Talk:In Re Bilski, Mayer dissenting opinion

From Bill Goodwine's Wiki
Revision as of 13:48, 18 March 2010 by Maura (talk | contribs) (Created page with ' == Maura == The patent system is intended to protect and promote advances in science and technology, not ideas about how to structure commercial transactions. Claim 1 of the ap…')
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigationJump to search

Maura

The patent system is intended to protect and promote advances in science and technology, not ideas about how to structure commercial transactions. Claim 1 of the application of Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw (“Bilski”) is not eligible for patent protection because it is directed to a method of conducting business. Affording patent protection to business methods lacks constitutional and statutory support, serves to hinder rather than promote innovation and usurps that which rightfully belongs in the public domain. State Street and AT & T should be overruled.

When drafting the Constitution, the framers were well aware of the abuses that led to the English Statute of Monopolies and therefore “consciously acted to bar Congress from granting letters patent in particular types of business.”

By 1952, when Congress enacted the current Patent Act, it was widely acknowledged that methods of doing business were ineligible for patent protection. See, e.g., Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 552 (1st Cir.1949) (“[A] system for the transaction of business ... however novel, useful, or commercially successful is not patentable apart from the means for making the system practically useful, or carrying it out.”); In re Patton, 29 C.C.P.A. 982, 127 F.2d 324 (1942) (noting that “a system of transacting business, apart from the means for carrying out such system” is not patentable); Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir.1908) (“A system of transacting business disconnected from the means for carrying out the system is not, within the most liberal interpretation of the term, an art.”); In re Moeser, 27 App. D.C. 307, 310 (1906) (holding that a system for burial insurance contracts was not patentable because “contracts or proposals for contracts, devised or adopted as a method of transacting a particular class of ... business, [are] not patentable as an art”); see also 145 Cong. Rec. H6,947 (Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Manzullo) (“Before the State Street Bank and Trust case ... it was universally thought that methods of doing or conducting business were not patentable items.”).

State Street's decision to jettison the prohibition against patenting methods of doing business contravenes congressional intent. Because (1) “the framers consciously acted to bar Congress from granting letters patent in particular types of business,” Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1375, and (2) Congress evidenced no intent to modify the long-established rule against business method patents when it enacted the 1952 Patent Act, it is hard to fathom how the issuance of patents on business methods can be supported.

To the contrary, the language supports the opposite view: a person may have “invented” anything under the sun, but it is “not necessarily patentable” unless the statutory requirements for patentability have been satisfied. Thus, the legislative history oft-cited to support business method patents undercuts, rather than supports, the notion that Congress intended to extend the scope of section 101 to encompass such methods.

Business method patents do not promote the “useful arts” because they are not directed to any technological or scientific innovation. Although business method applications may use technology-such as computers-to accomplish desired results, the innovative aspect of the claimed method is an entrepreneurial rather than a technological one. Thus, although Bilski's claimed hedging method could theoretically be implemented on a computer, that alone does not render it patentable.

Methods of doing business do not apply “the law of nature to a new and useful end.” Because the innovative aspect of such methods is an entrepreneurial rather than a technological one, they should be deemed ineligible for patent protection.

There are a host of difficulties associated with allowing patents to issue on methods of conducting business. Not only do such patents tend to impede rather than promote innovation, they are frequently of poor quality. Most fundamentally, they raise significant First Amendment concerns by imposing broad restrictions on speech and the free flow of ideas.

Business method patents, unlike those granted for pharmaceuticals and other products, offer rewards that are grossly disproportionate to the costs of innovation. In contrast to technological endeavors, business innovations frequently involve little or no investment in research and development. Bilski, for example, likely spent only nominal sums to develop his hedging method. The reward he could reap if his application were allowed- exclusive rights over methods of managing risks in a wide array of commodity transactions-vastly exceeds any costs he might have incurred in devising his “invention.”

Instead of providing incentives to competitors to develop improved business techniques, business method patents remove building blocks of commercial innovation from the public domain. Dreyfuss, supra at 275-77. Because they restrict competitors from using and improving upon patented business methods, such patents stifle innovation.

One reason for the poor quality of business method patents is the lack of readily accessible prior art references. Because business methods were not patentable prior to State Street, “there is very little patent-related prior art readily at hand to the examiner corps.” Dreyfuss, supra at 269.

Like many business method applications, Bilski's application is very broadly drafted. It covers a wide range of means for “hedging” in commodity transactions. If his application were allowed, anyone who discussed ways to balance market risks in any sort of commodity could face potential infringement liability. By adopting overly expansive standards for patentability, the government enables private parties to impose broad and unwarranted burdens on speech and the free flow of ideas.

Indeed, although this court has struggled for years to set out what constitutes sufficient physical transformation to render a process patentable, we have yet to provide a consistent or satisfactory resolution of this issue.

The majority, however, fails to enlighten three of the thorniest issues in the patentability thicket: (1) the continued viability of business method patents, (2) what constitutes sufficient physical transformation or machine-implementation to render a process patentable, and (3) the extent to which computer software and computer-implemented processes constitute statutory subject matter.