Respondent (Sep. 25, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of the Intellectual Property Section of the Nevada State Bar, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent (Sep. 25, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Professor Lee A. Hollaar and IEEE-USA as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance (Sep. 1, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Austin Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amici Curiae Entrepreneurial Software Companies in Support of Petitioner (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amici Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization, Advanced Medical Technology Association, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation &amp;amp; The Regents of the University of California in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Mzahm&lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Medtronic, Inc. in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of F%21ed%21eration Internationale Des Conseils En Propri%21et%21e Industrielle as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professor Kevin Emerson Collins in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Legal OnRamp in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae John Sutton in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Novartis Corporation Supporting Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief Amicus Curiae of The Federal Circuit Bar Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Regulatory Datacorp, Inc, American Express Company, Palm Inc., Rockwell Automation, Inc., and SAP America, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Double Rock Corporation, Island Intellectual Property LLC, LIDs Capital LLC, Intrasweep LLC, Access Control Advantage, Inc., Ecomp Consultants, Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, Rearden Capital Corporation, Craig Mowry and PCT Capital LLC as Ami ci Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief Amici Curiae of 20 Law and Business Professors in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae The Houston Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Franklin Pierce Law Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#LMiller&lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of TELES AG as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae San Diego Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party on the Merits (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Robert R. Sachs and Daniel R. Brownstone as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae the University of South Florida in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae AwakenIP, LLC in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Pmitros &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 6, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Georgia Biomedical Partnership, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for Prometheus Laboratories Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for the Business Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioner (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Bobby Powers&lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amici Curiae Association Internationale Pour la Protection de la Propriete Intellectuelle and International Association For The Protection Of Intellectual Property (U.S.) in Support of Reversal (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Caris Diagnostics, Inc. in Support of Petitioners (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Monogram Biosciences, Inc. and Genomic Health, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Raymond C. Meiers in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 5, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of On Time Systems, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 4, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Conejo Valley Bar Association in Support of Neither Party (Aug. 3, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief For Petitioners (Jul. 30, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Telecommunication Systems, Inc. in Support of Neither Party and for Purely Prospective Application of Any Adoption of the New Legal Test Applied Below (Jul. 24, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for the State of Oregon as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Jul. 24, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Timothy F. McDonough, Ph.D. in Support of Petitioners (Jul. 22, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Petitioners&#039; Reply Brief (May 8, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief for the Respondent in Opposition (May 1, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Accenture and Pitney Bowes Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief Amicus Curiae of Franklin Pierce Law Center in Support of Certiorari (Mar. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amica Curiae Anne E. Barschall, Pro Se in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (Mar. 2, 2009) &lt;br /&gt;
#Jmarmole&lt;br /&gt;
#Brief of John P. Sutton Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners (Feb. 25, 2009)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3039</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3039"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T05:18:25Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* U.S. v. Adams (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling on this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together segments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined that for an invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. This case also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear implication or definition would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham the Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a obvious substitution of materials like the U.S. had argued (which the court compares such simple substitutions as being similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle). Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing the contents of the &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot; that the patent must distinguish itself from. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art should be interpreted by establishing a list of criteria within the prior art that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
The origin of the &amp;quot;inventive&amp;quot; language used in the court systems dates back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood when the court set forth the idea of the inventive step(see above) that must be made for something to be considered patentable. Unfortunately, this term had lead to an inconsistency in the expressions and decisions made in the courts due to its difficult to define nature. Because of this, Congress added section 103 on nonobviousness to attempt to minimize the number of perceived departures from court precedent on patent law. In Graham v. John Deere, the court set forth a number of primary and secondary criteria to be used when determining the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for list of criteria). Ultimately the terms of section 103 have their origins in the precedent set forth in Hotchkiss as related to the idea of the inventive step.  Therefore, both emphasize establishing the content of the prior art, however the terms set forth in section 103 provide a more usable set of criteria to establish the patent&#039;s relationship to the prior art than the more ambiguous &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; language was able to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere the Court established a list of primary and secondary criteria to consider when evaluating the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for the list of secondary criteria). Although these secondary criteria can be potentially useful when determining nonobviousness, they do not necessarily apply to every and all situations that may arise. Therefore, they must be applied logically and with proper discretion to the patent in question. Additionally, if all of the primary criteria for nonobviousness can not be met, then these secondary criteria generally can not make up for the absence of the fulfillment of the primary criteria(s). Rather, they should be used to simply further the case for nonobviousness after all the primary criteria have been met.