Warner-Jenkinson Company v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. (901422128)
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Reading Notes
- Decided by the USSC in 1997
- Hilton sued Warner for infringement of a 1985 patent for purifying dyes
- Patent specifies filtration through a porous membrane at pH of 5-9
- This was specified because examiner found an overlap with an old patent which was above pH 9
- Patent specifies filtration through a porous membrane at pH of 5-9
- Hilton sued based on doctrine of equivalents
- District court ruled in Hilton's favor
- Court rejects Warner's argument that the doctrine is inconsistent with the Act of 1952
- USSC disagrees
- Court in concerned that the broad application conflicts with holdings that a patent may not be enlarged beyond the scope of its claims
- To avoid this, apply doctrine individually to each element and not the product/process as a whole
- Warner is wrong to suggest that surrender of subject matter during the patent prosecution establishes a bright line beyond which no equivalents may be claimed
- Must determine the reason behind the language change
- In this case it is known why the upper limit was added but not the lower
- Must determine the reason behind the language change
- USSC reverses and remands
- Federal Circuit did not consider all requirements of the doctrine
- USSC does not speak the death of the doctrine but does seek to clarify it
- Parties disagree about why the low limit (pH 6) was added
- Jury ruled infringement under the doctrine but awarded only 20% of the damages for lack of intent
- CAFC affirmed
- Warner argues doctrine is inconsistent with aspects of the Act of 1952
- Section 112 - specific claims
- Section 251-252 - reissue process
- None of these hold enough water
- USSC is concerned the doctrine has become unbounded by patent claims
- Must be applied to individual elements and not the invention as a whole
- Warner also offered alternative arguments for a more restricted doctrine of equivalents
- Graver Tank never meant to supersede a well-established limit on non-literal infringement
- Any surrender, during prosecution, for whatever reason, precludes recapturing subject matter
- Only if it is to avoid unpatentability does it do this
- Since the reason for the lower limit is unknown, it does not preclude the application of doctrine of equivalents
- USSC thinks the burden should be placed on the patent holder to establish the reason for an amendment during prosecution
- If none is given it should be assumed that it was related to patentability
- USSC thinks the burden should be placed on the patent holder to establish the reason for an amendment during prosecution
- Doctrine does not require proof of intent
- Warner's final argument is that the doctrine should be limited to equivalents disclosed within the patent
- Also should be limited to those known at the time of the patent
- USSC rejects both of these ideas
- USSC agrees with the Federal Circuit that juries should apply the doctrine but they do not decide it here
Infringement
- Considerations for applying doctrine
- Patent's context
- Prior art
- Purpose for which an ingredient is used, etc.
- Whether a person reasonable skilled in the art would know the interchangeability of an ingredient
- Intent plays no role in the doctrine's application
- Proper time for evaluating knowledge of interchangeability is at the time of infringement, not the patent
- 1952 Patent Act is not materially different from the 1870 Act with regard to claiming, reissue, and the role of the PTO
- Section 112 allows "means" claims
- Prosecuting history estoppel places limits on the doctrine and insulates it from conflict with the Patent Act
- Triple identity test
- Function served by an element, the way it serves that function, and the result thus obtained
- Good for mechanical but not other products and processes
- Insubstantial differences test
- Offers little guidance to what is insubstantial
Concurring judges
- Have to be careful that this new presumption does not unfairly discount the expectations of a patentee who had no notice of such a presumption at the time of patent prosecution