https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/api.php?action=feedcontributions&feedformat=atom&user=Rabot 2026-06-04T13:19:49Z User contributions MediaWiki 1.44.2 https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4924 2011-04-29T03:00:03Z

<p>Rabot: /* Bottom Line */</p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> === Introduction ===<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products should not give them permission to practice all of LGE's patents.<br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> ==== 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant ==== <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ''General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,'' the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.”<br /> <br /> ==== 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries ==== <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> * Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> ** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> * Electronics industry<br /> ** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development.<br /> <br /> ==== 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses ==== <br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced into the impossible task of predicting all the possible uses and marketing strategies for their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> ==== 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights ==== <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to dictate where a property can be used geographically.<br /> <br /> ==== Bottom Line ==== <br /> &lt;p&gt; The nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for an “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4923 2011-04-29T02:59:36Z

<p>Rabot: /* 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights */</p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> === Introduction ===<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products should not give them permission to practice all of LGE's patents.<br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> ==== 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant ==== <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ''General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,'' the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.”<br /> <br /> ==== 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries ==== <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> * Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> ** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> * Electronics industry<br /> ** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development.<br /> <br /> ==== 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses ==== <br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced into the impossible task of predicting all the possible uses and marketing strategies for their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> ==== 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights ==== <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to dictate where a property can be used geographically.<br /> <br /> ==== Bottom Line ==== <br /> &lt;p&gt; The nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4922 2011-04-29T02:59:22Z

<p>Rabot: /* 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights */</p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> === Introduction ===<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products should not give them permission to practice all of LGE's patents.<br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> ==== 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant ==== <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ''General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,'' the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.”<br /> <br /> ==== 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries ==== <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> * Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> ** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> * Electronics industry<br /> ** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development.<br /> <br /> ==== 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses ==== <br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced into the impossible task of predicting all the possible uses and marketing strategies for their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> ==== 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights ==== <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to limit where a property can be used geographically.<br /> <br /> ==== Bottom Line ==== <br /> &lt;p&gt; The nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4921 2011-04-29T02:58:35Z

<p>Rabot: /* 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses */</p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> === Introduction ===<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products should not give them permission to practice all of LGE's patents.<br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> ==== 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant ==== <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ''General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,'' the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.”<br /> <br /> ==== 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries ==== <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> * Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> ** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> * Electronics industry<br /> ** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development.<br /> <br /> ==== 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses ==== <br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced into the impossible task of predicting all the possible uses and marketing strategies for their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> ==== 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights ==== <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> ==== Bottom Line ==== <br /> &lt;p&gt; The nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4920 2011-04-29T02:57:51Z

<p>Rabot: /* Four Main Arguments */</p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> === Introduction ===<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products should not give them permission to practice all of LGE's patents.<br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> ==== 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant ==== <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ''General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,'' the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.”<br /> <br /> ==== 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries ==== <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> * Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> ** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> * Electronics industry<br /> ** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development.<br /> <br /> ==== 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses ==== <br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced to “anticipate all possible options regarding the use and marketing” of their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> ==== 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights ==== <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> ==== Bottom Line ==== <br /> &lt;p&gt; The nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4919 2011-04-29T02:57:34Z

<p>Rabot: /* 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries. */</p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> === Introduction ===<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products should not give them permission to practice all of LGE's patents.<br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> ==== 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant. ==== <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ''General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,'' the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.”<br /> <br /> ==== 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries. ==== <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> * Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> ** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> * Electronics industry<br /> ** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development.<br /> <br /> ==== 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses ==== <br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced to “anticipate all possible options regarding the use and marketing” of their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> ==== 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights ==== <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> ==== Bottom Line ==== <br /> &lt;p&gt; The nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4918 2011-04-29T02:56:12Z

<p>Rabot: /* 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant. */</p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> === Introduction ===<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products should not give them permission to practice all of LGE's patents.<br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> ==== 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant. ==== <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ''General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,'' the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.”<br /> <br /> ==== 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries. ==== <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> * Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> ** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> * Electronics industry<br /> ** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development. <br /> <br /> <br /> ==== 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses ==== <br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced to “anticipate all possible options regarding the use and marketing” of their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> ==== 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights ==== <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> ==== Bottom Line ==== <br /> &lt;p&gt; The nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4917 2011-04-29T02:55:47Z

<p>Rabot: /* Introduction */</p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> === Introduction ===<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products should not give them permission to practice all of LGE's patents.<br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> ==== 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant. ==== <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ‘’General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,’’ the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.” <br /> <br /> ==== 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries. ==== <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> * Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> ** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> * Electronics industry<br /> ** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development. <br /> <br /> <br /> ==== 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses ==== <br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced to “anticipate all possible options regarding the use and marketing” of their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> ==== 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights ==== <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> ==== Bottom Line ==== <br /> &lt;p&gt; The nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4916 2011-04-29T02:55:35Z

<p>Rabot: /* Introduction */</p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> === Introduction ===<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products should not give them license to practice all of LGE's patents.<br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> ==== 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant. ==== <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ‘’General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,’’ the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.” <br /> <br /> ==== 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries. ==== <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> * Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> ** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> * Electronics industry<br /> ** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development. <br /> <br /> <br /> ==== 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses ==== <br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced to “anticipate all possible options regarding the use and marketing” of their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> ==== 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights ==== <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> ==== Bottom Line ==== <br /> &lt;p&gt; The nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4915 2011-04-29T02:54:38Z

<p>Rabot: /* Bottom Line */</p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> === Introduction ===<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products “does not grant them a license to practice all of LGE’s patents.” <br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> ==== 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant. ==== <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ‘’General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,’’ the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.” <br /> <br /> ==== 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries. ==== <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> * Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> ** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> * Electronics industry<br /> ** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development. <br /> <br /> <br /> ==== 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses ==== <br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced to “anticipate all possible options regarding the use and marketing” of their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> ==== 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights ==== <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> ==== Bottom Line ==== <br /> &lt;p&gt; The nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4914 2011-04-29T02:54:15Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> === Introduction ===<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products “does not grant them a license to practice all of LGE’s patents.” <br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> ==== 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant. ==== <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ‘’General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,’’ the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.” <br /> <br /> ==== 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries. ==== <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> * Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> ** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> * Electronics industry<br /> ** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development. <br /> <br /> <br /> ==== 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses ==== <br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced to “anticipate all possible options regarding the use and marketing” of their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> ==== 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights ==== <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> ==== Bottom Line ==== <br /> &lt;p&gt; In conclusion, the nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4913 2011-04-29T02:53:12Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products “does not grant them a license to practice all of LGE’s patents.” <br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant. <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ‘’General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,’’ the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.” <br /> <br /> 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries. <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> * Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> ** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> * Electronics industry<br /> ** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development. <br /> <br /> <br /> 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses<br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced to “anticipate all possible options regarding the use and marketing” of their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt; <br /> &lt;p&gt; In conclusion, the nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4912 2011-04-29T02:52:44Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products “does not grant them a license to practice all of LGE’s patents.” <br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant. <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ‘’General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,’’ the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.” <br /> <br /> 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries. <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> ** Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> *** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> ** Electronics industry<br /> *** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development. <br /> <br /> <br /> 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses<br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced to “anticipate all possible options regarding the use and marketing” of their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt; <br /> &lt;p&gt; In conclusion, the nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4911 2011-04-29T02:52:15Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> <br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products “does not grant them a license to practice all of LGE’s patents.” <br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant. <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ‘’General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,’’ the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.” <br /> <br /> 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries. <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> Examples<br /> ** Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> *** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> ** Electronics industry<br /> *** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development. <br /> <br /> <br /> 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses<br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced to “anticipate all possible options regarding the use and marketing” of their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt; <br /> &lt;p&gt; In conclusion, the nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4910 2011-04-29T02:51:35Z