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An ideal example of how to apply these secondary criteria is provided in the case of Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb. Once Justice Hand has established that all primary criteria for nonobviousness has been met, he goes to on to consider secondary factors such as the fact that there was a long felt but unsatisfied need within the art, the failures of other competent individuals within the art, and as the ability of the invention to completely supplant the existing practice as further evidence of the nonobviousness of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3038</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3038"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T05:17:17Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* U.S. v. Adams (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling on this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together segments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined that for an invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. This case also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear implication or definition would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham the Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution of materials like the U.S. had argued (which the court compares such simple substitutions as being similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle). Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing the contents of the &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot; that the patent must distinguish itself from. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art should be interpreted by establishing a list of criteria within the prior art that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
The origin of the &amp;quot;inventive&amp;quot; language used in the court systems dates back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood when the court set forth the idea of the inventive step(see above) that must be made for something to be considered patentable. Unfortunately, this term had lead to an inconsistency in the expressions and decisions made in the courts due to its difficult to define nature. Because of this, Congress added section 103 on nonobviousness to attempt to minimize the number of perceived departures from court precedent on patent law. In Graham v. John Deere, the court set forth a number of primary and secondary criteria to be used when determining the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for list of criteria). Ultimately the terms of section 103 have their origins in the precedent set forth in Hotchkiss as related to the idea of the inventive step.  Therefore, both emphasize establishing the content of the prior art, however the terms set forth in section 103 provide a more usable set of criteria to establish the patent&#039;s relationship to the prior art than the more ambiguous &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; language was able to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere the Court established a list of primary and secondary criteria to consider when evaluating the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for the list of secondary criteria). Although these secondary criteria can be potentially useful when determining nonobviousness, they do not necessarily apply to every and all situations that may arise. Therefore, they must be applied logically and with proper discretion to the patent in question. Additionally, if all of the primary criteria for nonobviousness can not be met, then these secondary criteria generally can not make up for the absence of the fulfillment of the primary criteria(s). Rather, they should be used to simply further the case for nonobviousness after all the primary criteria have been met.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An ideal example of how to apply these secondary criteria is provided in the case of Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb. Once Justice Hand has established that all primary criteria for nonobviousness has been met, he goes to on to consider secondary factors such as the fact that there was a long felt but unsatisfied need within the art, the failures of other competent individuals within the art, and as the ability of the invention to completely supplant the existing practice as further evidence of the nonobviousness of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3035</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3035"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T05:14:50Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Graham v. John Deere (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling on this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together segments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined that for an invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. This case also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear implication or definition would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham the Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing the contents of the &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot; that the patent must distinguish itself from. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art should be interpreted by establishing a list of criteria within the prior art that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
The origin of the &amp;quot;inventive&amp;quot; language used in the court systems dates back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood when the court set forth the idea of the inventive step(see above) that must be made for something to be considered patentable. Unfortunately, this term had lead to an inconsistency in the expressions and decisions made in the courts due to its difficult to define nature. Because of this, Congress added section 103 on nonobviousness to attempt to minimize the number of perceived departures from court precedent on patent law. In Graham v. John Deere, the court set forth a number of primary and secondary criteria to be used when determining the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for list of criteria). Ultimately the terms of section 103 have their origins in the precedent set forth in Hotchkiss as related to the idea of the inventive step.  Therefore, both emphasize establishing the content of the prior art, however the terms set forth in section 103 provide a more usable set of criteria to establish the patent&#039;s relationship to the prior art than the more ambiguous &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; language was able to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere the Court established a list of primary and secondary criteria to consider when evaluating the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for the list of secondary criteria). Although these secondary criteria can be potentially useful when determining nonobviousness, they do not necessarily apply to every and all situations that may arise. Therefore, they must be applied logically and with proper discretion to the patent in question. Additionally, if all of the primary criteria for nonobviousness can not be met, then these secondary criteria generally can not make up for the absence of the fulfillment of the primary criteria(s). Rather, they should be used to simply further the case for nonobviousness after all the primary criteria have been met.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An ideal example of how to apply these secondary criteria is provided in the case of Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb. Once Justice Hand has established that all primary criteria for nonobviousness has been met, he goes to on to consider secondary factors such as the fact that there was a long felt but unsatisfied need within the art, the failures of other competent individuals within the art, and as the ability of the invention to completely supplant the existing practice as further evidence of the nonobviousness of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3034</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3034"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T05:14:18Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Graham v. John Deere (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling on this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together segments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined that for an invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. This case also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear implication or definition would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing the contents of the &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot; that the patent must distinguish itself from. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art should be interpreted by establishing a list of criteria within the prior art that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
