Talk:Laboratory Corporation of America vs. Metabolite Laboratories, 548 U.S. 124 (2005): (full text)

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Courtney and Maura

I A The relevant principle of law “[e]xclude[s] from ... patent protection ... laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981). This principle finds its roots in both English and American law. See, e.g., Neilson v. Harford, Webster's Patent Cases 295, 371 (1841); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175, 14 L.Ed. 367 (1853); O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 14 L.Ed. 601 (1854); The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 8 S.Ct. 778, 31 L.Ed. 863 (1888). The principle means that Einstein could not have “patent[ed] his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 65 L.Ed.2d 144 (1980). Neither can one patent “a novel and useful mathematical formula,” Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978), the motive power of electromagnetism or steam, Morse, supra, at 116, “the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals,” Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 68 S.Ct. 440, 92 L.Ed. 588 (1948).

The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that “laws of nature” are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are not useful. To the contrary, research into such matters may be costly and time consuming; monetary incentives may matter; and the fruits of those incentives and that research may prove of great benefit to the human race. Rather, the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” the constitutional *127 objective of patent and copyright protection. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only encourage research by providing monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.

Patent law seeks to avoid the dangers of overprotection just as surely as it seeks to avoid the diminished incentive to invent that underprotection can threaten. One way in which patent law seeks to sail between these opposing and risky shoals is through rules that bring certain types of invention and discovery within the scope of patentability while excluding others. And scholars have noted that “patent law['s] exclu[sion of] fundamental scientific (including mathematical) and technological principles” (like copyright's exclusion of “ideas”) is a rule of the latter variety. W. **2923 Landes & R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 305 (2003). That rule reflects “both ... the enormous potential for rent seeking that would be created if property rights could be obtained in [those basic principles] and ... the enormous transaction costs that would be imposed on would-be users.” Id., at 305-306; cf. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (C.A.2 1930) (L.Hand, J.).