Difference between revisions of "Talk:Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)"

From Bill Goodwine's Wiki
Jump to navigationJump to search
(→‎Maura: new section)
Line 15: Line 15:
  
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 11 is affirmed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Nos. 37 and 43 is reversed, and the cases remanded to the District Court for disposition not inconsistent with this opinion.
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 11 is affirmed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Nos. 37 and 43 is reversed, and the cases remanded to the District Court for disposition not inconsistent with this opinion.
 +
 +
== Maura ==
 +
 +
In 1955, the Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, ruling that a combination is patentable when it produces an "old result in a cheaper and otherwise more advantageous way." Here, the Eighth Circuit held that, since there was no new result in the combination, the patent was invalid.
 +
 +
Since our last expression on patent validity, Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U. S. 147 (1950), the Congress has, for the first time, expressly added a third statutory dimension to the two requirements of novelty and utility that had been the sole statutory test since the Patent Act of 1793. This is the test of obviousness, i.e., whether
 +
"the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made."
 +
§ 103 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964 ed.).
 +
 +
In 1955, the Fifth Circuit had held the patent valid under its rule that, when a combination produces an "old result in a cheaper and otherwise more advantageous way," it is patentable. Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc. v. Graham, 219 F.2d 511, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 826. In 1964, the Eighth Circuit held, in the case at bar, that there was no new result in the patented combination, and that the patent was therefore not valid. 333 F.2d 529, reversing 216 F.Supp. 272. We granted certiorari, 379 U.S. 956. Although we have determined that neither Circuit applied the correct test, we conclude that the patent is invalid under § 103, and therefore we affirm the judgment of the Eighth Circuit.
 +
 +
"[U]nless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . . than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the inventor."
 +
 +
"§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter"
 +
"A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made. "
 +
 +
The major distinction is that Congress has emphasized "nonobviousness" as the operative test of the section, rather than the less definite "invention" language of Hotchkiss that Congress thought had led to "a large variety" of expressions in decisions and writings. In the title itself, the Congress used the phrase "Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter" (italics added), thus focusing upon "nonobviousness," rather than "invention." [Footnote 6] The Senate and House Reports, S.Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); H.R.Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reflect this emphasis in these terms:
 +
"Section 103, for the first time in our statute, provides a condition which exists in the law and has existed for more than 100 years, but only by reason of decisions of the courts. An invention which has been made, and which is new in the sense that the same thing has not been made before, may still not be patentable if the difference between the new thing and what was known before is not considered sufficiently great to warrant a patent. That has been expressed in a large variety of ways in decisions of
 +
Page 383 U. S. 15
 +
the courts and in writings. Section 103 states this requirement in the title. It refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented."
 +
 +
It is, of course, well settled that an invention is construed not only in the light of the claims, but also with reference to the file wrapper or prosecution history in the Patent Office. 52 U. S. 185-186 (1930); Schriber- Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co.,@ 311 U. S. 211, 311 U. S. 220-221 (1940).
 +
 +
"[A] change of material should not give title to a patent. As the making a ploughshare of cast, rather than of wrought, iron; a comb of iron, instead of horn or of ivory. . . ."
 +
Ibid.
 +
"[A] mere change of form should give no right to a patent, as a high-quartered shoe instead of a low one, a round hat instead of a three-square; or a square bucket instead of a round one."

Revision as of 00:24, 8 February 2010

Courtney

In No. 11, petitioners sued for infringement of a patent, consisting of a combination of old mechanical elements, for a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil to prevent damage to the plow. In 1955, the Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, ruling that a combination is patentable when it produces an "old result in a cheaper and otherwise more advantageous way." Here, the Eighth Circuit held that, since there was no new result in the combination, the patent was invalid.

The section is cast in relatively unambiguous terms. Patentability is to depend, in addition to novelty and utility, upon the "non-obvious" nature of the "subject matter sought to be patented" to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art.

The Prior Art

Five prior patents indicating the state of the art were cited by the Patent Office in the prosecution of the '798 application. Four of these patents, 10 other United States patents, and two prior-use spring-clamp arrangements not of record in the '798 file wrapper were relied upon by respondents as revealing the prior art. The District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the prior art "as a whole in one form or another contains all of the mechanical elements of the 798 Patent." One of the prior-use clamp devices not before the Patent Examiner -- Glencoe -- was found to have "all of the elements."