The origin of the &amp;quot;inventive&amp;quot; language used in the court systems dates back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood when the court set forth the idea of the inventive step(see above) that must be made for something to be considered patentable. Unfortunately, this term had lead to an inconsistency in the expressions and decisions made in the courts due to its difficult to define nature. Because of this, Congress added section 103 on nonobviousness to attempt to minimize the number of perceived departures from court precedent on patent law. In Graham v. John Deere, the court set forth a number of primary and secondary criteria to be used when determining the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for list of criteria). Ultimately the terms of section 103 have their origins in the precedent set forth in Hotchkiss as related to the idea of the inventive step.  Therefore, both emphasize establishing the content of the prior art, however the terms set forth in section 103 provide a more usable set of criteria to establish the patent&#039;s relationship to the prior art than the more ambiguous &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; language was able to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere the Court established a list of primary and secondary criteria to consider when evaluating the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for the list of secondary criteria). Although these secondary criteria can be potentially useful when determining nonobviousness, they do not necessarily apply to every and all situations that may arise. Therefore, they must be applied logically and with proper discretion to the patent in question. Additionally, if all of the primary criteria for nonobviousness can not be met, then these secondary criteria generally can not make up for the absence of the fulfillment of the primary criteria(s). Rather, they should be used to simply further the case for nonobviousness after all the primary criteria have been met.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An ideal example of how to apply these secondary criteria is provided in the case of Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb. Once Justice Hand has established that all primary criteria for nonobviousness has been met, he goes to on to consider secondary factors such as the fact that there was a long felt but unsatisfied need within the art, the failures of other competent individuals within the art, and as the ability of the invention to completely supplant the existing practice as further evidence of the nonobviousness of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3031</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3031"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T05:13:19Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Graham v. John Deere (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling on this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together segments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined that for an invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. This case also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing the contents of the &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot; that the patent must distinguish itself from. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art should be interpreted by establishing a list of criteria within the prior art that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
The origin of the &amp;quot;inventive&amp;quot; language used in the court systems dates back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood when the court set forth the idea of the inventive step(see above) that must be made for something to be considered patentable. Unfortunately, this term had lead to an inconsistency in the expressions and decisions made in the courts due to its difficult to define nature. Because of this, Congress added section 103 on nonobviousness to attempt to minimize the number of perceived departures from court precedent on patent law. In Graham v. John Deere, the court set forth a number of primary and secondary criteria to be used when determining the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for list of criteria). Ultimately the terms of section 103 have their origins in the precedent set forth in Hotchkiss as related to the idea of the inventive step.  Therefore, both emphasize establishing the content of the prior art, however the terms set forth in section 103 provide a more usable set of criteria to establish the patent&#039;s relationship to the prior art than the more ambiguous &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; language was able to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere the Court established a list of primary and secondary criteria to consider when evaluating the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for the list of secondary criteria). Although these secondary criteria can be potentially useful when determining nonobviousness, they do not necessarily apply to every and all situations that may arise. Therefore, they must be applied logically and with proper discretion to the patent in question. Additionally, if all of the primary criteria for nonobviousness can not be met, then these secondary criteria generally can not make up for the absence of the fulfillment of the primary criteria(s). Rather, they should be used to simply further the case for nonobviousness after all the primary criteria have been met.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An ideal example of how to apply these secondary criteria is provided in the case of Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb. Once Justice Hand has established that all primary criteria for nonobviousness has been met, he goes to on to consider secondary factors such as the fact that there was a long felt but unsatisfied need within the art, the failures of other competent individuals within the art, and as the ability of the invention to completely supplant the existing practice as further evidence of the nonobviousness of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3030</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3030"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T05:12:39Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Graham v. John Deere (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling on this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together segments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined that for an invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing the contents of the &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot; that the patent must distinguish itself from. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art should be interpreted by establishing a list of criteria within the prior art that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
The origin of the &amp;quot;inventive&amp;quot; language used in the court systems dates back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood when the court set forth the idea of the inventive step(see above) that must be made for something to be considered patentable. Unfortunately, this term had lead to an inconsistency in the expressions and decisions made in the courts due to its difficult to define nature. Because of this, Congress added section 103 on nonobviousness to attempt to minimize the number of perceived departures from court precedent on patent law. In Graham v. John Deere, the court set forth a number of primary and secondary criteria to be used when determining the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for list of criteria). Ultimately the terms of section 103 have their origins in the precedent set forth in Hotchkiss as related to the idea of the inventive step.  Therefore, both emphasize establishing the content of the prior art, however the terms set forth in section 103 provide a more usable set of criteria to establish the patent&#039;s relationship to the prior art than the more ambiguous &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; language was able to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere the Court established a list of primary and secondary criteria to consider when evaluating the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for the list of secondary criteria). Although these secondary criteria can be potentially useful when determining nonobviousness, they do not necessarily apply to every and all situations that may arise. Therefore, they must be applied logically and with proper discretion to the patent in question. Additionally, if all of the primary criteria for nonobviousness can not be met, then these secondary criteria generally can not make up for the absence of the fulfillment of the primary criteria(s). Rather, they should be used to simply further the case for nonobviousness after all the primary criteria have been met.