<p>Rabot: /* Four Main Arguments */</p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> <br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products “does not grant them a license to practice all of LGE’s patents.” <br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> 1. The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant. <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ‘’General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,’’ the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.” <br /> <br /> 2. Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries. <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> * Examples<br /> *** Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> **** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> *** Electronics industry<br /> **** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development. <br /> <br /> <br /> 3. Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses<br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced to “anticipate all possible options regarding the use and marketing” of their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> 4. Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt; <br /> &lt;p&gt; In conclusion, the nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4909 2011-04-29T02:51:07Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> <br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products “does not grant them a license to practice all of LGE’s patents.” <br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> # The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant. <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ‘’General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,’’ the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.” <br /> <br /> ## Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries. <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> * Examples<br /> *** Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> **** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> *** Electronics industry<br /> **** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development. <br /> <br /> <br /> ### Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses<br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced to “anticipate all possible options regarding the use and marketing” of their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> #### Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt; <br /> &lt;p&gt; In conclusion, the nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4908 2011-04-29T02:50:22Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> * Members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) are granted about 30% of the patents issued to U.S. nationals by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. <br /> <br /> * The IPO’s four main arguments focus on the nature of the business community and the negative economic and developmental consequences that would result from the Petitioners’ position. <br /> <br /> * The IPO claims that patent holders have the “right to lawfully condition the sale or license of a patented product to limit the scope of the patent rights granted.” They also assert that downstream purchasers—such as Quanta—“should not be able to claim broader rights than those held by the party from whom they purchase.”<br /> <br /> ** Valid conditional agreements allow patent holders to distribute their property logically and with proper economic gain. <br /> ** In this case, the petitioners’ purchase and use of the licensed Intel products “does not grant them a license to practice all of LGE’s patents.” <br /> <br /> === Four Main Arguments ===<br /> <br /> # The patentee’s ability to grant limited licenses is a right inherent in the patent grant. <br /> <br /> * The patent holder may choose to license with or without restriction. <br /> * The Court has enforced conditional license agreements. <br /> ** For example, in ‘’General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Rubber Co.,’’ the Court upheld a limited license for home use that excluded commercial use. <br /> ** The Court also upheld agreements where products were sold as “single use only.” <br /> <br /> # Conditional licensing is common practice in many industries. <br /> <br /> * Court precedent exists. <br /> * Owners of intellectual property rely on the “ability to condition sales of patented goods […] Conditional licenses and sales of intellectual property ensure that the price for the right to use the protected intellectual property is commensurate with its economic value.” <br /> ** For example, commercial uses are more valuable than individual uses, so the economic compensation for commercial use is higher. <br /> * In the case of conditional sales, the copyright interest is analogous to the patent interest. Granting different conditional licenses (at different rates) to different users allows patent holders “to make their property available for many different applications on a sensible economic basis.” <br /> ** The same product might have a different economic value depending on its use.<br /> ** Different embodiments of a patent may have different applications and different values. <br /> ** One claim may cover a single component while another might describe that component within a system. <br /> <br /> * Examples<br /> *** Genetically modified crop seeds<br /> **** If the seller sold both the seeds and the right to sell future generations of seeds, it would be forced to recoup all of its investment in one growing season. This would discourage expensive and risky investment; this is the opposite of the patent system’s goal of promoting the sciences and useful arts. <br /> *** Electronics industry<br /> **** A microprocessor might be most valuable in high-end research computers but have some lower value in home PCs. It is optimal to charge a lower price to home users on the condition that they do not resell them for use in the high-value computers. If patent holders could not license usage in this way, they would increase the cost of all systems by charging the higher values or market the product as a commodity, lose the high-value compensation, and discourage product development. <br /> <br /> <br /> # Public policy favors enforcing conditional sales or licenses<br /> <br /> * A “patent owner should be able to fashion a license that grants less than the full patent right” just as the owner of any other kind of property can generally limit how that property is used. <br /> <br /> * Otherwise, patentees will shift the burden for protecting their inventions from license agreements to the patenting process. <br /> ** They would be forced to “anticipate all possible options regarding the use and marketing” of their property. <br /> ** The extra applications would overburden the patent system<br /> <br /> # Conditional licenses are subject to patent exhaustion when paired with an abuse of patent rights <br /> <br /> * Patent exhaustion provides a limit when a monopoly extends too far, such as when it violates antitrust laws or tries to impose “impermissible geographic restrictions.” <br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt; <br /> &lt;p&gt; In conclusion, the nature of the market and patent rights requires “flexible licensing arrangements.” The Court has long supported valid conditional licenses that allow for the “appropriate exchange of economic value.”&lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4905 2011-04-29T02:16:51Z

<p>Rabot: /* Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents */</p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==<br /> <br /> ##</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4900 2011-04-29T00:37:35Z

<p>Rabot: /* Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Re: Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. */</p> <hr /> <div>== Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association In Support of the Respondents ==</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4854 2011-04-27T23:39:27Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>== Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Re: Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. ==</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Quanta_Brief_Summary_901330223&diff=4853 2011-04-27T23:30:12Z

<p>Rabot: Created page with &quot;Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008)&quot;</p> <hr /> <div>Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008)</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Here_in_list_of_arguments_in_Quanta&diff=4852 2011-04-27T23:29:46Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>Post a link to your summary of the brief you read here.<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief Summary 901330223]]</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Rabot&diff=4851 2011-04-27T23:29:30Z

<p>Rabot: /* Links to Assignments */</p> <hr /> <div>==Links to Assignments ==<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 4,424,275 (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 1)<br /> <br /> [[Patentability Case-Study: Tracing Hotchkiss, A.&amp;P., and Lyon (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 2)<br /> <br /> [[Two Faces: US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966) (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 3)<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[Historical Development of Nonobviousness (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Suggestion to Combine (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Objective Tests (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[The Inventive Step (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Relationship with Novelty (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Other Historical Considerations (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 3,643,513 (HW 2-25) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Printed Publication (HW 3-23) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Doctrine of Equivalents (HW 4-4) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[Honeywell Ruling (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[Quanta Brief Summary 901330223]]<br /> <br /> == Links to Notes ==<br /> <br /> [[ Brief of Amici Curiae AMA, ACMG, ASHG, APHMG, and Mayo Clinic in Support of Respondents (Oct. 2, 2009) ]]<br /> <br /> [[Abbott timeline (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Appellate Brief for Petitioner (January 1939) in The Electric Storage Battery Co., Petitioner, v. Genzo Shimadzu and Northeastern Engineering Corporation, Respondents (RCTA)]]</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Rabot&diff=4700 2011-04-06T15:48:50Z

<p>Rabot: /* Links to Assignments */</p> <hr /> <div>==Links to Assignments ==<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 4,424,275 (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 1)<br /> <br /> [[Patentability Case-Study: Tracing Hotchkiss, A.&amp;P., and Lyon (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 2)<br /> <br /> [[Two Faces: US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966) (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 3)<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[Historical Development of Nonobviousness (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Suggestion to Combine (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Objective Tests (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[The Inventive Step (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Relationship with Novelty (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Other Historical Considerations (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 3,643,513 (HW 2-25) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Printed Publication (HW 3-23) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Doctrine of Equivalents (HW 4-4) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[Honeywell Ruling (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> == Links to Notes ==<br /> <br /> [[ Brief of Amici Curiae AMA, ACMG, ASHG, APHMG, and Mayo Clinic in Support of Respondents (Oct. 2, 2009) ]]<br /> <br /> [[Abbott timeline (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Appellate Brief for Petitioner (January 1939) in The Electric Storage Battery Co., Petitioner, v. Genzo Shimadzu and Northeastern Engineering Corporation, Respondents (RCTA)]]</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Honeywell_Ruling_(RCTA)&diff=4698 2011-04-06T15:47:46Z