The substitution of a rib built into a collar likewise presents no patentable difference above the prior art. It was fully disclosed and dedicated to the public in the Livingstone patent. Cook Chemical argues, however, that Livingstone is not in the pertinent prior art, because it relates to liquid containers having pouring spouts, rather than pump sprayers. Apart from the fact that respondent made no such objection to similar references cited by the Examiner, [Footnote 18] so restricted a view of the applicable prior art is not justified. The problems confronting Scoggin and the insecticide industry were not insecticide problems, they were mechanical closure problems. Closure devices in such a closely related art as pouring spouts for liquid containers are, at the very least, pertinent references. See II Walker on Patents § 260 (Deller ed. 1937).

However, these factors do not, in the circumstances of this case, tip the scales of patentability. The Scoggin invention, as limited by the Patent Office and accepted by Scoggin, rests upon exceedingly small and quite nontechnical mechanical differences in a device which was old in the art. At the latest, those differences were rendered apparent in 1953 by the appearance of the Livingstone patent, and unsuccessful attempts to reach a solution to the problems confronting Scoggin made before that time became wholly irrelevant. It is also irrelevant that no one apparently chose to avail himself of knowledge stored in the Patent Office and readily available by the simple expedient of conducting a patent search -- a prudent and nowadays common preliminary to well organized research. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U. S. 485 (1900). To us, the limited claims of the Scoggin patent are clearly evident from the prior art as it stood at the time of the invention.

We conclude that the claims in issue in the Scoggin patent must fall as not meeting the test of § 103, since the differences between them and the pertinent prior art would have been obvious to a person reasonably skilled in that art.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 11 is affirmed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Nos. 37 and 43 is reversed, and the cases remanded to the District Court for disposition not inconsistent with this opinion.

Maura

In 1955, the Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, ruling that a combination is patentable when it produces an "old result in a cheaper and otherwise more advantageous way." Here, the Eighth Circuit held that, since there was no new result in the combination, the patent was invalid.

Since our last expression on patent validity, Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U. S. 147 (1950), the Congress has, for the first time, expressly added a third statutory dimension to the two requirements of novelty and utility that had been the sole statutory test since the Patent Act of 1793. This is the test of obviousness, i.e., whether

"the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made." § 103 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964 ed.).

In 1955, the Fifth Circuit had held the patent valid under its rule that, when a combination produces an "old result in a cheaper and otherwise more advantageous way," it is patentable. Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc. v. Graham, 219 F.2d 511, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 826. In 1964, the Eighth Circuit held, in the case at bar, that there was no new result in the patented combination, and that the patent was therefore not valid. 333 F.2d 529, reversing 216 F.Supp. 272. We granted certiorari, 379 U.S. 956. Although we have determined that neither Circuit applied the correct test, we conclude that the patent is invalid under § 103, and therefore we affirm the judgment of the Eighth Circuit.

"[U]nless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . . than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the inventor."

"§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter" "A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made. "

The major distinction is that Congress has emphasized "nonobviousness" as the operative test of the section, rather than the less definite "invention" language of Hotchkiss that Congress thought had led to "a large variety" of expressions in decisions and writings. In the title itself, the Congress used the phrase "Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter" (italics added), thus focusing upon "nonobviousness," rather than "invention." [Footnote 6] The Senate and House Reports, S.Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); H.R.Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reflect this emphasis in these terms: "Section 103, for the first time in our statute, provides a condition which exists in the law and has existed for more than 100 years, but only by reason of decisions of the courts. An invention which has been made, and which is new in the sense that the same thing has not been made before, may still not be patentable if the difference between the new thing and what was known before is not considered sufficiently great to warrant a patent. That has been expressed in a large variety of ways in decisions of Page 383 U. S. 15 the courts and in writings. Section 103 states this requirement in the title. It refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented."

It is, of course, well settled that an invention is construed not only in the light of the claims, but also with reference to the file wrapper or prosecution history in the Patent Office. 52 U. S. 185-186 (1930); Schriber- Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co.,@ 311 U. S. 211, 311 U. S. 220-221 (1940).

"[A] change of material should not give title to a patent. As the making a ploughshare of cast, rather than of wrought, iron; a comb of iron, instead of horn or of ivory. . . ." Ibid. "[A] mere change of form should give no right to a patent, as a high-quartered shoe instead of a low one, a round hat instead of a three-square; or a square bucket instead of a round one."