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An ideal example of how to apply these secondary criteria is provided in the case of Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb. Once Justice Hand has established that all primary criteria for nonobviousness has been met, he goes to on to consider secondary factors such as the fact that there was a long felt but unsatisfied need within the art, the failures of other competent individuals within the art, and as the ability of the invention to completely supplant the existing practice as further evidence of the nonobviousness of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3029</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3029"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T05:12:23Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Graham v. John Deere (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling on this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together segments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined that for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing the contents of the &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot; that the patent must distinguish itself from. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art should be interpreted by establishing a list of criteria within the prior art that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
The origin of the &amp;quot;inventive&amp;quot; language used in the court systems dates back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood when the court set forth the idea of the inventive step(see above) that must be made for something to be considered patentable. Unfortunately, this term had lead to an inconsistency in the expressions and decisions made in the courts due to its difficult to define nature. Because of this, Congress added section 103 on nonobviousness to attempt to minimize the number of perceived departures from court precedent on patent law. In Graham v. John Deere, the court set forth a number of primary and secondary criteria to be used when determining the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for list of criteria). Ultimately the terms of section 103 have their origins in the precedent set forth in Hotchkiss as related to the idea of the inventive step.  Therefore, both emphasize establishing the content of the prior art, however the terms set forth in section 103 provide a more usable set of criteria to establish the patent&#039;s relationship to the prior art than the more ambiguous &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; language was able to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere the Court established a list of primary and secondary criteria to consider when evaluating the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for the list of secondary criteria). Although these secondary criteria can be potentially useful when determining nonobviousness, they do not necessarily apply to every and all situations that may arise. Therefore, they must be applied logically and with proper discretion to the patent in question. Additionally, if all of the primary criteria for nonobviousness can not be met, then these secondary criteria generally can not make up for the absence of the fulfillment of the primary criteria(s). Rather, they should be used to simply further the case for nonobviousness after all the primary criteria have been met.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An ideal example of how to apply these secondary criteria is provided in the case of Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb. Once Justice Hand has established that all primary criteria for nonobviousness has been met, he goes to on to consider secondary factors such as the fact that there was a long felt but unsatisfied need within the art, the failures of other competent individuals within the art, and as the ability of the invention to completely supplant the existing practice as further evidence of the nonobviousness of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3025</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3025"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T05:09:08Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling on this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together segments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing the contents of the &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot; that the patent must distinguish itself from. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art should be interpreted by establishing a list of criteria within the prior art that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
The origin of the &amp;quot;inventive&amp;quot; language used in the court systems dates back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood when the court set forth the idea of the inventive step(see above) that must be made for something to be considered patentable. Unfortunately, this term had lead to an inconsistency in the expressions and decisions made in the courts due to its difficult to define nature. Because of this, Congress added section 103 on nonobviousness to attempt to minimize the number of perceived departures from court precedent on patent law. In Graham v. John Deere, the court set forth a number of primary and secondary criteria to be used when determining the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for list of criteria). Ultimately the terms of section 103 have their origins in the precedent set forth in Hotchkiss as related to the idea of the inventive step.  Therefore, both emphasize establishing the content of the prior art, however the terms set forth in section 103 provide a more usable set of criteria to establish the patent&#039;s relationship to the prior art than the more ambiguous &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; language was able to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere the Court established a list of primary and secondary criteria to consider when evaluating the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for the list of secondary criteria). Although these secondary criteria can be potentially useful when determining nonobviousness, they do not necessarily apply to every and all situations that may arise. Therefore, they must be applied logically and with proper discretion to the patent in question. Additionally, if all of the primary criteria for nonobviousness can not be met, then these secondary criteria generally can not make up for the absence of the fulfillment of the primary criteria(s). Rather, they should be used to simply further the case for nonobviousness after all the primary criteria have been met.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An ideal example of how to apply these secondary criteria is provided in the case of Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb. Once Justice Hand has established that all primary criteria for nonobviousness has been met, he goes to on to consider secondary factors such as the fact that there was a long felt but unsatisfied need within the art, the failures of other competent individuals within the art, and as the ability of the invention to completely supplant the existing practice as further evidence of the nonobviousness of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3024</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3024"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T05:08:32Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling on this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing the contents of the &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot; that the patent must distinguish itself from. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art should be interpreted by establishing a list of criteria within the prior art that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