<p>Rabot: Created page with &quot;&lt;p&gt;In petitioning a rehearing, counsel for Honeywell addressed our two concerns, arguing 1) that the Hamilton Sundstrand device was equivalent to their patented design and method...&quot;</p> <hr /> <div>&lt;p&gt;In petitioning a rehearing, counsel for Honeywell addressed our two concerns, arguing 1) that the Hamilton Sundstrand device was equivalent to their patented design and method and 2) to rebut the presumption of prosecution history estoppel. We vacate the latter issue and remand the former issue. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; Honeywell cited this Court’s logic in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002) and in Warner-Jenkinson Company v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 US 17 (1997). We agree that the rationale behind patent claims should be considered when determining whether the presumption of prosecution history estoppel might be rebutted. However, it is more important that patents serve their dual functions of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts and of informing the public of the scope of their unusual monopolies. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt;Therefore, following the holding of Festo, what the original claims contained when compared to what the revised claims contained will be the most important factors in determining whether the alleged equivalents are barred by estoppel. For example, an original claim might contain elements A, B, and C. If it is rejected by the patent examiner in light of the prior art and then later allowed to issue with the claim rewritten to include elements A, B, C, and D, then the patent holder clearly relinquishes all claim to A, B, and C together without D. Amending claims to avoid the prior art should always bar future expansion into that area, even by equivalents. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt;Honeywell claimed that its revision of its dependent claims into independent claims did not add the element of the IGVs. Instead, what occurred was merely procedural: the revision of one, higher-level claim resulted in the lower claims being rewritten in independent form; this occurred as if in a cascade, with no bearing on patentability. In this “cascade” kind of case, where revisions do not add limitations but merely comply with procedural guidelines, the estoppel presumption may be rebutted in light of the other facts of the case. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt;Furthermore, even if estoppel is presumed, Honeywell argues that it may be rebutted because the equivalent would not have been foreseeable at the time the patent was filed. This argument follows the precedent of the lower court and has merit. Honeywell also argued that Hamilton Sundstrand infringed because their device contained all the elements of the Honeywell patent, adding only the DELPQP calculation parameter to distinguish between high and low flow. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt;Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F .2d 1574 (1989) was a case of non-equivalence: the two devices had the same goal but used very different means to achieve it. This is method equivalence. Here, the two devices use the same means to achieve different immediate goals. The Sundstrand device is unique in its measuring of the IGVs’ positions to determine high and low flow. However, both have similar ultimate goals. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt;In response, Hamilton Sundstrand did not address the equivalency issue but instead argued that Honeywell’s patent was foreseeable and that, consequently, Hamilton Sundstrand could not be held liable for damages. The burden is upon Honeywell to craft its claims carefully; however, the ordinary meaning of language should be relied upon when determining equivalents or foreseeability, especially ten years after an invention. Hamilton Sundstrand contended that the equivalence issue was foreseeable a long time prior to Honeywell’s patent in light of the prior art of the 1970s: the L1011’s use of static pressure differentials. Both sides conceded that there was no literal infringement, and Hamilton Sundstrand argued that the doctrine of equivalents could not be used because of foreseeability. That is, Honeywell should have covered Hamilton Sundstrand’s use in their claim. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt;We find that the equivalent was not foreseeable in light of the prior art. Not only did Honeywell’s invention address a long-standing problem in the field, the applications of the 1970s were significantly different from those of Honeywell. For the above reasons, we vacate the holding insofar as it relied upon the presumption of prosecution history estoppel and remand to the lower court for evaluation of the infringement claim and the alleged equivalency of the Hamilton Sundstrand device with that of the patented Honeywell device.&lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt;Finally, the logic of the court below regarding tangentiality does not rely upon facts internal to the patent or to the patent prosecution process; rather, tangentiality is dependent upon what is contained within the future alleged infringement. The dissenting opinion of Judge Newman is illustrative: “[The tangentiality] criterion relates to why an amendment was made; it does not become irrebuttable simply when the accused equivalent concerns the same element that was added by amendment.” Each patent must be evaluated on its facts and circumstances at the time of its filing. The prosecution file wrapper is thus important both for the Courts and the public in determining patent scope. While the amendment would not be material to the case unless it concerns the same element as the accused equivalent, this simple association does not make rebuttal of estoppel presumption impossible. &lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Rabot&diff=4697 2011-04-06T15:46:27Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>==Links to Assignments ==<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 4,424,275 (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 1)<br /> <br /> [[Patentability Case-Study: Tracing Hotchkiss, A.&amp;P., and Lyon (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 2)<br /> <br /> [[Two Faces: US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966) (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 3)<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[Historical Development of Nonobviousness (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Suggestion to Combine (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Objective Tests (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[The Inventive Step (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Relationship with Novelty (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Other Historical Considerations (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 3,643,513 (HW 2-25) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Printed Publication (HW 3-23) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Doctrine of Equivalents (HW 4-4) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Honeywell Ruling (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> == Links to Notes ==<br /> <br /> [[ Brief of Amici Curiae AMA, ACMG, ASHG, APHMG, and Mayo Clinic in Support of Respondents (Oct. 2, 2009) ]]<br /> <br /> [[Abbott timeline (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Appellate Brief for Petitioner (January 1939) in The Electric Storage Battery Co., Petitioner, v. Genzo Shimadzu and Northeastern Engineering Corporation, Respondents (RCTA)]]</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Doctrine_of_Equivalents_Case_List&diff=4520 2011-04-01T22:36:51Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>Add your case to the list with a one-paragraph (approximately 250 words) summary of the facts at issues, i.e., &quot;an umbrella is or is not equivalent to a parasol because...&quot;<br /> <br /> Please put the cases in chronological order. If two are from the same year, then put them in alphabetical order. Also put your name, your login name or NDID number with your case. Use the following for a template.<br /> <br /> * Goodwine v. Batill, 123 US 4567 (1066)<br /> This case concerned a patent for an iPad and the patentee sued the maker of an iPod for infringement. The important part of the claim was &quot;a device for playing music and other media comprising a touch screen...&quot; The court held that iPod infringed the iPad patent because the ... was equivalent to the ... because ...<br /> <br /> Bill Goodwine<br /> <br /> *AMEC Liquidating Trust v. IVAC Corporation, 885 F.2d 1574 (1989)<br /> <br /> AMEC had a patent for a thermometer with a plastic cover held on by a hooking type mechanism. IVAC created a thermometer with a cover held on by a ring that created a friction lock. The CAFC held the IVAC invention was non-infringing on the AMEC patent because under the doctrine of equivalents, it did not perform the same function in the same way. The AMEC thermometer cover used an inscription fit, which created deep scratches in the cover. The IVAC thermometer used a friction fit, which only created superficial scratches in the cover. The CAFC found that the superficial scratches did not constitute an inscription fit. Also, the CAFC decided that AMEC did not present any evidence proving that the ring in the IVAC patent was equivalent to the “hook” in the AMEC patent. Because of this, the patent was non-infringing under the doctrine of equivalents.<br /> <br /> 901444263<br /> <br /> * Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202 (1992) <br /> <br /> Lemelson sued Mattel, alleging that Mattel's &quot;Hot Wheels&quot; toy car track infringed on his patented toy track. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of the plaintiff. Mattel appealed to the CAFC. The Court held that the &quot;Hot Wheels&quot; track did not contain all the limitations of the patent; it was equivalent to the prior art. That is, Lemelson's patent could not be both valid in light of the prior art and infringed upon by Mattel. Furthermore, upon his first application, claim 3 of Lemelson's patent had five clauses. The PTO examiner found the patent to be indistinguishable from the prior art. Lemelson added clauses [f] and [g] and received a patent. The important parts of the claim were, &quot;[f] said guide means include a pair of spaced apart runner portions for defining the pathway of a vehicle moving over said track, [g] said spaced apart runner portions include upwardly extending rails for guiding the wheels of a vehicle.&quot; The Court held that &quot;Hot wheels&quot; did not contain any elements equivalent to the clauses [f] and [g]. The Court also noted that the public is entitled to the PTO record to determine the scope and meaning of claims. <br /> <br /> 901330223<br /> <br /> *Hale Propeller, L.L.C. v Ryan Marine Products Pty., LTD., et al, 151 F. Supp .2d 183 (2001) Connecticut District Court<br /> Ryan owned patent 4411073, issued on 25 October 1983, which concerned devices to measure the pitch of propeller blades. Ryan originally filed the claim on 13 July 1981 it was rejected and then ammended on 4 October 1982. Hale's device called the &quot;Hale Propeller MRI&quot; was developed in 1997. In question are claims 1(b),(c),(f), and 6. A third party, Michigan Wheel Corporation, a distributor of Hale's invention filed for patent invalidity. The important differences between Hale's and Ryan's device are that Hale's does not use gears or worm-drives to rotate the blade and the device does not give direct readouts of the measurements using electric circuits. The issue with claim 1(b) was if a roller was a necessary part of the structure because it prevents skipping of the probe making the measurements more accurate. The court used means-plus-function to rule that the roller was important and Hale did not infringe. The issue with claim 1(c) deals with whether a worm or gear drive is necessary to rotate the blade. Ryan's patent discloses a hand-cranked device, like Hales, but includes a worm-drive. Part of Ryan's ammendment to his claim was to include worm gear to the hand-cranking device and therefore the court used prosecution history estoppel to make their decision because Ryan forfeited that claim (hand-cranked device without worm-drive) in order to get the patent and therefore cannot use doctrine of equivalents to get the claim back. The issue of claim 1(f) was whether the computer in the claim was a special computer needed for the readouts. The court ruled that the claim was not that narrow, but then the court ruled that claim 6 dealt with a computer that receives measurement data from the optical encoder and therefore Hale did not infringe. The patent was also ruled valid using the roller and worm drive to prove that it was non-obvious §103, definitively disclosed §112, and not anticipated by prior art §102(b).<br /> <br /> Gillian Allsup<br /> <br /> *Next case here...<br /> 901281608<br /> <br /> *Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics &amp; Plastics, Inc. Nos. 2010-1145, 2010-117. (2001) United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> <br /> <br /> This case began as an infringement lawsuit by Siemens Medical Solutions USA, inc. against Saint-Gobain Ceramics and Plastics, Inc. for the alleged infringement of a patent held by Siemens for a scintillator, a part of an x-ray machine that detects radiation. Saint-Gobain owned a patent for a similar device and the circuit court found that this patent infringed on the patent held by Siemens, which was filed earlier. Though the doctrine of equivalents was used to rule infringement, Saint-Gobain was found to have accidentally, rather than willfully infringed and Siemens was awarded 52.3 million dollars. <br /> <br /> Siemens filed for patent number 4,958,080 on August 4, 1989. This patent was for a scintillator containing cerium-doped- lutetium oxyorthosilicate. This is a component of a radiation detector that absorbs gamma-ray photons from an x-ray machine and converts them to visible light so the results can be interpreted. Saint-Gobain also produces scintillators, filing patent number 6,6424,420 in 2000 for a cerium-doped lutetium-yttrium orthosilicate. The chemical composition differs from that of the Siemens' patent as %10 of the lutetium is substituted for yttrium. These scintillators were sold by Saint-Gobain to Philips Medical Systems, a competitor of Siemens. The circuit court found that the composition of Saint-Gobain's scintillator preformed largely the same function in the same manner as Siemens' patent, and therefore was infringement under the doctrine of equivalence. <br /> <br /> Saint-Gobain filed a motion for a new trail, on the basis that the jury was not told that infringement by the doctrine of equivalence must be proved by clear evidence and argued that damages should be remitted. The Federal Appeals Court did not grant Saint-Gobain a new trial, but did reduces the damages to 44 million. <br /> <br /> *<br /> *<br /> *<br /> *</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Doctrine_of_Equivalents_Case_List&diff=4519 2011-04-01T22:35:53Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>Add your case to the list with a one-paragraph (approximately 250 words) summary of the facts at issues, i.e., &quot;an umbrella is or is not equivalent to a parasol because...&quot;<br /> <br /> Please put the cases in chronological order. If two are from the same year, then put them in alphabetical order. Also put your name, your login name or NDID number with your case. Use the following for a template.<br /> <br /> * Goodwine v. Batill, 123 US 4567 (1066)<br /> This case concerned a patent for an iPad and the patentee sued the maker of an iPod for infringement. The important part of the claim was &quot;a device for playing music and other media comprising a touch screen...&quot; The court held that iPod infringed the iPad patent because the ... was equivalent to the ... because ...<br /> <br /> Bill Goodwine<br /> <br /> *AMEC Liquidating Trust v. IVAC Corporation, 885 F.2d 1574 (1989)<br /> <br /> AMEC had a patent for a thermometer with a plastic cover held on by a hooking type mechanism. IVAC created a thermometer with a cover held on by a ring that created a friction lock. The CAFC held the IVAC invention was non-infringing on the AMEC patent because under the doctrine of equivalents, it did not perform the same function in the same way. The AMEC thermometer cover used an inscription fit, which created deep scratches in the cover. The IVAC thermometer used a friction fit, which only created superficial scratches in the cover. The CAFC found that the superficial scratches did not constitute an inscription fit. Also, the CAFC decided that AMEC did not present any evidence proving that the ring in the IVAC patent was equivalent to the “hook” in the AMEC patent. Because of this, the patent was non-infringing under the doctrine of equivalents.<br /> <br /> 901444263<br /> <br /> * Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202 (1992) <br /> <br /> Lemelson sued Mattel, alleging that Mattel's &quot;Hot Wheels&quot; toy car track infringed on his patented toy track. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of the plaintiff. Mattel appealed to the CAFC. The Court held that the &quot;Hot Wheels&quot; track did not contain all the limitations of the patent; it was equivalent to the prior art. That is, Lemelson's patent could not be both valid in light of the prior art and infringed upon by Mattel. Furthermore, upon his first application, claim 3 of Lemelson's patent had five clauses. The PTO examiner found the patent to be indistinguishable from the prior art. Lemelson added clauses [f] and [g] and received a patent:<br /> ** [f] said guide means include a pair of spaced apart runner portions for defining the pathway of a vehicle moving over said track, <br /> ** [g] said spaced apart runner portions include upwardly extending rails for guiding the wheels of a vehicle. <br /> The Court held that &quot;Hot wheels&quot; did not contain any elements equivalent to the clauses [f] and [g]. The Court also noted that the public is entitled to the PTO record to determine the scope and meaning of claims. <br /> <br /> 901330223<br /> <br /> *Hale Propeller, L.L.C. v Ryan Marine Products Pty., LTD., et al, 151 F. Supp .2d 183 (2001) Connecticut District Court<br /> Ryan owned patent 4411073, issued on 25 October 1983, which concerned devices to measure the pitch of propeller blades. Ryan originally filed the claim on 13 July 1981 it was rejected and then ammended on 4 October 1982. Hale's device called the &quot;Hale Propeller MRI&quot; was developed in 1997. In question are claims 1(b),(c),(f), and 6. A third party, Michigan Wheel Corporation, a distributor of Hale's invention filed for patent invalidity. The important differences between Hale's and Ryan's device are that Hale's does not use gears or worm-drives to rotate the blade and the device does not give direct readouts of the measurements using electric circuits. The issue with claim 1(b) was if a roller was a necessary part of the structure because it prevents skipping of the probe making the measurements more accurate. The court used means-plus-function to rule that the roller was important and Hale did not infringe. The issue with claim 1(c) deals with whether a worm or gear drive is necessary to rotate the blade. Ryan's patent discloses a hand-cranked device, like Hales, but includes a worm-drive. Part of Ryan's ammendment to his claim was to include worm gear to the hand-cranking device and therefore the court used prosecution history estoppel to make their decision because Ryan forfeited that claim (hand-cranked device without worm-drive) in order to get the patent and therefore cannot use doctrine of equivalents to get the claim back. The issue of claim 1(f) was whether the computer in the claim was a special computer needed for the readouts. The court ruled that the claim was not that narrow, but then the court ruled that claim 6 dealt with a computer that receives measurement data from the optical encoder and therefore Hale did not infringe. The patent was also ruled valid using the roller and worm drive to prove that it was non-obvious §103, definitively disclosed §112, and not anticipated by prior art §102(b).<br /> <br /> Gillian Allsup<br /> <br /> *Next case here...<br /> 901281608<br /> <br /> *Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics &amp; Plastics, Inc. Nos. 2010-1145, 2010-117. (2001) United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> <br /> <br /> This case began as an infringement lawsuit by Siemens Medical Solutions USA, inc. against Saint-Gobain Ceramics and Plastics, Inc. for the alleged infringement of a patent held by Siemens for a scintillator, a part of an x-ray machine that detects radiation. Saint-Gobain owned a patent for a similar device and the circuit court found that this patent infringed on the patent held by Siemens, which was filed earlier. Though the doctrine of equivalents was used to rule infringement, Saint-Gobain was found to have accidentally, rather than willfully infringed and Siemens was awarded 52.3 million dollars. <br /> <br /> Siemens filed for patent number 4,958,080 on August 4, 1989. This patent was for a scintillator containing cerium-doped- lutetium oxyorthosilicate. This is a component of a radiation detector that absorbs gamma-ray photons from an x-ray machine and converts them to visible light so the results can be interpreted. Saint-Gobain also produces scintillators, filing patent number 6,6424,420 in 2000 for a cerium-doped lutetium-yttrium orthosilicate. The chemical composition differs from that of the Siemens' patent as %10 of the lutetium is substituted for yttrium. These scintillators were sold by Saint-Gobain to Philips Medical Systems, a competitor of Siemens. The circuit court found that the composition of Saint-Gobain's scintillator preformed largely the same function in the same manner as Siemens' patent, and therefore was infringement under the doctrine of equivalence. <br /> <br /> Saint-Gobain filed a motion for a new trail, on the basis that the jury was not told that infringement by the doctrine of equivalence must be proved by clear evidence and argued that damages should be remitted. The Federal Appeals Court did not grant Saint-Gobain a new trial, but did reduces the damages to 44 million. <br /> <br /> *<br /> *<br /> *<br /> *</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Doctrine_of_Equivalents_Case_List&diff=4518 2011-04-01T22:35:35Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>Add your case to the list with a one-paragraph (approximately 250 words) summary of the facts at issues, i.e., &quot;an umbrella is or is not equivalent to a parasol because...&quot;<br /> <br /> Please put the cases in chronological order. If two are from the same year, then put them in alphabetical order. Also put your name, your login name or NDID number with your case. Use the following for a template.<br /> <br /> * Goodwine v. Batill, 123 US 4567 (1066)<br /> This case concerned a patent for an iPad and the patentee sued the maker of an iPod for infringement. The important part of the claim was &quot;a device for playing music and other media comprising a touch screen...&quot; The court held that iPod infringed the iPad patent because the ... was equivalent to the ... because ...<br /> <br /> Bill Goodwine<br /> <br /> *AMEC Liquidating Trust v. IVAC Corporation, 885 F.2d 1574 (1989)<br /> <br /> AMEC had a patent for a thermometer with a plastic cover held on by a hooking type mechanism. IVAC created a thermometer with a cover held on by a ring that created a friction lock. The CAFC held the IVAC invention was non-infringing on the AMEC patent because under the doctrine of equivalents, it did not perform the same function in the same way. The AMEC thermometer cover used an inscription fit, which created deep scratches in the cover. The IVAC thermometer used a friction fit, which only created superficial scratches in the cover. The CAFC found that the superficial scratches did not constitute an inscription fit. Also, the CAFC decided that AMEC did not present any evidence proving that the ring in the IVAC patent was equivalent to the “hook” in the AMEC patent. Because of this, the patent was non-infringing under the doctrine of equivalents.<br /> <br /> 901444263<br /> <br /> * Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202 (1992) <br /> <br /> Lemelson sued Mattel, alleging that Mattel's &quot;Hot Wheels&quot; toy car track infringed on his patented toy track. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of the plaintiff. Mattel appealed to the CAFC. The Court held that the &quot;Hot Wheels&quot; track did not contain all the limitations of the patent; it was equivalent to the prior art. That is, Lemelson's patent could not be both valid in light of the prior art and infringed upon by Mattel. Furthermore, upon his first application, claim 3 of Lemelson's patent had five clauses. The PTO examiner found the patent to be indistinguishable from the prior art. Lemelson added clauses [f] and [g] and received a patent:<br /> <br /> ** [f] said guide means include a pair of spaced apart runner portions for defining the pathway of a vehicle moving over said track, <br /> ** [g] said spaced apart runner portions include upwardly extending rails for guiding the wheels of a vehicle. <br /> <br /> The Court held that &quot;Hot wheels&quot; did not contain any elements equivalent to the clauses [f] and [g]. The Court also noted that the public is entitled to the PTO record to determine the scope and meaning of claims. <br /> <br /> 901330223<br /> <br /> *Hale Propeller, L.L.C. v Ryan Marine Products Pty., LTD., et al, 151 F. Supp .2d 183 (2001) Connecticut District Court<br /> Ryan owned patent 4411073, issued on 25 October 1983, which concerned devices to measure the pitch of propeller blades. Ryan originally filed the claim on 13 July 1981 it was rejected and then ammended on 4 October 1982. Hale's device called the &quot;Hale Propeller MRI&quot; was developed in 1997. In question are claims 1(b),(c),(f), and 6. A third party, Michigan Wheel Corporation, a distributor of Hale's invention filed for patent invalidity. The important differences between Hale's and Ryan's device are that Hale's does not use gears or worm-drives to rotate the blade and the device does not give direct readouts of the measurements using electric circuits. The issue with claim 1(b) was if a roller was a necessary part of the structure because it prevents skipping of the probe making the measurements more accurate. The court used means-plus-function to rule that the roller was important and Hale did not infringe. The issue with claim 1(c) deals with whether a worm or gear drive is necessary to rotate the blade. Ryan's patent discloses a hand-cranked device, like Hales, but includes a worm-drive. Part of Ryan's ammendment to his claim was to include worm gear to the hand-cranking device and therefore the court used prosecution history estoppel to make their decision because Ryan forfeited that claim (hand-cranked device without worm-drive) in order to get the patent and therefore cannot use doctrine of equivalents to get the claim back. The issue of claim 1(f) was whether the computer in the claim was a special computer needed for the readouts. The court ruled that the claim was not that narrow, but then the court ruled that claim 6 dealt with a computer that receives measurement data from the optical encoder and therefore Hale did not infringe. The patent was also ruled valid using the roller and worm drive to prove that it was non-obvious §103, definitively disclosed §112, and not anticipated by prior art §102(b).<br /> <br /> Gillian Allsup<br /> <br /> *Next case here...<br /> 901281608<br /> <br /> *Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics &amp; Plastics, Inc. Nos. 2010-1145, 2010-117. (2001) United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> <br /> <br /> This case began as an infringement lawsuit by Siemens Medical Solutions USA, inc. against Saint-Gobain Ceramics and Plastics, Inc. for the alleged infringement of a patent held by Siemens for a scintillator, a part of an x-ray machine that detects radiation. Saint-Gobain owned a patent for a similar device and the circuit court found that this patent infringed on the patent held by Siemens, which was filed earlier. Though the doctrine of equivalents was used to rule infringement, Saint-Gobain was found to have accidentally, rather than willfully infringed and Siemens was awarded 52.3 million dollars. <br /> <br /> Siemens filed for patent number 4,958,080 on August 4, 1989. This patent was for a scintillator containing cerium-doped- lutetium oxyorthosilicate. This is a component of a radiation detector that absorbs gamma-ray photons from an x-ray machine and converts them to visible light so the results can be interpreted. Saint-Gobain also produces scintillators, filing patent number 6,6424,420 in 2000 for a cerium-doped lutetium-yttrium orthosilicate. The chemical composition differs from that of the Siemens' patent as %10 of the lutetium is substituted for yttrium. These scintillators were sold by Saint-Gobain to Philips Medical Systems, a competitor of Siemens. The circuit court found that the composition of Saint-Gobain's scintillator preformed largely the same function in the same manner as Siemens' patent, and therefore was infringement under the doctrine of equivalence. <br /> <br /> Saint-Gobain filed a motion for a new trail, on the basis that the jury was not told that infringement by the doctrine of equivalence must be proved by clear evidence and argued that damages should be remitted. The Federal Appeals Court did not grant Saint-Gobain a new trial, but did reduces the damages to 44 million. <br /> <br /> *<br /> *<br /> *<br /> *</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Doctrine_of_Equivalents_Case_List&diff=4517 2011-04-01T22:34:44Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>Add your case to the list with a one-paragraph (approximately 250 words) summary of the facts at issues, i.e., &quot;an umbrella is or is not equivalent to a parasol because...&quot;<br /> <br /> Please put the cases in chronological order. If two are from the same year, then put them in alphabetical order. Also put your name, your login name or NDID number with your case. Use the following for a template.<br /> <br /> * Goodwine v. Batill, 123 US 4567 (1066)<br /> This case concerned a patent for an iPad and the patentee sued the maker of an iPod for infringement. The important part of the claim was &quot;a device for playing music and other media comprising a touch screen...&quot; The court held that iPod infringed the iPad patent because the ... was equivalent to the ... because ...<br /> <br /> Bill Goodwine<br /> <br /> *AMEC Liquidating Trust v. IVAC Corporation, 885 F.2d 1574 (1989)<br /> <br /> AMEC had a patent for a thermometer with a plastic cover held on by a hooking type mechanism. IVAC created a thermometer with a cover held on by a ring that created a friction lock. The CAFC held the IVAC invention was non-infringing on the AMEC patent because under the doctrine of equivalents, it did not perform the same function in the same way. The AMEC thermometer cover used an inscription fit, which created deep scratches in the cover. The IVAC thermometer used a friction fit, which only created superficial scratches in the cover. The CAFC found that the superficial scratches did not constitute an inscription fit. Also, the CAFC decided that AMEC did not present any evidence proving that the ring in the IVAC patent was equivalent to the “hook” in the AMEC patent. Because of this, the patent was non-infringing under the doctrine of equivalents.<br /> <br /> 901444263<br /> <br /> * Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202 (1992) <br /> <br /> Lemelson sued Mattel, alleging that Mattel's &quot;Hot Wheels&quot; toy car track infringed on his patented toy track. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of the plaintiff. Mattel appealed to the CAFC. The Court held that the &quot;Hot Wheels&quot; track did not contain all the limitations of the patent; it was equivalent to the prior art. That is, Lemelson's patent could not be both valid in light of the prior art and infringed upon by Mattel. Furthermore, upon his first application, claim 3 of Lemelson's patent had five clauses. The PTO examiner found the patent to be indistinguishable from the prior art. Lemelson added clauses [f] and [g] and received a patent: <br /> ** [f] said guide means include a pair of spaced apart runner portions for defining the pathway of a vehicle moving over said track, <br /> ** [g] said spaced apart runner portions include upwardly extending rails for guiding the wheels of a vehicle. <br /> The Court held that &quot;Hot wheels&quot; did not contain any elements equivalent to the clauses [f] and [g]. The Court also noted that the public is entitled to the PTO record to determine the scope and meaning of claims. <br /> <br /> 901330223<br /> <br /> *Hale Propeller, L.L.C. v Ryan Marine Products Pty., LTD., et al, 151 F. Supp .2d 183 (2001) Connecticut District Court<br /> Ryan owned patent 4411073, issued on 25 October 1983, which concerned devices to measure the pitch of propeller blades. Ryan originally filed the claim on 13 July 1981 it was rejected and then ammended on 4 October 1982. Hale's device called the &quot;Hale Propeller MRI&quot; was developed in 1997. In question are claims 1(b),(c),(f), and 6. A third party, Michigan Wheel Corporation, a distributor of Hale's invention filed for patent invalidity. The important differences between Hale's and Ryan's device are that Hale's does not use gears or worm-drives to rotate the blade and the device does not give direct readouts of the measurements using electric circuits. The issue with claim 1(b) was if a roller was a necessary part of the structure because it prevents skipping of the probe making the measurements more accurate. The court used means-plus-function to rule that the roller was important and Hale did not infringe. The issue with claim 1(c) deals with whether a worm or gear drive is necessary to rotate the blade. Ryan's patent discloses a hand-cranked device, like Hales, but includes a worm-drive. Part of Ryan's ammendment to his claim was to include worm gear to the hand-cranking device and therefore the court used prosecution history estoppel to make their decision because Ryan forfeited that claim (hand-cranked device without worm-drive) in order to get the patent and therefore cannot use doctrine of equivalents to get the claim back. The issue of claim 1(f) was whether the computer in the claim was a special computer needed for the readouts. The court ruled that the claim was not that narrow, but then the court ruled that claim 6 dealt with a computer that receives measurement data from the optical encoder and therefore Hale did not infringe. The patent was also ruled valid using the roller and worm drive to prove that it was non-obvious §103, definitively disclosed §112, and not anticipated by prior art §102(b).<br /> <br /> Gillian Allsup<br /> <br /> *Next case here...<br /> 901281608<br /> <br /> *Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics &amp; Plastics, Inc. Nos. 2010-1145, 2010-117. (2001) United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> <br /> <br /> This case began as an infringement lawsuit by Siemens Medical Solutions USA, inc. against Saint-Gobain Ceramics and Plastics, Inc. for the alleged infringement of a patent held by Siemens for a scintillator, a part of an x-ray machine that detects radiation. Saint-Gobain owned a patent for a similar device and the circuit court found that this patent infringed on the patent held by Siemens, which was filed earlier. Though the doctrine of equivalents was used to rule infringement, Saint-Gobain was found to have accidentally, rather than willfully infringed and Siemens was awarded 52.3 million dollars. <br /> <br /> Siemens filed for patent number 4,958,080 on August 4, 1989. This patent was for a scintillator containing cerium-doped- lutetium oxyorthosilicate. This is a component of a radiation detector that absorbs gamma-ray photons from an x-ray machine and converts them to visible light so the results can be interpreted. Saint-Gobain also produces scintillators, filing patent number 6,6424,420 in 2000 for a cerium-doped lutetium-yttrium orthosilicate. The chemical composition differs from that of the Siemens' patent as %10 of the lutetium is substituted for yttrium. These scintillators were sold by Saint-Gobain to Philips Medical Systems, a competitor of Siemens. The circuit court found that the composition of Saint-Gobain's scintillator preformed largely the same function in the same manner as Siemens' patent, and therefore was infringement under the doctrine of equivalence. <br /> <br /> Saint-Gobain filed a motion for a new trail, on the basis that the jury was not told that infringement by the doctrine of equivalence must be proved by clear evidence and argued that damages should be remitted. The Federal Appeals Court did not grant Saint-Gobain a new trial, but did reduces the damages to 44 million. <br /> <br /> *<br /> *<br /> *<br /> *</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Doctrine_of_Equivalents_(HW_4-4)_(RCTA)&diff=4498 2011-03-31T23:23:14Z

