Talk:In Re Bilski, Newman dissenting opinion

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The court achieves this result by redefining the word “process” in the patent statute, to exclude all processes that do not transform physical matter or that are not performed by machines. The court thus excludes many of the kinds of inventions that apply today's electronic and photonic technologies, as well as other processes that handle data and information in novel ways. Such processes have long been patent eligible, and contribute to the vigor and variety of today's Information Age. This exclusion of process inventions is contrary to statute, contrary to precedent, and a negation of the constitutional mandate. Its impact on the future, as well as on the thousands of patents already granted, is unknown.

This exclusion is imposed at the threshold, before it is determined whether the excluded process is new, non- obvious, enabled, described, particularly claimed, etc.; that is, before the new process is examined for patentability. For example, we do not know whether the Bilski process would be found patentable under the statutory criteria, for they were never applied.

This court's redefinition of “process” as limiting access to the patent system to those processes that use specific machinery or that transform matter, is contrary to two centuries of statutory definition.

Instead, the Court made clear that it was not barring patents on computer programs, and rejected the “argu[ment] that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing’ ” in order to satisfy Section 101. Id. Although my colleagues now describe these statements as “equivocal,” maj. op. at 956, there is nothing equivocal about “We do not so hold.” Benson, 409 U.S. at 71, 93 S.Ct. 253. Nonetheless, this court now so holds.

A rule that unanticipated inventions are without protection would conflict with the core concept of the patent law that anticipation undermines patentability. Mr. Justice Douglas reminded that the *981 inventions most benefiting mankind are those that push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like. Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely because such inventions are often unforeseeable.

However, the Court did not propose the “machine-or-transformation” test that this court now insists was “enunciated” in Diehr as a specific limit to Section 101. Maj. op. at 953-54. In Diehr there was no issue of machine or transformation, for the Diehr process both employed a machine and produced a chemical transformation: the process was conducted in “an openable rubber molding press,” and it cured the rubber. In discussing the known mathematical formula used by Diehr to calculate the relation between temperature and the rate of a chemical reaction, the Court recited the traditional exceptions of “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas,” 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. 1048, and explained that the entirety of the process *982 must be considered, not an individual mathematical step.

Although the Court in Benson and in Flook took care to state that these early decisions do not require the restrictions that the Court was rejecting, this court now places heavy reliance on these early decisions, which this court describes as “consistent with the machine-or-transformation test later articulated in Benson and reaffirmed in Diehr.” Maj. op. at 955. As I have discussed, no such test was “articulated in Benson ” and “reaffirmed in Diehr.”

However, these early cases do show, contrary to the majority opinion, that a “process” has always been a distinct category of patentable invention, and not tied to either apparatus or transformation, as this court now holds. For example, in Tilghman v. Proctor the Court considered a patent on a process for separating fats and oils, and held that the process was not restricted to any particular apparatus.

However, the claims that were directed to the communication system that was described by Morse were held patentable, although no machine, transformation, or manufacture was required. See Morse's Claim 5 (“The system of signs, consisting of dots and spaces, and horizontal lines, for numerals, letters, words, or sentences, substantially as herein set forth and illustrated, for telegraphic purposes.”). I cannot discern how the Court's rejection of Morse's Claim 8 on what would now be Section 112 grounds, or the allowance of his other claims, supports this court's ruling today. Indeed, Morse's claim 5, to a system of signs, is no more “tangible” than the systems held patentable in Alappat and State Street Bank, discussed post and now cast into doubt, or the Bilski system here held ineligible for access to patenting.

This court now rejects its own CCPA and Federal Circuit precedent The majority opinion holds that there is a Supreme Court restriction on process patents, “enunciated” in Benson, Flook, and Diehr; and that this restriction was improperly ignored by the Federal Circuit and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, leading us into error which we must now correct. Thus this court announces that our prior decisions may no longer be relied upon.

In In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed.Cir.1994) ( en banc ) the question was the eligibility for patent of a rasterizer that mathematically transforms data to eliminate aliasing in a digital oscilloscope. The court held that a computer-implemented system that produces a “useful, concrete, and tangible result” is Section 101 subject matter. Id. at 1544. This court now rules that “a ‘useful, concrete and tangible result’ analysis should no longer be relied on.” Maj. op. at 960 n. 19.

A close analysis of Diehr, Flook, and Benson reveals that the Supreme Court never intended to create an overly broad, fourth category of [mathematical] subject matter excluded from § 101. Rather, at the core of the Court's analysis in each of these cases lies an attempt by the Court to explain a rather straightforward concept, namely, that certain types of mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical application, and thus that subject matter is not, in and of itself, entitled to patent protection.

The PTO reports that in Class 705, the examination classification associated with “business methods” and most likely to receive inventions that may not use machinery or transform physical matter, there were almost 10,000 patent applications filed in FY 2006 alone, and over 40,000 applications filed since FY 98 when State Street Bank was decided.

See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921) (“[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.”).

Instead, the court states the “true issue before us” is “whether Applicants are seeking to claim a fundamental principle (such as an abstract idea) or mental process,” maj. op. at 952, and answers “yes.” With respect, that is the wrong question, and the wrong answer. Bilski's patent application describes his process of analyzing the effects of supply and demand on commodity prices and the use of a coupled transaction strategy to hedge against these risks; this is not a fundamental principle or an abstract idea; it is not a mental process or a law of nature. It is a “process,” set out in successive steps, for obtaining and analyzing information and carrying out a series of commercial transactions for the purpose of “managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity *996 sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price.”

Patents provide an incentive to invest in and work in new directions. In United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 332, 68 S.Ct. 550, 92 L.Ed. 701 (1948), Justice Burton, joined by Chief Justice *998 Vinson and Justice Frankfurter, remarked that “the frontiers of science have expanded until civilization now depends largely upon discoveries on those frontiers to meet the infinite needs of the future. The United States, thus far, has taken a leading part in making those discoveries and in putting them to use.” This remains true today. It is antithetical to this incentive to restrict eligibility for patenting to what has been done in the past, and to foreclose what might be done in the future.