The origin of the &amp;quot;inventive&amp;quot; language used in the court systems dates back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood when the court set forth the idea of the inventive step(see above) that must be made for something to be considered patentable. Unfortunately, this term had lead to an inconsistency in the expressions and decisions made in the courts due to its difficult to define nature. Because of this, Congress added section 103 on nonobviousness to attempt to minimize the number of perceived departures from court precedent on patent law. In Graham v. John Deere, the court set forth a number of primary and secondary criteria to be used when determining the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for list of criteria). Ultimately the terms of section 103 have their origins in the precedent set forth in Hotchkiss as related to the idea of the inventive step.  Therefore, both emphasize establishing the content of the prior art, however the terms set forth in section 103 provide a more usable set of criteria to establish the patent&#039;s relationship to the prior art than the more ambiguous &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; language was able to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere the Court established a list of primary and secondary criteria to consider when evaluating the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for the list of secondary criteria). Although these secondary criteria can be potentially useful when determining nonobviousness, they do not necessarily apply to every and all situations that may arise. Therefore, they must be applied logically and with proper discretion to the patent in question. Additionally, if all of the primary criteria for nonobviousness can not be met, then these secondary criteria generally can not make up for the absence of the fulfillment of the primary criteria(s). Rather, they should be used to simply further the case for nonobviousness after all the primary criteria have been met.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An ideal example of how to apply these secondary criteria is provided in the case of Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb. Once Justice Hand has established that all primary criteria for nonobviousness has been met, he goes to on to consider secondary factors such as the fact that there was a long felt but unsatisfied need within the art, the failures of other competent individuals within the art, and as the ability of the invention to completely supplant the existing practice as further evidence of the nonobviousness of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3021</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3021"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T05:07:33Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing the contents of the &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot; that the patent must distinguish itself from. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art should be interpreted by establishing a list of criteria within the prior art that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
The origin of the &amp;quot;inventive&amp;quot; language used in the court systems dates back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood when the court set forth the idea of the inventive step(see above) that must be made for something to be considered patentable. Unfortunately, this term had lead to an inconsistency in the expressions and decisions made in the courts due to its difficult to define nature. Because of this, Congress added section 103 on nonobviousness to attempt to minimize the number of perceived departures from court precedent on patent law. In Graham v. John Deere, the court set forth a number of primary and secondary criteria to be used when determining the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for list of criteria). Ultimately the terms of section 103 have their origins in the precedent set forth in Hotchkiss as related to the idea of the inventive step.  Therefore, both emphasize establishing the content of the prior art, however the terms set forth in section 103 provide a more usable set of criteria to establish the patent&#039;s relationship to the prior art than the more ambiguous &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; language was able to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere the Court established a list of primary and secondary criteria to consider when evaluating the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for the list of secondary criteria). Although these secondary criteria can be potentially useful when determining nonobviousness, they do not necessarily apply to every and all situations that may arise. Therefore, they must be applied logically and with proper discretion to the patent in question. Additionally, if all of the primary criteria for nonobviousness can not be met, then these secondary criteria generally can not make up for the absence of the fulfillment of the primary criteria(s). Rather, they should be used to simply further the case for nonobviousness after all the primary criteria have been met.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An ideal example of how to apply these secondary criteria is provided in the case of Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb. Once Justice Hand has established that all primary criteria for nonobviousness has been met, he goes to on to consider secondary factors such as the fact that there was a long felt but unsatisfied need within the art, the failures of other competent individuals within the art, and as the ability of the invention to completely supplant the existing practice as further evidence of the nonobviousness of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3016</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3016"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T05:01:10Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Secondary Considerations */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing the contents of the &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot; that the patent must distinguish itself from. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art should be interpreted by establishing a list of criteria within the prior art that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
The origin of the &amp;quot;inventive&amp;quot; language used in the court systems dates back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood when the court set forth the idea of the inventive step(see above) that must be made for something to be considered patentable. Unfortunately, this term had lead to an inconsistency in the expressions and decisions made in the courts due to its difficult to define nature. Because of this, Congress added section 103 on nonobviousness to attempt to minimize the number of perceived departures from court precedent on patent law. In Graham v. John Deere, the court set forth a number of primary and secondary criteria to be used when determining the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for list of criteria). Ultimately the terms of section 103 have their origins in the precedent set forth in Hotchkiss as related to the idea of the inventive step.  Therefore, both emphasize establishing the content of the prior art, however the terms set forth in section 103 provide a more usable set of criteria to establish the patent&#039;s relationship to the prior art than the more ambiguous &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; language was able to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
In Graham v. John Deere the Court established a list of primary and secondary criteria to consider when evaluating the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for the list of secondary criteria). Although these secondary criteria can be potentially useful when determining nonobviousness, they do not necessarily apply to every and all situations that may arise. Therefore, they must be applied logically and with proper discretion to the patent in question. Additionally, if all of the primary criteria for nonobviousness can not be met, then these secondary criteria generally can not make up for the absence of the fulfillment of the primary criteria(s). Rather, they should be used to simply further the case for nonobviousness after all the primary criteria have been met.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An ideal example of how to apply these secondary criteria is provided in the case of Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb. Once Justice Hand has established that all primary criteria for nonobviousness has been met, he goes to on to consider secondary factors such as the fact that there was a long felt but unsatisfied need within the art, the failures of other competent individuals within the art, and as the ability of the invention to completely supplant the existing practice as further evidence of the nonobviousness of the patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3004</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=3004"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T04:45:49Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Nonobviousness vs. Invention */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing the contents of the &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot; that the patent must distinguish itself from. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art should be interpreted by establishing a list of criteria within the prior art that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