<p>Rabot: /* Summary */</p> <hr /> <div>== Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc. (1992) ==<br /> <br /> * United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> * Plaintiff-Appellee: Jerome H. Lemelson<br /> * Defendants: General Mills, Inc., General Mills Fun Group, Inc., Marvin Glass &amp; Associates<br /> * Defendant-Appellant: Mattel, Inc. <br /> * June 30, 1992<br /> <br /> == Summary ==<br /> <br /> Lemelson sued Mattel, alleging that Mattel's &quot;Hot Wheels&quot; toy car track infringed on his patented toy track. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of the plaintiff. Mattel appealed to the CAFC. The Court held that the &quot;Hot Wheels&quot; track did not contain all the limitations of the patent; there was not enough evidence to show that it was distinguishable from the prior art. That is, Lemelson's patent could not be ''both'' valid in light of the prior art ''and'' infringed upon by Mattel. Furthermore, upon his first application, claim 3 of Lemelson's patent had five clauses. The PTO examiner found the patent to be indistinguishable from the prior art. Lemelson added clauses [f] and [g] and received a patent: <br /> <br /> * [f] said guide means include a pair of spaced apart runner portions for defining the pathway of a vehicle moving over said track,<br /> * [g] said spaced apart runner portions include upwardly extending rails for guiding the wheels of a vehicle. <br /> <br /> The Court held that &quot;Hot wheels&quot; did not contain any elements equivalent to clauses [f] and [g]. The Court also noted that the public is entitled to the PTO record to determine the scope and meaning of claims.</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Doctrine_of_Equivalents_(HW_4-4)_(RCTA)&diff=4497 2011-03-31T23:21:21Z