The origin of the &amp;quot;inventive&amp;quot; language used in the court systems dates back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood when the court set forth the idea of the inventive step(see above) that must be made for something to be considered patentable. Unfortunately, this term had lead to an inconsistency in the expressions and decisions made in the courts due to its difficult to define nature. Because of this, Congress added section 103 on nonobviousness to attempt to minimize the number of perceived departures from court precedent on patent law. In Graham v. John Deere, the court set forth a number of primary and secondary criteria to be used when determining the nonobviousness of a patent (see Graham v. John Deere for list of criteria). Ultimately the terms of section 103 have their origins in the precedent set forth in Hotchkiss as related to the idea of the inventive step.  Therefore, both emphasize establishing the content of the prior art, however the terms set forth in section 103 provide a more usable set of criteria to establish the patent&#039;s relationship to the prior art than the more ambiguous &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; language was able to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2995</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2995"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T04:28:16Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Relationship with Novelty */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing the contents of the &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot; that the patent must distinguish itself from. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art should be interpreted by establishing a list of criteria within the prior art that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2991</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2991"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T04:24:58Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Nonobviousness vs. Invention */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing what is meant by &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot;. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art can make or break the case for a patent&#039;s validity by establishing a list of criteria that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2990</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2990"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T04:23:03Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Relationship with Novelty */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
In order for a patent to be considered valid, it must meet both the novelty (section 102) requirements and criteria for nonobviousness (section 103). In order to develop an understanding of their relationship it is beneficial to read through Graham v. John Deere. In this case, the court cites a Senate and House report reflecting on the passing of section 103: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;[Section 103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this it is clear that there is some overlapping spaces between sections 102 and 103. In this case section 102 can be seen as the guidelines on establishing what is meant by &amp;quot;prior art&amp;quot;. Whereas section 103 establishes what how the state of the prior art can make or break the case for a patent&#039;s validity by establishing a list of criteria that the patent must meet to earn patentability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2969</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2969"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T03:57:32Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* The Inventive Step */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step that the patent laws seek to protect and would instead provide a monopoly on what is considered to be available public knowledge. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2967</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2967"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T03:55:22Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* The Inventive Step */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered eligible for patentability. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step required to justify patentability. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2966</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2966"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T03:53:39Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* The Inventive Step */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court sets forth the precedent that unless more ingenuity and skill was required in the development of a patent than was possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted in the art, then &amp;quot;there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor&amp;quot; and therefore should not be considered a valid patent. The implication in the Court&#039;s ruling is that such a patent would lack the inventive step required to justify patentability. The purpose of the patent system is to encourage growth within the sciences by issuing a temporary monopoly on technological advances that will serve to further the scientific arts. The concept of the inventive step attempts to separate the ideas that serve to advance the scientific arts from those that do not. This idea would eventually go on to evolve into the ideas of Nonobviousness set forth in section 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2958</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2958"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T03:32:41Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* U.S. v. Adams (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2957</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2957"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T03:32:22Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* U.S. v. Adams (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent issued to Adams was challenged by the US government claiming that it failed to meet the qualifications for patentability set forth in sections 102 and 103. Adam&#039;s patent was a wet battery composed of two electrodes (one magnesium and one cuprous chloride) that used either plain or salt water for an electrolyte. The battery&#039;s performance in terms of its ability to deliver a constant voltage generate current far exceeded those of similar batteries at that time. In fact, the battery&#039;s performance was so ideal, when Adams first presented it to experts in the U.S. Navy and Army, they deemed the performance figures submitted by Adams to be unrealistic and full of errors. A year later, Signal Corps scientists declared the battery feasible and it then entered wide use within the armed forces. However, they did not contact Adams to inform him of the use of his design. When Adams claimed infringement, the U.S. challenged the validity of the patent. Through an analysis of the prior art, the court established that not only did the prior art not teach Adams design, but it would have given Adams substantial inclination away from his design. Previous attempts to implement Adam&#039;s design in a useful for had often ended in failure (along with fires and explosions). The Court found that Adams design was not a simple substitution of materials as the U.S. had implied, but rather a novel use of the design&#039;s components to produce a surprising and unexpected outcome. Combining all the evidence presented, the Court determined that Adam&#039;s design was both novel and nonobvious, and as a result the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness. Although on first glance Adam&#039;s patent may appear strikingly similar to the prior art, upon further examination, it was both novel and nonobvious. An analysis of the prior art indicated that Adam&#039;s design was not a simple substitution similar to fitting the last piece of a puzzle. Instead, the prior art taught against Adam&#039;s design.  Additionally the experts in the field at that time did not believe Adam&#039;s claims about his battery&#039;s performance. Therefore, the Court determined the nonobviousness requirements of 103 and novelty requirements of 102 were satisfied. If one were to examine the patent without considering the standards set forth in section 103, Adam&#039;s design might appear as simple material substitution not worthy of a patent. However, when one considers the criteria for nonobviousness set forth in Graham v. John Deere, it becomes clear that Adam&#039;s invention was a scientific advance in the relevant art worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2941</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2941"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T03:05:40Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* U.S. v. Adams (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This case served as an interesting example of what &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2931</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2931"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T02:54:16Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Graham v. John Deere (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
* commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
* long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
* failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2930</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2930"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T02:53:47Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Graham v. John Deere (1966) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case, the validity of a patent that contained a clamp for vibrating shank plows. In the lower courts, one had held the patent valid, while another had ruled the patent to be invalid. At question was whether or not the elements contained within the clamp device were already taught in the prior art. The patent in question, no. 2,627,798 (registered to Graham), is a modification of a previous patent also filed by Graham, no. 2,493,811. In this case the court explicitly addresses the implications of 103 and the standards that should be applied when determining whether a patent is nonobvious. In this case, the court determines that in light of the prior art (notably a patent issued to Glencoe and patent &#039;811), there was no nonobvious elements in the &#039;798 patent. Therefore, it rules the patent to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contribution to nonobviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;:[[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness&amp;quot; set forth in 103. In its ruling the court traced the development of 103 back to Hotchkiss v Greenwood. It was here that the Court determined for a invention to be patentable, it must be beyond the skill of an ordinary mechanic in the art. However, this also helped to give rise to the use of the word &amp;quot;invention&amp;quot; as a legal term to signify patentable inventions. The use of this term and its lack of a clear definition or implication would result in occasionally inconsistent rulings which section 103 attempted to address. However, the important precedent that was set was the comparison of the subject matter of the patent and the ordinary skill found within the art. In Graham The Court stated that the passing of 103 was intended to codify the precedent set in the courts that had begun to develop since the Hotchkiss case. By doing so, &amp;quot;this section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.&amp;quot; The Court stated that 103 &amp;quot;when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.&amp;quot; The Court then proceeded to provide a list of criteria to determine nonobviousness. The criteria to determine nonobviousness include:&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secondary considerations include:&lt;br /&gt;
** commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2896</id>
		<title>Mitros:Homework 4 (2/8/2011)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Mitros:Homework_4_(2/8/2011)&amp;diff=2896"/>
		<updated>2011-02-09T02:07:27Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Pmitros: /* Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Historical Development==&lt;br /&gt;
The following are some cases through history that trace the evolution of what is currently the nonobviousness standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (1850)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: Hotchkiss had received a patent consisting for a drawer knob that consisted of a porcelain knob, metallic shank, and spindle. After Greenwood was accused by Hotchkiss of patent infringement, Greenwood demonstrated that Hotchkiss&#039;s general design had existed in the previous art. Hotchkiss had argued that the fact that the knob was made out of porcelain (as opposed to the traditional wood or metal) as well as the method in which the shank was attached to the knob made it worthy of a patent. However, the court ruled that &amp;quot;unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absense of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. &#039;&#039;In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: Prior to [[Hotchkiss v. Greenwood]] an invention only had to be novel.  This case basically established the notion that there had to me more to it, some sort of threshold for inventivness, which ultimately became the idea of &#039;&#039;nonobviousness&#039;&#039;. Additionally, it ruled that mere substitution of material is not something worthy of a patent. This issue will arise in later cases such as Adams v. United States in which the court further emphasizes that mere substitutions of materials is not patentable if their effect on the system would be predictable&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:...the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter&#039;s clay is not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The novelty would consist in the new composition made practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was old, or well known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that previously employed in making the knob.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one, or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===A&amp;amp;P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment (1950)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case:&#039;&#039;&#039; The case was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. The patent in dispute contained a design for a cashier&#039;s check out counter that was found in the previous art and had been improved by the addition of an extension of the counter. Both the District Court and Appeals Court had ruled that the claims of the patent were valid, and as a result the patent had been infringed upon. After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate standards to determine the validity of the patent had not been used and ruled the claims of the patent to be invalid. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The District Court had found that each element in the device claimed in the patent was known to the prior art. However, it went on to state that &amp;quot;the conception of a counter with an extension...was a decidedly novel feature and constitutes a new and useful combination.&amp;quot; Therefore, the court found the patent to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Appeals Court had similarly found no other new or different element to constitute invention but overcame this doubt by consideration of the need for such a device and the evidence of the commercial success of this one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and determined the patent was invalid. It claimed that the counter extension had not been clearly defined within the patent&#039;s claims, that regardless the extension did not amount to an invention, and that the claims of the patent were too overbearing by claiming the invention of old elements performing their normal function. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
While it pre-dates the language of section 103, [[A. &amp;amp; P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)]] discussed some of the more difficult issues related to the level of invention as well as the difficulty in defining what constitutes an invention when applied to a combination of old elements.&lt;br /&gt;
*First the &amp;quot;level of invention&amp;quot; was partly evidenced by &amp;quot;long felt but unsatisfied need&amp;quot; which is a standard used today for nonobviousness. &lt;br /&gt;
**Considerations such as commercial success can be &#039;&#039;secondary&#039;&#039; factors in determining whether there was an was unsatisfied need for an invention. If commercial success is used as a primary factor to determine the validity of the patent, this can still provide erroneous judgments as evidenced by the Appeals Court&#039;s ruling of this case. The Supreme Court states that &amp;quot;commercial success without invention will not make patentability.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Second, it expressed a bias toward patent protection at the frontier of science or engineering, but not for more mundane things like plows, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
**The Court states that in this case &amp;quot;the patentee has added nothing to the total stock of knowledge, but has merely brought together sugments of prior art and claims them in congregation as a monopoly.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
**&amp;quot;An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
*Third, it dealt with the issue of the fact that any invention is basically a combination of old elements. The Court states that any invention consisting of old elements must result in surprising or unusual consequences in order for it to be worthy of a patent.&lt;br /&gt;