<p>Rabot: &quot;Hot Wheels&quot; toy track case, doctrine of equivalents</p> <hr /> <div>== Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc. (1992) ==<br /> <br /> * United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> * Plaintiff-Appellee: Jerome H. Lemelson<br /> * Defendants: General Mills, Inc., General Mills Fun Group, Inc., Marvin Glass &amp; Associates<br /> * Defendant-Appellant: Mattel, Inc. <br /> * June 30, 1992<br /> <br /> == Summary ==<br /> <br /> Lemelson sued Mattel, alleging that Mattel's &quot;Hot Wheels&quot; toy car track infringed on his patented toy track. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of the plaintiff. Mattel appealed to the CAFC. The Court held that Lemelson's patent could not be ''both'' valid in light of the prior art ''and'' infringed upon by Mattel. First, the &quot;Hot Wheels&quot; track did not contain all the limitations of the patent; there was not enough evidence to show that it was distinguishable from the prior art. Upon his first application, claim 3 of Lemelson's patent had five clauses. The PTO examiner found the patent to be indistinguishable from the prior art. Lemelson added clauses [f] and [g] and received a patent: <br /> <br /> * [f] said guide means include a pair of spaced apart runner portions for defining the pathway of a vehicle moving over said track,<br /> * [g] said spaced apart runner portions include upwardly extending rails for guiding the wheels of a vehicle. <br /> <br /> The Court held that &quot;Hot wheels&quot; did not contain any elements equivalent to clauses [f] and [g]. The Court also noted that the public is entitled to the PTO record to determine the scope and meaning of claims.</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Rabot&diff=4496 2011-03-31T23:08:14Z

<p>Rabot: /* Links to Assignments */</p> <hr /> <div>==Links to Assignments ==<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 4,424,275 (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 1)<br /> <br /> [[Patentability Case-Study: Tracing Hotchkiss, A.&amp;P., and Lyon (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 2)<br /> <br /> [[Two Faces: US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966) (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 3)<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[Historical Development of Nonobviousness (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Suggestion to Combine (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Objective Tests (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[The Inventive Step (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Relationship with Novelty (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Other Historical Considerations (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 3,643,513 (HW 2-25) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Printed Publication (HW 3-23) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Doctrine of Equivalents (HW 4-4) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> == Links to Notes ==<br /> <br /> [[ Brief of Amici Curiae AMA, ACMG, ASHG, APHMG, and Mayo Clinic in Support of Respondents (Oct. 2, 2009) ]]<br /> <br /> [[Abbott timeline (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Appellate Brief for Petitioner (January 1939) in The Electric Storage Battery Co., Petitioner, v. Genzo Shimadzu and Northeastern Engineering Corporation, Respondents (RCTA)]]</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Printed_Publication_(HW_3-23)_(RCTA)&diff=4194 2011-03-22T20:29:54Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>==MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum==<br /> <br /> * United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> * Plaintiffs-Appellants: MEHL/Biophile International Corp., Selvac Acquisitions Corp. and Nardo Zaias, M.D.<br /> * Defendants-Appellees: Sandy Milgraum, M.D., Palomar Medical Technologies, Inc., and Spectrum Medical Technologies, Inc. <br /> * Date: Sept. 30, 1999 (Rehearing denied Oct. 27, 1999)<br /> <br /> ==Holding==<br /> <br /> # Patent was not anticipated by instruction manual for laser used to remove tattoos (instruction manual for Spectrum RD-1200 laser)<br /> # Patent was anticipated by prior art article (&quot;Melanosomes Are a Primary Target of Q-Switched Ruby Laser Irradiation in Guinea Pig Skin&quot; by Dr. Luigi Polla et al, published in the 1987 Journal of Investigative Dermatology)<br /> <br /> ==Summary==<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; MEHL/Biophile sued Dr. Sandy Milgraum for infringing U.S. patent No. 5,059,192 ('192 patent), a method for removing hair using a laser. Milgraum asserted that the patent claims were invalid because they had been anticipated in the prior art. The Court held that to &quot;anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently.&quot; Milgraum presented two sources, arguing that both anticipated '192 patent and rendered it invalid under 35 USC 102. The first was a manual for a laser used to remove tattoos. The second was an article relating a study of &quot;tissue damage induced by laser pulses on epilated backs of guinea pigs.&quot; The district court concluded that the manual anticipated the '192 patent and granted a summary judgment of invalidity. However, the CAFC concluded that the manual was not an anticipation because it does not teach the Claim 1 limitation of &quot;aligning a laser light applicator substantially vertically over a hair follicle opening.&quot; That is, someone following the manual could use the laser without aligning it in the configuration required by the claim. In contrast, the natural result of following the teaching of the Polla article would be alignment of the laser over the hair follicle. In holding the laser perpendicular to the skin and pulsing the laser, the conductors of the study necessarily held the laser &quot;substantially vertically&quot; and damaged hair follicles. In fact, the article repeatedly mentions the effect that the laser treatment had upon hair follicles, so the natural result was the function in question. The CAFC held the patent invalid by reason of anticipation in the prior art in the Polla article. &lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Printed_Publication_(HW_3-23)_(RCTA)&diff=4193 2011-03-22T20:24:54Z

<p>Rabot: /* Summary */</p> <hr /> <div>Assignment: Use the West KeyCite system to find another case dealing with a different type of &quot;Printed Publication&quot; such as advertisements, computer manuals, etc. Try to find one that is different and interesting, i.e., not the first one that comes up on the list.<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; I think you don't want to use the &quot;k. Requisites of Publication&quot; necessarily, but probably the one right above it. Create a wiki page with a one-paragraph description of the facts of the case and the holding. Be sure to include which court it was. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> ==MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum==<br /> <br /> * United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> * Plaintiffs-Appellants: MEHL/Biophile International Corp., Selvac Acquisitions Corp. and Nardo Zaias, M.D.<br /> * Defendants-Appellees: Sandy Milgraum, M.D., Palomar Medical Technologies, Inc., and Spectrum Medical Technologies, Inc. <br /> * Date: Sept. 30, 1999 (Rehearing denied Oct. 27, 1999)<br /> <br /> ==Holding==<br /> <br /> # Patent was not anticipated by instruction manual for laser used to remove tattoos (instruction manual for Spectrum RD-1200 laser)<br /> # Patent was anticipated by prior art article (&quot;Melanosomes Are a Primary Target of Q-Switched Ruby Laser Irradiation in Guinea Pig Skin&quot; by Dr. Luigi Polla et al, published in the 1987 Journal of Investigative Dermatology)<br /> <br /> ==Summary==<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; MEHL/Biophile sued Dr. Sandy Milgraum infringing U.S. patent No. 5,059,192 ('192 patent), a patent for a method for removing hair using a laser and preventing its regrowth. Milgraum asserted that the patent claims were invalid because they had been anticipated in the prior art. The Court held that to &quot;anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently.&quot; For a claim to be anticipated inherently, the prior art must either &quot;necessarily function with&quot; or otherwise include the claim limitations.&lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; Milgraum presented two sources, arguing that both anticipated '192 patent and rendered it invalid under 35 USC 102. The first was a manual for a laser used to remove tattoos. The second was an article relating a study of &quot;tissue damage induced by laser pulses on epilated backs of guinea pigs.&quot;&lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; The district court concluded that the manual anticipated the '192 patent and granted a summary judgment of invalidity. However, the CAFC concluded that the manual was not an anticipation because it does not teach the Claim 1 limitation of &quot;aligning a laser light applicator substantially vertically over a hair follicle opening.&quot; That is, someone following the manual could use the laser without aligning it in the configuration required by the claim. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; In contrast, the natural result of following the teaching of the Polla article would be alignment of the laser over the hair follicle. In holding the laser perpendicular to the skin and pulsing the laser, the conductors of the study necessarily held the laser &quot;substantially vertically&quot; and damaged hair follicles. In fact, the article repeatedly mentions the effect that the laser treatment had upon hair follicles, so the natural result was the function in question. &lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Printed_Publication_(HW_3-23)_(RCTA)&diff=4189 2011-03-22T19:30:45Z

<p>Rabot: /* Summary */</p> <hr /> <div>Assignment: Use the West KeyCite system to find another case dealing with a different type of &quot;Printed Publication&quot; such as advertisements, computer manuals, etc. Try to find one that is different and interesting, i.e., not the first one that comes up on the list.<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; I think you don't want to use the &quot;k. Requisites of Publication&quot; necessarily, but probably the one right above it. Create a wiki page with a one-paragraph description of the facts of the case and the holding. Be sure to include which court it was. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> ==MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum==<br /> <br /> * United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> * Plaintiffs-Appellants: MEHL/Biophile International Corp., Selvac Acquisitions Corp. and Nardo Zaias, M.D.<br /> * Defendants-Appellees: Sandy Milgraum, M.D., Palomar Medical Technologies, Inc., and Spectrum Medical Technologies, Inc. <br /> * Date: Sept. 30, 1999 (Rehearing denied Oct. 27, 1999)<br /> <br /> ==Holding==<br /> <br /> # Patent was not anticipated by instruction manual for laser used to remove tattoos (instruction manual for Spectrum RD-1200 laser)<br /> # Patent was anticipated by prior art article (&quot;Melanosomes Are a Primary Target of Q-Switched Ruby Laser Irradiation in Guinea Pig Skin&quot; by Dr. Luigi Polla et al, published in the 1987 Journal of Investigative Dermatology)<br /> <br /> ==Summary==<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; MEHL/Biophile sued Dr. Sandy Milgraum infringing U.S. patent No. 5,059,192 ('192 patent), a patent for a method for removing hair using a laser and preventing its regrowth. Milgraum asserted that the patent claims were invalid because they had been anticipated in the prior art. The Court held that to &quot;anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently.&quot; For a claim to be anticipated inherently, the prior art must either &quot;necessarily function with&quot; or otherwise include the claim limitations.&lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; Milgraum presented two sources, arguing that both anticipated '192 patent and rendered it invalid under 35 USC 102. The first was a manual for a laser used to remove tattoos. The second was an article relating a study of &quot;tissue damage induced by laser pulses on epilated backs of guinea pigs.&quot;&lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; The district court concluded that the manual anticipated the '192 patent and granted a summary judgment of invalidity. However, the CAFC concluded that the manual was not an anticipation because it does not teach the Claim 1 limitation of &quot;aligning a laser light applicator substantially vertically over a hair follicle opening.&quot;<br /> could use the laser according to the manual without necessarily aligning <br /> <br /> <br /> natural result would result in alignment of laser over hair follicle<br /> <br /> &quot;The method involves epilating guinea pigs with soft wax, holding the aperture of the laser in contact with the skin, and pulsing the laser&quot; <br /> &quot;disruption of melanosomes deep in the hair papillae&quot; <br /> otehr references to hair follicles <br /> <br /> natural result would be the function in question</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Printed_Publication_(HW_3-23)_(RCTA)&diff=4188 2011-03-22T19:20:23Z