**In this case the Court claims that &amp;quot;the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===35 USC 103 (1952)===&lt;br /&gt;
This section of the code was adopted in 1952 and prohibits a patent in a case where&lt;br /&gt;
:the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb (1955)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Account of the case&#039;&#039;&#039;: In this case Lyon had received a patent for a process to coat an optical lense to produce the desired reflective characteristics. The process in this patent was similar in nature to a few previously filed patents, however, none of them contained Lyon&#039;s process of heating the optical element itself while it was being coated. Therefore, there was some question as to whether or not Lyon&#039;s process was either previously taught or obvious in the previous state of the art. Furthermore, there was a second individual, Cartwright, who had been independently experimenting with Lyon&#039;s method. The court had to determine whether Cartwright&#039;s actions implied that Lyon&#039;s method was &amp;quot;public use&amp;quot;. According to the Court, in order for something to fall under the category of public use it must neither be experimental, secret, or abandoned. Although Cartwright had performed many experiments using the Lyon method, the Court determined that he had abandoned the idea after testing it and had never pushed the method past that of the experimental stage. According to the Court, not only does abandonment fail to advance the art, it also puts it among those efforts that are proved useless. Therefore, even though Cartwright had experimented with Lyon&#039;s method, his actions failed to make the method public use/knowledge. The Court determined that the key step in Lyon&#039;s process was not, in fact, disclosed in the prior art as evidenced by Cartwright&#039;s failures along with those of many other individuals. Furthermore, the court determined that there had been an obvious, unmet need in the prior art that Lyon&#039;s method was able to meet. Over a period of at least ten years some of the most competent individuals in the field had attempted to produce the same results as Lyon but had failed. Furthermore, once Lyon&#039;s method was introduced to the art, it had &amp;quot;supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field.&amp;quot; Therefore, the advances to the art provided in Lyon&#039;s patent were considered to be nonobvious and the validity of the patent was upheld.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Contributions to Non-obviousness&#039;&#039;&#039;: This ruling was passed soon after § 103 had been put into law. With this in mind, Learned Hand provides the Court&#039;s interpretation of the law and how it applies to the case at hand. Through Learned Hand&#039;s analysis of § 103 and its implications on patent law one can begin to see the start of the transition away from the previous language of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; of a patent (which Hand calls a &amp;quot;baffling concept...for indefinitely varying occasions&amp;quot;) towards the standards of Nonobviousness. The standards of nonobviousness help to apply some general guidelines in determining what should be patentable subject matter over a wide variety of fields (as will be inevitable when it comes to patent law). In order to do this it focuses primarily on developing an understanding of the prior art. In this case, Learned Hand focuses  specifically on the ideas of demonstrating the need for a solution to a relevant problem in the prior art that has remained elusive, its impact upon the art after its discovery, and the level of skill within the art required to produce such a solution. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Lyon v. Bausch &amp;amp; Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (1955)]] Learned Hand, in his brilliance, expounded on the new standard thusly:&lt;br /&gt;
:Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon&#039;s contribution, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed it conforms to the accepted standards of that time. The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been &amp;quot;obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the art&amp;quot; — § 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to apply — indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103.4&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Graham v. John Deere (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)]] indicated a shift away from trying to establish a level of &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; to the statutory language of &amp;quot;nonobviousness.&amp;quot;  The criteria to determine nonobviousness include&lt;br /&gt;
* scope and content of the prior art;&lt;br /&gt;
* differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;&lt;br /&gt;
* level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and,&lt;br /&gt;
* secondary considerations, including:&lt;br /&gt;
** commercial success of the invention;&lt;br /&gt;
** long-felt but unsolved needs;&lt;br /&gt;
** failure of others to find a solution, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===U.S. v. Adams (1966)===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 1966: [[US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)]] All the evidence must be considered.  Even small changes can have large consequences, which is relevant to a determination of nonobviousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Anderson&#039;s Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage (1969)===&lt;br /&gt;
Things seem relatively clear at this point, but the Supreme Court seemingly basically messed it all up again in [[Anderson&#039;s Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)]] by returning the focus to &amp;quot;inventiveness&amp;quot; by revisiting the old problem of when a combination of old or know elements can become patentable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Suggestion to Combine==&lt;br /&gt;
[[In Re Rouffet]] deals with the issue of a combination of previously-patented elements.  The cases above all pre-dated the 1952 statute and the 1966 Supreme Court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:&amp;quot;[T]he suggestion to combine requirement is a safeguard against the use of hindsight combinations to negate patentability. While the skill level is a component of the inquiry for a suggestion to combine, a lofty level of skill alone does not suffice to supply a motivation to combine. Otherwise a high level of ordinary skill in an art field would almost always preclude patentable inventions. As this court has often noted, invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Objective Tests==&lt;br /&gt;
Two important considerations were the focus of [[Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antiboties, 802 F.2d 1375]].&lt;br /&gt;
*A lot of the evidences hinges on laboratory notebooks.  The CAFC held that even though the lab notebooks were not witnessed until months or about a year after did not preclude them of being of credible evidentiary value.&lt;br /&gt;
*The secondary considerations, commercial success, are not optional considerations.  If evidence is available pertaining to them, they &#039;&#039;must&#039;&#039; be considered by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
*This case also considers the concept of &#039;&#039;enablement&#039;&#039; which means that that patent specification must be complete enough so that someone with ordinary skill in the art would be able to make the invention.  Enablement is set out in 35 USC 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==The Inventive Step==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Relationship with Novelty==&lt;br /&gt;
==Nonobviousness vs. Invention==&lt;br /&gt;
==Secondary Considerations==&lt;br /&gt;
==Ordinary Skill in the Art==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co. (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Reiner v. I. Leon Co.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US (full text)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[South Corp. v. US]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Pmitros</name></author>
	</entry>
</feed>