<p>Rabot: /* Holding */</p> <hr /> <div>Assignment: Use the West KeyCite system to find another case dealing with a different type of &quot;Printed Publication&quot; such as advertisements, computer manuals, etc. Try to find one that is different and interesting, i.e., not the first one that comes up on the list.<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; I think you don't want to use the &quot;k. Requisites of Publication&quot; necessarily, but probably the one right above it. Create a wiki page with a one-paragraph description of the facts of the case and the holding. Be sure to include which court it was. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> ==MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum==<br /> <br /> * United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> * Plaintiffs-Appellants: MEHL/Biophile International Corp., Selvac Acquisitions Corp. and Nardo Zaias, M.D.<br /> * Defendants-Appellees: Sandy Milgraum, M.D., Palomar Medical Technologies, Inc., and Spectrum Medical Technologies, Inc. <br /> * Date: Sept. 30, 1999 (Rehearing denied Oct. 27, 1999)<br /> <br /> ==Holding==<br /> <br /> # Patent was not anticipated by instruction manual for laser used to remove tattoos (instruction manual for Spectrum RD-1200 laser)<br /> # Patent was anticipated by prior art article (&quot;Melanosomes Are a Primary Target of Q-Switched Ruby Laser Irradiation in Guinea Pig Skin&quot; by Dr. Luigi Polla et al, published in the 1987 Journal of Investigative Dermatology)<br /> <br /> ==Summary==<br /> <br /> To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently. <br /> <br /> Inherency: if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the limitations claimed in a patent, it anticipates <br /> <br /> Dr. Sandy Milgraum infringed U.S. patent No. 5,059,192<br /> Two sources<br /> article documenting study of tissue damage induced by laser pulses on epilated backs of guinea pigs<br /> natural result would result in alignment of laser over hair follicle</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Printed_Publication_(HW_3-23)_(RCTA)&diff=4187 2011-03-22T19:19:44Z

<p>Rabot: /* Holding */</p> <hr /> <div>Assignment: Use the West KeyCite system to find another case dealing with a different type of &quot;Printed Publication&quot; such as advertisements, computer manuals, etc. Try to find one that is different and interesting, i.e., not the first one that comes up on the list.<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; I think you don't want to use the &quot;k. Requisites of Publication&quot; necessarily, but probably the one right above it. Create a wiki page with a one-paragraph description of the facts of the case and the holding. Be sure to include which court it was. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> ==MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum==<br /> <br /> * United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> * Plaintiffs-Appellants: MEHL/Biophile International Corp., Selvac Acquisitions Corp. and Nardo Zaias, M.D.<br /> * Defendants-Appellees: Sandy Milgraum, M.D., Palomar Medical Technologies, Inc., and Spectrum Medical Technologies, Inc. <br /> * Date: Sept. 30, 1999 (Rehearing denied Oct. 27, 1999)<br /> <br /> ==Holding==<br /> <br /> # Patent was not anticipated by instruction manual for laser used to remove tattoos (instruction manual for Spectrum RD-1200 laser)<br /> # Patent was anticipated by prior art article (&quot;Melanosomes Are a Primary Target of Q-Switched Ruby Laser Irradiation in Guinea Pig Skin&quot;)<br /> <br /> ==Summary==<br /> <br /> To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently. <br /> <br /> Inherency: if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the limitations claimed in a patent, it anticipates <br /> <br /> Dr. Sandy Milgraum infringed U.S. patent No. 5,059,192<br /> Two sources<br /> article documenting study of tissue damage induced by laser pulses on epilated backs of guinea pigs<br /> natural result would result in alignment of laser over hair follicle</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Printed_Publication_(HW_3-23)_(RCTA)&diff=4186 2011-03-22T19:19:20Z

<p>Rabot: /* Summary */</p> <hr /> <div>Assignment: Use the West KeyCite system to find another case dealing with a different type of &quot;Printed Publication&quot; such as advertisements, computer manuals, etc. Try to find one that is different and interesting, i.e., not the first one that comes up on the list.<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; I think you don't want to use the &quot;k. Requisites of Publication&quot; necessarily, but probably the one right above it. Create a wiki page with a one-paragraph description of the facts of the case and the holding. Be sure to include which court it was. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> ==MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum==<br /> <br /> * United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> * Plaintiffs-Appellants: MEHL/Biophile International Corp., Selvac Acquisitions Corp. and Nardo Zaias, M.D.<br /> * Defendants-Appellees: Sandy Milgraum, M.D., Palomar Medical Technologies, Inc., and Spectrum Medical Technologies, Inc. <br /> * Date: Sept. 30, 1999 (Rehearing denied Oct. 27, 1999)<br /> <br /> ==Holding==<br /> <br /> # Patent was not anticipated by instruction manual for laser used to remove tattoos (manual for RD-1200 Q-switched laser)<br /> # Patent was anticipated by prior art article (&quot;Melanosomes Are a Primary Target of Q-Switched Ruby Laser Irradiation in Guinea Pig Skin&quot;)<br /> <br /> ==Summary==<br /> <br /> To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently. <br /> <br /> Inherency: if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the limitations claimed in a patent, it anticipates <br /> <br /> Dr. Sandy Milgraum infringed U.S. patent No. 5,059,192<br /> Two sources<br /> article documenting study of tissue damage induced by laser pulses on epilated backs of guinea pigs<br /> natural result would result in alignment of laser over hair follicle</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Printed_Publication_(HW_3-23)_(RCTA)&diff=4183 2011-03-22T19:16:17Z

<p>Rabot: /* Holding */</p> <hr /> <div>Assignment: Use the West KeyCite system to find another case dealing with a different type of &quot;Printed Publication&quot; such as advertisements, computer manuals, etc. Try to find one that is different and interesting, i.e., not the first one that comes up on the list.<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; I think you don't want to use the &quot;k. Requisites of Publication&quot; necessarily, but probably the one right above it. Create a wiki page with a one-paragraph description of the facts of the case and the holding. Be sure to include which court it was. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> ==MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum==<br /> <br /> * United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> * Plaintiffs-Appellants: MEHL/Biophile International Corp., Selvac Acquisitions Corp. and Nardo Zaias, M.D.<br /> * Defendants-Appellees: Sandy Milgraum, M.D., Palomar Medical Technologies, Inc., and Spectrum Medical Technologies, Inc. <br /> * Date: Sept. 30, 1999 (Rehearing denied Oct. 27, 1999)<br /> <br /> ==Holding==<br /> <br /> # Patent was not anticipated by instruction manual for laser used to remove tattoos (manual for RD-1200 Q-switched laser)<br /> # Patent was anticipated by prior art article (&quot;Melanosomes Are a Primary Target of Q-Switched Ruby Laser Irradiation in Guinea Pig Skin&quot;)<br /> <br /> ==Summary==</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Abbott_timeline_(RCTA)&diff=4170 2011-03-22T17:37:55Z

<p>Rabot: Created page with &quot;* 1989-1990: Byron sells anhydrous terazosin hydrochloride * 1991: Byron sells (Form IV) to Geneva * 1992: Byron sells (Form IV) to Warner Chilcott * 10/18/1993: Critical date * ...&quot;</p> <hr /> <div>* 1989-1990: Byron sells anhydrous terazosin hydrochloride<br /> * 1991: Byron sells (Form IV) to Geneva<br /> * 1992: Byron sells (Form IV) to Warner Chilcott<br /> * 10/18/1993: Critical date<br /> * 10/18/1994: Abbott filing date</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Rabot&diff=4169 2011-03-22T17:37:50Z

<p>Rabot: /* Links to Notes */</p> <hr /> <div>==Links to Assignments ==<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 4,424,275 (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 1)<br /> <br /> [[Patentability Case-Study: Tracing Hotchkiss, A.&amp;P., and Lyon (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 2)<br /> <br /> [[Two Faces: US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966) (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 3)<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[Historical Development of Nonobviousness (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Suggestion to Combine (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Objective Tests (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[The Inventive Step (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Relationship with Novelty (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Other Historical Considerations (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 3,643,513 (HW 2-25) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Printed Publication (HW 3-23) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> == Links to Notes ==<br /> <br /> [[ Brief of Amici Curiae AMA, ACMG, ASHG, APHMG, and Mayo Clinic in Support of Respondents (Oct. 2, 2009) ]]<br /> <br /> [[Abbott timeline (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Appellate Brief for Petitioner (January 1939) in The Electric Storage Battery Co., Petitioner, v. Genzo Shimadzu and Northeastern Engineering Corporation, Respondents (RCTA)]]</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Rabot&diff=4168 2011-03-22T17:34:39Z

<p>Rabot: /* Links to Notes */</p> <hr /> <div>==Links to Assignments ==<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 4,424,275 (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 1)<br /> <br /> [[Patentability Case-Study: Tracing Hotchkiss, A.&amp;P., and Lyon (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 2)<br /> <br /> [[Two Faces: US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966) (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 3)<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[Historical Development of Nonobviousness (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Suggestion to Combine (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Objective Tests (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[The Inventive Step (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Relationship with Novelty (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Other Historical Considerations (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 3,643,513 (HW 2-25) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Printed Publication (HW 3-23) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> == Links to Notes ==<br /> <br /> [[ Brief of Amici Curiae AMA, ACMG, ASHG, APHMG, and Mayo Clinic in Support of Respondents (Oct. 2, 2009) ]]<br /> <br /> [[Abbott timeline (RCTA)]]<br /> [[Abbott timeline]]<br /> [[Appellate Brief for Petitioner (January 1939) in The Electric Storage Battery Co., Petitioner, v. Genzo Shimadzu and Northeastern Engineering Corporation, Respondents (RCTA)]]</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Rabot&diff=4167 2011-03-22T17:34:23Z

<p>Rabot: /* Links to Notes */</p> <hr /> <div>==Links to Assignments ==<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 4,424,275 (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 1)<br /> <br /> [[Patentability Case-Study: Tracing Hotchkiss, A.&amp;P., and Lyon (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 2)<br /> <br /> [[Two Faces: US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966) (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 3)<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[Historical Development of Nonobviousness (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Suggestion to Combine (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Objective Tests (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[The Inventive Step (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Relationship with Novelty (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Other Historical Considerations (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 3,643,513 (HW 2-25) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Printed Publication (HW 3-23) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> == Links to Notes ==<br /> <br /> [[ Brief of Amici Curiae AMA, ACMG, ASHG, APHMG, and Mayo Clinic in Support of Respondents (Oct. 2, 2009) ]]<br /> <br /> [[Abbott timeline (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Appellate Brief for Petitioner (January 1939) in The Electric Storage Battery Co., Petitioner, v. Genzo Shimadzu and Northeastern Engineering Corporation, Respondents (RCTA)]]</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Printed_Publication_(HW_3-23)_(RCTA)&diff=4166 2011-03-22T17:32:15Z

<p>Rabot: </p> <hr /> <div>Assignment: Use the West KeyCite system to find another case dealing with a different type of &quot;Printed Publication&quot; such as advertisements, computer manuals, etc. Try to find one that is different and interesting, i.e., not the first one that comes up on the list.<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; I think you don't want to use the &quot;k. Requisites of Publication&quot; necessarily, but probably the one right above it. Create a wiki page with a one-paragraph description of the facts of the case and the holding. Be sure to include which court it was. &lt;/p&gt;<br /> <br /> ==MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum==<br /> <br /> * United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit<br /> * Plaintiffs-Appellants: MEHL/Biophile International Corp., Selvac Acquisitions Corp. and Nardo Zaias, M.D.<br /> * Defendants-Appellees: Sandy Milgraum, M.D., Palomar Medical Technologies, Inc., and Spectrum Medical Technologies, Inc. <br /> * Date: Sept. 30, 1999 (Rehearing denied Oct. 27, 1999)<br /> <br /> ==Holding==<br /> <br /> # Patent was not anticipated by instruction manual for laser used to remove tattoos<br /> # Patent was anticipated by prior art article.<br /> <br /> ==Summary==</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Printed_Publication_(HW_3-23)_(RCTA)&diff=4165 2011-03-22T17:19:32Z

<p>Rabot: Created page with &quot;Assignment: Use the West KeyCite system to find another case dealing with a different type of &quot;Printed Publication&quot; such as advertisements, computer manuals, etc. Try to find one...&quot;</p> <hr /> <div>Assignment: Use the West KeyCite system to find another case dealing with a different type of &quot;Printed Publication&quot; such as advertisements, computer manuals, etc. Try to find one that is different and interesting, i.e., not the first one that comes up on the list.<br /> <br /> &lt;p&gt; I think you don't want to use the &quot;k. Requisites of Publication&quot; necessarily, but probably the one right above it. Create a wiki page with a one-paragraph description of the facts of the case and the holding. Be sure to include which court it was. &lt;/p&gt;</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Rabot&diff=4164 2011-03-22T17:18:41Z

<p>Rabot: /* Links to Assignments */</p> <hr /> <div>==Links to Assignments ==<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 4,424,275 (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 1)<br /> <br /> [[Patentability Case-Study: Tracing Hotchkiss, A.&amp;P., and Lyon (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 2)<br /> <br /> [[Two Faces: US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966) (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 3)<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[Historical Development of Nonobviousness (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Suggestion to Combine (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Objective Tests (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[The Inventive Step (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Relationship with Novelty (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Other Historical Considerations (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 3,643,513 (HW 2-25) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Printed Publication (HW 3-23) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> == Links to Notes ==<br /> <br /> [[ Brief of Amici Curiae AMA, ACMG, ASHG, APHMG, and Mayo Clinic in Support of Respondents (Oct. 2, 2009) ]]<br /> <br /> [[Abbott timeline]]<br /> <br /> [[Appellate Brief for Petitioner (January 1939) in The Electric Storage Battery Co., Petitioner, v. Genzo Shimadzu and Northeastern Engineering Corporation, Respondents (RCTA)]]</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Appellate_Brief_for_Petitioner_(January_1939)_in_The_Electric_Storage_Battery_Co.,_Petitioner,_v._Genzo_Shimadzu_and_Northeastern_Engineering_Corporation,_Respondents_(RCTA)&diff=4010 2011-03-04T17:22:04Z

<p>Rabot: /* Undisputed Facts */</p> <hr /> <div>== Questions Addressed ==<br /> <br /> # Whether Shimadzu can by oral evidence of earlier conception take the date of his inventions back of June 1921. <br /> # Whether the patents, if otherwise valid, are invalidated by Shimadzu's suppressing, concealing, and withholding his inventions <br /> # Whether the commercial use by the petitioner is a public use and a bar to patentability<br /> <br /> == Undisputed Facts ==<br /> <br /> # Petitioner began commercial production in June 1921<br /> # Shimadzu made no disclosure of his inventions to anyone in the U.S. prior to filing<br /> # Shimadzu has no foreign patent for 1,896,020<br /> # Upon evidence of oral testimony, drawings, and purported copies of alleged notebook entries, Courts below found date of invention as no later than August 1919. <br /> # Lower court: &quot;We are not concerned with the motives which prompted him, in taking out the '563 patent, to confine it to a single step [...] and to ''withhold the really essential steps of the invention for later patenting.'' It is sufficient to say that he had the right to do this if he chose.&quot;<br /> # Respondents themselves proved that petitioner's process and apparatus were not secret. <br /> # The inventions of petitioner's process and apparatus were made wholly independently of Shimadzu.<br /> <br /> == Timeline ==<br /> <br /> * 08/??/1919: Alleged ''foreign'' invention<br /> * 11/20/1920: Japanese patent 41,728 (alleged 1,584,149)<br /> * 11/27/1920: Japanese patent 42,563 (alleged 1,584,149)<br /> * 06/??/1921: Petitioner's public use in U.S.<br /> * 01/30/1922: Filed patent 1,584,149 <br /> * 07/14/1923: Japanese patent 42,563 (alleged 1,584,150) AND filed patent 1,584,150<br /> * 04/27/1926: Filed patent 1,896,020</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=Abbott_timeline&diff=4004 2011-03-04T16:58:58Z

<p>Rabot: Created page with &quot;* 1989-1990: Byron sells anhydrous terazosin hydrochloride * 1991: Byron sells (Form IV) to Geneva * 1992: Byron sells (Form IV) to Warner Chilcott * 10/18/1993: Critical date * ...&quot;</p> <hr /> <div>* 1989-1990: Byron sells anhydrous terazosin hydrochloride<br /> * 1991: Byron sells (Form IV) to Geneva<br /> * 1992: Byron sells (Form IV) to Warner Chilcott<br /> * 10/18/1993: Critical date<br /> * 10/18/1994: Abbott filing date</div>

Rabot https://controls.ame.nd.edu/mediawiki/index.php?title=User:Rabot&diff=4003 2011-03-04T16:55:03Z

<p>Rabot: /* Links to Notes */</p> <hr /> <div>==Links to Assignments ==<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 4,424,275 (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 1)<br /> <br /> [[Patentability Case-Study: Tracing Hotchkiss, A.&amp;P., and Lyon (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 2)<br /> <br /> [[Two Faces: US v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966) (RCTA)]]<br /> (Homework 3)<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[Historical Development of Nonobviousness (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Suggestion to Combine (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Objective Tests (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[The Inventive Step (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Relationship with Novelty (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> [[Other Historical Considerations (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> &lt;br /&gt;<br /> <br /> [[United States Patent 3,643,513 (HW 2-25) (RCTA)]]<br /> <br /> == Links to Notes ==<br /> <br /> [[ Brief of Amici Curiae AMA, ACMG, ASHG, APHMG, and Mayo Clinic in Support of Respondents (Oct. 2, 2009) ]]<br /> <br /> [[Abbott timeline]]<br /> <br /> [[Appellate Brief for Petitioner (January 1939) in The Electric Storage Battery Co., Petitioner, v. Genzo Shimadzu and Northeastern Engineering Corporation, Respondents (RCTA)]]</div>

Rabot